K. NARAIN

A Critique of Mādhva Refutation of the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta

The Śaṁkara School of Vedānta, as is well known, is a philosophical system that lays the foundations of Absolute Idealistic Monism. It is a system that comprehends Ultimate Reality as Indeterminate, partless and one and consequently believes that all differences and the variegated objects of experience, being phenomenal, are like illusion from the ultimate standpoint. The Reality is only Brahman and that Brahman is Atman; the individual soul when it realises this truth shakes off its ignorance, the cause of bondage, and becomes free. The real instrument of emancipation is knowledge though Bhakti has its own importance as a means to the attainment of knowledge.

This philosophy aroused virulent criticism from various quarters, especially among those who belonged to Vaiṣṇavite tradition and the chief among them are Mādhva and his illustrious followers. The works of Mādhvācārya and his followers abound in the criticism of the philosophical standpoints of the Śaṁkara school inasmuch as it was only by disproving the principles of the Śaṁkara Vedānta that they could lay the solid foundations of their theistic realistic pluralism. The Mādhva criticism was again discussed threadbare and denounced by the eminent philosophers of the Śaṁkara School such as Citsukha, Nṛsinghāśrama, Madhusūdana Saraswati and others.

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

It is a matter of great pleasure to me to place the second edition of this book before the public. While sending this book first to the press I had hoped that the treatment of the controversy between the Mādhva and Śaṁkarite philosophies would help the readers to correctly assess the positions of the Advaita and the Dvaita systems on the various philosophical problems and I am gratified that my hopes have not been belied. There has been a persistent demand for this book and I am rather apologetic for having not arranged for its second edition earlier.

The first publication of this book aroused some curious comments in some quarters. One of the authorities on this subject has remarked "One wonders what could have lead to Dr. Narain in executing such a somersault within a span of two years". "This is probably due to a misunderstanding. My revered teacher Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Umesha Mishra told me once that the best way of presenting a system is to consider oneself as the follower of that School. Acting according to this precept, I always try to identify myself with the system of philosophy whose exposition I undertake. But this does not mean that they are my own views. In both of my books, the arguments advanced are those as available in the works of the great masters of those schools, and not my own philosophical views. Should destiny so permit, I shall place before the intellectual community my own philosophical convictions sometime in future.

My thanks are due to all the readers who have encouraged me in sending this book again to the press and also to Prof. S.S. Roy of the University of Allahabad for his high appreciation of this work.

I am thankful to Mr. Devendra Jain of Messrs Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, for having agreed to re-publish this work.

K. Narain

Lucas Estate
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27th May, 1986

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Time and again Śaṁkara's philosophical position has been criticized, not only by the Western critics but also by many eminent philosophers of India who happen to be the propounders of different systems of philosophy and faith. No doubt, their criticism is the foundation on which they have raised the edifice of their philosophical theory, yet from the point of view of Śaṁkarite philosophy it has proved beneficial inasmuch as it has provided with a stimulus the response against which is available in the whole of the Śaṁkarite literature. In the history of this criticism, the Mādhva refutation is probably the most vehement and provoking because of the uncompromising dualism of Madhva's philosophical position. The virulence of their attack, specially of Jaya-Tīrtha and Vyāsa-Tīrtha, is such as has compelled the Śaṁkarites to re-examine their philosophical foundations and write treatises in defence the most important of which is Madhusūdana's *Advaita-siddhi*.

A study of this refutation is important as it presents to utmost logical subtlety all the deeper aspects of the varied philosophical presuppositions whose comprehension is necessary for a firm decision about the validity of either of the two antagonistic philosophical points of view, the monistic and the pluralistic. It is important also because it can by guiding the reader through the wilderness of Dialectics bring him to a state of decision about the truth of either Idealism or Realism.

In my exposition of this refutation I have endeavoured to present the Śaṁkarite position in detail and have elaborated the various Post-Śaṁkarite opinions that have been taken by the Mādhva philosophers as the *pūrva-pakṣa*. This not only facilitates the clear presentation of the theme but also renders the comprehension of the discourse more easy. In doing this I have tried to depend always on original sources.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The history of Mādhva refutation and the Śaṁkarite defence is spread over several centuries and the available matter, in Saṁskṛta literature, is so vast that it can be covered up only within several volumes of this kind. I have, therefore, limited myself to the history that ends with the author of *Laghucandrikā*. No doubt, there are illustrious commentaries and treatises after it as well, yet to me they appear to be explaining the old arguments. It has also not been possible for me to refer to almost all the modern interpreters of either Madhva's or Śaṁkara's philosophy because it is not necessary for the exposition of the subject.

I am obliged to the publishers for having permitted a change in the title of the book during the course of its printing.

Allahabad **K. N.**
March 10, 1964

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Of all the rivals of the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta, Madhva's system is, probably, the most powerful. Though others, e.g., Rāmānuja, attempted a systematic criticism of Śaṁkara's idealistic metaphysics, yet because of their own philosophical positions they could not enter into the arena with such vigour and strength as the Madhvites could do. The uncompromising realism of Madhva's philosophical approach and the perfect dualism of his ultimate metaphysical constructions have made him the most formidable opponent of Śaṁkara's idealism.

Śaṁkara, as we know, conceived of the Ultimate Reality—Brahman or Ātman—as one Indeterminate Whole whose nature, as described in the Upaniṣads, is Consciousness, Existence and Bliss. It is a unity whose comprehension in terms of the logical moulds of human intellect and the relative existence of phenomena is impossible. The trenchant opposition to which thought is ultimately reduced and its utter helplessness in crossing the borders of its own limitations makes a mockery of the rationalist's dream that Reality as a whole may be manifested to the limited light of Reason. It is one of the truths about Reason or Intellect that it cannot go beyond distinction, it cannot shed its light on anything that does not embrace the category of difference. In other words, it is an important limitation of Thought that it is relative, it consists of parts, it is attributive and cannot contradict the contradiction. The life of Thought consists in these and to go beyond them would be its death.

Then, can Thought, Reason or Intellect ever apprehend the true unity of Brahman ? How can the Real which is beyond all contradictions be comprehended by a principle that carries contradiction in its bosom ? Śaṁkara is, therefore, assertive about the truth of the proposition that the real nature of Brahman is unknowable through intellect, is ineffable, is relationless, partless and attributeless and is without a second. Consciousness, which is an aspect of Brahman, is also non-relative, partless and attributeless. But such a formulation of the Ultimate Reality as transgressing our highest conception to which thought is reducible would be falling in the lap of the most formidable form of agnosticism. Śaṁkara, however, escapes this dreadful situation by contending that the Ultimate Reality or Brahman can be realized through a Supra-rational Experience (*Aparokṣānubhūti*) or the True Wisdom which brings to man his self-realization.

In the context of such a vision of the Ultimate Truth what would be the nature of the individual self that acts and enjoys its fruit, that suffers under the harrow of the mortal conditions of its earthly bondage ? In whatever higher altitudes, in the different graded stages of divinity, the soul may have its station in its exasperating journey towards the Supreme End the fetters of bondage would continue to exist. Śaṁkara, in his search after the cause of this deep-rooted spiritual malady, finds in the wisdom of the Upaniṣads the real cause and remedy to this ailment. As interpreted by him, the main purport of the Upaniṣads consists in communicating the eternal truth that difference or *bheda* is the real cause of bondage and the negation of this difference is deliverance. Truth is always the Good and the departure from Truth is the Evil. Truth or Brahman, whose nature is described above, is non-dual, the *advaita*; therefore, the *dvaita* or the understanding of difference is the cause of human bondage. Thus, for Śaṁkara, the only means of breaking the fetters of bondage is the realization that the jīvātman is Brahman and his appearance as an agent in association with the gross and subtle bodies is mere ignorance.

But, why should there be this ignorance ? Why should the jīvātman which is Brahman, according to Śaṁkara, acquire such a wrong attitude and understanding about its real nature ? Is there any other principle that is responsible for the jīva's fall from its divinity and its appearance in this world ? According to Śaṁkara, *avidyā* or *māyā* is the cause of its denigration. But, it would be a misunderstanding of the gravest type to think that the *avidyā* or *māyā* is different from Brahman for this would then be suicidal to the very conception of the *advaita*. On the other hand, it would be fallacious to equate it with Brahman; to consider *māyā* or *avidyā* as identical with Brahman would be to take its absolute reality for granted and, thereby, negating all possibilities of its removal. This *māyā* or *avidyā* is, therefore, *anirvacanīya* or different from both real (*sat*) and unreal (*asat*). It is different from 'real' because it, along with its effects, is removed; it is different from 'unreal' because its effects are the objects of experience.

In reality, there is only Brahman without a second and the world-phenomenon with its manifold objects and individual souls is an illusory imposition caused by *māyā* or *ajñāna*. This *māyā* is responsible for the manifold appearance of both the subjective and the objective phenomena. The description of Brahman as the Omniscient and Omnipotent Being who is said to create, sustain and destroy the world is only with reference to Īśvara who, when associated with that aspect of *māyā* known as *vikṣepaśakti*, projects the entire world. Creation for Śaṁkara, as for Gauḍapāda, has no truth because the concept of causality is itself phenomenal having no absolute or transcendental value. On the other hand, Brahman when associated with that aspect of *ajñāna* that has the predominance of the veiling power (*āvaraṇa-śakti*) appears as jīvātman. In its phenomenal appearance as the jīvātman it forgets its unity with Brahman and its essential nature as truth, knowledge and bliss and considers itself as the transmigratory creature.

It is due to ignorance that the jīva is in bondage and so Śaṁkara repeatedly asserts that liberation is possible only through knowledge, i. e., by comprehending that the real nature of jīva is not its physical or psychic appearance but its nature as *saccidānanda*. In fact, the jīva is always infinite and immortal; its idea about itself as finite and mortal is the cause of bondage. Because the individual self is Brahman, there is, in truth, neither any bondage nor release. Immortality, according to Śaṁkara, is not to be obtained but only to be realized. The solution of the problem of emancipation or *mokṣa* lies in realization and not in acquisition, a realization in which the soul shakes off all false notions about its individuality and difference from Brahman.

Madhva, on the other hand, propounds a doctrine that does not accept the foundational concepts of Advaita philosophy as the logical formulations of the ultimate structure of Reality; they do not even confirm to the real intentions of the Upaniṣadic texts. As against the Advaitic approach, Madhva is firm in his conviction that Reality is not without difference; the category of 'difference' is just another aspect of Reality. His system of philosophy is, therefore, a powerful defence of difference, which, according to him, is of five kinds, viz., that between God and soul, between God and matter, between matter and soul and between one soul and another soul and between one matter and another matter; all these differences are absolutely real. Madhva's system, being essentially dualistic in character and realistic in approach, formulates the absolute reality of the manifold existents and their relations in this world and firmly asserts that they are not phenomenal or illusory projections of the Ultimate Reality. For Madhva, every fact that comes under the purview of experience is always real; it is, however, another matter that the duration of its existence may make it either 'eternal' or 'non-eternal'.

In Madhva's philosophy we have two types of substances, viz., Independent and Dependent. God is the only Independent Substance, whereas, all other things including the individual souls depend on Him for their existence. The idea of independence here is not a substitute for eternality because there are substances that are dependent and yet eternal, e. g., *Prakṛti*.

The world is a creation of God who creates it out of the Primordial Matter or *Prakṛti*. Brahman is only the instrumental-cause of creation, whereas, *Prakrti* is its material-cause. It is not only for its creation that the world depends on Īśvara but also for its sustenance, destruction and control; the knowledge, ignorance, bondage and release of the jīvas are also controlled by Him. The jīvātman, according to Madhva, is not Brahman but a part of Brahman and his nature as consciousness and bliss is similar to that of the Lord. The ignorance of the jīva about its real nature and the nature of *Paramātman* who is full of infinite and virtuous qualities is responsible for its bondage. As such the right knowledge about the nature of God is instrumental in man's deliverance. But here knowledge is not the ultimate means of attaining *mokṣa*. Bondage being real cannot be destroyed merely through knowledge; it is possible to do so only when *Paramātman* so wishes and it is His Benediction that is the ultimate instrument in man's emancipation. Knowledge has its utility only in invoking the blessings of Īśvara. But without *bhakti* and complete surrender the acquisition of true knowledge is impossible because in Madhva's system true knowledge can be acquired only when the Lord reveals Himself to His devotee. Thus the real means of liberation is to surrender oneself completely to God and acquire knowledge about Him so that He may, by showering His blessings, liberate the devotee from the sorrows and sufferings of this earth.

This exposition of the philosophy of Madhva will indicate that on almost every problem of philosophical interest his solution is antagonistic to that of Śaṁkara and his followers. When the Advaitins proclaim that Reality, from the transcendental point of view, is *advaita* the Madhvites emphasize that it is always dualistic. The criterion of reality for Śaṁkara is non-contradiction but for the Madhvites it consists in being an object to experience. Knowledge for Śaṁkara, is always indeterminate, partless and attributeless, whereas, for the Madhvites it is always determinate, consists of parts and is invariably related to its object. It is one of the foundational concepts of Mādhva epistemology that 'object' is always real when the Śaṁkarites have always endeavoured to establish its nature as something superimposed and having no absolute reality. Not only this, the Madhvites disagree with their opponents on the question of the nature and the number of the means of knowledge or *pramāṇas*. Whereas, for the Advaitins, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* are new sources and means of knowledge, the Madhvites find them quite redundant. The problem of illusion and ignorance is tackled by the Madhvites in their own way. *Ajñāna* for the Śaṁkarites is *anirvacanīya* and positive but the Mādhva philosopher is satisfied with his theory that *ajñāna* is the negation of knowledge and its existence is quite negative.

In their ontological conceptions also the two schools are poles asunder. When for the Madhvites world is created by Īśvara out of the Primordial Matter the Śaṁkarites propound that 'creation' is not a fact at all and Īśvara, who is supposed to create, sustain and destroy the world-order, is phenomenal. The jīvātman, for Madhva, is different from Brahman and it is through his Benediction alone that the jīva can be free from his bondage of earthly existence. Though knowledge has its utility in invoking the blessings of *Paramātman*, yet without *bhakti* and self-surrender these are impossible. Thus, the ultimate instrument of emancipation (*mokṣa*) is the Lord's Grace or *Īśvaraprasāda* and not knowledge (*jñāna*) as contemplated in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta. Unlike the Advaita philosophy of *mokṣa* as self-realization, the Mādhva philosophy of emancipation is the acquisition of the state of *mokṣa* through God's Grace which is the ultimate instrument in human emancipation. The description of the state of emancipation in the two philosophies is also different; whereas, for the Śaṁkarites it is merely identity with Brahman and a state in which the individuality of the individual soul is completely annihilated, the Madhvites have striven hard for establishing that individuality persists even in the state of *mokṣa*. Their doctrine of the four types of *mukti* is a proof of their untiring venture.

With this antagonism in their views on almost every problem of philosophical interest, the scholars of both the schools engaged themselves in a conflict of ideology which is, probably, the most interesting and memorable event in the history of philosophy in India. The extraordinarily dialectical character of the discussions, the critical analysis and the searching examination of the opponent's views, the untiring perseverance in arriving at a conclusion without compromise and a zealous formulation of doctrine worthy of those who are firm in their religious and philosophical convictions are some of the features of this controversy. Apart from the historical value which this controversy obtains in the dissemination of the teachings of the two schools, it seeks to pronounce a judgement on the controversy between Idealism and Realism. Though it may not bridge over the gulf between them, yet it may throw a flood of light and supply valuable information about the worth of these two philosophical points of view. A study of this controversy is, therefore, of considerable value for comprehending the relative worth of the philosophical speculations of the two schools, the schools of Śaṁkara and Madhva, and in deciding about the validity of Idealism or Realism as a correct presentation of Truth.

Before concluding it is necessary to point out that much of the criticism against Śaṁkarite philosophy, as available in most of the important texts of Mādhva philosophy, e. g., *Nyāya-sudhā*, *Nyāyāmṛta*, *Yuktimallikā*, the five minor treatises of Madhva, *Tattvaprakāśikā*, and other commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtraṣ*, *Bhagavadgītā*, *Anuvyākhyāna*, etc., is not against Śaṁkara but against the Post-Śaṁkarites. It is rather interesting that the *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa* should occupy the major portions of their *pūrva-pakṣas*. This tells an important truth. The formulation of Vedānta in Śaṁkara's works is merely in outlines, is incomplete in details and does not provide satisfactory answers to many problems that have originated from the broad outlines of his Vedānta. They are the Post-Śaṁkarites of the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivaraṇa* schools who have worked out the Vedānta in its details and have made it a comprehensive philosophy with every stone properly set in and well-carved in the edifice of Vedānta, raised on Śaṁkara's-foundational concepts, to add to its grace and strength.

CHAPTER II

THE CRITERION OF REALITY

§1. INTRODUCTORY

Notwithstanding the difference in their explanations of the constitution of the Ultimate Reality, all the schools of Indian philosophy are unanimous in their belief that the knowledge of Reality is an infallible instrument of human emancipation. For Vedānta the importance of this conviction is still greater. The bold assertion that it is through knowledge alone that one can have salvation is one of those premises that accord a rational justification to the restless spirit of philosophical enquiry. No human aspiration, on the intellectual plane, can afford to disparage the almost innate tendency of the human mind that gathers in the true knowledge of Reality the real way to deliverance. What, then, is the nature of this Reality ? Is it existent or non-existent, conscious or unconscious, blissful or painful ? But, this question cannot be answered unless we know what is actually meant by 'real'. The proposition that the reality is only one is not acceptable to all. There are some in Indian philosophy who are monists and idealists, some are pluralists and realists and some are pure momentarians. With this divergence in the formulation of the ultimate structure of Reality, how is one to decide for himself its true character ? This is possible only when we are in possession of a criterion by which we can know the real and its distinction from what is unreal or an appearance, the semblance of reality. Truth can be known and distinguished from its negation only when a criterion warranting its existence and differentiating it from falsehood has been well comprehended.

At the first sight, the distinction between the real and the appearance may appear rather incompatible with our notion of things that does not doubt the reality of all that is known through experience. This commonsense approach to the problem of reality would have been sustainable had there been no experience of things that are known to be completely unreal. To every intellect, whether it be initiated into the special outlook of a philosophical approach or not, a conch-shell-silver or a mirage would always continue to be untrue. Such cases of experience are not real; they are false or, in the language of philosophy, are only 'appearance'. The unreal is as much an object of experience as the real and, therefore, any attempt in the direction of comprehending by 'reality' all that is an object to experience would be surrendering to an eternal fallacy. How are, then, we to judge the real from the unreal ? Is there any absolute criterion by which we may obtain a correct knowledge of Reality and its nature ?

In language the word 'real' seems to bear two chief connotations. When a man finds out that the object in front of him is really a post and not a man, he feels that he was till then under a delusion and the object of his knowledge was unreal. The meaning which he attaches to the word 'unreal', in this usage, is that the knowledge of the object did not actually correspond with the true character of that object. The first meaning of the word 'real', therefore, is that the presentation of an exterior-object to our knowledge is in complete agreement with the true character of that object.

Another sense of the word 'unreal' is, however, revealed in such expressions as are frequent at the time of one's bereavement. In a melancholy mood and sad reverie one is convinced of the unreality of our earthly existence implying that existence on this earth is only a passing phase, a transitory living destined to meet its end. Thus, unreality, here, stands for something that is evanescent, transient and short-lived. This connotation of 'unreal' is also available in our judgement that dreams are unreal. In the case of dreams, there is no exterior object to which they may agree and, hence, the possibility of the first meaning is ruled out. What is intended by unreal is that the state of awakening, which causes the panorama of dream-land to disappear, infuses the sense of the impermanence of dream-presentations. The second implication of the word 'unreal' is, therefore, impermanence, change and evanescence and, consequently, what is intended by 'real' is that it is permanent, immutable and eternal. The same conclusion[1] may be drawn from the Buddhist proposition that the absolute and the real nature of a thing never undergoes a change either through causes that are outside it or are inherent in its own nature. Thus, reality means, firstly, the correspondence of knowledge with the true nature of its object and, secondly, its nature as unchanging, permanent and eternal.

Out of these two implications, the first is chiefly of an epistemological bearing, whereas, the second—as we find in the development of the different schools—transcends all phenomenal appearances and enters into a region which is beyond all logic and normal experience. It is to this state that the *śruti* suggests when it says, "This state cannot be attained through logic".[2]

In this analysis of the linguistic implications of the term 'real' it would be wrong to imply that the two meanings are mutually exclusive; there is always a harmonious blending between the two, the difference only consists in the attitude of attaching ultimate importance. To a realistic approach, whether it be of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā or Mādhva-Vedānta, the object of any of the instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) is absolutely real. The idealistic way of comprehension, such as is reflcted in the schools of Buddhism and Advaita-Vedānta, refuses to accept as valid the contention that knowledge, acquired through the *pramāṇas*, is absolutely real; it, however, assigns them a reality that is only practical (*vyāvahārika*) and not transcendental (*pāramārthika*). Both the realists and idealists are in agreement about the practical and empirical existence of world-phenomena yet about their ultimate complexion they are in disagreement; whereas, the former stamp it as ultimate and absolute, the latter deny any such claim. We will discuss, in the next chapter, the Vedānta philosophy of the different orders of reality that conceives of a transcendental reality as different from the empirical one. Naturally, we would not be wrong in assuming that the criteria of reality for these two orders of existence should be different. For a proper understanding of these criteria it would be expedient to undertake a brief analysis of the conceptions of the criteria of reality as available in the other systems of Indian philosophy.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school contends that whatever is the object of right knowledge is real and right knowledge, according to them, is that which presents an object with a character which it really has. "A perception[3] is erroneous when it presents an object with a character which it does not possess". Reality, in Nyāya, is the very nature of the substance which consists in being the object of any of the *pramāṇas*. That which is not an object of *pramāṇa* has no reality at all; it is an absolute non-entity, e.g., the hare's horn. Reality or substance, in Nyāya, is both existent and non-existent. What happens to be the object of the judgement, 'This is existent',[4] and is immune from any perverseness, is existent, whereas, that which is the object of the judgement, 'This is non-existent',[5] is non-existent. According to Naiyāyikas, the whole world is a conglomeration of real units and *sattā* is considered by them as a generality (*sāmānya*) abiding by all the particulars (*viśeṣa*) The conception of *sattā* as a *jāti*, in Nyāya, would appear to be a crude development of the commonsense standpoint of reality where each unit of the so called reals, being the object of uncontradicted knowledge, is hypergeneralized into *jāti*. Almost the same view of reality and existence was upheld by the Mīmāṁsakas. As defined by Prabhākara, the[6] 'real' is that which possesses the capacity to be the object of *pramāṇa*.

The Buddhists who propounded the doctrine of momentariness and the philosophy of the eternal flux of phenomena, however, explained the problem of reality in a different way. To them, what we call a thing is but a conglomeration of diverse characteristics that are found to affect, determine and influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or as inanimate bodies. The supplementation of a particular set of conglomerations by any other new characteristic brings out another set, the effect. By 'existence' or 'being' of things is meant the work which any conglomeration does or the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. To the Buddhists, the criterion of existence, therefore, consists in the performance (by the real) of certain specific functions, in other words, the production of some effect in a particular way. That which produces such an effect is called existent or *sat*. This is what is known as the doctrine of causal-efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*). In our understanding of this particular conception of Buddhist philosophy we have to bear in mind that *arthakriyākāritva* as a criterion of reality is not an exclusive opinion of the Buddhists. It has been accepted in some form or other by the different schools of Indian philosophy.

It may now be asked : Is *arthakriyākāritva* an absolute criterion of reality that can steer its course through the dark abysmal mysteries of universe or is its scope limited only to phenomena ? We will be guilty of doing little justice to Buddhism if we take this particular criterion as final. The author of *Bodhicaryāvatārapañcikā* clearly[7] mentions that the real nature of a thing is always immutable and uneffected; it can neither be created nor destroyed by conditions either inherent in its own nature or lying outside it. This criterion which, in its logical development, ultimately carries us to the *Śūnyatā* or the *nissvabhāvatā* of Mādhyamika Buddhism is really the criterion of absolute value. The law of *arthakriyākāritva* has its operation only in the field of *vyāvahārika* existence and is helpless as an instrument of imparting knowledge about the ultimate nature of Reality.

§2. ŚAṀKARITE CRITERION OF REALITY

This account of the Bauddha criterion of reality may give us an idea that an idealist believing in a transcendental reality can hardly find satisfaction in a criterion that has its application only in the world of phenomena. To him, the Absolute Reality transgresses the phenomenal criterion and can be known only by a criterion that is absolute. The Vedānta, as preached by Śaṁkara, also shares this view and maintains that the law of causal-efficiency, the law that whatever is an object of knowledge is real and others have their importance only in the *vyāvahārika* plane of existence. The absolute criterion is something different. It is the law[8] of non-contradiction with reference to all time and space; that which is[9] not contradicted either in past, present or future alone has the title to absolute reality. This concept of the absolute criterion is liable to arouse a possible objection on the ground that from a purely pragmatic standpoint it is foolish to be sympathetic towards a negative criterion, the law of non-contradiction, in our quest after an absolute criterion. There are many passages in some of the important Post-Śaṁkarite texts that provide us with an answer to this question which was probably posed in their times also. Vācaspati, in his *Bhāmatī*, denounces[10] the idea of attributing transcendental reality (*pāramārthika-sattā*) to the objects of experience on the ground that the law that what is experienced is real is contradicted in cases of illusory presentations, e.g., the appearance of mirage, which have no reality in the form in which they are experienced. The same argument is available in the *Siddhivyākhyā*[11] commentary on *Advaita-siddhi* in which it is contended that we can never be on safe ground if we believe that what is established by a *pramāṇa* is absolutely real. The capability of the various means of cognition (*pramāṇas*) in imparting us a correct knowledge of Absolute Reality has always been questioned in Vedānta which views almost with abhorrence the truth of the conviction that whatever is an object of cognition is absolutely real.

Another realistic definition of the 'real', that it is related to a certain point of space and time and, conversely, that which has no relation with time and space is unreal, has been decried in *Siddhi-vyākhyā* on the ground that such an assumption[12] would establish the unreality of Brahman. Because Brahman is the substratum of the world-imposition, it is beyond time and space and, naturally, in view of the above contention it must be unreal like the hare's horn. The contradiction inherent in this definition of the real which ultimately leads us to the unreality of the Highest Reality is thus quite apparent.

Thus, the Vedāntins discard all the realistic definitions of the real as insufficient and contradictory explanations of the Truth. Instead, they contend that non-contradiction is the absolute and the final criterion of reality. In their enunciation of the law of non-contradiction, the Vedāntic approach is not so much the formulation of the relation between 'reality' and 'non-contradiction' as the assertion of the proposition that what is contradicted is always false. As we will discuss in another chapter of this book, the illusory presentation of snake caused by the inexplicable *avidyā* has its existence so long as it is not sublated by the true knowledge of the rope. The appearance of the snake during the course of its experience can hardly be taken as untrue unless it is contradicted by the posterior experience or the knowledge of the rope. If we closely examine the explanations of both the realists and the idealists on the problem of the origin and genesis of illusion, we would know, at least, one point of agreement, the fact that each one of them believes in the sublation of false knowledge by the true knowledge of the substratum. Vedānta, therefore, concludes that what is contradicted is false; not only this, the converse that what is non-contradicted is true is also beyond suspicion. The absolute criterion of truth, therefore, is the absence of contradiction with reference to any point of time and space. Nṛsiṁghāśrama refers to this very criterion when he denies to Brahman, in his commentary on *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, the three types of finitude,[13] the finitude due to space, time and substance.

Here one may ask : Is the law of non-contradiction a sufficient criterion for obtaining a positive knowledge of reality ? Is it not merely an instrument of negative approach ? Though it is extremely difficult to find anywhere in all the systems of Indian philosophy a blatant refusal of the invariable concomitance between falsehood and contradiction, yet it is always a point of dispute whether this criterion can suggest a reality transcending all name and form. A dispassionate study of this aspect of the Śaṁkarite philosophy would, however, reveal that the logical development of their law of non-contradiction is a success only in proving the unreality of world-appearance and in pointing to a transcendental reality whose nature can be best communicated as a denial of characters rather than in positive predications. The *śruti* also tacitly admits the value of this criterion when, while describing the nature of Brahman, it says, "Not this, not this".[14]

§3. MĀDHVA CRITERION OF REALITY

The followers of Madhva also could not undermine the importance of the law of non-contradiction. Jaya-Tīrtha, while discussing[15] the meaning of reality, in his *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, admits that if by sublation be meant the right knowledge of that which has hitherto been known in a different way then this sort of sublation is acceptable to the scholars of his school. Another illustration of such a contention in Mādhva philosophy may be found in their belief that the transitory knowledge of the world is contradicted and removed by the eternal knowledge of the Lord and other entities. It is, therefore, clear that the law that what is contradicted is not real has not been dispensed with even by the followers of Madhva.

Now, if this interpretation be true, in what consists the difference between the Mādhva criterion and the criterion of reality as preached in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta ? From the description of 'reality', as given by Jaya-Tīrtha, it would appear that though the transitory existence of the world is contradicted by the right and eternal knowledge of the Lord it does not for that reason dwindle into mere nothingness or the falsity of a dream; it has a claim to reality though not eternal. It will be observed, later on, that knowledge in

Madhva, which is obtained through the agency of the *sākṣin*, is always valid and the falsehood of knowledge always consists in the presence of certain defects in the normal conditions essential for the generation of knowledge. It comes out from the validity of knowledge, as a natural and logical consequence, that whatever is an object of experience is always real. As explicitly indicated by Madhva, in his *Tattvodyota*,[16] the criterion of reality always consists in being the object of experience and thus represents a more realistic approach in comparison to the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta.

Apparently, the Mādhva definition of 'real' is extensive to include the facts of illusion which none the less are objects of experience and, therefore, the Mādhva criterion of reality, originally contemplated as consisting in objectivity to experience, has been slightly modified by Vyāsa-Tīrtha. Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, defines reality as that which is not the counterpositive (*pratiyogin*) of absolute negation with reference to all time and space meaning, thereby, that in order to be real a thing must exist at a particular point of time and space. "This definition of the 'real' is fundamental in the sense that to define the real by its other characters presupposes that it exists at a point of time and space. Without admitting its existence at a point of time and space no other consideration can be had with reference to the real thing."[17]

§4. CONTROVERSY OVER THE CRITERION

According to Madhusūdana, though the Mādhva definition of 'real' is not[18] untenable from the phenomenal standpoint as it is not inconsistent with the falsity of world, yet its title to the claim of being absolute may not be above doubt if we try to comprehend its logical implications. As a principle, according to Advaitins, the perception of 'negation' necessarily implies the perception of the counterpositive (*pratiyogin*) or of the entity demonstrated by it but in Vyāsa-Tīrtha's definition of 'real' it is impossible to know through perception the denial of the counterpositive of absolute negation because this counterpositive is itself beyond the human senses, e. g., the eye. Nobody has ever perceived the counter-entity which has its existence with reference to all time and space and as such it is almost impossible, according to Advaitins, to comprehend through perception the counterpositive of absolute negation which for Vyāsa-Tīrtha is the necessary condition of reality.

This invariable relationship between the perception of 'negation' and the perception of its counter-entity such as the former is impossible without the latter or that the latter is impossible without the former has been criticised by Rāmācārya in his *Taranginī.*[19] For him, it is possible to have the perception of the thing negated even though there may not be any perception of the negation itself; illustrations of this may be found in negation prior to existence (*prāgabhāva*) and total negation (*atyantābhāva*). When one acquires the knowledge of jug as 'here' and not 'there', he perceives the jug which, however, is the counterpositive of complete negation at other place though the negation itself is not actually perceived for want of necessary sense-contact. Similarly, the counter-entity of absolute negation with reference to all time and space is also an object of perception through the agency of the intuitive agent (*sākṣin*). Thus, for Rāmācārya, the knowledge of the denial of being the counterpositive of absolute negation, as required in Vyāsa-Tīrtha's definition, is not impossible.

Rāmācārya's criticism has been further reviewed and met with by the author of *Laghucandrikā*[20] who supplements the arguments of his predecessor with vigorous polemics in order to maintain that the perception of negation is never possible without the perception of the counterpositive. According to him, if there is at all any counter-entity, it must be capable of being perceived. But, because, in the Mādhva definition of reality, the counterpositive is general and supersensuous there is hardly any justification for upholding the conviction that the negation in question can be an object of perception. The example of *saṁsargābhāva*, as given by the author of *Taranginī*, is of no utility in this case for the simple reason that its analogy with 'negation prior to existence' is far-fetched and out of point. It is accepted[21] by almost all thinkers that the perception of relation implies with it, as a cause, the perception of the 'related'. In this case, the perception of negation too, being a perception of relation, must presuppose the perception of the counterpositive.

Besides this definition of reality, Vyāsa-Tīrtha suggests, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, four other definitions of 'real' that are as follows :

1. That 'real' is[22] the absence of *mithyātva* (falsehood) as propounded in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta.

2. That 'real' is[23] different from 'absolute non-existence' and is also not superimposed.

3. That 'real' is[24] directly the object of knowledge known as 'existent'.

4. That 'real' is[25] that which has its relation with time.

All these definitions have been rejected by Madhusūdana, in his *Advaita-siddhi*,[26] for several reasons. The first definition, according to him, suffers from the fallacy of wider extension because, as argued by the Śaṁkarites, an absolute non-entity, e. g., a hare's horn or the son of a barren woman, is also different from *mithyātva* (falsity). The predication of 'truth' as the denial of falsity would logically establish the real character of the above cases of non-existence which is apparently incongruous.

The second definition is also untenable because its latter condition is not acceptable to the Buddhists who, while maintaining the doctrine of momentariness, do not believe in any existence which is not a case of superimposition. The latter half of the definition is, therefore, irrelevant.

The third definition is a more consistent and purified form of the realistic criterion that the 'real' is the object of true cognition (*pramāviṣayatvaṁ*). This definition also, according to the Advaitins, is incapable of giving us a true vision of the Absolute Truth for diverse weighty reasons. Firstly, because it is admitted, as a rule, by each and every thinker that the various instruments of cognition cannot have their application to anything completely devoid of existence, every[27] true knowledge implies the existence of its object. Thus, this definition tacitly assumes 'existence', in point of fact, even before it becomes the object of true cognition meaning, thereby, that the criterion of 'real' is something other than its being the object of true knowledge. Secondly, a logical examination of Vyāsa-Tīrtha's contention would disclose the fallacy of interdependence. When asked about the import of 'real knowledge', the realist would reply that the validity of knowledge consists in its having some real entity as its object apart from other conditions and when again enquired as to what is the meaning of 'real-entity' his spontaneous answer would be that it is the fact of being an object to 'real knowledge'. This, according to the Advaitins, is an indisputed case of the fallacy of interdependence. In this connection, it is significant to note that the Advaitin's criticism of the above definition of realty is only with regard to its claim for validity as an absolute criterion and not against its pragmatic importance as functioning in the practical order of things.

As regards the fourth definiton, the Advaitins[28] object that the idea of 'real' as described in this definition is not perfectly realistic because the predicate of the judgement is equally applicable to cases of illusion. Even in illusion, e. g., the conch-shell-silver, the appearance of silver is always related to a moment of time which, though not absolute in its nature, has *prātibhāsika* existence. What is questioned here, in this definition of 'real', is simply the absolute standpoint with which the relation of 'real' with time is viewed by the Madhvites and not its phenomenal appearance.

In this connection, it is essential to refer here to the law of causal-efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) which has been unanimously upheld by[29] the realists as one of the criteria of reality and has also been accepted by the Buddhists in their own way. As regards the value of this criterion as an absolute test, it has already been indicated that the Buddhistic reaction, which contains an implicit denial of this assertion, bears a close similarity to the Śaṁkarite standpoint that *arthakriyākāritva* has its operation only in the region of phenomena. Śaṁkara and his followers vigorously contend that it is inessential that the law of causal-efficiency should possess an absolute status because even purely illusory appearances[30] are also capable of producing effects in the practical life of man. A man who mistakes a rope as snake is found running away from the place, the thirsty one is tempted towards the mirage in expectation of water. It is, therefore, an established fact in experience that even illusory objects possess the capacity to produce effects though they are themselves devoid of any absolute existence.

This analogy of the serpent in rope is rejected by Jaya-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāya-sudhā*,[31] on the ground that the cause of the fear in man is not the snake but rather the knowledge of the snake. According to him, the effect of the causality of snake is the showing of its teeth, etc., and not the generation of fear. But it may be asked : Is this knowledge of snake caused by the absence of snake or is due to its presence ? By accepting the former alternative we would land ourselves into a position in which it would transpire that any knowledge may be produced by any entity which besides being impossible is against the accredited principles of epistemology. The second alternative would, however, recommend the Advaitin's position that it is actually the presence of the snake and not its knowledge alone that is responsible for the consequent fear. Thus, from the Advaitin's standpoint, Jaya-Tīrtha's criticism that the real cause of fear lies, not in the presence of the snake, but only in the knowledge of the snake is redundant as well as cumbrous.

Another instance of *arthakriyākāritva*[32] in the objects of purely imaginary character may be found in dreams which are avowedly of *prātibhāsika* nature though the Mādhva interpretation of dreams seeks to ascribe them a real character. On his awakening the dreamer is often found lapsing into a delightful reverie after the romantic sweetness of his dream and at another instant he is found perspiring and breathing fast due to the gruesome nature of the tragic occurrence of his dream. Moreover, in the dream itself, one feels pleasure or pain at the sight of a certain object that has the character to cause such a feeling. These examples, according to Advaitins, are sufficient to establish *arthakriyākāritva* in imaginary and *anirvacanīya* objects; the objects[33] of dream have, however, the capacity to produce their effects both in the dream-state and in the *vyavahāra*.

This discussion may clarify and strengthen the Vedānta position that there is nothing illogical in accepting the operation of the law of causal-efficiency in empirical and illusory existence. Thus, like so many other criteria, the law of causal-efficiency too has only a pragmatic utility and is without any *pāramārthika* or absolute application.

The protagonists of Vedānta mention two other propositions about truth that are only derived corollaries of their law of non-contradiction. These are : (1) The 'truth' is unlimited and (2) the 'real' is always eternal. Nṛsiṁhāśrama, in his *Tattvabodhinī*,[34] describes that the nature of Brahman is the transcendence of all finitude, the finitude due to space, time and substance. The denial of finitude is suggested by the proposition that the ultimate truth is always unlimited. We will discuss, later on, that the limited character of entities is considered by the Post-Śaṁkarites as one of the reasons of the falsity of world. The denial of finitude by another substance in the ultimate nature of truth leads us to its eternal character. Nothing that is real can suffer a change in its nature. Vācaspati explicitly mentions, in his *Bhāmatī*,[35] that the eternal is only real and the real nature of an object always presupposes its eternal character.

These two propositions about 'truth', as would be apparent, are quite inconsistent with the Mādhva criterion of reality and have, therefore, been topics of vehement criticism in the principal works of Mādhva philosophy. For Madhva and his followers the objects limited in space and time are as much real as any other transcendent reality recognized in their system. It is a curious derivation of Mādhva epistemology that both the limited and unlimited, the eternal and non-eternal have equal reality and none of them is false.

Vyāsa-Tīrtha, while criticising the Advaita position in his *Nyāyāmṛta*,[36] contends that the description of ultimate reality as unlimited is vitiated by the fallacy of wider extension (*ativyāpti*). According to him, because the *Śūnya* of the Buddhists is also unlimited, we cannot escape the absurdity of declaring its reality on the assumption that whatever is unlimited is always real. Against this, Madhusūdana, however, contends that an astute examination of this charge would easily disclose its futility. There is an essential difference between the unlimitedness of Brahman, the Ultimate Reality, and the essential non-entity of the *Śūnya*. The former, being the substratum of the false superimposition of world-phenomena, is a purely positive principle, whereas, the latter is absolutely non-existent and is without any nature whatsoever. In a more compact language of philosophy, it may be asserted that *Śūnya* has every conceivable object as its *pratiyogin*, whereas, Brahman is neither a *pratiyogin* nor an *anuyogin*. This difference in the essential character of the Brahman and the *Śūnya* has always to be borne in mind for understanding the point that positiveness is always a significant factor in 'unlimitedness' which is contemplated as a reason in the comprehension of the Real.

The judgement that the eternal alone is real is also discarded in Mādhva philosophy in which a non-eternal entity is as much real as the eternal one for both of them are the objects of experience. Their difference as eternal and non-eternal consists in their individual nature and not in their reality. It is easy to discern that this difference of opinion in the philosophies of Śaṁkara and Madhva is an outcome of their divergent views on the problem of the criterion of reality, i.e, their conclusions, on the one hand, that the non-contradicted alone is real and, on the other, that whatever is an object of valid experience has a claim to reality.

It is thus clear, from this treatment, that the Advaita criterion of reality as non-contradiction is pregnant with the logical possibilities of demonstrating the ultimate nature of reality as a single unity, whereas, the Mādhva criterion faces the veritable conclusion of reducing the universe to the plurality of reals.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF REALITY AND FALSITY

§1. THE STAGES OF REALITY

While emphasizing the absolute validity of the law of non-contradiction and the empirical value of such criteria as the law of causal-efficiency, the law that whatever is the object of knowledge is real, etc., in the previous chapter, we have referred to the Vedānta doctrine of the gradations of truth. The students of the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta are well aware of their thesis of the three orders of 'reality', viz., the *pāramārthika* (absolute), the *vyāvahārika* (empirical) and the *prātibhāsika* (illusory) which is the cornerstone and the crux of the Vedānta system. As many of the criticisms against Vedānta by its rival schools owe themselves to their ignorance and lack of appreciation of the real spirit behind the Śaṁkarite philosophy of the three orders of reality, it is necessary to discuss them in detail, in the light of the Mādhva criticism, so that we may have a correct understanding of the problem which is undoubtedly the most important aspect of Vedānta philosophy.

Following the conviction that absolute reality is never contradicted and is always eternal, Śaṁkara and his followers declare that the ultimate nature of Reality is always immutable, permanent and one. As explained by Gauḍapāda, the predecessor of Śaṁkara, the essential[1] nature of a thing is never subject to change, birth or destruction; whatever changes is never[2] the inherent nature of thing. It is in the changelessness of the essential nature of reality that there consists in its immortality. 'The immortal',[3] as the *kārikā* says, 'can never be mortal'. The chief purpose of the *śruti*, according to Śaṁkara, consists in imparting the true knowledge about the ultimate nature of Reality which, decidedly, is the one immutable and eternal principle governing all activity and status in this world. The quest for the unchangeable on the subjective and objective sides has led to the conviction of the Advaitins that the Self or Ātman, which abides by all the three states of[4] consciousness, viz., the waking-state, the dream and the deep-sleep-state, is the only eternal[5] and non-sublated principle. This Ātman[6] is identical with Brahman, the permanent substratum behind the changing forms of phenomena, and is of the nature of self-illuminating consciousness. The Divine Consciousness[7] or Existence of Ātman is not known through any other principle but in its turn illumines every existence, status and activity. At so many places the *śruti* remarks[8] that the nature of Brahman is beyond the comprehension of human intellect, mind and the cognitive faculties and transcends the categories of space, time and relation. Thus, this Ātman is attributeless[9] and is the transcendence of all determinations and predications. The essential nature of Ātman or Brahman, according to Vedānta, is a non-composite[10], eternal and pure consciousness beyond all name and form and is the witness of all human[11] experiences. This Brahman pervades through the universe and enlightens it through its own light which is far more mysterious[12] and illuminating than either the sun, moon or stars. The ultimate all pervading reality has no second[13] to excel[14] it; it is one truth which is greater than the greatest and[15] smaller than the smallest. By quoting the *śrutis* of negative approach, the Vedānta formulates the view that the real nature of Brahman transcends all logic and is ineffable; the only way of communicating anything about Reality is to express it in terms[16] of negatives.

Is this type of Absolute Reality which is considered by the Advaitins as the transcendence of phenomena also recognized by Madhva and, if not, in what consists the difference in their absolute standpoints ? The following pages may reveal that the absolute reality, as contemplated by Madhva and his followers, is just the negation of the Advaitin's *pāramārthika-sattā*. The absolute reality, in Madhva, is always what comes directly under human experience not vitiated through the presence of defects recognized in this system as hampering the validity of knowledge. It would, perhaps, be no overstatement of facts to assert that absolute truth, in Madhva, is just the *vyāvahārika-sattā* of Advaita Vedānta with the difference that, whereas, for the Advaitins it is a product of *avidyā* and is, consequently, false, for the Madhvites it is always real and absolute. This should, however, not be misunderstood as asserting the proposition that there is no transcendental reality in Madhva and that all reality in the Mādhva system is purely empirical. There are 'reals' in this system that are never the objects of ordinary human experience, e.g., Īśvara, Lakṣmī, etc. What we desire to contend is that Madhva never gives cognizance to the argument, as done by Śaṁkara, that the transcendence of the real is necessarily an argument for its being a different order of being. The difference in the nature of reality, according to Madhva, is no justification for its being of a lower or lesser degree than the other.

In accordance with their own criterion of reality, the Mādhva philosophers argue that it is illogical to conceive that the ultimate reality is always transcendental and one. If Brahman is the transcendence of all logic and reason and is never an object of thought, it would simply be a wild goose chase to undertake the study of scriptures (*śāstras*). Bādarāyaṇa himself contends that Brahman, for whose knowledge we undertake[17] an enquiry, is knowable only through the scriptural[18] texts. The followers of Madhva always regard knowledge as determinate and as related to a particular object possessing certain characters to be known and predicated by it. Thus, to them, the Śaṁkarite proposition of indeterminate knowledge and an absolute reality beyond human reason and comprehension is absolutely illogical. It would, again, be incorrect to assert that the absolute reality is only one and all difference and plurality of existence is due to the inexplicable *avidyā*. Though *Īśvara* is the supreme reality[19] in the Mādhva system, his status of reality is not the least superior to other existents. The reality of all things is always absolute and the same.

A doubt may be persistently flung on us : If the ultimate constitution of reality be really transcendental what would then be the nature and status of the variety of existents in the world ? If they are not absolutely real they must be[20] unreal or false for every fact has to be either of the two. Because the transcendental reality alone is absolutely real, there is left no other alternative for the Śaṁkarites but to contend that the world-phenomenon is false or *mithyā*. One would be distressed at the findings of such a philosophy because it is difficult to believe that all that has an age-long persistence in experience may be as false as an illusion. Is there no difference between an illusion and a phenomenal appearance and do they differ, at all, from what is known as total unreality as that of a hare's horn ?

With these difficulties in view, the Advaitins have graded 'reality' into three different stages; these stages are completely different from what is known as the 'absolute non-existence' such as a hare's horn or the son of a barren woman. Absolute non-existence or *alīka* is defined in Vedānta as something which is 'incapable of being[21] experienced as existent in all times whether past, present or future'. It is, however, clear from this definition that the determinant (*avacchedaka*) of the reality of a thing is the fact of its illumination in knowledge as 'existent'. It is with this determinant and conception of existence in view that Vedānta endeavours to explain the other two orders of reality, i. e., the *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhāsika*.

From the above description of the nature of Absolute Reality (*pāramārthika-sattā*) it may not be difficult for us to comprehend the fundamental Vedantic tenet that the *paramārtha* is the only reality and all else is false. Vedānta distinguishes the falsehood of world from absolute non-existence when it asserts that a false entity is perceptible[22] and in nature while different from existence is also different from non-existence. This point about falsehood (*mithyātva*) is of utmost importance for comprehending the Vedānta conception of the *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhāsika* orders of existence.

With the exception of certain Vaiṣṇavites, almost all the thinkers in Indian philosophy are unanimous in their belief that illusions, whose *prātibhāsika-sattā* the Vedantins venture to establish, are all unreal and are somehow imposed on the substrata of their appearance. Their disagreement is mainly with regard to the analysis of the causes and the genesis of illusion. This illusion which has its cause, according to Vedānta, in the inexplicable and beginningless Nescience (*avidyā*) lasts so long as the substratum of appearance is not cognized and the *avidyā* causing the whole illusion is not annihilated. The falsity of illusion is apprehended only when it is sublated by the knowledge of the substratum. Thus the nature of the *prātibhāsika-sattā*, according to Vedānta, consists in its illusory manifestation to immediate experience caused by the veiling and creative potentialities of Nescience and in its being sublated by the knowledge of the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*).

The nature of the *vyāvahārika* order of existence is well illustrated by Śaṁkara when he seeks to justify, in his *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, the position that the *vyavahāra* is caused by the mutual superimposition[23] of the 'real' and 'unreal' or the 'Self' and the 'not-self' whose material-cause is said to subsist in the beginningless and positive *avidyā.*

If the *vyavahāra* has its cause in *avidyā* and its powers, in what consists in the difference between the *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhāsika* orders of reality ? If the nature of *vyavahāra* be really false why should then Vedānta emphasize, at all, the distinction between the *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhāsika* orders of reality? A reading of the Vedānta philosophy with these doubts in mind would be unfailing in creating an impression that the persistent character of phenomenal objects, their importance in the practical life of man and their utility in the production of knowledge have compelled Vedānta to accept the reality of *vyavahāra* as a stage between the *prātibhāsika* reality of illusion and the ultimate transcendental reality. For Vedānta, the *vyāvahārika* order has its appearance and existence only as long as one has not annihilated *avidyā* with all its products by obtaining the supreme realization of Brahman. The difference between the *vyāvahārikā* and the *prātibhāsika* orders of reality consists only in the fact that, whereas, the former exists, so long as one has not achieved the supreme realization of Brahman, the latter is sublated during the course of *vyavahāra.*

Another point of importance, in this connection, that fully explains the distinction between *vyāvahārika-sattā* and pure illusion is the difference in the nature of their sublations. When the false knowledge of 'silver' is contradicted by the true knowledge of 'conch-shell' the appearance of the percipient subject or the *pramātā* is not sublated. But, when one obtains the true knowledge of Self the whole world-appearance along with the knower dissolves and there is left no cause or seed to produce another superimposition in the form of world-appearance. Thus, the difference between 'pure-illusion' and 'practical reality' consists in the fact that, whereas, in the sublation of the former there continues the 'self' as 'I', the contradiction of the latter through Brahman-realization or 'transcendental experience' destroys the whole of *avidyā* with all its effects including the notion of the 'ego'. The nature of the *vyāvahārika-sattā* may, therefore, be defined as the appearance caused by the potentialities of the beginningless and positive principle of *avidyā* sublatable only at the true knowledge of the Self.

It has already been stated that, from the ultimate standpoint, the transcendental Self is the only reality, whereas, every phenomenal appearance is only a false imposition on the ultimate pure consciousness as the substratum. This means that from the transcendental standpoint, both the *vyavahāra* and pure illusion are equally false; the difference between the *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika-sattās* is asserted from the empirical standpoint only. In the *pāramārthika* state, when the Nescience with all its products completely vanishes, there is left no ground for introducing a difference between the *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhāsika* orders of reality. There is only one Ultimate Reality which is immutable and transcendental. Some of the traditional writers of Vedānta, for example, Prakāśānanda, declare[24] in quite unambiguous and bold language that reality, in Vedānta, is only twofold, the *pāramārthika* and the *prātibhāsika* and that the *vyāvahārika* order is maintained only for the sake of the deluded vulgar. A study of the *kārikas* of Gauḍapāda would reveal that the Advaita philosophy, as propounded by him and his followers, comprehends, from the ultimate standpoint, only one reality; all phenomenal[25] appearances that are not immutable and transcendental in character are only false impositions on the Ultimate Reality as the substratum. There is, thus, from the ultimate standpoint, absolutely no difference between the *prātibhāsika* and the *vyāvahārika* orders of being.

While summing up the Advaitic position on the problem of the stages of reality it may be asserted without any mental reservation that 'reality', according to Vedānta, may be classified into two, viz., the primary[26] (*mukhya*) and the secondary (*amukhya*). The primary reality is the *pāramārthika-sattā* which is transcendental, immutable and one and is never sublated whether in past, present or future. The secondary reality, on the other hand, is always subject to future contradiction; its reality chiefly consists in being the object of perception. Again, the secondary reality is also classified into two, viz., the *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhāsika*, due to the difference in their limitative adjuncts (*upādhis*); the first is determined[27] by *māyā*, whereas, the second is conditioned by the individual *avidyā*. The nature of the secondary reality is not absolute; it possesses an existence that is termed in Vedānta as the *anirvacanīya-sattā*.

§2. MADHVA CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE STAGES OF REALITY

This doctrine of the stages of reality had been a point of vehement criticism at the hands of the eminent thinkers of the Mādhva school. Jaya-Tīrtha while discussing, in his *Nyāya-sudhā*, the possible meanings of the threefold reality asks : Does[28] it mean that the ultimate transcendental reality, as formulated by the Śaṁkarites, is the only reality, whereas, the other two, though equally unreal, are differentiated due to the difference in their sublations ? If not, should it be interpreted as to mean that the reality is itself comprised of the threefold internal division ? If the Śaṁkarites accept the first alternative, they should, according to Jaya-Tīrtha, accord a satisfactory explanation for professing the separate reality of *vyavahāra*. But, then, Jaya-Tīrtha would question : Is it at all possible for an appearance that it should be capable of serving useful purpose in the life of man simply by virtue of being an object of knowledge ? If it were so, even the conch-shell-silver could be as useful for man as the real silver contradicting all our experiences of normal life.

As regards the second alternative, Jaya-Tīrtha would ask : Should this threefold division be comprehended from the ultimate standpoint or from the practical or illusory standpoints ? Because the nature of the last two realities, according to Jaya-Tīrtha, is not fully established by reasoning, it is impossible to conceive of any division resting on them as hypothesis and so the last resort for us is to comprehend this threefold division from the absolute standpoint. Here the Mādhva philosopher would again enquire : What is the guarantor of this ultimate division ? Is it something different or identical with it ? The first alternative is inadmissible because to conceive of a cause different from Ātman would necessarily contradict the Advaitic position for it would, then, entail the ultimate reality of a second. Again, the Ātman itself cannot be taken as a reason for proving the threefold reality. Because Ātman, according to the followers of Vedānta, is always undifferentiated (*nirviśeṣa*), any attempt to envisage it as a reason for proving the threefold nature of reality would certainly destroy its essential nature as 'undifferentiated'.

To anybody well posted in the philosophy of the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta it would automatically strike that the second alternative, as contemplated by Jaya-Tīrtha, has never been upheld by the Vedāntins and as such there are no valid grounds for proposing and then criticising it as an Advaitic position. As regards the objections against the first alternative it may be replied that because the *anirvacanīya* objects, according to Vedānta, have also the capacity of producing effects and serving the same purpose as the real objects till their knowledge is not sublated there can possibly be no valid objection against admitting the false character of the *vyavahāra*.

The most important point of objection as traced by the opponents concerns the nature of the *anirvacanīya-sattā* and whether it is at all possible to maintain a reality which, from the ultimate standpoint, is false and can be defined as inexplicable (*anirvacanīya*). This *anirvacanīyatā* or *mithyātva*[29] (falsity) has been defined, in the Śaṁkarite literature, in the following five different ways (*pañca-mithyātva*). As these definitions have been subjected to threadbare analysis for purposes of criticism by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, it is essential that we should discuss them in detail in order to understand the true implication and nature of that with regard to which 'unreality' is predicated.

§3. THE DEFINITION AND NATURE OF FALSITY

(a) *First Definition*

The first definition of falsity (*mithyātva*), as given by the author of *Pañcapādikā*,[30] contends that 'unreality' or 'falsity' is neither the substratum of 'existence' nor 'non-existence', i.e., it cannot[31] be expressed in the sense of either 'to be' or 'not to be'. As this definition apparently involves two contradictory predications in one subject, it is necessary that the real import of the denials of both 'existence' and 'non-existence' be correctly apprehended. Vyāsa-Tīrtha, therefore, enquires: Does the definition mean (1) that[32] the object denoted as false is the negation of 'being' as qualified by 'non-being' or (2) it[33] means that the object possesses the two attributes, viz., 'the absolute negation of being and the absolute negation of non-being' or (3) it means the combined property of the 'absolute negation of non-being' in accompaniment with the 'absolute negation of being' ? None of these alternatives, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, can prove the validity of the definition which is not free from errors of judgement and recurrent fallacies of argumentation.

The first of these alternatives is untenable because it is one of the foundational concepts with almost all the logicians that the 'world' is the substratum of only 'being' and not of 'being' as[34] qualified by 'non-being'. The second alternative is also inadmissible because it is a flagrant violation of the Law of Excluded Middle.

It is an accredited principle in logic that between 'being' and 'non-being' the presence of the one necessarily implies the absence of the other; to argue the presence of both in a single substratum is not only contradictory but is[36] a grotesque monster of human imagination. Jaya-Tīrtha, in his *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, argues that the nature of 'unreality' as different from both existence and non-existence comprises in itself two opposite characteristics, viz., 'the absence of being' and 'the absence of non-being'. Out of these two, the 'absence of non-being', in the case of world-appearance, is acceptable[37] even to the Madhvites and as such a part of this definition only seeks to prove what is already established (*siddha-sādhanatā*). Moreover, as argued by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, though the world[38] may be destitute of the attribute 'being' like Brahman, who is attributeless, yet it may not be false as its reality is already established through *pramāṇas*. For all these reasons, the third alternative that the Śaṁkarite definition of falsity means only its possessing the combined property of the absolute negation of non-being as accompanied by the absolute negation of being also becomes futile and untenable.

In reply to these charges, Madhusūdana, who has given ample proof of his genius in defending the Śaṁkarite position from Vyāsa-Tīrtha's onslaughts, argues, in his *Advaita-siddhi*, that the true implication of the Śaṁkarite definition of 'unreality' consists in being constituted of the two attributes, viz., the 'absolute negation of non-being' and the 'absolute negation of being'; there is, however, no 'self-contradiction' in this definition as contended by the opponents. According to Madhusūdana, the fallacy of self-contradiction, as pointed out by the Mādhva philosopher, on the ground that between 'being' and 'non-being' the presence of one necessarily implies the absence of the other[39] can be valid only in the following circumstances :

(1) If,[40] between 'being' and 'non-being' one has the character of being the absence of the other.

(2) If the absence of one is invariably accompanied by the presence of the other.

(3) If the presence of one is invariably accompanied by the absence of the other.

None of these definitions, according to Madhusūdana, are present in the Śaṁkarite definition of 'falsity'.

The first of these[41] conditions is not applicable to the Śaṁkarite definition because they do not admit any such mutually negative or exclusive relation between 'being' and 'non-being'. What they actually mean by 'non-being', whose absence is declared in the definition, is not the absence of 'true being' but the absence of being cognized as existing in a substratum. The term 'being' (*sattva*) occurring in the definition is, however, used in a different sense; there it refers to a non-contradicted absolute reality and not to the object of cognition in a substratum. Thus, the true import[42] of '*anirvacanīya* existence' is its being cognizable as existing in a substratum while, at the same time, being different from what is not liable to sublation in past, present or future.

The second condition of 'self-contradiction', as narrated above, has also[43] no application to the Śaṁkarite definition of 'falsity' because we find its violation in the appearance of conch-shell-silver which is undoubtedly an instance of *anirvacanīyatā*. In this case, we find that the silver has the absence of being—because it is contradicted—whereas, there subsists in it the 'absence of non-being' in the sense of 'apparent cognizability'. As such, there is no invariable concomitance between 'absence of being' and the 'presence of being'.

Lastly the third condition does not completely guarantee the alleged self-contradiction in the Śaṁkarite definition because it by no means implies self-contradiction. Madhusūdana, in his *Advaita-siddhi*,[44] explains this point by giving an illustration. He argues that though it is true that the class-character of a cow is invariably accompanied by the absence of the class-character of a horse (i.e., a cow is not a horse) and vice versa, yet we observe that the negations of these two class-characters (*jātis*) exist together in one and the same substratum, for example, a camel which is neither a cow nor a horse. Madhusūdana, therefore, argues that in the light of this illustration it is not impossible to predicate both 'being' and 'non-being' in a single substratum with reference to the different orders of reality. The Śaṁkarites, however, do not denounce the operation of the law of Excluded Middle in cases of 'being' and 'non-being' belonging to the same order of reality and pertaining to a particular object; the non-being of the class-character of horse cannot be predicated in the horse whose being and non-being pertain to the same *vyāvahārika* existence. This also refutes Rāmācārya's contention, in this regard, that mutual exclusiveness of 'being' and 'non-being' pertaining to the same order of reality should not be denied, as a principle, because the absence of one is invariably accompanied by the presence of the other. The Śaṁkarites too do not disregard the truth of this principle; their disagreement with the Mādhva philosopher is only with regard to its application to cases belonging to the different orders of existence. The main crux of the argument, therefore, lies in the problem whether there is at all any justification for the doctrine of the different orders of reality, a point that has already been discussed.

Now let us turn to the second argument against the Śaṁkarite definition of *mithyātva* which contends that just as Brahman, though devoid of attributes has 'being' as its essential nature, the phenomenal world may also be considered as existing and not unreal. This objection, according to Śaṁkarites, has no force because there is absolutely no similarity between Brahman, which is the substratum of world-phenomena, and the phenomenal world whose false-existence is quite different from that of the true-being. Falsity or *mithyātva* is defined by the Śaṁkarites as being constituted by that difference which has both 'being' and 'non-being' for its counter-entity. This definition, therefore, leaves no ground for *arthāntaratā* as contemplated by Vyāsa-Tīrtha.

It would also be incorrect to argue against the Śaṁkarite definition that it is open to the charge of partial superfluity of reasoning because, then, such an objection would be equally applicable to some of the views upheld by the Mādhva philosophers. The Madhvites while upholding the *bhedābheda* view argue that 'a quality is at the same time both different and non-different from the substance, to which it belongs, because the two have a common substratum'. The difference of qualities 'from the substance', admitted in this case, is also admitted by the Naiyāyikas and, hence, the Mādhva philosophers fall a prey to the tool which they use against their opponents. As a matter of fact, the partial admittance of a theory by another system should never be a sufficient justification for levelling the charge of partial superfluity. This charge against the Śaṁkarite definition of *mithyātva* is, therefore, not relevant at all.

(*b*) *Second Definition*

Unreality is also defined[45] by the Post-Śaṁkarites as that which is the counterpositive (*pratiyogin*) of absolute negation, with reference to the substratum in which it is cognized, or to the substratum, which is cognized as being qualified by[46] the knowledge of a false appearance meaning, thereby, that when we brand the snake in rope as 'unreal' we mean that it is capable of being absolutely denied in the substratum in which it is perceived.

Now the principal objection against this definition, from the dualist's camp, consists in investigating the nature of 'absolute negation' whose counter-entity is declared as 'unreal'. It may be asked : Is this denial real or is so only from the *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika* standpoints ? Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta* argues[47] that it is quite impossible to defend the Vedānta position while accepting any of these alternatives regarding the nature of the absolute negation. If 'negation' under reference is real then there being two realities, viz., Brahman and 'negation', the monistic standpoint of Advaita philosophy would be severely damaged. If, on the other hand, the 'negation' be regarded as only apparently real, then the world, which is the counterpositive of this apparently real negation, would also become real and the Advaitin would be compelled to embark the dualist's position exposing himself to the charge of partial superfluity. It would, again, be quite unsafe to uphold the view that this 'negation' has only practical reality (*vyāvahārika-sattā*) because a negation of this kind is also liable to sublation at the time of self-realization. This denial of negation, though at the covetable moment of self-realization, would equate this position with that of the former which asserts the *prātibhāsika* character of this 'negation'. The denial of absolute negation, in this case, would only suggest the reality of the phenomenal world, which is the object of this negation, and would destroy the whole Śaṁkarite position.

In reply to this criticism, the Advaitins maintain that there is no harm in accepting the nature of this 'negation' either as *pāramārthika* or *vyāvahārika*. In the former case, the acceptance of 'negation' as absolutely real would not imply the abandonment of the monistic standpoint[48] because the 'negation', in this case, is non-different from Brahman which is the substratum of world-phenomena.[49] Moreover, the fact that the world is an object of an absolutely real negation does not imply that the world in itself is absolutely real for we find that no such reality belongs to the conch-shell-silver which, however, is an object of absolutely real negation. Against this Rāmācārya points out, in his *Taraṅgiṇi*,[50] that it is impossible for the Advaitins to maintain the absolute reality of 'negation' while maintaining the falsity of the conch-shell-silver, the counter-entity of this negation; as a rule, both the absence and its counter-positive must belong to the same order of reality and, hence, the negation in this case cannot be absolute.

Another objection raised by Rāmācārya, in this connection, is that the absolute negation referred to in this definition of the falsity of world cannot be identical with Brahman because if it were so then at the time of the manifestation of Brahman, for creating the world-illusion, this identity would also be manifested, consequently, resulting in the disillusionment of the world-order. Moreover, the simultaneous occurrence of both the creation of illusion and its negation is, according to Rāmācārya, impossible and highly preposterous. The author of *Laghucandrikā*[51] defends the Advaitic position against this charge by contending that the 'absolute negation', in the Vedantic definition, should be so construed as to mean 'having the character of the absolute negation of world' which refers to a sublated phenomenal world-order while, on the other hand, the pure unqualified negation is absolutely non-different from Brahman, the Ultimate Reality. This qualification besides establishing the non-duality of the Vedantic system (because the 'absolute negation' is identical with Brahman) is essential in order to avoid the contingency arising out of our accepting the principle that the counterpositive of absolute negation should also be real. According to him, merely being the counter-entity of negation is not the sufficient condition for possessing the equality of the status of reality. But, the negation which is demonstrated[52] (*nirūpita*) by a particular fact must be qualified by the determinant of the character of that demonstration. Thus the negation of the phenomenal-world as qualified by the 'idea of its being absolutely non-existent' is false because it is demonstrated by a counterpositive which is also unreal; in the case of the 'pure-negation', there being no demonstration whatsoever, there is no question of its being false. Similarly, the negation referred to in the case of the conch-shell-silver is also identical with its substratum which is of the nature of consciousness. The negation can be said to be apparently[53] real (*prātītika-sattā*) only when it is demonstrated by a counter-entity which is apparently real. Thus, in its pure and qualityless state, the negation, being identical with Brahman, can be considered as absolutely real without warranting either the absolute existence of the phenomenal world or endangering its own status. It may also be noted in the light of the above criticism that the second objection, as put forth by Rāmācārya, loses its ground as soon as the negation is conceived as identical with Brahman in its pure and qualityless form. There is no question of the simultaneous disillusionment of the phenomenal world at the time when it is enlightened by Brahman because the necessary character of 'negation' as being associated with the idea of the denial of the phenomenal world is altogether absent. Mere illumination of Brahman, as substratum, which is identical with the pure and unqualified negation is insufficient to manifest the idea that the world in its phenomenal character has no existence whatsoever. Therefore, Rāmācārya's objection that along with the illumination of Brahman the manifestation of the absolute denial of the phenomenal world may also take place appears redundant because the Advaitins maintain the pure and unqualified identity of 'negation' with Brahman and not that of 'negation' as qualified by the absolute non-existence of the phenomenal world which alone can produce the disillusionment of the world-order.

It has been proposed by the Advaitins that if the absoluteness of 'negation' in the Śaṁkarite definition of *mithyātva* be not above doubt, it may also be regarded as having practical reality. The Mādhva objection that because the practical reality (*vyāvahārika sattā*) is itself liable to sublation, the phenomenal world, whose negation is intended in the definition, would also become real on account of being the counterpositive of absolute negation, is, according to the Advaitins, a fallacious reasoning. The principle that the contradiction of negation[54] necessarily implies the position of an absolute existent, the principle adopted by Vyāsa-Tīrtha in his criticisms, is not always valid. We can find the violation of this principle in the dream-phenomenon where a thing seen is sublated by negation which itself is a part of the dream. On awakening the dream experience together with its sublation vanishes into unreality. The mere fact of the judgement that the dream vanishes into unreality, being itself unreal, does not make the object of dream-sublation unreal. Thus, according to Madhusūdana,[55] what necessarily implies the reality of a thing negated is not the fact that the negation itself is sublated but the circumstance that the reality of 'negation' is of lesser degree than the reality of the thing negated. Within the same order of existence, the denial of 'negation' can be a pointer to the[56] reality of the counter-entity only when it is intended to establish the reality of the counterpositive through the negation of 'negation'. For example, when anyone asserts about the real silver, "This is not non-silver", after his false knowledge, "This is not silver", the mere negation of negation is insufficient for establishing the reality of the object, the silver. What assures the reality of the counter-entity is the circumstance that it is of a greater degree in comparison to the degree of the reality of 'negation'. The absolute character of the reality of an object is a matter of its own essential nature which cannot be obtained by any denial of 'negation'. Moreover, it may be observed that the sublation of the reality of an 'appearance' always consists in the assertion of a higher degree of reality, for example, the sublation of the appearance of snake is always associated with the assertion about the reality of the 'rope'. Because the negation of a particular appearance is always an assertion of a higher order of reality it may safely be taken as belonging to the higher order of existence. Thus, the negation of a greater degree or of the same degree is always capable of denouncing the absoluteness of an object. Consequently, it may be concluded that the necessary condition for the reality of a thing is the circumstance of its having a greater degree of reality than its negation. Thus the Mādhva objection that the sublation[57] of *vyāvahārika* negation would entail the absolute position of phenomenal world is illogical because both 'negation' and 'world-phenomena' belong to the same order of reality which is insufficient to prove the absolute character of the latter.

It has been questioned by Vyāsa-Tīrtha that if the order of the reality of negation, in the Śaṁkarite definition of the falsity of world, is to be taken as *vyāvahārika* how an unreal object could become the counterpositive of this negation ? To this the Advaitins reply that unreal objects, e. g., the conch-shell-silver, the phenomenal world, etc., are in their very nature objects of absolute negation as expressed in the proposition, 'Here is no silver'. But, then, Vyāsa-Tīrtha may argue that it is impossible to maintain the absolute negation of either the phenomenal world or the conch-shell-silver; because they are the effects of *avidyā*, their material-cause, they are liable to destruction through knowledge. Again, the phenomenal world is also subject to origination and destruction and is also capable of functioning for definite and useful ends. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha[54], all these qualities can subsist only in entities that, in their very nature, are never liable to any contradiction. The phenomenal world or the conch-shell-silver is never the object of absolute negation.

Madhusūdana's reply to this criticism, however, consists in[59] disproving the principle that only those entities which in their very nature are never the objects of negation alone are capable of possessing origination and the other aforesaid qualities. The Madhvites, when they do not admit the origination of *ākāśa* while maintaining its absolute existence, violate themselves the invariable concomitance between origination, destruction, etc., and the essential non-negated character of entities. Thus, the principle warranting these attributions of origination, destruction, etc., is something else that is possible even in unreal entities. It has already been discussed before that unreal phenomena, e.g., dream, conch-shell-silver, etc., possess the capacity of producing effects and other qualities and so the proposition that only real entities have origination, destruction, etc., is baseless and without any sound logic.

(*c*) *Third Definition*

Falsity is further[60] defined, by the[61] Śaṁkarites, as that which possesses the character of being sublated or discarded by knowledge. They, however, maintain that knowledge can set aside only such phenomena as are the products of *avidyā* and not those entities that can somehow be established as absolutely real. Both our ordinary human experience of illusion and the *śrutis* that declare the sublation of world-phenomena through the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality point to the fact that there are appearances that are liable to contradiction by a posterior knowledge. These appearances, according to Śaṁkarites, cannot be absolutely real because of their future contradiction; to accept them as such would mean the transgression of the Śaṁkarite criterion of non-contradiction. But, they are not absolutely unreal also for they have an appearance and thus there has to be accepted a separate order of reality as distinct from that which is transcendental and absolute.

The followers of Madhva, however, criticise this definition on the ground that it is not free from the defect of inconclusiveness[62] (*avyāpti*) and is also wider in extension (*ativyāpti*). There is no two opinion amongst the Śaṁkarites on the point that a jar being an entity in the phenomenal world is always unreal and, therefore, Vyāsa-Tīrtha enquires whether the Śaṁkarites would like to accept a jar, which has been destroyed by a stick in the past, as unreal. If they acknowledge its character as unreal, they would certainly, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, overlook the essential part of their definition—the contention that an unreal entity must always be discarded by knowledge—because here the cessation of the appearance of the jar is only through a stick and not through knowledge. Moreover, immediacy is a necessary condition for the sublation of an object by knowledge which is conspicuously absent in the jar destroyed in the past. From all this one can easily conclude that the jar destroyed in the past is not unreal because its removal is not through knowledge. The Śaṁkarite definition, in question, therefore, is inconclusive (*avyāpti*) because it fails to include a case of unreal appearance. Moreover, the later experience[63] of the correct knowledge of conch-shell results in the association that there was *ajñāna* in conch-shell that had caused the illusion of silver and was removed by a posterior knowledge. One has the feeling that this *ajñāna* is unreal as it is the cause of illusion till the fateful moment of the true knowledge of the conch-shell. But it may be noted that this *ajñāna* also, as interpreted by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, falls within the purview of the definition of falsity because it is sublated by knowledge. The Śaṁkarite definition is, therefore, also wider in extent.

It may further be noted that the above criticism is directed against the Śaṁkarite definition where by knowledge is meant only knowledge and nothing else either pervaded by or associated with knowledge. The definition[64] may also be reinterpreted so as to mean by 'unreality' that which is removed by all that is pervaded[65] by knowledge. The significance of this interpretation consists in incorporating both memory and *saṁskāras* into the span of knowledge whose causality in removing the unreal appearance has also been acknowledged. Against this, Vyāsa-Tīrtha points out that if memory and *saṁskāras*, because they are pervaded by knowledge, are also considered as capable of removing other *saṁskāras* then the definition would again be exposed to the fallacy[66] of wider extension. According to Śaṁkarites, the latent tendencies in the *jīvanmukti* state are not annihilated by the *saṁskāras* arising out of the true and, at the same time, posterior knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. Now the Madhvites argue that the above reinterpretation of the Vedānta definition of falsity should necessarily imply the negation of the latent tendencies (*saṁskāras*) of the *jīvanmukti* state and, thereby, create a contradiction in the Advaita position. If the position of the latent tendencies causing activities of the *jīvanmukta* has to be defended, then the Śaṁkarite definition of 'falsity' would fail to include[67] within its extension this particular instance which, being a part of the phenomenal world, should also be false and would introduce the fallacy of lesser extension (*avyāpti*).

In order to meet the above charges against the Advaita position, the author of *Advaita-siddhi* maintains[68] that what is actually meant by the term 'being sublated by knowledge' in the definition is to be the counterpositive of the general negation of 'existence' caused by the knowledge of the substratum. This 'existence', according to Madhusūdana, is of two kinds, firstly, in its own form (*svarūpeṇa*) as an effect and, secondly, in the form of its cause (*kāraṇātmanā*). This distinction between the two aspects of 'existence' provides the Advaitins with a successful means of resolving the difficulty, as pointed out by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, that the destruction of the jar in the past would introduce the fallacy of inconclusiveness. Though the jar, destroyed in the past, may not be the counterpositive of 'absence' in its form as 'jar', yet it can certainly be so in its causal form. At the dawn of the true knowledge of Brahman, *avidyā* with all its products vanishes and may, therefore, be rightly conceived as false. If *avidyā* is false, its effect, the jar, though destroyed in the past by a stick, would also be false and there would thus be no derogation in the principles of logic. The Mādhva objection that the Advaitic definition suffers from the fallacy of lesser extension is, therefore, without any proper justification.

The second objection, that the Śaṁkarite definition of falsity also suffers from the fallacy of wider extension because it includes the removal of real *ajñāna*, veiling the mother-of-pearl, at the moment of the true knowledge of the conch-shell, can also be refuted on the ground that from the *pāramārthika* standpoint the causal-*avidyā* is also annihilated through the ultimate realization of Brahman and is, therefore, not absolutely real as imagined by Vyāsa-Tīrtha. The Mādhva objection is only due to the confusion in standpoints that has led them to imagine the *ajñāna* in the conch-shell as real when this has never been contemplated by the Śaṁkarites. Thus, there is no fallacy of wider extension in the Śaṁkarite definition of *mithyātva*. As it has been repeatedly asserted by the various authors of Vedānta that *avidyā* with all its effects is annihilated by the true knowledge of Brahman, there is hardly any occasion for excluding *avidyā* from the scope of 'unreality'.

Madhusūdana further maintains[69] that there is hardly any doubt in admitting the definition of falsity as that which is rejected or sublated by all that is pervaded by knowledge. The criticism that this definition would imply the removal of the *saṁskāras* by the *saṁskāras*, that are pervaded by knowledge, and would, consequently, mean the annihilation of the latent tendencies in the *jīvanmukti* state in the event of the true knowledge of the Ultimate Reality is quite irrelevant. The Śaṁkarite refutation of this charge rests on the standpoint that the *saṁskāras* in the *jīvanmukti* state can be destroyed by the realization of the Highest State and not through the *saṁskāras* of knowledge and so the *jīvanmukti* state does not occur within the definition of falsity at all. The Śaṁkarites draw a distinction between the realization of the Ultimate Reality and the phenomenal, though valid, knowledge of the empirical world. In order to be consistent with this position, Madhusūdana has redefined 'unreality' as that which is capable of being removed by knowledge in its form as realizaton. It would not be an illegitimate objection if anyone questions as to how the *jīvanmukti* state is at all possible if it is finally annihilated at the time of Brahman-realization. We, however, leave this point for discussion in our chapter, 'The Doctrine of Mukti'.

Another important attack from the Mādhva side which strikes at the very root of the Advaita conception of 'falsity' is from the pen of Vādirāja. In his monumental work *Yuktimallikā*, Vādirāja contends that the Vedānta thesis[70] of *ajñāna* as a positive principle destructible by knowledge is opposed to all learned opinion. Knowledge, according to him, is not a principle that destroys ignorance but is of the nature of the negation of ignorance and, whenever, we speak of knowledge as removing *ajñāna* it is always with the conviction that *ajñāna* is nothing but the negation[71] of knowledge. The author of *Yuktimallikā* unambiguously[72] asserts the view that the negation of 'negation' is always 'affirmation'; the negation of the 'negation of knowledge', i. e., *ajñāna* is what is termed as knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, cannot remove positive *ajñāna* as contemplated in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta.

It may not be unworthy to observe that the above contention which denies that the nature of *ajñāna* is removable by knowledge would naturally conclude in the proposition that the phenomenal world, which is an effect of *ajñāna*, is also not removable by knowledge. Because, as argued in *Yuktimallikā*, there is no relation of invariable concomitance between the absence of *ajñāna* and knowledge, the conclusion of the falsity of an appearance on the basis of its posterior contradiction by knowledge would also become invalid. But it is still a point for our deliberation whether Vādiraja's philosophy of the relation between knowledge and ignorance is logically conceivable. Though this point is to be discussed later on in detail, yet it is necessary to remark here that the philosophy of knowledge and ignorance as conceived in *Yuktimallikā* involves the fallacy of mutual dependence as knowledge is the negation of 'ignorance' and ignorance is the negation of 'knowledge'. Moreover, it is also unintelligible as to how the Mādhva philosopher can justify the contention that the negation of 'negation' means 'affirmation'. Unless in the description of 'A' as 'not not-A' we are sure of the existence as well as the nature of 'A', we cannot comprehend its conceptual meaning. Similarly, without affirming the existence of knowledge as a positive principle the Mādhva attempt in expressing the nature of knowledge would result in the wilderness of the endless series of negatives without any positive fact. Though ignorance may be comprehended as the negation of knowledge yet it is difficult to imagine how knowledge can be the negation of ignorance.

(*d*) *Fourth Definition*

Falsity has also been defined, by[73] Citsukhācārya, in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, as the counterpositive of absolute negation located in its own substratum. The cloth which is cognized as subsisting in the closely woven yarns is not real simply because its existence anywhere else other than the yarns, in which it is perceived, is not possible and we cannot attribute any reality to it in its locus because we know that it is merely an arrangement of yarns. Hence, there is no way out of this riddle but to admit that the cloth is unreal and is the object of absolute negation located in yarns, i.e., the substratum. Notwithstanding a minute distinction, this definition is quite similar to the second one, already discussed, and as such the objections raised against this definition are almost the same that have been discussed while undertaking the exposition of the second definition.

(*e*) *Fifth Definition*

The fifth and the last definition of *mithyātva* (falsity) as explained by the Post-Śaṁkarite authors of Vedānta is that it is something[74] distinct and different from 'reality' or 'existence'. The Mādhva philosophers, however, raise an objection : What is the meaning[75] of 'existence' in this definition ? Does it mean existence as genus, i.e., *sattā*, or is it something that is never an object of contradiction so that it is only a synonym of the Supreme Reality or Brahman ? If the Śaṁkarites mean by 'existence' (*sat*) existence as a genus, as contemplated in the Nyāya school, then the phenomenal objects, e.g., a jar, would also become real, a proposition that is quite unacceptable to the Śaṁkarites. The second alternative would only mean that what is contradicted is unreal and thus to define 'unreality' as something distinct from 'existence' is only a jugglery of words. The Madhvites further argue that if the word 'existence' is used as a synonym of Brahman then the definition would be exposed to the charge of partial superfluity for the distinction of the phenomena, whose unreality is professed by the Śaṁkarites, from Brahman is also accepted in Mādhva philosophy.

If we closely analyse the implications of the Śaṁkarite definition we would observe that the Mādhva refutation has lost sight of some of the major considerations implicitly contained in the definition. As Madhusūdana points out, the 'real' or the 'existence' in the definition means that which is established by *pramāṇa* unassociated[76] with any of the defects which have, however, their final causality in *avidyā*[77] and remains uncontradicted at all times, past, present and future.

The first objection loses its importance because 'existence' as *jāti* being a creation and product of *avidyā*, as the Advaitins maintain, is not comprehended in this definition. The second and the third objections are of no metaphysical importance. The Śaṁkarite criterion of reality as non-contradiction itself implies the corollary that the contradicted is false; the various definitions discussed in the above pages are essential for comprehending the real import of *anirvacanīyatā*. The third charge would also appear futile because similarity between two or more systems of philosophy is no ground for establishing the charge of partial-superfluity; because there is considerable dissimilarity between the philosophies of Śaṁkara and Madhva, no such refutation can be considered valid.

It can be drawn as a quintessence from our discussion about the five definitions of *mithyātva* that the real import of *anirvacanīya-sattā* as contemplated in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta is the appearance, in a different substratum, of a phenomenon, whose knowledge is later on sublated by the true knowledge of the substratum and whose nature, consequently, is beyond the comprehension of the human intellect in such logical moulds as the 'real' and the 'unreal'. It has also been discussed in the first definition that it is not impossible to think of a stage of reality that transgresses the Law of Excluded Middle and whose phenomenal eventuality is undoubted because of its appearance. It will be discussed in the successive chapters of this book that the Śaṁkarites adopted the conception of *anirvacanīya-sattā* for explaining the phenomenal division between the 'real,' and the 'unreal' and of the various apparent illusions, e.g., the dream, the conch-shell-silver, etc. For all these reasons the Mādhva objection that it is rationally impossible to justify the existence of *anirvacanīyatā* appears to be logically unsound.

In these pages an attempt has been made to formulate the logical principles on which Śaṁkara and his followers have endeavoured to erect the edifice of their philosophy of the Ultimate Reality, a structure that denies any absolute character to what is phenomenal, relative and conditional and which reduces them to mere illusory impositions on the Ultimate Substratum or Reality caused by the principle of *avidyā* and which for diverse weighty reasons fails to discard a reality, though only practical, to the enduring and perdurable objects in phenomena, vouching a distinction between them and the illustrations of pure illusion.

CHAPTER IV

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

A. THE IDEA OF KNOWLEDGE

§1. THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

Even a simple proposition, e.g., 'I know this', would on critical examination appear as consisting of three ingredients, the 'subject', the 'knowledge' and the 'object' represented by the 'I', the 'know' and the 'this'. Every theory of knowledge has to enquire into these concepts but because the 'subject' and the 'object' are the topics of discussion in the other chapters of this book our reflection here would be limited only to the examination of the fundamentals of knowledge. Epistemological enquiry is always the backbone of metaphysics the truth of which can be found in the philosophies of the schools of Śaṁkara and Madhva.

The controversy between these schools would appear to be representing the dispute between Idealism and Realism in which one may find, at times, certain striking parallels with the discussions undertaken by the Western philosophers of the two warring camps. Before discussing the viewpoints of the Mādhva and the Śāṁkara schools and the problems raised by them in the field of epistemology, a little reflection on the problem of the existence of Self would appear to be necessary.

With the solitary exception of the Buddhists, almost every other system of Indian philosophy contributes to the conception that the existence of Self is beyond doubt and is permanent. Śaṁkara, in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*,[1] contends that because no one feels 'I am not' the existence of Ātman has to be taken as self-evident. The authors[2] of Nyāya, while criticising the Yogācāra theory of Self as an illusory appearance of the momentary bits of *vijñāna*, put forward a more vigorous argument as a proof for the existence of Self. According to them, the discrete events can neither produce the idea of unity nor can they account for the apprehension of memory; these can be explained only on the assumption of Self as a permanent entity whose ubiquitous character renders it capable of unifying these separate bits of consciousness. The doctrine of the existence of Self is one of those concepts of Indian thought in which we have the widest range of unanimity amongst the different schools of Indian philosophy. The difference is not so much on the question of the existence of Self itself as on its nature and its relation to knowledge and object and this is true of Śaṁkara and Madhva as well. We would, therefore, discuss, with special reference to Śaṁkara and Madhva, the nature of knowledge, its relation to the subject and the object and the question if knowledge can, at all, point to some deeper phase transcending the categories of human thought.

The Buddhist View

Broadly, the character of knowledge as available in the different systems of Indian philosophy may be classified into three divisions[3], i.e., (1) knowledge as the quality of soul, (2) knowledge as the *karma* (action) of the soul and (3) knowledge as identical with the soul. The nature of knowledge in the heterodox schools is somewhat different. According to the Śūnyavāda School of Buddhism which is not in favour of accepting any absolute existence, consciousness has, from the transcendental standpoint (*paramārthadṛṣṭi*), no existence though for the purposes of *vyavahāra* they can not deny[4] the existence of consciousness whose nature, they contend, is illusory and unreal.

The Vijñānavāda View

The Vijñānavāda or the Yogācāra school, while denying the reality of the so-called external objects, also discarded the idea of Self as a permanent entity. Instead of a permanent Self this system conceives of a "store-house" of momentary bits of consciousness or *ālaya-vijñāna* which, by virtue of the beginningless potencies of desire (*vāsanā*) associated with them, projects the external-world. According to them, the two phases of *vijñāna*, viz., the *pravṛti-vijnāna* and *ālaya-vijñāna*, which correspond to[5] the ideas of the 'object' (such as 'this jug') and the 'subject' (i.e., 'I') are sufficient to explain every aspect of human knowledge without presuming either the identity and existence of Self or the belief in the external world.

The Materialist View

In the Cārvāka School of Materialism the Self is nothing different from the physical organism of the various *indriyas* and is, consequently, a destructible and a transitory phenomenon. Knowledge or consciousness is only an epi-phenomenon or the by-product of the four natural elements as contemplated in the Cārvāka system; their combination produces knowledge just as the red colour is produced through the combination of betel-leaf, lime and nut. Knowledge in this theory is, therefore, born and non-eternal.

The Nyāya View

It is in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system that we find for the first time a doctrine which tries to prove the existence of soul as an eternal substance and as different from the other categories. By a special type of inference, known as *pariśeṣānumāna*, the Naiyāyikas propound that knowledge, which is produced through the conjoined action of Ātman, *manas*, *indriyas* and *viṣaya*, is a quality of the soul (*ātman*) in which it inheres. Knowledge, according to Nyāya, is not self-valid as contended in Vedānta, Sāṁkhya and Yoga; its validity, however, is governed by factors other than knowledge itself. The argument that knowledge or consciousness is produced would justify the view that consciousness is only an adventitious property of Ātman whose essential nature is *jaḍa* (unconscious). To quote an important authority in this connection, "It is also clear from this that consciousness is not the very nature of Ātman. In fact, the Ātman is essentially non-conscious (jaḍa), but it becomes conscious only when due to the sense-organ and the object contact consciousness is produced in it. If consciousness were the very nature of it, then everybody would have become omniscient".[6]

The Mīmāṁsā View

The essential nature of Ātman as *jaḍa* (unconscious) persists even in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā system though with a different emphasis on the question of the nature of consciousness. Consciousness, in Mīmāṁsā, is a direct and immediate revelation which illumines itself[7], the subject and the object. Very often we find the Mīmāṁsā explaining the nature of consciousness with the example of a lamp whose light illumines itself, its object and its substrate (the wick). In its own nature the Ātman or Self has no power of illumination. The absence of consciousness in deep-sleep is considered as a reason in seeking a justification for the non-conscious character of Self; had

Ātman been conscious, consciousness would have persisted even in its state of deep-sleep (*suṣupti*).

"To the question what knowledge is in itself and in what relation it stands to the Self, the Mīmāṁsā reply is that it is a karma[8] or action of the soul; it is this jñāna-karma of the soul which produces the jñānatā or the cognizedness which makes the object known to its subject." Notwithstanding the similarity in their approach towards the problem of the nature of Ātman, the difference in the character of knowledge as propagated in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsā really makes a point of distinction in the epistemological approach of the two systems; knowledge in Mīmāṁsā is an action, whereas, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika it is a quality of the soul.

Another point of importance in the Mīmāṁsā epistemology is the conception of the self-illuminacy[9] of knowledge emphasizing its immediacy; this, however, acquires for knowledge, in this system, a unique and exalted position in comparison to the more realistic system of Nyāya. In spite of this distinction, we may observe that the nature of Self in Mīmāṁsā is as *jaḍa* as it is in Nyāya. The dual character of self as conscious and unconscious, both in the waking and the deep-sleep-state of man, is sufficient to indicate that the nature of 'self' in Mīmāṁsā is *jaḍa*, whereas, its consciousness is generated and acquired.

The Sāṁkhya View

From this discussion about the nature of knowledge in the different systems of Indian philosophy it would transpire that they all refrained from accepting the priority and importance of knowledge in relation to the external-reality which it illumines. For the first time, the foundational character of knowledge was emphasized by the great teachers of Sāṁkhya who contended that it is impossible to deny the existence of knowledge because the denial of knowledge is itself a knowledge preceding the denial. Knowledge, according to them, is foundational and is a necessary condition of all existence. This belief in the foundational character of knowledge and the permanence of soul led them to identify knowledge and *Puruṣa* which, in Sāṁkhya philosophy, is a pure and transcendental consciousness. This pure-consciousness is taken as a witness[10] to whom all objects present themselves but which is, in no circumstances, affected or blemished by them. Besides this transcendental aspect of knowledge or *svarūpajñāna*, which is really the consciousness, Sāṁkhya also maintains a theory of empirical knowledge which justifies that knowledge as judgement is a modification[11] of *Buddhi*, the *sattva* aspect of *Prakṛti*, with the reflection of *Puruṣa*. Sāṁkhya clearly differentiates between the *vṛtti-jñāna* and the *svarūpa-jñāna* when it emphasizes that the former is produced, non-eternal and *jaḍa*, whereas, the latter is eternal, foundational and transcendental. In Sāṁkhya, knowledge, as *svarūpa-jñāna*, is not a product of any collocation of conditions, as in Nyāya, but is eternal, unproduced, infinite and unique. This conception of knowledge, in its transcendental as well as empirical aspects, would appear to be a fore-runner of the Vedānta epistemology which has been considerably influenced by it.

The Mādhva View

After this brief resume of the views of some of the important schools of Indian philosophy, the comprehension of which is necessary for understanding the nature and place of knowledge in the schools of Madhva and Śaṁkara, we proceed to discuss their points of view. The special feature of Mādhva epistemology is the conception of knowledge as *sakhaṇḍa* and *saviśeṣa* as against the Vedānta contention that it is partless and attributeless. The very idea of knowledge without 'subject' and 'object' is unimaginable. It is, however, an essential feature of knowledge that it always refers to some object; an object-less[12] knowledge, as advocated in the Śaṁkara School of Vedānta, is a flagrant contradiction of experience. Another point worthy of consideration, in this regard, is the Mādhva conception that knowledge is self-illumined. Much like Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta, the philosophical genius of the Mādhva school also recognizes the self-evident character of knowledge though the Mādhva interpretation of 'self-illuminacy' is different from both Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta. According to Madhva and his followers, 'self-evidence' is but another expression of the idea that knowledge is its own object.

The problem of the relation of knowledge with its subject and object is solved in the Mādhva system by acknowledging that knowledge is an essential[13] attribute of self which is always associated with the 'ego-consciousness'. According to Madhva, the Vedāntin's contention that there is no 'I-consciousness' in the deep-sleep-state is incorrect; the absence of the experience of 'I' in this state is only due to the dim consciousness of the 'I' which is caused by the absence of objects. The attributive theory of knowledge in Mādhva philosophy is different from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of knowledge which maintains that knowledge is produced by the conjoined action of collocations, both conscious and unconscious, inasmuch as, in this system knowledge, as revealed in self-consciousness, is not an adventitious property, as held by the Naiyāyikās and the Cārvākas, but is an essential and eternal attribute of self. It is why the scriptures[14] tell that the self is of the nature of consciousness (*citsvabhāva*). The consideration of knowledge as eternal and as an essential attribute of Ātman would go to establish that the position of knowledge in this system is more fundamental than either in Nyāya or Mīmāṁsā though it does not possess such a transcendental character as that of Sāṁkhya and Vedānta.

Besides, the Mādhva system recognizes another form of knowledge known as *vṛtti-jñāna* which is neither eternal nor essentially related to Ātman. This form of knowledge is produced through the contact of the object, the sense-organs, *manas* and the *sākṣin* and is, therefore, non-eternal, intermittent and unenduring.

The relation between knowledge and its object is neither *saṁyoga* nor *samavāya;* it is what is known as *viṣaya-viṣayī-bhāva* or the relation between the revealer and the revealed. It is contained in the very nature of knowledge that it should reveal an object; the object is not an object unless it is revealed by some knowledge. There is a unique relation between knowledge and its object, termed in Mādhva philosophy as *viṣaya-viṣayī-bhāva* which is not a single or unitary relation but is as numerous as the related entities.

Besides human knowledge whose nature is described above, we also come across certain descriptions of the knowledge of Īśvara in the main works of the Mādhva system. They contend that knowledge forms the very body of Īśvara to whom all objects in the world stand uninterruptedly[17] ever-revealed. Here also the fundamental position about knowledge that it refers to 'object' is upheld. Īśvara is the object of His self-consciousness and His knowledge reveals itself, the objects and Him in its continuous and eternal revelation.

Another speciality about Īśvara's knowledge is that it is never of the nature of *vṛtti-jñāna* such as we have in case of Jīvātman; to think of a non-eternal, produced and destructible type of knowledge—which a *vṛtti-jñāna* is—in Īśvara would be inconsistent with the doctrine of His omniscience. The omniscience of the Lord, as Jaya-Tīrtha contends,[18] has its reason in His knowledge which is contained in His very *svarūpa* (essential nature) and not through any *pramāṇa.* The whole universe, therefore, is always and directly revealed to Him by virtue of His eternal knowledge forming His body.

This narration of the epistemological points of view of the important systems of Indian philosophy and the school of Madhvācārya would facilitate our understanding of the contribution of the Śāṁkara school and the vulnerable points in their philosophy that have been made the targets of attack in the important works of Mādhva school. We will first describe the nature of knowledge as maintained in Śāṁkara Vedānta and then undertake the exposition and evaluation of the Mādhva criticism.

The Vedānta View

Śaṁkara, while criticising the Nihilist standpoint of consciousness in his commentary on *Praśnopaniṣad,*[19] writes that it is impossible to establish the absence of consciousness at any time. Because this absence is itself an object of consciousness, some form of consciousness is necessary to prove this absence; it is, therefore, futile to think of a moment without consciousness. It is a matter of ordinary experience that though the objects undergo change the consciousness to which they are objects is immutable. Vidyāraṇya, in his *Pañcadaśī,*[20] argues that at the back of our knowledge of objects, both in the dream and waking states, there pulsates a single consciousness (*saṁvid*) that synthesizes the different experiences of human life. One may ask : The presence of consciousness in the waking and dream states may not be questionable but where is the certainty that it pervades the deep-sleep-state as well ? In the important works of Advaita philosophy this question is replied by referring to the statement of a man who has just risen from his sleep. If we interrogate this man about his sleep he would say, 'I have slept happily and have not experienced anything'.[21] An analysis of this statement would, however, reveal that it is based on the memory of the darkness of deep-sleep which would never have been possible had this darkness been not an object of consciousness because one can memorize only such objects as have been experienced in the past. The presence of consciousness in the deep-sleep-state is as indubitable as in the waking and the dream states of consciousness. In all the three states of human life there is not a single moment when consciousness is absent.

Another important contention of far-reaching influence in Advaita philosophy is Vidyāraṇya's contention, in his *Pañcadaśī*, that consciousness, in all the three states, is a unity[22] which does not comprehend any difference whatsoever. In spite of the varied character of the illumination of consciousness in the waking and the dream states, consciousness as such remains identical. What creates the impression of difference in consciousness is the difference in the nature of objects which it illumines. The objects of consciousness in the waking state are apparently perdurable, whereas, those of the dream state are short-lived and this is what creates a corresponding difference in the manifestation of consciousness in these states.

Śaṁkara's assertion about the presence of consciousness in all the states has a direct corollary which is recognized as an important tenet in the idealistic theory of knowledge. It means that there can be no object of knowledge without knowledge—a contention that contributes to the view that consciousness is the prius of reality. "The objects may change their essence, but consciousness cannot be said to change inasmuch as it witnesses all objects irrespective of the place where they may happen to be; the fact of being is thus implied by all objects without exception....In this sense, consciousness is the prior principle or the foundational fact which cannot be reduced to something other than itself except through a confusion of thought."[23] This transcendental and pure form of knowledge is a necessary condition of all phenomena. Śaṁkara himself contends in his commentary[24] on *Kenopaniṣad* that this pure form of consciousness, which is the ground of all other forms of knowledge, is *nirupādhika* and is the very essence of Ātman.

Besides this form of knowledge which is transcendental, pure and foundational, there is another form of knowledge which appears in relation to 'subject' and 'object', is empirical and is subject to change. According to Śaṁkara, the empirical variety of knowledge is a product of the limitation of pure-knowledge through the *vṛttis* of antaḥkaraṇa (*Vṛtti-jñāna*) and is, therefore, *sopādhika*. Thus we have, in Śāṁkara Vedānta, two aspects of knowledge, viz., (1) the transcendental, foundational and pure and (2) the empirical one which explains the distinction between the knower, knowledge and the known. The Vedānta recognition of the transcendental and foundational aspect of knowledge lays emphasis on the fact that this knowledge is without any beginning or end; it is transcendental, unique, eternal and uncaused.

It would follow from this absolute and transcendental conception of knowledge or consciousness, which is only a unity of awareness, that it has neither external relations nor internal differences. In order that a thing may possess internal differences it is essential that it has parts, whereas, for external relations the second with whom the relations are to be established is a necessary pre-condition. In Absolute Consciousness, however, we can neither think of any internal parts nor can we imagine of a second to which it may be related. By imagining parts inside, we would simply destroy the nature of consciousness as a synthetic principle behind the varied forms of experience because the synthesis of these parts would require another principle to create the unity of awareness and so on ad-infinitum. The other alternative is also untenable because the very idea of a second, which implies difference, is antagonistic to the doctrine of consciousness as a foundational principle. The implication of recognizing something as different from consciousness is clear; it means that there exists something which is not founded in consciousness, a conclusion suicidal to the Vedānta thesis of consciousness as a foundational and a-priori principle. With the force of this logic Vedanta concludes that the absolute and essential nature of consciousness (*jñapti*) is non-differentiated and without any distinction and whatever understanding we have of difference in knowledge is only with regard to its empirical aspect or *vṛtti-jñāna*.

Another concept of vital importance in the Vedānta theory of knowledge, which is intimately related with the above view, is its doctrine that knowledge or consciousness is self-evident (*sva-prakāśa*). The comprehension of this standpoint would be easier if we compare it with the antagonistic doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school according to which a cognition is not self-illumined; instead, it depends on a subsequent cognition for being known (*para-prakāśatva*). The cognition of 'this' in the judgement, 'I know this', is cognized not by itself but through a special type of cognition, known as *mānas-pratyakṣa*, demonstrated in the subsequent cognition 'I know'.

The above theory that cognitions are not self-cognizable has been discarded by Prabhākara and the Vedāntins on the ground that it either leads us to regressus-ad-infinitum or ultimately stoops to accept the self-illuminating character of the subsequent cognition. Citsukhācārya, while criticising the Nyāya theory, in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, argues[25] that if the character of being self-revealed is not imbedded in the very nature of knowledge and if we do not have the knowledge of the cognition simultaneously with the illumination of its object, one would not be certain, in the next moment, if he has actually cognized the object. Instead of this certainty one would have either suspicion or some sort of perverseness with regard to that cognition. The same point is emphasized by Śrī Harṣa, in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*,[26] when he contends that no view other than the doctrine of *svaprakāśatva* can satisfactorily explain the fact of apprehension and it alone should be accepted as a valid doctrine. Knowledge does not require another knowledge for its illumination just as the sun does not require another light.

The next point about the nature of knowledge, as propagated in Vedānta, is the doctrine of its immediacy which is closely associated with the theory that it is self-revealed (*svaprakāśatva*). As contended by Prabhākara, knowledge in its very flash of revelation manifests itself, the knower and the known directly without the intervention of any intermediary. In Vedānta the distinction between the knower, the knowledge and the known is only from the empirical standpoint which is imposed on the Absolute Consciousness. The Absolute Consciousness also carries with it an immediacy, the Absolute Immediacy of the self-illuminating consciousness[28]—the 'jyotiḥ' of the whole universe.

We may now ask : What is the definition and the meaning of *svaprakāśatva* which is so vigorously upheld by the followers of Vedānta? Does it mean that knowledge is its own object, as maintained in Mīmāṁsā, or its revelation is object-less ? The former alternative, however, can be challenged on the ground that a thing cannot be both its object and subject, whereas, the second can be refuted with the plea that an objectless knowledge is a contradiction in itself.

With these difficulties in view, the authors of the Śāṁkara school define *svaprakāśatva* (self-illuminacy) of consciousness as the capacity[29] of immediate presentation without being an object of knowledge.

The distinction between the knower, the knowledge and the known for Vedānta is a matter of phenomena which has absolutely no place in the transcendental plane. The argument that the Vedānta definition of *svaprakāśatva* would involve the fallacy of the identification of the subject and the object would, however, be a misrepresentation of Vedānta inasmuch as Vedānta refuses to accept any distinction in the Absolute Consciousness. The other difficulty, as mentioned above, is also insignificant because the principle that knowledge is always of an object is not upheld by the Śaṁkarites who, on the other hand, subscribe to the view that an objectless knowledge in the transcendental state is not inconceivable. Whether the Śaṁkarite position is logically acceptable is a question which requires further elaboration; this point will, however, be discussed by us, in detail, while evaluating the Mādhva criticism.

This exposition of an important aspect of Vedānta philosophy might give us an idea of the ultimate and absolute aspect of consciousness which is different from both the known and the unknown[30], different from the known because of its essential in objectivity and from the unknown because it is self-effulgent[31] and illuminating. Notwithstanding this enunciation of the real and the ultimate nature of consciousness, Vedānta appears to be fully aware that this philosophy alone is insufficient to explain the phenomenal appearance of knowledge which manifests itself in the triple distinction of the knower, the knowledge and the known. In order to build up a complete theory of knowledge Vedānta has to propound a theory of the empirical knowledge which it seeks to explain through what is known as the limited (*sopādhika*) concept of knowledge or *vṛtti-jñāna.*

By the way, it may be mentioned that the difficulty of explaining the empirical order of knowledge while, at the same time, giving cognizance to the transcendental nature of intelligence was felt by Sāṁkhya when it explained that the changing forms of knowledge really belong to the non-intelligent *buddhi*—an evolute of *Prakṛti*—which is made, as if, conscious through the reflection of the Intelligent *Puruṣa.* Vedānta would have, probably, agreed to such a solution had the inherent dualism of the Sāṁkhya system not been antagonistic to its philosophy of the non-dualism of the ultimate and transcendental consciousness which, as explained in Vedānta, is the ground of the empirical forms of knowledge; the reflection theory[32] of Sāṁkhya has, therefore, been rejected by Vedānta in their search after a solution of the empirical order of knowledge though the Sāṁkhya fundamentals, in many cases, have been obviously admitted, e.g., the Vivaraṇa doctrine of reflection. Like Sāṁkhya, Vedānta believes that we cannot attribute change to the Pure Consciousness; change pertains not to Pure Consciousness but to *antaḥkaraṇa*, an aspect of Primal Nescience (*avidyā*). Empirical knowledge, therefore, is a modification of *antaḥkaraṇa* appearing in different forms such as perception, inference, etc., which is, however, made conscious and attributed to the agency of the individual soul through the mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self.[33] The phenomenal distinction between the knower, the knowledge and the known is also explained in Vedānta through the beginningless *adhyāsa* or the mutual superimposition between the self and the not-self having Nescience for its material-cause. Madhusūdana, while[34] explaining this mental psychosis in his *Siddhāntabindu*, says that in the event of knowledge the pure *antaḥkaraṇa* emerges through the eye and, while pervading the object, obtains its form. The whole span of this *antaḥkaraṇa* may be conceived as having three parts, the one pervading the individual's body, the second ranging between the individual and the object and the third pervading the object; these three parts of *antaḥkaraṇa* are respectively known as '*kartā*' (the agent), '*kriyā*' (action) and '*karma*' (object). Corresponding to these forms[35] of *antaḥkaraṇa*, viz., kartā, kriyā and karma, we have three forms of consciousness also that are termed as *pramātā*, *pramāṇā* and *prameya*.

It would appear that the empirical aspect of knowledge or cognition is an outcome of the determination of pure-consciousness by *antaḥkaraṇa* and is, therefore, *sopādhika*. We have thus in Vedānta epistemology two aspects of knowledge which correspond to the *pāramārthika* and the *vyāvahārika* orders of reality; the one is *svarūpajñāna* which is absolute, pure, eternal and self-illuminating consciousness[36] transcending all objectivity and the other is *vṛtti-jñāna* which is always related to its object. This *vṛtti-jñāna* is produced through the operation of sense-organs and *citta* whenever the conditions responsible for its production are favourable and is the result of the false superimposition between the self and the not-self.

Mādhva Criticism of the Vedānta Conception.

It has been indicated while discussing the Mādhva conception of knowledge that its essential nature of knowledge, according to this system, is always determinate and consists chiefly in the revelation[37] of the object. The main objection against the Śaṁkarites on this problem, therefore, refers to their philosophy of the transcendental and indeterminate character of knowledge. Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, contends that because it is contained in the very nature of knowledge that it should always reveal an object, knowledge cannot[38] be free from attributions; to imagine it as attributeless and partless, as done by the Śaṁkarites, would be to fall a prey to a devastating fallacy. Describing a thing as partless and attributeless tacitly assumes the existence of parts and attributes in it; without attributing partlessness and attributelessness to a thing it cannot be described as partless and attributeless. The very conception of knowledge as transcendental unity beyond objectivity and determination is a contradiction in itself[39] because in its very idea *cit* is *sakhaṇḍa* and *saviśeṣa*. If the Śamkarites contend that knowledge can be possible even without revealing the object then, Vyāsa-Tīrtha argues,[40] such unconscious entities as jar, pot, etc., would also possess the character of knowledge as they too do not reveal any object. The idea of the possibility of knowledge without revealing an object, according to him, is not only inaccurate but is also fantastic.

Moreover, the Śaṁkarites cannot earnestly claim that Brahman, the transcendental consciousness, is itself not an object when they maintain that Brahman is the ground of the cosmic superimposition caused by *avidyā*. If it is the ground of cosmic superimposition then it is also its object. The Vedāntins themselves describe Brahman as the substratum[41] of Nescience and as such it would be illogical to argue that Brahman is indeterminate, partless and attributeless.

Madhusūdana's Defence

In reply to this argument, Madhusūdana writes, in his *Advaitasiddhi*, that though the character of knowledge as related to its object is true yet it is limited to what is known as the *vyāvahārika*[42] order of existence. From the ultimate standpoint, no relation between knowledge and its object can be rationally established for this relation is itself superimposition (*adhyāsa*). The character of knowledge as consisting in the manifestation of object is hardly fundamental from the absolute standpoint. The second objection that Brahman being the ground of world-illusion is an object of this illusion and as such it is neither partless nor attributeless is also irrelevant because, from the transcendental standpoint, Vedānta refuses to accept any reality other than the transcendental consciousness or Brahman. The cosmic superimposition being *anirvacanīya* in character is a fact only in *vyavahāra* and can with no logical argumentation be related to the Ultimate Reality; to relate this superimposition with Brahman as its object would provide us with an instance where the critics of Vedānta have allowed themselves the indulgence of confusing between the *vyavahāra* and the *paramārtha dṛṣṭis*.

§2. THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND ITS OBJECT

Vyāsa-Tīrtha's Definition of Viṣayatva

During the course of our discussion in the above paragraphs, we have noted, more than once, that the main point at issue between the two systems, in the evolution of their theory of knowledge, is the question if at all knowledge is required to be ever-related to its object. What is actually meant by being an object? Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, defines *viṣayatva*, with his characteristic realism, as the capacity of inducing[43] practical activity or behaviour in respect of a particular type of knowledge. As the object is always manifested in relation and in dependence[44] to knowledge, *viṣayatva* may also be defined as that which reveals itself to a particular type of knowledge or as that which determines[45] the character of an event of knowledge. Moreover, it is a point of agreement that the knowledge of an entity is always generated through the contact of certain instruments and as such *viṣayatva* in respect of a specific[46] cognition may also be defined as that through whose contact the various instruments produce that cognition.

The philosophers of the Śāṁkara school, on the other hand, contend that from the transcendental standpoint neither *viṣayatva* nor its relation to knowledge can be established because knowledge in *paramārtha* is always transcendental, pure, and indeterminate. The Śaṁkarite point of view finds it incorrect to define *viṣayatva* (objectivity) as the capacity of producing practical behaviour, as done by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, because this requires another[47] capacity for being itself an object and so on ad-infinitum. The realistic assumptions of the Mādhva philosophers would require 'capacity' in their definition, in order to be known, as also an object and thus exposing themselves to the Śaṁkarite criticism that the Mādhva definition suffers from the fallacy of the regressus ad infinitum. This criticism is replied by Vyāsa-Tīrtha in his contention that this 'capacity' does not stand in need of another capacity for the knowledge of this capacity just as 'object' in perception (*dṛśya*) does not require another internal objectivity for being known. The capacity and objectivity in both of these cases are contained in their very nature and are self-dependent. But, according to Madhusūdana, this explanation cannot satisfactorily ward off the difficulty because in order to know the capacity its determinant character must also be known. Here, however, no determinant (*avacchedaka*) of this capacity can possibly be maintained—because of the difficulty of the regressus-ad-infinitum—and as such the definition of *viṣayatva* as the capacity of producing practical behaviour is logically invalid.

Again, the realist's definition of '*viṣayatva*' as that which reveals itself to knowledge is not less perplexing because—as revelation in itself is dependent on objectivity—this definition also suffers from the fallacy of self-dependence. This definition of *viṣayatva* is often put in a different language in the realist quarters and is explained as that which determines the form of a specific cognition. As explained by Udayana,[48] *viṣayatva* consists in the special character of the knowledge of a real existent which is determined by it and, therefore, *viṣayatva* may be defined as that which, while independent of any other relation, is the determinant of knowledge, whereas, in its own nature it is undetermined by knowledge just as a jar, when perceived, determines the form of knowledge though in itself it is unaffected by that knowledge. To the Advaitins these interpretations again suffer from the defect of self-dependence because when 'objectivity' is defined as the determinant of an event of knowledge we have no other character of the determinant but 'objectivity' itself. The definition finally takes the form : 'Objectivity is the objectivity determining the particular form of knowledge' which clearly indicates the fallacy of self-dependence in this argument. If in order to avoid this difficulty another objectivity is introduced to determine the form of knowledge, then this would require another objectivity with the result that the realist would again be thrown[49] in the abyss of the inexorable regressus-ad-infinitum. It has to be borne in mind, from the Advaitin's point of view, that from the absolute standpoint no *viṣayatva* (objectivity) is logically sustainable either by conceiving it as identical with knowledge,[50] as upheld by Udayana, or as different from it. The determinant of knowledge, on the realist's assumptions, should always be different from knowledge and as such 'objectivity', if conceived as identical with knowledge, would violate the realistic hypothesis. Again, to contemplate it as different from knowledge would be to introduce the fallacy of regressus-ad-infinitum and, hence, a real-objectivity, as contemplated by Madhva and other realists, would never stand the acid test of logical analysis.

Moreover, if the realists intend to justify the reality of *viṣayatva* (objectivity) by explaining it as the determinant of knowledge, which in its own nature is quite undetermined by knowledge, then also it would not be in conformity with experience. According to Madhusūdana,[51] the judgement, 'A known jar', indicates that the jar, while it is the object of knowledge, is also determined by knowledge and, hence, the definition of objectivity as that which is absolutely undetermined by knowledge stands refuted.

Another attempt to justify the reality of 'objectivity' is made by the realists when they define it as the ground[52] (*āśraya*) of the contact of the instrument which, according to them, is the extraordinary cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) of knowledge. It may be recalled that both the Nyāya and the Mādhva systems recognize the importance of sense and *manas* contact in the production[53] of knowledge and, therefore, according to Madhusūdana,[54] *manas* which is the ground of the sense-manas-contact—an uncommon cause—would also become an object of knowledge, a conclusion not acceptable to the realists at all. Moreover, this definition suffers from the defect of narrow extension (*avāpti*) because in cases of mediate knowledge, where there is no sense-contact, no extraordinary cause or its ground can possibly be demonstrated. Hence, to the idealists, this definition also fails in explaining the nature of objectivity that may be consistent with the realist's desire of according to objectivity a reality different from knowledge.

Śaṁkarite Conception of Viṣayatva

The above idealistic criticism and its conclusion has led the

Śaṁkarites to denounce the realistic hypothesis that 'object' has always a separate status and is distinct from its knowledge. According to them, objectivity is intelligible only as a superimposition on knowledge which is limited only to the *vyavahārika* order of existence. This phenomenal and superimposed appearance of 'object' in knowledge and the relation between them has been upheld by the Śaṁkarites as one of the reasons for proving the falsity of world. They argue that because no relation between knowledge and its object is sustainable it has to be conceived as one of superimposition only.

While elaborating the above standpoint, the Advaitins contend that it would be futile to imagine either the relation of contact (*saṁyoga*) or inherence (*samavāya*) between knowledge and its object because knowledge being subjective in character can neither contact nor inhere in an object of the external world; the only way of maintaining this relation is to imagine it as one of superimposition. The realists may, however, argue that the relation between knowledge and its object is something which is contained in their very nature (*svarūpasambandha*). But the idealist, as is expected of him, is reluctant to agree to this point of view inasmuch as the formulation of a mutual relation between knowledge and the variegated objects of world is against the unconditional and foundational character of knowledge—the cardinal principle of idealistic thought—and has, therefore, been discarded by the followers of the Śāṁkara school. The logic of this idealistic thinking denying any reality other than that of superimposition to object (*viṣaya*) is so occupying with them that the Śaṁkarites were led to criticize the relation of *viṣaya-viṣayī-bhāva* which the Mādhva philosophers conceived between knowledge and its object. As the object, according to them, is merely superimposed on knowledge, a real relation between knowledge and its object, viz., *viṣaya-viṣayī-bhāva*, as upheld by the followers of Madhva, is logically inadmissible.

The Śaṁkarite criticism of *viṣayatva* (objectivity) and its relation to knowledge, as described above, is reminiscent of the unique character of Śaṁkarite methodology which seeks to prove its conclusion by resorting to the method of reductio-ad-absurdum. By eliminating all possibilities of a satisfactory explanation of objectivity and its relation, the Śaṁkarites have cautiously refrained from attributing them any absolute character. Because no other explanation of objectivity[55] and its relation to knowledge can stand the test of dialectical criticism this relation can be accepted as one of superimposition only. Objectivity, according to Śaṁkarites, is imposed on the unconditioned, infinite and pure knowledge which is the only transcendental and absolute reality behind the world-phenomena.

Mādhva Criticism of the Saṁkarite View

The Mādhva philosophers have, on the other hand, argued that a real relation between knowledge and its object can be maintained. Vyāsa-Tīrtha,[56] in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, points out that it is possible to establish a relation between knowledge and its object—defined later on by him as the subject-object-relation (*viṣaya-viṣayī-bhāva*)—through the *vṛttis* generated by sense-object-contact. According to him, the Śaṁkarites also accept the importance and utility of *vṛttis* when they explain that the objects in perception are revealed only through the agency of the *vṛttis*. Thus there exists a real relation between knowledge, which has been explained in the Mādhva system as the attribute of self, and its object, technically called *viṣaya-viṣyai-bhāva*. The Madhvites further define the nature of this relation as the one which exists between the quality and the qualified citing the instances of such knowledge as 'the vacant place', 'the known jar', 'the desired pot', etc. It is incorrect to contend like the philosophers of the Śāṁkara school that because neither the relation of contact nor of inherence can be established between knowledge and its object no relation between them is sustainable. In the instances quoted above, though no relation of contact or of inherence sustains between them even then we have such qualified knowledge as 'the vacant place' or 'the known jar' where vacancy or the absence qualifies the place or the quality of the jar's being known qualifying the jar itself; here the qualified knowledge is determined by the relation which subsists between the *Viśeṣaṇa* and the *viśeṣya*. Similarly, the relation between 'knowledge' and its 'object' may also be conceived as the one subsisting between the quality and the qualified because the knowledge of the object is always [57] determinate and qualified.

The Madhvites further argue that the Śaṁkarite conception of object as *ādhyāsika* or illusory is fraught with several contradictions. First of all, the probandum in the inference of the falsity of world with 'illusory character of relation' as one of its probans is inconsistent with many other ideas of Vedānta. The Śaṁkarites seem to weigh less the truth of their own proposition, in the doctrine of relations, which asserts that the unreality of the relation implies the falsehood of the relata; if the relation is false then the relata must also be false. The Madhvites illustrate this point by citing a case from Vedānta philosophy which asserts that the relation between the pure, unconditioned Brahman and world is illusory (*ādhyāsika*) while at the same time maintaining that Brahman is absolutely real. This assertion about the reality of Brahman is in utter disregard of their conclusion in the inference of the falsity of world. If the falsehoold of the relation could be an instrument for establishing the falsehood of the world, why should it become blunt for proving the falsehood of Brahman ? The Vedānta position of the reality of Brahman, in this context, is, however, indicative of the truth of a different proposition asserting the truth of the relation while maintaining the relation as *ādhyāsika* or inexplicable. The author of *Yuktimallikā* quotes[58] an instance to explain that the inexplicablity of the relation between two existents does not entail their falsehood. Just as our incompetence in grasping the nature of the relation between the 'absence of jar' and the ground (where no jar is cognized) does not prove the unreality of either the ground or the 'absence of jar'; the Śaṁkarite failure in comprehending the correct nature of the relation between knowledge and its object should not be taken as a sufficient reason for establishing the falsehood (*mithyātva*) of the object. According to the Mādhva philosopher, the argument that the objects in phenomena are false because of the falsity of the relation is absolutely invalid.

Secondly, if we ask the Śaṁkarites, who maintain the illusory relation between knowledge and its object, to explain the relation between Brahman-realization[59] and its object (i. e., Brahman) they would, in order to be consistent in their argument, seek to establish that this relation is false and would explain this Brahman-realization as something imposed on the pure-consciousness of Brahman. But in Vedānta philosophy Brahman-realization has the same absolute reality as Brahman. How can this be consistent with the Vedānta hypothesis that the nature of a superimposed entity is always illusory ? If an entity can be superimposed, while at the same time real, then an object, e. g., a jar, which is considerd to be imposed on Brahman, should also be taken as absolutely real. This contradiction in the different conclusions of Vedānta philosophy is indicative of the fallacious character of the standpoint that 'object' is always unreal.

Moreover, the Vedānta theory of the illusory character of objectivity (*viṣayatva*) is only partly true. As argued by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*,[60] *adhyāsa* (superimposition) is possible only in immediate knowledge and not in past and mediate knowledge with the result that objectivity in these cases is not illusory. Further, it is inessential for 'objectivity' to be always illusory and superimposed because in many cases the Śaṁkarites themselves do not accept an object as unreal, e. g., Brahman, which is the object of *avidyā* and *śabda-pramāṇa*.

Again, as argued by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, object[61] cannot be considered as imposed on knowledge because both knowledge and its object belong to the same order of practical (*vyāvahārika*) reality. It is a principal tenet of the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta that the substratum of an illusory superimposition is always of a higher order of reality; as such, there is hardly any justification in contending that knowledge is the ground of the superimposition of its object because knowledge does not belong to a superior order of reality as compared to its object. These arguments go to establish, from the Mādhva standpoint, that the Vedānta doctrine[62] of *viṣayatva* is illogical and has no rational foundation.

Evaluation of Mādhva Criticism

After discussing the main points of the Mādhva criticism against the theory of the illusory relation between knowledge and its object it is essential to evaluate, in short, the validity of these criticisms in the light of the Śaṁkarite explanations available in some of the important texts of Vedānta philosophy. As already mentioned in this book, most of the criticisms against Śāṁkara and his followers are grounded in the confusion of standpoints to which the opponents of Śaṁkara have shown a persistent tendency. Here also this confusion is caused in the minds of the Mādhva critics when they equate the *vyāvahārika* and the *pāramārthika* aspects of knowledge. We can find this confusion in their criticism that knowledge cannot be the substratum of the superimposition of its object as the substratum must always be of a higher degree in the order of reality. It is a point worthy of our consideration that the Śaṁkarites maintain the relation of superimposition between knowledge and its object only from the transcendental standpoint; it is only in the *pāramārthika* state that the knower is identical with knowledge. Because the knowledge, which is the ground of the superimposition of objects, is *pāramārthika* and the imposed objects are only *vyāvahārika* no violation of the principle that the substratum should always be of the higher order of reality is involved.

Vyāsa-Tīrtha had argued that because a subject-object-relation is logically conceivable between knowledge and its object, through the perception of *vṛttis*, which find a place in Vedānta philosophy also, it would be improper on their part to brand it as illusory. If we put this criticism to a minute observation, it would occur to us that Vyāsa-Tīrtha has incorrectly understood the Advaita position which, in reality, seeks to establish the superimposed character of the relation between knowledge and its object only with reference to knowledge which is pure and indeterminate and where there is no *vṛtti* to accord a linkage. From the *vyāvahārika* standpoint, the *vṛtti* in the Śaṁkarite position is incomprehensible as an instrument of relation between the object and knowledge because *vṛtti* with the reflection of pure-consciousness is in itself knowledge in Vedānta. The Advaitin's explanation of the perceptual process makes sufficiently clear that the relation between *vṛtti* and the object, which it pervades, is one of contact and not of superimposition and as such the question of the illusory relation, from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint, does not arise. How the *vṛtti-jñāna* takes place in cases of mediate knowledge and what is the relation between *vṛtti* and its object in such cases is a problem whose discussion is postponed for another section of this chapter.

During the course of the Mādhva criticism we have also noted that Vyāsa-Tīrtha had raised two important points in his criticism of the Śaṁkarite theory, one about the irrelevancy of the idea of illusoriness of 'object' as a necessary condition for the conception of *ādhyāsika* relation and the other about the incompatibility of the idea of the falsity of world when in the superimposition of Brahman-realization on Brahman, which is its object, this realization is considered to be absolute. It may be observed in this connection that the substratum in superimposition always acquires a higher reality than the entity imposed and as such the relation between them should not be considered as similar to the one that subsists between two real entities (of the same order of existence); in every case of illusion the object imposed is always illusory, whereas, its substratum is real. There is, however, no incompatibility in the Śaṁkarite conception of the falsity of object while maintaining the illusory relation of knowledge and its object and the absolute reality of Brahman.

In reply to the second point, the Advaitins have argued that Brahman-realization in Vedānta consists only in the removal of *ajñāna* which is the cause of the perverse knowledge of the world and the concealment of the true nature of Reality. During the supreme realization the Advaitins do not consider any objectivity in Brahman and as such it is only a misrepresentation of Vedānta to first attribute 'objectivity' to Brahman and then establish the relation of superimposition between Brahman and Brahman-realization. The Post-Śaṁkarite arguments in favour of the doctrine of the *ādhyāsika* character of relation and *viṣayatva* are too profound to be set aside so easily as their opponents are prone to imagine. The intention of the Śaṁkarites is not to seek their falsehood from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint but only from the *pāramarthika* standpoint.

§3. THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND ATMAN

The Vedānta Conception

It has been observed in the beginning of this chapter that the relation between knowledge and Ātman is advocated in the principal schools of Indian philosophy in three different ways. Some of them, e. g., the schools of Nyāya and Vaiṣṇavism uphold that Ātman is the substrate in which knowledge inheres as a quality, the others like Kumārila and Prabhākara propagate the agency of Ātman only in relation to the act of cognition, whereas, the schools of Kāśmīraka Śaivism,[63] Vijñānavāda Buddhism and the Śāṁkara Vedānta, however, maintain the essential identity of knowledge and Ātman. As most of the schools had flourished before Śāṁkara, we find in his commentaries and the works of his followers a critical reference to their philosophical positions whose examination, we feel, can be of great help to us. While criticizing the doctrines of his opponents, the author of *Advaita-brahma-siddhi* argues that the relation[64] of knowledge with Ātman is conceivable only as difference, identity and both identity and difference; out of these only the second one can stand the test of logical analysis. The upholders of the first view who generally maintain this relation to be the one subsisting between substance and its attributes cannot satisfactorily explain the nature of this relation. It can neither be contact, because contact is always between substances and not between a substance and its attribute, nor can it be 'inherence' for the contemplation of this relation as inherence, in this case, has its own disadvantages. We may ask : How is quality related to its substance ? Is it through another relation or by virtue of its own nature ? The first alternative has the bleak prospect of the regressus-ad-infinitum, whereas, about the second we may ask : What is actually intended by the relation whose occurrence depends on the nature of the inhering quality ? What is the nature of this inhering quality which makes the relation of inherence possible ? Is it different from inherence or identical with it ? The admission of the first alternative would naturally conclude in the inexorable regressus-ad-infinitum, whereas, the second one contains in its womb an instance of pure tautology. Our acceptance of the nature of the inhering quality as identical with inherence would mean that the relation of inherence between the inhering quality and its substrate is rendered possible by virtue of inherence—obviously an instance of tautology. Thus the author of *Advaita-brahma-siddhi* contends that neither the relation of contact nor of inherence is conceivable between knowledge and Ātman. It is also difficult, according to him, to find a reasonable support for the opinion that the relation between self and knowledge should be contemplated as one of identity and difference. Because the ideas of 'identity' and 'difference' are mutually contradictory, their coexistence is inconceivable by any stretch of imagination. The only alternative that can be acceptable to the Vedāntins is the proposition that the relation between knowledge and Ātman is one of essential identity.

If the relation of essential identity between knowledge and Ātman be true, how is one to explain an act of cognition or knowledge in its form as activity ? Does Vedānta intend by knowledge the empirical, objective and active form of knowledge when it speaks of the identity of knowledge with Ātman ? Śāṁkara, while examining the real nature of knowledge, in his commentary on *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, brings out two salient objections against the idea of knowledge as 'activity'. He argues that the idea of knowledge as an act is not in conformity with the *Upaniṣadic* teaching that Brahman is Truth, Knowledge and Infinity. Because the conception of activity is necessarily related with objectivity and change, the idea of knowledge as an act would not only destroy the conception of Brahman as an enduring consciousness but would also strike at the foundation of Its Infinity and Truth.

Śaṁkara further suggests that if, from the absolute standpoint, the character of knowledge as an act, which naturally involves the subject-object-distinction, be justified then in order that the omniscience of Brahman as taught in the *Upaniṣads* be rationally commendable Brahman should be the object of His knowledge with the implication that Brahman is both the subject and the object—a proposition absolutely unthinkable in Vedānta philosophy. There is, however, another reason why Brahman cannot be regarded as both the subject and the object. Such a conception, according to Śaṁkara, would badly damage the very basis of all speculations about its nature as partless and would also introduce in its nature the character of finitude as against its eternal infinity. The Śaṁkarites attribute all such activity and difference in knowledge to the principle of *antaḥkaraṇa* whose conditioning is responsible for the distorted and perverse appearance of the transcendental and pure consciousness in the form of the phenomenal and discursive knowledge. Here again, we confront a dual conception of knowledge, one the transcendental pure *Cit*,[66] which is the substratum or the ground cause of all phenomenal manifestations, and the other the empirical or the *vṛtti-jñāna*—an inferior type of knowledge. The conception of the essential identity of Ātman and knowledge as upheld by the Śaṁkarites is only in respect of its transcendental character and not from the empirical or the *vyāvahārika* standpoint, as often mistaken by the adversaries of Śaṁkara. In empirical consciousness, the knower is as much different from knowledge as an object from its congnition. Moreover, because the knowledge is produced through the superimposition and reflection of pure-consicousness in *antaḥkaraṇa* it becomes limited and affected by the character and quality of the intellect[67] (*buddhi*). Śaṁkara's philosophy, therefore, does not recommend the appraisal of the identity of self with knowledge that is discursive in character but only with such knowledge as is pure, transcendental and beyond the triple distinction of the knower, the knowledge and the known. The Śaṁkarite contention of the identity of knowledge with self is only from the *pāramārthika* standpoint and not the *vyāvahārika* as often confused by the critics of Vedānta.

Mādhva Criticism

It is clear from the above exposition that the Vedānta doctrine of the identity of knowledge and Atman has its basis in the theory of knowledge as indeterminate, partless and transcendental. This theory, as we have noticed, is antagonistic to Madhva's accredited beliefs in the field of epistemology. Madhva and his followers were not only reluctant to share this view but they maintained a divergent theory of determinate and objective knowledge which strikes hard at the very root of the conception that knowledge and Self are identical. According to them, it is inherent in the very nature of knowledge that it should belong to a subject[68] and appear in relation[69] to an object. As knowledge in Madhva is a mental activity, like so many activities of the individual, it is highly preposterous, according to them, to think of knowledge either without a subject or as identical with it. Moreover, if knowledge were identical with the Self, then our experience about knowledge would have been in the form of the judgement 'I am knowledge' and not 'I know myself', in other words, 'I have knowledge'. This usage of the possessive with regard to knowledge is a sufficient evidence that justifies the attributive character of knowledge and the view that knowledge subsists as a quality in Ātman, its substrate.

The Śaṁkarites often reply this by arguing that because knowledge is beginningless it does not stand in need of a subject or its manifestation. But beginninglessness, as Vyāsa-Tīrtha argues, is not a sure criterion for the rejection of the relative importance of the subject. There are several instances in which beginningless entities are found as dependent on something else, e. g., *prāgabhāva*, Iśvara's knowledge, etc. One can have the knowledge of *prāgabhāva* (negation prior to existence) which, according to Mādhva philosophy, is beginningless only through the perception of its counterpositive. Similarly, Īśvara's[70] knowledge, though not produced by the object, is none the less determined by it. In the presence of such contrary instances it would be illogical to contend that because knowledge is beginningless, it has not to depend, for its manifestation, on the subject and object.

If the Vedānta doctrine of the identity of knowledge and Ātman is untenable, what can be the most valid relation between them? As it has already been explained, Ātman in Madhva's philosophy is the substrate in which knowledge inheres[71] as a quality. This knowledge[72] is not an adventitious property of Ātman, as maintained in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, but is an eternal property, because it would inevitably lead to the unconscious character or the *jaḍatva* of the individual soul. Moreover, it is a fact in experience that consciousness[73] always accompanies the existence of man and there is no self, at least, without the consciousness of the 'I'; not only in the waking or the dream states but in deep-sleep also there is no absence of consciousness. The followers of Madhva, therefore, venture to establish the eternality of consciousness and its nature as a quality inhering in the self which, according to them, is possible only through the presence and the agency of the *viśiṣṭa* a category which, in the system of Madhva, is a via-media of explaining a number of improbabilities that are otherwise logically inexplicable.

The Advaitin's Rebuttal

The Śaṁkarite reaction and their counter-criticism of the Mādhva attack on the doctrine of the identity of knowledge and Ātman can be read in the treatment of this problem by Kāśmīraka Sadānanda, in his *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, some arguments from which have already been reproduced above. Śaṁkara, as we have already discussed, criticized the doctrine that knowledge is a mental activity and is essentially related to its object. Yet the problem whether Śaṁkara's philosophy recognizes the interdependence of knowledge and its subject from the absolute standpoint requires elucidation. Madhusūdana, in his *Advaita-siddhi*,[74] discusses this problem in detail and endeavours to demonstrate that it is neither possible to establish the fact that knowledge is caused by its subject nor that it is pervaded by the subject so as to explain the invariable concomitance between knowledge and its subject. The first alternative, according to Madhusūdana, would conclude in the non-eternality of Lord's knowledge for then it has to be accepted that His knowledge is also produced. The second alternative is justifiable only if it can be established that knowledge is either an act or a quality both of which, according to Śaṁkarites, are logically insupportable. There is, therefore, no ground in the make-belief that knowledge is dependent for its manifestation on its subject and is really attributive and not substantial in nature. In this connection, we should not be oblivious of the Śaṁkarite contention that their criticism of the realist's standpoint about knowledge is only from the absolute standpoint and not from the pragmatic or the *vyāvahārika* point of view because in practical experience they themselves admit the triple distinction of the 'knower', 'knowledge' and 'known'. The theory of the identity of knowledge and Ātman is preached by Śaṁkara and his followers only in case of the knowledge which is supreme and transcendental and not which is inferior and discursive.

§4. THE NATURE OF EGO

Mādhva Conception of Ego

Mādhva philosophy, as will be discussed in a later chapter of this book, formulates the doctrine that *caitanya* (consciousness) is the eternal nature of self whose knowledge is always associated with what is known as the 'I-consciousness'; there is no aspect of human experience when this 'ego' may be[75] absent. Even in the deep-sleep-state this 'ego-consciousness' is present though its manifestation, for certain reasons, is not distinct. The judgement about the absence of the 'ego' in the deep-sleep-state has its reason, not in its absence, but in the absence of some other object in whose knowledge it might be distinguished. The clear manifestation of the ego-consciousness is possible only if it reveals some object with which it is distinguished. This constant association of the ego with the self, in human experience, provides the Mādhva philosopher with an argument for professing the doctrine of the identity of self and the ego or the ego-consciousness which is the eternal attribute of Ātman as against the Śaṁkarite doctrine that the essential nature of Ātman is free from the profane and the malfeasant influences of the ego which is only a product of the not-self. This consideration of the 'ego' within the category of the not-self in Vedānta provides the Madhvites an opportunity for pressing their standpoint by attacking the fortress of Vedānta philosophy at a point which to them is most vulnerable.

Vedānta Conception of Ego

The Vedānta polemics, at this stage, seeks a justification for the existence of 'ego' as different from Ātman. The Śaṁkarites feel that they can be provided with a sure argument for this in that most mysterious of the states of human experience, the deep-sleep-state. According to them, no one has the experience of 'I' in the deep-sleep-state. The later judgements, e. g., 'I have slept happily', 'I have not perceived anything', which point to the continuance of the sleeper's individuality during this state, refer only to the existence of the self-illuminating Ātman as the substrate of the veil of *ajñāna* (ignorance). The absence of the 'I-consciousness' during *suṣupti* (deep-sleep) is, therefore, a sufficient indication towards the validity of the doctrine that the 'ego' is different from Ātman because the presence of Ātman during *suṣupti* is beyond doubt. This is, however, another reason which weighs considerably with the Advaitins and has a basis in the essential characters of the Ātman and the 'ego'. The 'ego', as the analysis of such judgements as 'I know', 'I do', would indicate, has activity, whereas, the Ātman is immutable and inactive. How can then the two[76] be identical ?

With their assertion of the ego as different from the Ātman, the Vedānta confronts two vital questions : (1) What is the nature of the 'ego' and (2) how the judgement, after awakening, about the deep-sleep, 'I have slept happily', is to be explained ? In reply to the first question, the Vedānta contends that the nature of 'ego' is *cidacidātmaka*[77] (both conscious and unconscious) which is based on the mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self. The reason for such an assertion is rather interesting; the ego is considered *cit* and *acit* because it reveals, in its manifestation, the two aspects of knowledge and action which belong respectively to the self and the not-self. Moreover, because between Self and the not-self no relation other than that of *adhyāsa* is conceivable, the ego is explained as an outcome of the superimposition (*adhyāsa*) between Ātman and *anātman*. The Vedānta is emphatic about its assertion that the 'I-consciousness'[78] is the result of the superimposition of the reflection[79] of the *caitanya* or Ātman in *antaḥkaraṇa* and as such is not identical with the Self.

The second question regarding the objective experience of the deep-sleep is answered by the Śaṁkarites by asserting that, as a matter of fact, there is no objective knowledge in this state (*suṣupti*); the judgement, 'I have slept happily', after awakening, is due to the memory of the previous day, the day when the man went to sleep. The objectivity to knowledge as revealed in this judgement is, therefore, a case of appearance, unreal and superimposed.

Vyāsa-Tīrtha's Refutation

From the above exposition of the Vedānta conception of the nature of the ego, it would appear that the whole argument in favour of the difference between the self and the ego ultimately depends on the manifestation of the former and the non-manifestation of the latter in the deep-sleep-state. As the doctrine of the 'ego' has a considerable influence in determining the nature of the individual soul, the Vedānta standpoint in this regard has been put to scathing criticism in Vyāsa-Tīrtha's monumental work, the *Nyāyāmṛta*. He asks in his characteristic polemical tone : What is the basis of the Śaṁkarite belief that in the deep-sleep[80] only Ātman is illumined, whereas, the 'ego' is not illumined when the human experience is otherwise ? On the basis of our experience we know that the judgement, 'I have slept and have not seen anything', refers actually to the 'ego', the object of 'I', and not to the Ātman. The Advaitin may, however, try to defend his position by arguing that because the appearance of the ego is made possible through the limitation of Ātman by *antaḥkaraṇa* the association which appears to refer to the ego actually refers to Ātman—the substratum and the cause of the manifestation of the ego. But this argument, Vyāsa-Tīrtha contends, contradicts an important position in the Śaṁkarite philosophy. In another context, it is argued by the veterans of Vedānta philosophy that *avidyā* is the object of the association and apprehension in the deep-sleep-state (the Advaitins arrive at this conclusion by analysing the later judgement 'I did not experience anything'). This paradox, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, is insurmountable unless the Advaitins become conscious of the lurking fallacy in the argument that, whereas, the Ātman in *suṣputi* is illumined the illumination of the ego is wanting.

Moreover, the denial of the 'ego' in the deep-sleep-state would also lead to the following difficulties as enumerated by Vyāsa-Tīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta* :

(1) There is a natural inclination in human beings to enter into *suṣupti* in moments of suffering for temporary emancipation from pain. This inclination[81] would, however, be inexplicable if

there is no 'I' in this state because then no one would be left to enjoy this freedom.

(2) The denial of the ego in the deep-sleep-state entails the discontinuity of the 'I' that enters this realm of oblivion with the result that it is difficult to be convinced that the same sleeper has awakened. In other words, the denial of ego in the deep-sleep would make the recognition of personality impossible.

(3) Because the individual before sleep was a different personality, all his actions must be supposed to have remained fruitless.[82] Not only this, the enjoyments of the awakened individual would appear as due to no *karma* at all. But, is it not against the strict moral law that a man reaps only what he sows ?

(4) Again, because, according to Vedānta, the activity and enjoyment[83] belong to the ego and not to the self, the discontinuity of the ego in the deep-sleep would mean that the doer before the sleep is different from the enjoyer who awakes in the morning—a conclusion violating the verdict of the strict moral-law.

Moreover, the Vedānta theory that the manifestation of self-consciousness in deep-sleep, as suggested in later experience, is caused by the remembrance of the past is also incompatible[84] and is wanting in the requisite conditions of memory. As memory is always of[85] identical objects apprehended in the past and because there is no apprehension of the 'ego' in the *suṣupti*, the Vedānta explanation of the later judgement as being rooted in memory is, from the Mādhva point of view, absolutely illogical and irrelevant. There is only one possibility of explaining the post-slumber judgement about *suṣupti* and that is by pleading the truth of the doctrine that the ego is identical with Ātman and is present during the deep-sleep-state.

Evaluation of Mādhva Criticism

It is clear from the Mādhva criticism, as narrated above, that the whole criticism hinges on the question of the apprehension of the ego in the state of *suṣupti*. The Śaṁkarites who are reluctant to identify the ego with the Ātman, probably due to the fear of endangering its transcendental, pure and indeterminate character, deny any such experience of the ego in the deep-sleep-state and explain the later experience, 'I have slept happily', as having association only with the Ātman which is concealed by *avidyā*. Vyāsa-

Tīrtha's objection against this position that it is incompatible with the Vedānta contention about *avidyā* being the object of the judgement, 'I did not see anything', as discussed above, is replied by the Śaṁkarites by appending an explanation to their thesis. According to them, because Ātman is the substratum of *avidyā*, the judgement in question while referring to *avidyā* refers to Ātman as well; as a rule, correspondence to a superimposed entity implies correspondence to its substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*). Moreover, without the manifestation of Ātman in the deep-sleep no knowledge of *avidyā* in this state could have occurred because *avidyā* in Vedānta is essentially non-illuminating. Thus, according to the followers of Śaṁkarācārya, the explanation that the judgement in the waking state regarding deep-sleep refers only to the Ātman and not to the ego is not at all inconsistent with their contention that *avidyā* is the object of the judgement 'I did not know'.

According to Śaṁkarites, the ego, being an evolute of *antaḥkaraṇa*, merges in its causal principle, the Nescience, during the state of *suṣupti* and emerges out, through the latent *saṁskāras*, at the rise of the subsequent dream or the waking state. Though the Śaṁkarites deny the existence of ego in the deep-sleep-state yet they do not deny the existence and continuance of the individual soul, the Ātman determined by *avidyā* and its evolutes. The negation of the ego, however, does not dispense with either the existence or the continuity of the jīva that may provide logical basis for the charge that the Vedānta aims at the denunciation of individual personality. The Mādhva criticism, as narrated in these pages, appears grounded in a serious misunderstanding about the nature and the function of the ego.

It is thus clear that the Advaitin's denial of the ego in *suṣupti* is due to the absence of 'I-consciousness' subsequently leading to the assumption that the ego is different from Ātman. Though there is no ego in this state yet its existence in a causal form,[86] i.e., *avidyā* has always been accepted in Vedānta. The concealment of the real nature of Ātman by *avidyā* continues so long as it has not realized itself after which alone the Nescience with all its evolutes is subjected to destruction. The real nature of Ātman[87] which is transcendent and is the pre-condition of all knowledge is, therefore, quite different from its appearance as 'ego' in the lower level of knowledge. It is revealed only in a state which transcends the limit and approach of inferior human knowledge—the three states of consciousness; it is the fourth unconditioned and transcendent state of consciousness, the Turīya of the *Māndūkyopaniṣad.*

§5. SELF-LUMINOSITY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ĀTMAN

The Vedānta View

It has been stated, more than once, that the conceptions of self-luminosity and immediacy of knowledge are fundamental for a theory of knowledge emphasizing its foundational and a-priori character, a position to which the followers of both Śaṁkara and Madhva have given their unequivocal support, though in their own way, as would be manifest from their criticism of the antagonistic theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school (the doctrine of *para-prakāśatva*). Notwithstanding their accord, the variance in their epistemological positions has led to a difference in their explanations of these concepts and, at times, to mutual criticism and counter-criticism.

As Śrī Harṣa points out, in his *Khandana-khanḍa-khādya*, the conception of *svaprakāśatva*[88] (self-luminosity) of knowledge and Ātman, besides being the only doctrine that can satisfactorily explain the fact of apprehension, is necessary to save the world from its natural[89] unintelligence; the world being the manifestation of the unintelligent *avidyā* can never radiate intelligence and activity without a self-luminous and conscious substratum. But, what is actually meant by the term '*sva-prakāśa*' ?

According to Vācaspati, *svaprakāśatva*[90] of knowledge means its independence of illumination or that there is something inherent in the nature of knowledge which is responsible for its illumination. In reality, this definition describes, in a nutshell, the Vedānta conception of *svaprakāśatva* (self-luminosity) and is suggestive of other definitions that are only expositions and elaborations of this fundamental definition. The fact of illumination as something inherent in the nature and existence of knowledge and Ātman has also been recognized[90] by Vidyāraṇya who explained the *svaprakāśatva* of Ātman on the ground that its existence is not wanting[92] in *prakāśa* (illumination). Though the essential features of *svaprakāśatva* have been successfully brought out in these definitions yet the problem of its immediacy and its transcendental character has been left unanswered. These aspects of *svaprakāśatva* have been rightly emphasized by Citsukha who tried to modify Vācaspati's definition in order to make it more comprehensive and perfect in all respects.

Citsukha, in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, defines *svaprakāśatva* of Ātman or consciousness as that which being[93] non-cognizable has the capacity of immediate revelation. This definition is constituted of three important judgements, viz., (1) that the *svaprakāśa* principle is non-cognizable, (2) that it is a sort of immediate revelation and (3) that it is a 'capability'. We will now elaborate these judgements a little at length in order to bring home to us their meaning and contribution to the full import of '*svaprakāśatva*'.

(1) *Non-cognizability* (*avedyatva*) : 'Cognizability', in Advaita Vedānta, means the manifestation of the objective consciousness through the removal of the particular aspect of *avidyā* caused by the contact of mental psychosis or *citta-vṛtti*. In order to be cognizable, it is necessary that the thing must be an 'object' whose character, as defined by Vācaspati,[94] is the fruition of an act (of cognizance) on the part of a principle other than itself, i. e., the 'subject'. This definition of the 'object' justifies, on the one hand, the contention that the subject and the object are not identical and, on the other, maintains the view that 'objectivity' is a character essentially of the *jaḍa* (the not-self) and not of the self-illuminating Ātman. According to Vedānta, it is also a point of common experience that all the *jaḍa-padārthas* depend on knowledge for being known and as such are *para-prakāśya* and not self-illumined. Thus, 'cognizability' is a character which belongs to something that is other-illumined and not self-luminous. *Svaprakāśatva* is, therefore, non-cognizable.

(2) *Immediacy of Revelation* : The idea of the immediacy of consciousness is closely related to the concept of self-luminosity because the concept of mediacy being always other-dependent cannot be associated with self-luminosity on account of its apparent contradiction. It is, however, a commonplace in Indian philosophy that a direct *pramāṇa* on account of its immediacy has more strength, validity and truth than the indirect or mediate *pramāṇas* and as such the immediacy of revelation is more reliable as a harbinger of truth than any of the mediate forms of knowledge. It

would perhaps be no overstatement of facts to remark that the greater the degree of immediacy the greater the revelation of truth and the supreme manifestation of truth is available in the highest form of immediacy known as '*aparokṣānubhūti*'.

This immediacy has been broadly classified by Vedānta into two classes, (1) the transcendental and (2) the *vyāvahārika* or phenomenal. The phenomenal immediacy relates to the inferior or discursive type of knowledge which is not fully independent of the various conditions (*sāmagrī*) and instruments required for its generation. The immediacy, in the case of an ordinary perception of a pot, though independent of any other knowledge, e.g., *anumiti* or *upamiti*, is dependent upon and is mediated by its generating conditions and the *vṛttis* of *antaḥkaraṇa*. The immediacy and, consequently, the self-illumination of the inferior type of knowledge is imperfect and is not absolute and whatever self-luminosity is attributed to this type of knowledge is only due to the reflection or the superimposition of the transcendental knowledge.

The highest type of immediacy and *svaprakāśatva* is, therefore, possible only in the transcendental and self-evident knowledge which is the substratum of all the manifestations of the world. It is this knowledge whose revelation, though not experienced by senses, is really self-illuminating and is the only means of achieving the supreme realization of Truth. As one of the *āgamas* rightly says, "For[95] the achievement of Truth knowledge—the goddess—is the only shelter for us."

(3) *The Capability* (*yogyatā*) : Though the two constituents of the definition, as discussed above, are sufficient to guard against the fallacy that the definition is too wide and applicable to the *jaḍa-padārthas* of the universe yet it is open to the charge that this definition is too narrow in scope. The two constituents, taken jointly define a principle which though transcendental and non-cognizable necessitates an immediate *vyavahāra* (*aparokṣa-vyavahāra*) which is a *dharma* pertaining to the practical order of reality. The state of *mokṣa* which being identical with Ātman is self-illuminating would fall outside the extent of this definition and would exhibit the fallacy that the definition is too narrow in scope (*avyāpti-doṣa*). In order to be immune from this difficulty, Citsukha adds one more constituent, i.e., 'capability' to the definition and defines self-luminosity as that which being non-cognizable has the capability

of immediate *vyavahāra*. The introduction of the term 'capability' to the definition would include within its compass the state of emancipation also. The state of *mokṣa* in which there is no immediate *vyāvahārika* revelation has nevertheless the capacity to do so because in its absence the immediate cognition before this state, in case of the *mukta-jīvas* (liberated souls), would be impossible.

In this connection one more difficulty may, however, stare us in the face. It has been often pointed out by the critics of Vedānta that the capability of immediate revelation, being a *dharma*, should not be attributed to the state of *mokṣa* which, as the Vedāntins say, is indeterminate and beyond all attributions. Such an attribution would, however, be detrimental to the Advaita contention that the real nature of Ātman is indeterminate and transcendental; thus the liberated soul can never be the substratum of the capacity of immediate revelation. In order to defend himself against this charge, Citsukha takes shelter under the renowned Nyāya technique that explains the substratum of *yogyatā* as the non-substratum of the absolute negation[96] of *yogyatā* (capability). This explanation gives him the advantage of denying a positive attribution to the real nature of self-luminosity. Whatever positive revelation or manifestation is available in the ordinary course of knowledge is only *kalpanā* having its cause in the beginningless *avidyā*. It may not be out of place to observe that the Vaiśeṣikas who define a substance as a substrate of qualities have also to depend on this type of explanation for upholding[97] the existence of substance in the first moment of creation, which, however, is devoid of all attributes. They too define the substance as 'the non-substrate of the absolute non-existence of quality'. Thus, not being the substratum of the non-existence of any attribute embodies in itself an unmanifested capacity which though not a *dharma* is none the less capable of later manifestations. With these weighty considerations and his flawless polemics of which he was a true master, Citsukha defines *svaprakāśatva* as the absence of the substrate of absolute non-existence of the capacity of immediate revelation along with the fact that it is non-cognizable.

Mādhva Criticism and its Evaluation

Citsukha's definition of *svaprakāśatva* has evoked considerable interest and extremely bitter criticism in the literature of the

Mādhva school where it has been contended that the Śaṁkarite explanation of *svaprakāśatva* is inconsistent with the real nature of knowledge. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, who discusses Citsukha's definition at a considerable length in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, all the constituents of the definition, as explained by him, are untenable specially in the context of the other accredited principles of Advaita philosophy.

To begin with the first constituent, i. e., 'non-cognizability', Vyāsa-Tīrtha[98] objects that if it were a valid condition for *svaprakāśatva* then Brahman, which is *svaprakāśa*, would remain unknown for ever. Here Vyāsa-Tīrtha refers to the Śaṁkarite explanation of the process of knowing Brahman wherein it is contended that the true knowledge of Brahman is acquired through its reflection in the supreme *vṛttis* of *antaḥkaraṇa* produced through the knowledge of the *śāstras*. Is it not a sufficient justification for the belief that Brahman is cognizable ? How can the Advaitins introduce 'non-cognizability' as a condition in the definition of *svaprakāśatva* without endangering the self-luminous character of Brahman ? The Advaitins try to meet this charge by contending that what they mean by 'non-cognizability' is the[99] absence of the relation between *vṛtti* and the *cit*, as divested of its veil, a condition necessary for any act of perception. But as this relation is possible only in the *vyāvahārika* level of existence where the category of difference is admitted and because the Śaṁkarites do not acquiesce in this difference in the transcendental state of Absolute Unity the condition of non-cognizability has necessarily to be introduced as one of the important factors constituting the definition of *svaprakāśatva*. From the Śaṁkarite standpoint, it is incorrect for the Madhvites to assert that Brahman is the object of the supreme *vṛtti* because the *vṛttis* as generated by the hearing of the *śāstras* have their function only in the removal of *mūlāvidyā* which stands as an impediment against the self-effulgence and illumination of Brahman. Thus, it is clear that 'non-cognizability' is an important condition in the definition of self-luminosity.

The Madhvites further object that it is inconsistent to maintain the immediacy of revelation while at the same time advocating its non-cognizability. As interpreted by them, non-cognizability only means the absence of the manifestation of its object which clearly indicates the contradiction inherent in accepting it as a qualifying clause of the definition of *svaprakāśatva*. For Madhvites it is an essential characteristic of immediate revelation that it always refers to some object. How can there be any immediacy in revelation without its object being known ? Citsukha has given proof of his polemical incompetence in not understanding such a glaring contradiction in his definition of *svaprakāśatva*. Madhusūdana replied this criticism, in his *Advaita-siddhi*, by arguing that the[100] Mādhva objection though valid in cases of *jaḍa-padārthas* cannot be held against knowledge which is by nature self-luminous. The *jaḍa-padārthas*, being unintelligent in nature, require another light or cognition for their manifestation but knowledge which is self-effulgent is not in need of another cognition. By virtue of its special position as a prius of all things knowledge has the prerogative of immediate revelation without being an object of cognition.

This discussion would, however, bring home to us that the most weighty consideration with the authors of the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta, in their whole philosophy, is the formulation of the transcendental and foundational character of knowledge as the ultimate synthesizing principle behind the various forms of cognition. As this principle is the basis of all comprehension, the Advaitins find it essential to justify its transcendence beyond the reach of all knowledge that is phenomenal or discursive or the *vṛttis* of *antaḥkaraṇa*. It is for this that Vedānta gives cognizance to *avedyatva* (non-cognizability) as a necessary condition and an unavoidable constituent in the definition of *svaprakāśatva*. Moreover, because this transcendental consciousness is the source of all intelligence, it is considered by the Śaṁkarites that it should possess the 'capacity of immediate revelation' as something essentially contained in its nature. Many a time its glory and illumination has been compared with that of the 'sun' which is the source of all light and is not dependent on any other light for its revelation.

Thus the main features of the Mādhva criticism against the Vedānta theory of *svaprakāśatva* are: (1) the refutation of the thesis that knowledge can be known without being an object and (2) the denunciation of the philosophy of the transcendence of knowledge. Because the Madhvites are the protagonists of the determinate character of knowledge, both eternal and non-eternal, it is but natural for them to raise their voice against a system that seeks to establish the character of *saṁvid* as indeterminate. Knowledge in their system does not enjoy the prerogative of occupying the superior position, in point of reality, to other objects. The difference between the standpoints of the schools of Śaṁkara and Madhva on the problem of *svaprakāśatva*, therefore, consists in their solution of the problem of the cognizability of knowledge and Ātman. Whereas, the Śaṁkarites do not acknowledge the cognizability of knowledge and Ātman in the *pāramārthika*-state Madhva and his followers are always prone[101] to do so. Here again, as in many cases, the divergence in the opinions is due to the Vedānta recognition of a transcendental state beyond phenomena or *vyavahāra*.

B—STAGES AND FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE

§1. INTRODUCTORY

Though, from the absolute standpoint, Vedānta recognizes only one stage and form of knowledge, which is described in the *śrutis*[102] as transcending the intellectual comprehension of man, yet because Vedānta formulates, in the field of *vyavahāra*, the existence and place of empirical knowledge through the medium of *antaḥkaraṇa*, it may not be difficult to trace certain stages and forms of knowledge as determined by the special modes of *citta-vṛttis*. Because these stages and forms of knowledge are possible only through the presence and existence of *antaḥkaraṇa* their existence is always confined to the *vyāvahārika* order. Thus when we consider the stages and forms of knowledge we do so only from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint which is sublatable at the dawn of the ultimate realization of Truth manifesting in full effulgence the only state of indeterminate pure consciousness. The various stages of knowledge, with the exception of the transcendental and indeterminate knowledge, belong only to the *vyāvahārika* order.

Before actually discussing the stages and forms of knowledge it is relevant to observe that we would not be unjustified in our expectation if we hope the Mādhva reaction against such a conception as complete disapprobation. As already suggested, the Mādhva philosophers were always reluctant to acquiesce in the conception of indeterminate knowledge which, as is apparent, is contradictory to their theory that all knowledge is determinate. The Śaṁkarite philosophy of the one, pure and indeterminate consciousness as the only real state along with the illusory character of all the stages of empirical or determinate knowledge was, therefore, argued by them as completely illogical and contradictory to experience. Because the Mādhva criticism against this aspect of Vedānta philosophy has already been discussed in the preceding section, we remain contented with the solitary remark that while in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta the stages of determinate knowledge are unreal, from the *pāramārthika* point of view, they are absolutely real in Mādhva philosophy.

§2. THE STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In *Māndūkyopaniṣad*[103] we find a reference to the four states of consciousness, viz., the waking, the dream, the deep-sleep and the *Turīya* out of which the last is taken to be the final and the real state of knowledge. The remaining three, being conditioned by *avidyā* and its products are always determined and belong to the *vyāvahārika* order of existence. We may, therefore, discuss these three states, viz., the waking, the dream and the deep-sleep in succession with reference to the standpoints of the schools of Śaṁkara and Madhva.

(1) *The Waking State*

This may be defined as an objective state, wherein, the objects are grasped through *vṛttis*[104] generated by sense contact. The existence of an external world, as the object of experience known through the various *pramāṇas,* is an essential[105] condition in this state along with the reality of the 'subject' which is determined by the *avidyā*, the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and the gross body. There are, in this state, the five organs of perception (*buddhendriyas*), the five organs[106] of action (*karmendriyas*)[107], the five aspects of vital breath (*prāṇa*, etc.), the mind (*manas*), the intellect (*buddhi*), the ego and the mind-stuff (*citta*). These are the instruments through which knowledge is acquired in this state by the subject which is conceived as distinct from its object on account of the illusory imposition of *avidyā*. The triple distinction of the knower, knowledge and the known is quite explicit in this state.

The Śaṁkarite stand on the nature and constitution of the waking state is, however, not at variance with the Mādhva standpoint inasmuch as the Śaṁkarites restrict themselves to its *vyāvahārika* appearance and do not investigate its ultimate nature. But as soon as the Śaṁkarites transcend to realize its real character they arrive at a conclusion which is vehemently criticized and discarded by the Mādhva philosophers. But as the problem of the falsity of world, from the ultimate standpoint, is a topic for discussion in another chapter of this book we propose to drop it here.

(2) *The Dream State*

According to Śāṁkara Vedānta, this state is caused by the impressions[108] or *vāsanas* left in the mind during the waking state at the rise of the *karmas* required to produce the dream experiences of the waking state. This state differs from the waking one inasmuch as we have here the perception of objects without the presence of *vṛttis* arising out of the sense-contact as distinct from the acquisition of objects in the latter state. This state, technically called[109] *Taijasa*, is determined by the two *upādhis*, viz., *avidyā* and *antaḥkaraṇa;* the third upādhi, i. e., the gross body as available in the waking state is removed at the rise of *tāmasa-vṛtti* in sleep. This state too like the waking one[110] is superimposed through the causality of *avidyā*.

It is often questioned : What is the substrate of this superimposition ? Is it Brahman or jīva? Madhusūdana, in his *Siddhāntabindu*[11] replies that both the standpoints are tenable. He contends that there is no difficulty in maintaining jīva as the locus. Even if Brahman be considered the substrate of the removal and sublation of the dream state by the knowledge of the waking state it can be explained on the analogy of the destruction of the illusion of serpent in the rope by a subsequent illusion of the stick. Thus, even though the ignorance of the real nature of the substrate may continue, an illusion may be removed by a subsequent illusion of a different character and hence, according to Madhusūdana, there is no difficulty in admitting the removal of the dream state through the knowledge of the waking state while at the same time maintaining Brahman as the locus of the illusory superimposition.

It is thus clear that, according to Vedānta, the nature of dream-presentation is always unreal and illusory. It is here that the Vedānta philosophy strikes a note of disharmony with the speculations of Mādhva philosophy which propounds, in clear and unequivocal language, the reality of dreams.

The problem of the nature of dreams was raised by Gauḍapāda as early[112] as in the sixth century A.D. who advanced certain arguments for establishing the unreal character of dreams. These arguments as explained by Śaṁkara, form the logical basis of the common sense belief in the falsity of dreams. Śaṁkara, in his commentary on the sūtra '*Māyāmātram tu kṛtsnyena anabhivyakta rūpatvāt*', enunciates the principle for examining the truth of an entity or state and argues that if the dreams were real, as contended by the opponents, they would confirm to the spatio-temporal-causal-relation[113] and would also do away with any possibility of a future contradiction. The dream state has neither any existence in space nor in time. The dream-operation[114] being limited to a very insignificant portion of the body, how can the vast expanse of the dream land be narrowed down to its limit ? It would also be a challenge to human ingenuity if it were argued that the soul goes out to distant lands and perceives the actual places of the dream. How can a man having slept in Ayodhyā go to Gandhāra in his sleep and return in such a short time ? According to Śaṁkara, it would be a travesty of facts and an absurdity of the highest magnitude if any one were to nod in favour of such a contention. This, therefore, indicates that the dream-presentations have no spatial relation. Time too loses its hold on a dream experience; this is apparent from such dreams in which one sees that he has spent years in a locality when actually the man has not more than an hour's slumber. What can be a better proof of time-illusion during the dreams ? Moreover, there is flagrant violation of the relation of cause and effect also in the dream-state which, according to Śaṁkara, is not rooted in any psychical apparatus as its cause. And, in the end, it is everybody's experience that awakening contradicts the dream. Śaṁkara, therefore, concludes that the dreams are *māyā-mātra*[115] and not real at all. As he states, 'there is not the slightest smell of reality in dream-creations'. Thus by testing the value of dreams on the touchstone of these principles Śaṁkara disparages all claims for its either pragmatic or absolute truth.

Jaya-Tīrtha, in his *Tattvaprakāśikā*, discusses almost all the important points raised by Śaṁkara against the reality of dreams and contends that the reality of dreams is a conclusion which is necessary for expounding the philosophy that the dream state is controlled[116] by the Lord whose greatness enjoins that this state should also be controlled by Him. Besides this, the Madhvites were moved by another more compelling consideration demanding a realistic interpretation of dreams. The motive behind this was to explain the dreams in such a way as to strike at the root of the famous

Śaṁkarite argument, 'The world is false, because it is cognizable for example a dream'. This argument, as we will discuss in another chapter of this book, takes for granted the unreal character of dreams that illustrate in themselves the invariable and necessary concomitance (*vyāpti*) between 'cognizability' and 'falsity'. The Mādhva contention that the dreams are real, therefore, will not only deprive the Śaṁkarite illustration of the probandam but will also establish the converse that what is cognizable is always true—the foundational concept of Mādhva epistemology.

According to Jaya-Tīrtha, though the dreams do not have any prior existence, they are actually created[117] during sleep by the Lord and as such there is no truth in the Śaṁkarite argument that because the dreams have no time, space and cause their nature should be considered as unreal. We can understand the spatio-temporal existence of these dreams just from the fact that they are created by Īśvara in the space inside the throat[118] (*kaṇṭha-deśa*), the location of the jīva during the dream. While discussing the problem of the causality of dreams in his *Tattvaprakāśikā*[119] and *Nyāyasudhā*, Jaya Tīrtha argues that both material and instrumental causality may be attributed to dream-presentations. The latent tendencies (*saṁskāras*), in the mind, about objects experienced in past provide sufficient material (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) out of which the Lord, moved by His desire, creates the objects of the dream. These latent *saṁskāras*[120] of the mind act as the material-cause for the creation of dreams, whereas, the Lord's desire serves as the instrumental-cause. There is absolutely no logic in the Śaṁkarite contention that because dreams have no cause their appearance should be branded as unreal.

Jaya-Tīrtha seeks a justification of his views in the authority of the *Brahma-sūtra*. To him, what Bādarāyaṇa[121] actually intends by the term '*māyā-mātra*' in his explanation of dreams is not its falsehood, as interpreted by Śaṁkara, but that the dream is produced out of the latent tendencies of the mind. Will anyone like to investigate the cause of an entity absolutely non-existent ? Because Bādarāyaṇa tells us of the creator of dream-objects, we would not be wrong in inferring that his intention is not to posit the unreality of dreams. The real philosophy of dream is the philosophy of its reality and not the profession of its falsehood as expressed in the logic of either Gauḍapāda or Śaṁkara.

Notwithstanding the ingenuity with which Jaya-Tīrtha ventures to discredit the Śaṁkarite doctrine of the unreality of dreams, we are prone to be overwhelmed with the feeling that the Mādhva criticism of the Śaṁkarite thesis has neglected an important argument which, probably, is the backbone of the Vedānta denunciation of the reality of dreams. Jaya Tīrtha does not appear to be convincingly refuting the Vedānta contention that the unreality of dreams is a logical consequence of its contradiction in the waking-state. To him the logic of contradiction is not a sufficient argument for unreality because when the waking-state is contradicted by the dream-state no one with any wisdom worth the name imagines of the falsity of the waking life. But this is really the wisdom which the Śaṁkarites would like to communicate. Their undaunted strength in carrying logic to its farthest limit did not allow them to make a compromise with the irrational. With unmitigated courage they propounded the doctrine of the unreality of both the waking and the dream existence because of their posterior sublation.

(3) *The Deep-Sleep-State* (*suṣupti*)

According to Vedānta, the *suṣupti-state* is the seat of repose of the individual soul tired due to its experiences in the dream and the waking states. When the activities of the waking and the dream[122] states have come to the rest and the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) with the latent desires rests as causal body that one gets into the state of *suṣupti*. In this state, the internal organ, which is responsible for all duality and differentiation in the other two states, merges and rests in its causal form veiling the real character of Ātman and creating a state of the veiled indifferentiation of knowledge. Because in this state the soul is free from all sufferings that the consciousness of deep-sleep,[123] the *Prājña*, is termed '*Ānanda-maya*' in the *Upaniṣad.*

Besides these three states, Madhusūdana, in his[124] *Siddhāntabindu*, refers to nine other states that occur in between them and are arrived at by a method of combination. As their natures are more or less similar to the three states described above their exhaustive treatment is not at all important. We have to be clear in understanding that these states of consciousness are the manifestations of consciousness as limited by *avidyā* and its products and are liable to contradiction at the time of the ultimate realization of the Final Wisdom. The nature of these states, from the absolute standpoint, is one of illusion having no reality other than its substratum, the *Turīya*, or the Knowledge par-excellence. It is only this last state, the *Turīya*, that can be said to be real from the *pāramārthika* point of view.

There is nothing in the details of the Mādhva analysis of these states for consideration as the opponent's wrangles, from the Śaṁkarite point of view, but for a few points whose mention we may justly make. Firstly, we have the opposition to the Vedānta thesis that all these states are unreal and are the products of *avidyā*. Even the dream-state whose unreality is a matter of common experience is explained by the Madhvites as something belonging to the world of reals. Secondly, all the states of consciousness whether waking, dream or deep-sleep are equal in point of reality. This is what really provides a fruitful philosophical situation antagonistic to the Vedānta contention. The Mādhva criticism against the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta on this particular issue mostly centres round the doctrine of *arthakriyākāritva* in illusion and the philosophy of the practical order of existence. As a discussion on these issues has already been taken in the preceding chapters of this book, we would better avoid their repetition here.

§3. THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE

What we mean by the form of knowledge is its character when it appears. As the production of knowledge depends on the activity of the *pramāṇas*, the nature and number of its forms are also dependent on the nature and number of the *pramāṇas*. It has already been observed that *vyāvahārika* knowledge, in Vedānta, is the identity of the objective-consciousness with the subjective-consciousness determined by the internal organ; this identity is brought through the removal of *ajñāna* veiling the objective-consciousness. Because the *vṛttis* of *antaḥkaraṇa* (internal-organ) through their contact affect this unveiling, the forms of *pramāṇa* and cognition are determined by the forms of these *vṛttis*. The forms of such *vṛttis*, that are the modification of *antaḥkaraṇa*, are six and so we have in this system six forms of cognition, viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), testimony (*śabda*), implication (*arthāpatti*) and non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*).

The problem of the forms of knowledge was raised in Mādhva philosophy also when Madhva and his followers classified[125] *pramāṇa* as *kevala-pramāṇa* and *anu-pramāṇa.* What they meant by *kevala-pramāṇa* was only valid knowledge, whereas, by *anu-pramāṇa* they meant the instruments or the means of the acquisition of such knowledge. On the basis of the principle of the dependence of the form on the means, the Mādhva philosophers categorised *kevala-pramāṇa*[126] into three, viz., perception, inference and testimony.

Here we have a clear difference of opinion from the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta not only on the question of the nature of knowledge but also on the number of the forms of cognition, the Madhvites considering the other three forms, i.e., Analogy, Implication and Non-apprehension as superfluous. Because the whole of this problem is a topic of discussion in the next section of this chapter we find it better to drop its discussion here.

Apart from these, a serious controversy is available in the answer to the question : Can memory be justifiably considered a form of valid cognition ? For various reasons the Śaṁkarites exclude 'memory' from[127] the category of valid knowledge. As the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* explicates, it is an essential condition of valid-cognition that it should be novel and unacquired. But the knowledge in remembrance is not something that is novel and unacquired because its object was known before as well. The Mādhva philosophers, on the other hand, ignore the essentiality of this condition and define the character of valid-knowledge as that which does not transgress the real[128] nature of its object. The validity of knowledge consists only in the correct representation of the object and not in its being a novel presentation. The exclusion of memory from the category of right-knowledge only on the ground that in it we have the absence of 'novelty' is, from the Mādhva standpoint, without any justification.

Moreover, as Jaya-Tīrtha argues in his *Nyāya-sudhā,* it is impossible[129] for any *pramāṇa* other than perception to produce knowledge without depending on memory. If we are to disbelieve in the validity of memory as a form of knowledge, how would we be in a position to account for the relation of concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the probandum and the reason which necessarily depends on memory ? Because inference invariably depends on the validity of the concomitance, our distrust in the validity of memory would once for all shake the logical foundations of 'inference' as an instrument of knowing the truth. Not only this, the Vedānta disapprobation of the *pramātva* of memory would take away the very ground on which the solid foundations of *smṛti*[180] as a testimony, which is recognised by the Advaitins also, are laid. *Smṛti*, as we all know, depends on the memory of the instructions imparted in the *śrutis*. How can the Advaitins give credence to the validity of *śmṛti* while arguing against its right to valid knowledge (*pramā*) ? It is not only illogical but also calamitous for the Advaitins to disapprove the certitude and validity of memory as a form of valid knowledge and put it outside the scope of *pramā*.

It would appear that the Śaṁkarite case against memory as a form of valid knowledge, which is so reminiscent of Prabhākara's denunciation of remembrance as valid-cognition, attaches considerable importance to the non-contradiction of knowledge which, to all opinion, cannot be fully guaranteed in the case of remembrance. Yet it is too much for them to stress that *anadhigatatva* (novelty) of knowledge is an essential condition constituting its nature and validity. No one can prevent the object of past cognition becoming the object of subsequent cognition. Would it then be logically justifiable to deny, on the ground of its posteriority, that the latter cognition is right knowledge ? If the latter cognition of the same object has no right to *pramātva*, only on the ground that it is posterior, the previous cognition may very well be declared the same. Though the chances of the incorrectness of knowledge produced through memory, due to the incomplete remembrance of all conditions and factors of the prior knowledge, may be greater yet the same omissions may also be responsible for the invalidity of knowledge produced through other *pramāṇas*. What is important for our discussion about the inclusion of a particular form of apprehension within the class 'valid-cognition' is whether the form of apprehension in its own nature, is not vitiated by the conditions responsible for invalidity and whether it is capable of producing valid knowledge and in so far as this principle be the determinant of our reflections in our search after the forms of valid cognition, 'memory' would none the less have its claim in the forefront. The Mādhva criticism of the Śaṁkarite denunciation of Memory is, therefore, not without justification.

§4. THE FINAL STATE OF KNOWLEDGE

Till now our discussion has been confined only to the stages and forms of such knowledge as are, in some way or the other, limited and determined by *avidyā* and its products. Besides these, we have in Vedānta philosophy a fourth state of consciousness which is the final state transcending all distinctions of the subject and the object. This final state of consciousness, the *Turīya*, is explained in *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*[131] as that 'which is not conscious of the internal or external world, nor that which is conscious of both, nor that which is a mass all sentiency, nor that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is insentient. It is unseen by any sense organ, not related to anything, uninferable, unthinkable, indescribable, essentially of the nature of consciousness constituting the Self alone, negation of all phenomena, the Peaceful all Bliss and Non-dual'. It means that this state is of the nature of pure-consciousness to which all the three states of consciousness belong just as the illusory snake belongs to the rope; it is beyond all intellectual comprehension transcending the discursive reason of man. On entering this final state the jīva realizes its true nature and becomes free from the bondage of birth[132] and rebirth; in this state the jīva shakes off even the last vestiges of *avidyā*. It is this absence of the seed of *avidyā*, the cause of world-superimposition, that constitutes the difference between this state and the state of *suṣupti* having *avidyā* in its causal form.

Here we may make a mention of a few other states of knowledge above the normal state of human-consciousness that may unhesitatingly be considered as ladders to the final summit, the state of *Turīya*. Vidyāraṇya, in his *Pañcadaśī*, refers to two such states out of which the first one is the state of acute concentration or *nididdhyāsana*[133] and may be said to be the same as *savikalpa-samādhi*. The second one is the state of *nirvikalpa-samādhi*. While the first state still embraces the distinction between the knower, knowledge and the known, the second one eliminates the separate[134] consciousness of the subject and identifies it completely with its object. This second state gives rise to the *śuddha-dharma*,[135] which is the means for the ultimate realization and the immediate experience of Truth (*aparokṣānubhūti*), and destroys all *karmas* both merit and demerit. This state of *nirvikalpa-samādhi* to which Lord Krsna referred[136] when he spoke of the Yogin's mind as one of pointed concentration, fixed and immobile like an unwavering flame in the absence of the gust of wind is named *Dharma-megha*[137] or the Cloud of Virtues[138]. It is only after the attainment of this state which is only the flow of pure translucent attribute, the state which is a means[139] to the removal of *avidyā* with all its products, that the knowledge of the identity of jīva and Brahman removes the veil of Nescience and manifests the real nature of Self.

The Advaita explanation of the *Turīya* as a state of indeterminate and pure consciousness transcending the phenomenal distinction between the subject, its cognition and the object is, according to the Mādhva commentators, not a faithful interpretation at all. Rāghavendra Yati, in his commentary on the *Māndūkyopaniṣad*, contends[140] that the *Turīya* and the other three states, viz., *Vaiśvānara*, *Taijosa* and *Prājña* are not the different aspects of Self, as interpreted by Śaṁkara and Gauḍapāda, but are the different manifestations of Īśvara, as *antaryāmin*, who propels the activities of the jīvātman in the three states, i. e., the waking, the dream and the deep-sleep. The *Turīya* is, therefore, the description of the real nature of *Paramātman* and not that of the Self as speculated in Advaita philosophy.

Moreover, because the very idea of knowledge without the relative existence of 'subject' and 'object' is a contradiction, the highest state of realization or knowledge can only manifest the effulgence and the infinite attributes of the Supreme Divinity without either losing the individual's identity or his knowledge. The state of knowledge during *bhāva-samādhi* may, on account of the deep concentration and the overflow of ideas about the Lord and his attributes, however, blur the consciousness of the devotee's individuality yet it always remains and does not merge into an undifferentiated unity with God. The Śaṁkarite interpretation that the *Turīya* state is the final state of the knowledge of Self is, for the Mādhva philosophers, only an incorrect and prejudiced explanation of the Upaniṣadic-text.

C—MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE (PRĀMAṆA)

§ 1. THE NATURE AND NUMBER OF PRAMANAS

On the basis of the twofold etymological derivation of the word *pramāṇa* as *bhāva* and *karaṇa* the Madhvites define *pramāṇa* as both knowledge and the means through which it is acquired. This leads them to the classification of *pramāṇa* as primary (*mukhya*) and secondary (*amukhya*) where by primary is meant the aspect of *pramāṇa* as knowledge or *kevala-pramāṇa*, as it is called, and by the secondary is intended the means of knowledge or the *anu-pramāṇa.* Though every school of Indian philosophy, as already suggested, believes both in knowledge and the means of its generation, their inclusion within the connotation of the term '*pramāṇa*' is a point of dispute. Vedānta, on this point, disregards the Mādhva opinion and defines *pramāṇa*[141] merely as a means to the acquisition of right knowledge (*pramā*) meaning, thereby, that *pramāṇa* is an uncommon-cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) which through its operation results in the fruition of valid-knowledge. Notwithstanding this difference, it would none the less occur that this difference of opinion does not effect the fundamentals of both the Śāṁkara and the Mādhva schools for they accept, either tacitly or overtly, the difference between knowledge and its means and is, consequently, without any importance.

We have suggested in the previous section that the Mādhva philosophers define '*pramāṇa*' as that which agrees with the[142] nature of the object and does not contradict it. This means that the essence of *pramāṇa* consists in making the cognitum an object[143] of cognition in the form in which it actually exists. This definition, however, is not in disagreement with the Śaṁkarite definition of *pramāṇa* as that which grasps the reality of an object because the fact of the acquisition of the real characters of the cognitum is admissible to the followers of both Śaṁkara and Madhva. Here a very pertinent question may be asked : Though the definition of *pramāṇa* as the process which cognizes the object in its true characters may be consistent with the epistemological foundations of Mādhva philosophy recognizing the distinction between the cognition and its cognitum yet it would be difficult to find its justification in the Vedānta theory of the one transcendental and pure knowledge which, according to the Advaitins, is the ultimate reality and the substratum of the world-phenomena. In other words, the definition and the theory of *pramāṇa* in Advaita Vedānta would remain insufficient unless it gives a cogent explanation to the facts of cognition (*pramāṇa*), the cognizer (*pramātā*) and cognitum (*prameya*) with reference to one transcendental reality of the world.

Śaṁkara, in his introduction to the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya,* discusses this point in detail and argues that there can be no cognition without a cognizer. As the ego of the cognizer is in itself the result of the superimposition[144] of the Self and the not-self, the cognizer is also determined by this superimposition and its cause, the Nescience. The concept of the cognizer, the cognition and the cognitum and the distinction subsisting between them is affected through the causality of *avidyā* and presupposes the mutual superimposition[145] between the Self and the not-self. Thus, for the Śaṁkarites, the concepts of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are restricted only to the practical order of existence and have no place in the transcendental order of the Being.

Yet this explanation is incomplete. The theory that the three categories, viz., the knowledge, the subject and the object, are only *vyāvahārika* or phenomenal would not satisfy a questioning mind unless the Advaitins are in a position to furnish a detailed account as to how they can be deduced from the primal-cause of the *vyavahāra*, i. e., *avidyā*. As the Śaṁkarites explain, the appearance of the subject, the object and knowledge has its basis in the forms and aspects of *avidyā*. Madhusūdana, in his *Siddhāntabindu*, gives an account of the limited character of the subject, the object and the cognition and their relation to *avidyā*. According to him, the consciousness determined[146] by the internal-organ is the subject (*pramātā*), the consciousness determined by the objective-*avidyā* is called '*prameya*' and the consciousness determined by the *vṛttis* of *antahkaraṇa* which pervades the object and affects its cognition is termed '*pramāṇa*'. Discursive knowledge or cognition, in Advaita philosophy, is, therefore, possible only through the agency of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and its *vṛttis*; it is the *antaḥkaraṇa* with its *vṛttis* that creates determinations in the otherwise indeterminate and transcendental consciousness and thus it pertains only to the *vyāvahārika* order of existence. The idea of *pramāṇa*, in Advaita philosophy, is, therefore inseparable from the concept of the positive character of *avidyā* and the doctrine of its susceptibility to transformations in different forms. It is common knowledge that the number of *pramāṇas* in Advaita Vedānta is six, whereas, in Mādhva philosophy it is only three. What is the basis of such a difference ? Though it would be a digression, it may be useful to discuss the principle which almost every system of Indian philosophy, either implicitly or explicitly, accepts in its formulation of the doctrine of the number of *pramāṇas*.

In Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's fourth *kārikā* we have a pregnant assertion that it is only through *pramāṇa* that one has the knowledge of the *prameya*. This enunciation bears an indirect suggestion that the number of *pramāṇas* in a system ultimately depends on the number and the types of *Pramiyas* contemplated by it. We may now illustrate this point by making a reference to Sāṁkhya philosophy. Sāṁkhya, as we know, accepts[147] three *pramāṇas*, viz., *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference) and *śabda* or *āptavacana* (testimony). Perception is necessary for acquiring knowledge about the objects of world. It should, however, not be misunderstood that it is only through perception that the objects of world are known—for they are known through inference and testimony as well—but that without perception no such knowledge is ever possible; inferential cognition and the testimony about the objects of world have also their basis in perception. Yet there are, at least, two categories in the Sāṁkhya system that are beyond the reach of perception, one is *Prakṛti* and the other is *Puruṣa.* For the knowledge of *Prakṛti* the Sāṁkhya mentions 'inference', whereas, the *Puruṣa* can be known only through testimony. *Prakṛti* in its unevolved state is beyond the immediate grasp of the operations of *buddhi;* as such, we have *anumāna* to prove its nature and existence. In spite of these two, i.e., perception and inference, the *Puruṣa* of Sāṁkhya can never be known unless the third *pramāṇa.* i. e., testimony is accepted. It is this alone that, according to Sāṁkhya, can probe into and illumine the nature of the Sāṁkhya *Puruṣa.*

The Vedāntin's enumeration of *pramāṇas* as six has also its basis in the principle formulated above. On the footprints of Kumārila's epistemological conclusions the Vedānta contributes to the logic of advocating the usefulness of the six types of *pramāṇas*, viz., *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi.* As the operation of perception in Vedānta is confined only to the immediate objects of sense-contact, a separate *pramāṇa* for cognizing mediate objects, e.g., inference, is considered necessary. But why should Vedānta give credence to *upamāna* when mediate objects can be cognized through inference ? The answer to this question may be found in Vedānta's peculiar interpretation of *anumāna* which restricts its operation only to cases involving definite concomitance between the reason and the probandum. This delimiting of the scope of inference thus requires another *pramāṇa* for such knowledge as is apprehended through the cognition of similarity. Like Nyāya, Vedānta terms this *pramāṇa* '*upamāna*'. Now, what are the grounds for the recognition of *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* when the former can be easily included within inference and the contents of the latter be cognized through perception ? In reply to this, the Advaitins have urged that their recognition of *arthāpatti* is for justifying the existence of *avidyā* which cannot be established only through *anumāna*. Because *anumāna* depends on the operation of *vyāpti* (concomitance) and as no *vyāpti* can be found operating in the case of *avidyā*, the justification for the existence of *avidyā* falls outside the span of inferential cognition. *Vedānta*, therefore, proposes a fifth *pramāṇa* for this purpose, the *arthāpatti*. *Anupalabdhi* too is not without an argument; its recognition, in Vedānta, is for explaining the cognition of negation. Because perception has its reach only to the objects of sense-contact, the admission of a separate *pramāṇa* for explaining the cognition of negation is almost imperative. The last of the *pramāṇas*, i. e., the *Āgama* or the Testimony is held for the purpose of imparting instructions regarding the true nature of Brahman (the Ultimate Reality) which, according to Vedānta, is beyond the discursive intellect of man. Because, from the ultimate standpoint, there is only one reality, viz., Brahman, there should be, as a matter of fact, one *pramāṇa*, i. e., *Āgama*. Yet, because the Advaitins recognize the *vyāvahārika* existence of world and its importance for the ultimate realization of Truth, the admittance of the other five *vyāvahārika pramāṇas* occurs to them by way of necessity.

The principle that the number of *pramāṇas* in a system is always governed by the nature and the number of *prameyas* can also be discovered in the Mādhva analysis and the enumeration of *pramāṇas*. They admitted perception to account for the knowledge of the direct and immediate objects of cognition, inference to justify the existence of all objects of mediate cognition and, lastly, testimony to establish the existence[147] of God and His Omniscience[148] which, in the Mādhva system, has been considered knowable only through *Āgama* and not 'inference'. The other means of cognition, as recognized in Vedānta, viz., *upamāna*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* are discarded by the Mādhva philosophers as unwanted and futile simply for the reason that in their system there in not a single *prameya* that may not be cognized by any of the three *pramāṇas*. i. e., perception, inference and testimony. The purpose of *upamāna* and *arthāpatti* can well be served by *anumāna; anupalabdhi* too is discarded on the ground that the knowledge of *abhāva* (negation) is possible through perception.

Thus, it may be noticed that the Mādhva arguments advocating the validity of only three *pramāṇas* are much similar to the Sāṁkhya[149] treatment of this problem, whereas, the Vedānta theory is reminiscent of the Mīmāṁsā[150] epistemology.

Perception

'Perception' is defined, in Vedānta, as a special type of cognitive process culminating in the illumination of the particular cognition termed '*pratyakṣa-pramā*'. Dharmarājādhvarendra, in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*,[151] contends that this valid perceptual knowledge, which carries with it the distinction from the other forms of cognition by virtue of its immediacy, is of the nature of consciousness (*caitanya*); it is not of the nature of *vṛttis* whose operation brings it into effect. But consciousness in its ultimate character is both beginningless and transcendental; its appearance as formal and determinate is, therefore, eventualized through the association of the *vṛttis* of *antaḥkaraṇa*. Thus, according to Vedānta, perceptual knowledge is the consciousness determined by *antaḥkaraṇa* and its *vṛttis* which, however, are the products of *avidyā*. One would be mistaken to identify it with the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttis* which being essentially unconscious (*jaḍa*) in character can never be conscious *per se*. The term 'knowledge' is figuratively used for *vṛttis* because they are the determinants of the ultimate consciousness.

At several places we have described that *vṛttis* are the modifications of *antaḥkaraṇa*. This *antaḥkaraṇa*, which is an evolute[152] of *avidyā* or *māyā*, is produced out of its *sattva* aspect and is contemplated in Vedānta as consisting of parts. It is a principle which does not belong to the class of sense organs (*indriyas*). Some philosophers argue that *manas* or *antaḥkaraṇa* is an *indriya* on the ground that unless it is an *indriya* no perception of pleasure and pain and its immediacy is possible. This, according to Vedānta, is a wrong hypothesis. To be caused by an *indriya* is, however, not a necessary condition for[154] the immediacy of knowledge, as a Naiyāyika is prone to think, because then on the assumption of *manas* as an *indriya*, knowledge generated through inference would also become immediate for inference too depends on the operation of *manas*. Moreover, this contention would also lead to the absence of immediacy in the Lord's knowledge for His knowledge, though direct and immediate, is never caused by an *indriya*. Thus, the *antaḥkaraṇa* which is recognized in Vedānta as a separate principle from the cognitive senses or *indriyas* plays an important role in determining an act of cognition.

It may not be out of place to mention that the conception of *antaḥkaraṇa* in Vedānta is somewhat similar to the idea of *citta* in the Yoga system[155] where *citta* is explained as an evolute of *Prakṛti* with the preponderance of the *sattva*[156] *guṇa* (attribute). In Vedānta too *māyā* with its three attributes, viz., *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, produces *antaḥkaraṇa* through the preponderance of the *sattva*[157] aspect, a quality which is mainly responsible for the working of the whole cognitive-process in Vedānta epistemology.

Every act of perception comprises in itself, firstly, the perception of the 'object' and, secondly, the perception of the cognition of the 'object'. The presence of these two aspects of perception within a single act of cognition and the cognitive process involved therein has been explained differently in the different systems of Indian philosophy and is, perhaps, one of the interesting points of discussion in the Vedānta epistemology. The author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* defines perceptual cognition as the non-differentiation of the cognizer[158] and the cognitum. This non-differentiation is brought about through the contact of the modifications of *antaḥkaraṇa*, i. e., the *vṛttis* which emerge out through the gates of the sense-organs, such as the eye, and transform themselves into the form of the object. The transformation of the *vṛttis* in the form of the object has a special function; by virtue of the *sattva-guṇa* contained in it, it removes that particular aspect of *ajñāna* which is supposed to be veiling the object and identifies the 'subject-reality' with the 'object-reality'. As all differences, according to Vedānta, are merely superimpositions on the ultimate unity of consciousness, an act of cognitive experience only requires the removal of *ajñāna* that covers the object for the manifestation of the identity of the subject-consciousness, i. e., the consciousness determined by *antaḥkaraṇa* (*pramātṛ-caitanya*) and the object-consciousness, the consciousness determined by the object. Not only does *vṛtti* bring an identification of the subject-consciousness and the object-consciousness, it also provides knowledge with a content through the form which it acquires by coming in contact with the object.

Here, it may be asked : How do the *vṛttis* emerge and remove the sheet of *ajñāna* covering the object ? According to Vedānta, this is due to the element of *sattva-guṇa* contained in the *vṛttis*. Due to this *sāttvic* character, the *vṛttis* are capable of removing the *ajñāna* which is essentially a product of the *tamas* aspect of *māyā*. Both in Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Vedānta the *sattva-guṇa* is contemplated as antagonistic to *tamas* just as light is opposed to darkness. But why should the *sattva* aspect of *ajñāna* be in a position to remove the *tāmasic* aspect when both of them have the same principle as their material-cause ? The answer to this may be found in the difference in their respective natures; whereas, *tamas* is reticient to reflect consciousness or *cit* the *sattva-guṇa* reflects it in almost perfect way.

Let us now consider the Vedānta opinion on the problem of the second type of perception, i. e., the perception of the cognition of the object. As explained by Dharmarājādhvarendra, the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, the cognitive process in this case is also the same with the only difference that the non-differentiation brought about through the operation of *vṛttis* is between the cognitum-consciousness[160], the consciousness defined by the object, and the cognition-consciousness, the consciousness determined by the *vṛttis* of *antaḥkaraṇa*. It is this non-differentiation which results in the knowledge of cognition. Here it is necessary to understand that though, from the analytic point of view, the abstraction of the two types of perceptions may obtain some justification yet to claim reality for this abstraction would be too far-fetched and unwarranted as illustrated in Prabhākara's concept of *triputi-pratyakṣa;* each cognition, therefore, involves both aspects of perception and hence the non-differentiation of the three types of determined-consciousness, the objective-consciousness, the cognizer-consciousness and the cognition-consciousness, is, from the Advaitin's point of view, a necessary condition for the manifestation of an object.

The Vedānta theory of perception as formulated above is one of the topics of discussion in Vyāsa-Tīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta* wherein he contends that the psychology of *vṛtti* is upheld in Vedānta only for two purposes; firstly, for creating the distinction between the subject and the object (*pratikarma-vyavasthā*) and, secondly, for explaining the illumination of the object. Neither of these, Vyāsa-Tīrtha argues, can be satisfactorily upheld by the Vedāntins in view of certain insurmountable difficulties in the philosophical foundations of the Vedānta system. Vyāsa-Tīrtha takes great pains to show that unless the Advaitins take recourse to illogical arguments, the doctrine of *vṛtti* as enunciated by them would appear ineffective for either upholding the distinction between the subject and the object or explaining the illumination of the object.

According to him, the theory of the emergence of *vṛttis* through the sense-organs and their contact with the objects of cognition requires the pre-existence of the objects, an assumption contradictory to the Vedānta theory of the falsity of objects and the conception that the *esse* of[161] things is always *percipi* (this is Vyāsa-Tīrtha's view). Even if the Advaitins try to safeguard themselves against this difficulty by maintaining the *vyāvahārika* existence of the objects of cognition the problem would remain unsolved because the *vyāvahārika* existence, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, is nothing but a prolonged[162] *prātibhāsika* appearance. Thus, the theory of the *vṛtti*-contact is, in all respects, contradictory to the Vedānta doctrine of the falsity of objects.

Moreover, the Advaita contention that the substrate-consciousness is manifested through its identity with the consciousness defined by the *vṛttis* is also unjustifiable for various reasons. Firstly, there is little justification for the Vedāntins in maintaining this position only in cases of immediate perception when they do not consider the operation of this process indispensable in the case of non-perceptual knowledge (*parokṣa*). If the Advaitins emphasize the necessity of *caitanyoparāga* in non-perceptual experience as well, then there is sure to arise the contingency of immediacy in all cases of knowledge irrespective of any sense-contact; hence, *caitanyoparāgā* should not be admitted in cases of mediate knowledge. Secondly, if the manifestation of objective-consciousness is a necessary condition in a cognition[163] then it is difficult to explain the ordinary immediate experience of the past. Because there is no *vṛtti* in the temporal form of the past, the manifestation of consciousness for its knowledge is impossible. Thus, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, there is no possibility of the perceptual cognition of the past in the Vedānta theory of knowledge.

Even if it be admitted that the *antaḥkaraṇa* goes outside the body, it would be difficult to conceive the nature of consciousness, which is supposed to illumine the object, either as consciousness reflected in the *vṛtti*[164] of *antaḥkaraṇa* (as supposed by Bhāratī-Tīrtha) or as the pure-consciousness which is the ground of the superimposition of world-appearance manifested by the consciousness reflected in the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* as urged by Sureśvara. The question here is whether consciousness manifested in the *antaḥkaraṇa*[165] illumines the object or the ground-consciousness underlying the world-objects. Neither of these views, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, can be considered tenable. The first view is untenable because the consciousness reflected in *antaḥkaraṇa* being false cannot be the substrate of the superimpositon of the cognitum. It is also not possible to uphold the second view; if the consciousness reflected in the *vṛtti* is supposed to remove the veil of the object, it may well be held to manifest it and as such it is unnecessary to suppose that the ground-consciousness illumines the object.

But the theory of the emergence of *vṛttis* and its assuming the form of the physical bodies is itself illogical. In its travel from the eye to the object of perception, the *vṛtti* comes in contact with[166] atoms and *ākāśa* as well. Why we do not have the immediate perception of these also when the necessary conditions of perceptions are quite fulfilled ? Moreover, the cognitive process explained by Vedānta in the case of eye-cognition must also be admitted in other types of sense-organs such as tactual-experience. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, if the emergence[167] of the *vṛttis* is a necessary condition for knowledge then there being no outlet for the *vṛttis* in tactual experience there should be no tactual-experience at all. And, if the *antaḥkaraṇa* can be conceived to go out without an outlet then *manas* may also be imagined to emerge and contact the cognitum which is quite impossible.

Further, the doctrine that the *antaḥkaraṇa* pervades the object is logically irrational. How can the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* assume, simultaneously, a variety of forms, both negative and positive? As explained in Mādhva philosophy, the existence of an object carries with it the negation of other entities. If the *antaḥkaraṇa* is supposed to take the form of an object, it must also assume the negative form as well. But it is difficult to understand how can the *antaḥkaraṇa* assume the positive and negative forms simultaneously at a single moment. Not only this, the Śaṁkarite theory of perception would create new difficulties in the philosophy of the realization of Brahman[169] which, according to Madhvites, is also a kind of perception. The modus-operandi of perception, as envisaged in Vedānta, necessarily entails the operation of *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttis* during Brahman-realization and their acquiring the form of Brahman. But, how can the *vṛttis* acquire the form of Brahman when it is indeterminate, formless and is not an object? The Śaṁkarites cannot reply this question without forsaking their primary conception that Brahman is indeterminate.

The doctrine of the removal of *ajñāna* by the *vṛtti* of *antaḥkaraṇa* is inexplicable whether we take *ajñāna* to be subjective or objective. If it be contended that *ajñāna* is subjective then even after the removal of *ajñāna* of one individual the *ajñāna* of other persons would continue to obstruct the illumination of object. On the other hand, if *ajñāna* is objective then its removal through the *vṛttis* of one person would manifest the object to every other person in the world.

Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, examines that aspect of the Vedānta theory which asserts that it is consciousness that reveals the object. Which consciousness is this? Is it the jīva-consciousness or the Brahman-consciousness that reveals the object? The former position is unacceptable because it contradicts the Vedānta view that objects are illusory superimpositions on pure-consciousness[179] or on the consciousness defined by the objects; in this case, the perceiving-consciousness, being consciousness underlying the jīva, is different both from pure-consciousness and the consciousness as defined by the objects. Moreover, the jīva itself cannot be regarded as the ground of creation for it is in itself an illusory creation. The substratum in each case of the superimposition must, as a rule, possess a higher reality than the appearance which is superimposed and as such the jīva, which is itself illusory, cannot be the ground of creation. For the same reasons, we cannot assert that it is Brahman-consciousness that illumines the object. The qualified Brahman, being itself illusory, should not for the very reason be considered as the consciousness revealing the object. Again, if it be supposed that it is pure Brahman-consciousness which illumines the object then it being itself veiled by *ajñāna* would be unable to manifest itself with the result that all knowledge about objects would be impossible.

Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism has been reproduced almost verbatim, for purposes of criticism, by Madhusūdana in his *Advaita-siddhi*. Madhusūdana[172] argues that the judgement that whatever is false has its *esse* as *percipi* is not universally valid. There are certain false appearances whose *esse* is not *percipi* at all for the existence as *percipi* is not necessarily related to 'falsity'. As no relation other than that of superimposition is logically comprehensible between the perceiver and the object of perception, we are made to believe that the nature of objects is fals . Yet because the persistence of objects is a matter of experience it would be incorrect to accord them an existence depending merely on perception. The continuance of objects in time and space has always been a pressing situation with the Śaṁkarites. It was this realization that persuaded them to propound the doctrine of *vyāvahārika* existence as different from *prātibhāsika-sattā*. According to Madhusūdana, the Mādhvites did not really understand the Advaitic position when they criticised that practical existence is only prolonged *prātibhāsika* existence. The reality of *vyavahāra* unfolds its illusory character only when one attains Brahman-realization; till then the objects are as real as they are to any realist, whether a Naiyāyika or a Mādhva. Madhusūdana is almost amazed at the deliberate misrepresentation of Vedānta in the criticism that the *esse* of objects in Vedānta is *percipi*.

Against the objection that immediate perception should also be explained without the operation of *vṛttis*, on the analogy of *parokṣa*-experience, the Śaṁkarites reply that mediate knowledge too is not without[173] the operation of *vṛttis* because here also the illumination is through the manifestation of consciousness by means of a mediate *vṛtti*. It is wrong to contend that because the illumination of consciousness is the determining principle in both mediate and immediate cognitions, mediate consciousness would also become immediate. The determining[174] principle in immediate cognition is the direct manifestation of the object-consciousness through the *vṛttis;* this happens through the sense-object-contact which, however, is conspicuously absent in what is known as mediate cognition. The fact of the mediacy or immediacy of cognition, according to Madhusūdana, always depends on the specific nature of the object and not on the specific modifications of the *vṛttis* and as such the Mādhva criticism as stated above is without any solid foundation.

The criticism that because pure-consciousness is always veiled by *ajñāna* no cognition is possible is also met with by Madhusūdana. Though *ajñāna*, is its entirety, may remain intact, so Madhusūdana argues,[175] yet a part of it may be removed by coming in contact with the *vṛttis* resulting in the cognition of 'object'.

Against the objection that in the final state of release the ultimate knowledge should dawn only through the operation of *vṛttis* the Śaṁkarites reply that because the state of final intuition is absolutely unconditioned it would not illumine itself through any form of *vṛtti* at all; hence, the objection that because Brahman is formless there can be no knowledge of the ultimate state of deliverance is invalid.

Further, the objection that the *vṛtti* cannot emerge out and pervade its object does not seem to carry much weight. According to Madhusūdana,[176] it is not essential in a *vṛtti*-contact that the *vṛtti* should also assume the form of the object. It is not an essential function of *vṛtti* to assume the form of the object; it is so by way of accident eventuated through certain accessary causes. "Thus, though the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* may travel up to the polar star or be in contact with objects of atomic structure, that does not imply that all objects in space intermediate between the eye and the star or the atoms should be perceived; such perceptions are baffled through the absence of such accessory as might have caused the *vṛttis* to assume their forms..."[177] Moreover, the *vṛtti* can illumine only that object which it aims for cognition and not all and sundry. It is also incorrect to suppose that in all other sense cognitions, except the eye, there is no migration of *antaḥkaraṇa* for there is no restriction that the *antaḥkaraṇa* should come out only through the eye and not through other sense-organs.

As regards the problem of the veil of *ajñāna*, Madhusūdana contends that the veiling power of *ajñāna* pertaining to one individual is destroyed through the functioning of his *vṛtti* so that he alone can perceive and not any other individual whose veiling power has not been destroyed. The nature of the veiling power of *ajñāna* is not so similar to darkness as is often supposed to be. The difference between the two consists in the fact that while the veiling power has its sway both on the subject and the object, darkness veils only the object. This difference would explain why the removal of *ajñāna* veiling an object through the *vṛttis* of one individual does not result in universal perception when the removal of darkness renders its object capable of being known by all.

From this brief narration of Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism and Madhusūdana's rejoinder, it would appear that in this part of his criticism Vyāsa-Tīrtha has attacked many of the fundamentals of Śaṁkarite philosophy and has brought to the surface many shortcomings of Vedānta epistemology. The problem of Nescience or *ajñāna* is probably the most ticklish aspect of Śaṁkarite philosophy and has, therefore, been, rightly, the target of adverse criticism. Here, one may not be wrong in forming a conviction that the Śaṁkarite theory of perception has its basis in many suppositions for which there are no convincing reasons. How a difference between the objects of mediate and immediate cognitions can be conceived to be fundamental and how the *avidyā* can be both subjective and objective so that it may manifest the object to the perceiver, on the one hand, and obscure its manifestation for others is still obscure. The only argument that can be advanced in favour of such assumptions is that it is contained in the very nature of *avidyā* to manifest itself in all such forms—a supposition detrimental to the concept of the inexplicable character of ignorance. Most of the difficulties and complications in Vedānta epistemology owe their being to the idealistic theory of the pure and transcendental knowledge whose relation to the appearance of difference in phenomena is the root of all epistemological problems that threaten the Vedāntic position with a possible debacle. Such difficulties are, however, not confronted by those who start with realistic presumptions and the followers of Madhva find it an easy path to tread over while explaining the event of perceptual cognition. It cannot be claimed, with all certainty, that the Vedānta theory of perception is really satisfactory for to seek an explanation of the phenomena in the context of the transcendental is a confusion of standpoints. The Post-Śaṁkarites were, probably, led astray under the pressure of imposing problems in the field of epistemology to undertake their explanation at the cost of some of the foundational principles of their philosophy.

Perception, according to Madhva, has its origin in sense-object-contact. This contact results in the valid perception of the object only when both the senses and the objects are free from defects which, however, cause[178] illusion and doubt. Valid perception is, therefore, defined as the cognition which is caused by the contact of the six senses—five sense-organs and *manas*—with their specific objects that are free from such defects as excessive remoteness, excessive nearness, etc., as enumerated by the author of[179] *Sāṁkhya-kārikā.* It is the association of these defects with the senses that deprives the *sākṣin* of its[180] natural illumination of knowledge and results in either illusion or doubt. The cognitive senses in Mādhva school are of two kinds, viz., (1) the intuitive faculty of the cognitive agent or the *sākṣin* and (2) the ordinary cognitive senses, i. e., the senses of smell, taste, ear, eye and touch and *manas*. The *sākṣin* is the purest form of *indriya* which is identical with the cognitive agent and possesses the absolute validity of knowledge. It may be observed here that the degree of the validity of knowledge in the Mādhva system depends on the degree of the purity of the sense-organs. As the intuitive faculty (*sākṣin*) is the purest sense-organ its knowledge is always valid and is an essential agency in the production of the knowledge of all other senses. *Manas*, unlike Vedānta, has also been conceived as an *indriya* and is considered to be the superintendent of all sense-organs and the faculty of memory. The faults of *manas* responsible for errors are passions and attachments;[181] those of the other senses are diseases such as jaundice, etc. Thus valid perception is the result of the combined action of the intuitive agent, the *manas* and the pure cognitive senses.

Thus the Mādhva theory of perception differs from the Vedāntic explanation of the problem in three ways: firstly, in their assertion of the absolute difference and the reality of the objects of cognition, secondly, in their conception of the *sākṣin* and, thirdly, in their doctrine of *manas*. We have already described, in detail, the Śaṁkarite refusal in accepting *manas* or *antaḥkaraṇa* as an *indriya* and their opinion on the phenomenon of the triple distinction between the knower, the knowledge and the known. The philosophy of the *sākṣin* in the two schools is also different; whereas, the Vedānta of Śaṁkara considers it as a witness of the various forms of cognition and a transcendental principle uniting and illuminating the various forms of phenomenal knowledge, the Mādhva philosophers are satisfied with their contention that the *sākṣin* is an *indriya* which invariably functions in every illumination of knowledge and carries with it its validity.

Inference (Anumāna)

There is an agreement amongst the traditional scholars that 'inference' is a means of valid cognition arising out of the perception of the reason (*hetu*) in association with the invariable concomitance with the object of cognition; their difference only consists in the explanation of the psychological process and its operation consummating in the knowledge of the cognitum. In Vedānta, inference[182] is defined as an uncommon cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) of *anumiti*, a valid cognition dependent only on the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) for its generation; this definition of *anumiti* as a cognition caused only by the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the reason and the probandum, however, distinguishes it from other forms of knowledge such as memory, *anuvyavasāya*[183] and testimony. As *anumiti* is supposed to be caused only through the knowledge of the invariable concomitance, 'inference' is defined as a synonym of the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the reason[184] and the probandum. It may be recalled that in Nyāya the discovery of the *linga* in the *pakṣa* as associated with the memory of its concomitance with the probandum, technically called[185] *tṛtīya-linga-parāmarśa*, is contemplated as the cause of inference but because the knowledge of the reason in the subject (*pakṣa*) is dependent on the agreement in presence and the agreement in absence it is simply cumbrous, according to Vedānta, to consider it as the cause of *anumiti*. Thus, the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) along with its memory (*saṁskāra*) as an intermediary operation (*vyāpāra*) is the cause of *anumiti*.

We may now ask : What is the meaning of this invariable concomitance between the reason (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhya*) in Vedānta ? In reply to this, the author of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* suggests a definition of *vyāpti*. According to him, *vyāpti* is the coexistence of the reason and the probandum[186] in one and the same locus ; thus the *vyāpti* between smoke and fire means the coexistence of the fire in the ground which is also the locus of the smoke. The idea of concomitance is produced by the perception of the reason and the probandum in one and the same substratum when no case of the failure of this concomitance is known. The notion of concomitance being altogether subjective, the Vedāntist does not emphasize the necessity of perceiving the concomitance in large number[187] of cases. Only one perception of concomitance may, in certain cases, be sufficient to produce the notion of the concomitance of a thing with the other in the absence of any contrary instance.

In Jaya-Tīrtha's *Nyāya-sudhā* we have a lucid account of the Mādhva doctrine of 'inference'. Inference is defined by him as a flawless[187] reasoning from a mark to the conclusion on the basis of an invariable relation subsisting between them. This invariable relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, is like Vedānta, the essential determinant of 'inference' which distinguishes it from other forms of cognition such as 'perception' and 'testimony'. The inferential cognition of an entity,[189] in the Mādhva system, is accomplished through the perception of the *hetu* (reason) in the subject as qualified by an invariable relation to that entity as a consequence. Thus, the perception of the smoke in the hill associated with fire leads to the knowledge of fire in that hill.

The relation of *vyāpti* is explained differently by Jaya-Tīrtha and Vyāsa-Tīrtha. The former describes the nature of concomitance, in his *Nyāya-sudhā*,[190] as an unfailing and inseparable relation precluding the existence of the reason without the existence of the consequence, a relation termed by him '*avinābhāva*'. This unconditional and invariable association between the smoke and the fire is such as to make the existence of the former an impossibility in the absence of the latter. Vyāsa-Tīrtha, however, takes a different stand. In his *Tarka-tāṇḍava*, he explains that the relation of *vyāpti* is *anupapatti*[191] or a sort of reductio-ad-absurdum demonstrating that the existence of the reason in the absence of the consequence leads to either contradiction of experience or to inadmissible implications. The main point in concomitance, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, is the reduction of an incontrovertible experience to an impossible situation necessitating the assumption of the entity inferred.

Naturally, the Mādhva philosophers were dissatisfied with the Vedānta dissertation regarding the nature of *vyāpti* and their outlook on the problem of inference as a whole. In one of their illuminating treatises we come across the criticism that the Śaṁkarite definition of *vyāpti* suffers from the fallacy of narrow-extension. It does not include many kinds of inferences such as the inference of rainfall in the upper regions from the perception of the rising level of water in the river of the lower terrain or the inference that Rohiṇī, a constellation, will shortly rise in the east because Kṛttikā (another constellation) has already arisen. In these two cases of inference we have a denial of the Śaṁkarite position, as stated in *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, that *vyāpti* is the coexistence of the reason and the probandum because in them we find that the reason is not coexistent with the consequence. These inferences stand evidence to the correctness of the charge that the Śaṁkarite *vyāpti* is operative only in a few cases of inferential cognition.

Though we may not accept Vyāsa-Tīrtha's definition of *vyāpti* as *anupapatti*, which is apparently a later development in Mādhva philosophy, on the ground that the recollection of the invariable concomitance between the reason and the consequence, in the event of the cognition of the reason, does not entail the complex understanding that the denial of the consequence would lead to inevitable contradictions, yet Jaya-Tīrtha's enunciation of *vyāpti* as an unfailing and inseparable relation is certainly wider and more comprehensive than its formulation at the hands of either a Śaṁkarite or a later Naiyāyika (e. g. Gangeśa). The restriction of *vyāpti* only to cases of coexistence has its reason in a pragmatic outlook requiring the existence of consequence in the subject which, however, is impossible without the coexistence of the reason and the probandum. But, *vyadhikaraṇa-vyāpti*[192] also produces inferential cognition. Would it not be incorrect to banish it from the operational field of *vyāpti* ? The Mādhva *vyāpti*, as it includes both inference by residues (*pariśeṣa*) and implication (*arthāpatti*) for which the Mīmāṁsakas and the Śaṁkarites had to admit another *pramāṇa* (i. e., *arthāpatti*), is more extensive in comparison to the Śaṁkarite *vyāpti*.

Let us now consider the question of the forms of *vyāpti* as admitted in the schools of Śaṁkara and Madhva. For the Śaṁkarites, the method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance or *vyāpti*, whereas, in Nyāya and Mādhva philosophy *vyāpti* is both 'agreement in presence' (*anvaya*) and 'agreement in difference' (*vyatireka*). On the pattern of the Nyāya, the Mādhva school also classifies inference into three, viz., (1) the[193] inference which depends on the agreement in presence (*kevalānvayī*), (2) the one which depends on agreement in absence (*kevalavyatirekī*) and (3) that which depends on both agreement in presence and agreement in absence (*anvayavyatirekī*). This classification is discarded by the Śaṁkarites probably on the ground that it is not in consonance with their theory of the falsity of world. The probandum in the *kevalānvayī* inference is that which is not the counterpositive of absolute negation; but[194] because all attributes, in Vedānta, are the counterpositives of absolute negation with reference to Brahman, it is difficult to find a probandum for the *kevalānvayī* inference. Moreover, the *kevalavyatirekī* or *anvayavyatirekī* inferences, which recognize the concomitance of the negation of the probandum with the denial of the reason, are useless for any inferential cognition because no knowledge of negation can produce any positive cognition. It may be observed that the author of *Pramāṇa-candrikā*, while discussing the utility[195] of *kevalavyatireki* inference also recognizes the point that an agreement in absence is not at all useful for proving the absence of the *sādhya* which is a positive entity; the only reason for admitting its utility, in the Mādhva system, is the purpose which this type of inference serves in exhausting all possibilities of the failures of the agreement in presence. The Śaṁkarites, on the other hand, discard every idea of usefulness in *vyatireka-vyāpti* (agreement in absence) and conclude that the cognition of the agreement in presence and its recollection is the sufficient condition for the operation of a valid inference.

So far we have discussed the nature of inference and *vyāpti*, as available in the works of Śaṁkara and Madhva, and now for a complete understanding of the problem of inference it would be useful to explain the Śaṁkarite analysis of the cognitive process involved in an inferential cognition specially in view of their doctrine that all cognitions are produced through the operation of the *vṛttis* of *antaḥkaraṇa*. In *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* we get a lucid account of the various stages of this process. It is argued that on the perception of the smoke in the hill, through the recollection of the invariable concomitance of the smoke and the fire, the *antaḥkaraṇa* of the perceiver gets transformed, as *vṛttis*, in the form of 'fire'. As the consciousness defined by the *vṛtti* of the fire is altogether subjective, it gets[196] undifferentiated with the consciousness determined by the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and we have thus the knowledge of the fire in the hill. It may be asked : Is the removal of ignorance also one of the factors in the illumination of mediate knowledge as it is in immediate cognition and, if so, how a distinction between mediacy and immediacy is explained in Vedānta ? While explaining this point, in his *Siddhāntabindu*,[197] Madhusūdana contends that the veil of ignorance whose removal is a necessary condition in the illumination of knowledge is of two kinds, viz., (1) that which has the *sākṣin* as its substrate and (2) that whose substrate is the objective consciousness of Brahman. The sheet of ignorance covering the subjective consciousness of the *sākṣin*, as defined by the *antaḥkaraṇa*, is removable by all knowledge, both mediate and immediate, but the ignorance that veils the consciousness of Brahman, as determined by the object, is removable by direct and immediate experience. Thus, in the inferential knowledge of the fire the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* in its specific form as 'fire' removes the subjective veil of ignorance over the *sākṣin* resulting in the consequent cognition of the fire in the hill. Because there is no removal of the objective consciousness in this case, the fear of immediacy is without any ground. In this way the Śaṁkarites uphold the view that the removal of *ajñāna* is a necessary condition in every cognition whether immediate or mediate; it is not a condition operating only in cases of immediate knowledge.

The Mādhva philosophers, however, find no justification in the recognition of the twofold character of ignorance; for them it would be adding fresh difficulties to a doctrine that cannot rationalize its own existence. It is difficult to accept the credentials of this theory without taking for granted the truth of the philosophy that all phenomenon is a manifestation of *avidyā* (nescience). There is a marked tendency in the later writers of Advaita philosophy of increasing the importance of *māyā* in the explanation of phenomena and defining its nature as an entity. Whether such a tendency is consistent with the conceptions of the inexplicability of *māyā* and the non-duality of the Ultimate Reality is a point to be discussed in a later chapter of this book, '*The Conceptions of Māyā and Īśvara*'.

Analogy (Upamāna)

In Vedānta, like Mīmāṁsā, '*upamāna*' is defined as a means of the cognition of similarity of an object which is not within the purview of the operation of senses at that moment. When a man who has seen a cow in the city goes to the forest and sees a wild *gavaya* (a species of ox), he cognizes the similarity of the cow in the *gavaya* and, thereafter, obtains the knowledge that the *gavaya* is similar to the cow. This posterior cognition of the similarity of the cow in the *gavaya* is said to be the result of the operation of *upamāna*. The whole process of apprehension in the example cited above consists of two cognitions of similarity, (1) that of the cow in the *gavaya* and (2) that of the *gavaya* in the cow. The first cognition of the similarity of the cow in the *gavaya* is stated to be the result of the operation of perception because the substrate of similarity in this case, the *gavaya*, comes directly in contact with the eye; but because the cow, in the second cognition of similarity, is not an object of sense-contact it cannot be apprehended through perception as viewed by Vācaspati in his[199] *Sāṁkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, This cognition of the similarity of the *gavaya* in the cow is also not due to inference as there is no operation of *vyāpti* in this case. It is, therefore, expedient that the cognition of similarity, which is not directly perceived by the senses, be contemplated as due to a different *pramāṇa*. This *pramāṇa* is termed in Vedānta '*upamāna*.'

As has been described, in another context, in this book, the Mādhva philosophers were always reluctant to acknowledge the claim of *upamāna* as a separate and a novel means of cognition, Like Sāṁkhya, they always appreciated the validity of the argument that the knowledge of similarity can be obtained through inference. When a man, after having known that a *gavaya* is similar to the cow, perceives a *gavaya* in the forest he argues, according to the author of *Pramāṇa-candrikā*, in the following way, "The object here is what is indicated by the term '*gavaya*' because, being not a cow, it has resemblance to a cow". He then concludes that the cognitum is related to the term '*gavaya*'. There is, according to them, absolutely no justification in the argument that a special type of *pramāṇa* is required for the apprehension of similarity.

It would appear from this criticism that, as a matter of fact, the target of this attack is not so much the Vedānta or the Mīmāṁsā exposition of *upamāna* as the Nyāya argument seeking to justify that *upamāna* is a novel means of cognition. The problem in Vedānta or Mīmāṁsa is not the association of an object with a word (i. e. *gavaya*) on the basis of the knowledge of its similarity to a known object, as in Nyāya; it is the cognition of the similarity of imperceptible object with an object of perception on the basis of its similarity already cognized. The Madhvites have rather sidetracked and overlooked the real situation leading to the recognition of *upamāna* in Vedānta and Mīmāṁsa. On this particular issue, the Sāṁkhya criticism, that because both the similarities subsisting in the cow and the *gavaya* are identical it is futile to think of a separate *pramāṇa* when the similarity of the cow in the *gavaya* can be acquired[200] directly through perception, has a correct appraisal of the epistemological situation. The justification and the value of the Sāṁkhya criticism may be brought home to us in our experience that the cognition of the mutual similarities between the relata occurs as a flash in a single and an identical cognition. It is, thus, a mere abstraction of thought to separate the cognition of the similarity of the cow in the *gavaya* from the cognition of the similarity of the *gavaya* in the cow and explain the one as the object of perception and the other as the object of *upamāna.*

Testimony (Āgama)

With the only exception of the Vaiseṣikas, all the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy are unanimous in recognizing the function and validity of verbal cognition (*śabda*). This *pramāṇa* distinguishes itself from other means of cognition, such as perception and inference, by virtue of the fact that in it we have the knowledge of things from relevant sentences uttered by reliable persons and by understanding the meaning of words of which they are composed. The validity of knowledge obtained through *śabda-pramāṇa,* therefore, depends, firstly, on the right understanding of the meaning of words and sentences and, secondly, on the infallibility of the authority speaking them. Though we have much of controversy, in the different systems of Indian philosophy, over the structure of sentence and its interpretation, yet because it is not of much value, from the philosophical point of view, it would be almost futile to undertake its discussion in this book. The next question of the infallibility of persons (*āptatva*), on which the validity of testimony or authoritv ultimately depends, is of considerable philosophical importance because of the supremacy which it has rightly deserved in certain schools of Indian philosophy that regard it as the only means of comprehending the true nature of the Ultimate Reality. We may, however, discuss this problem a little at length with special reference to the standpoints of Śaṁkara and Madhva.

Before actually undertaking a discussion on the nature of *āptatva* and its determining conditions, it may be useful to give some thought to the kinds of *śabda-pramāṇas* recognized in the Hindu systems. *Śabda-pramāṇa* and, consequently, *āptatva* may be classified, on the lines indicated by Kumārila and dittoed by the followers of Madhva into two classes, viz., (1) *Pauruṣeya*[201] or Personal and (2) *Apauruṣeya* or Impersonal. In the former class, i. e., the *Pauruṣeya,* are included all words spoken by trustworthy persons and in the latter, i. e., the *Apauruṣeya,* we have only the words of the Veda or the Revelation whose authority has its source in no human being. As the testimony of the Vedas either emanates from the eternal character of the Vedas themselves, as upheld by the Mīmāṁsakas, or from the omniscience of their Divine Creator, as in Nyāya, the problem of *āptatva* pertains to the class of *śabda pramāṇa* known as *pauruṣeya* or 'personal authority'.

Pauruṣeya (Personal Authority)

In this connection two questions are, however, important and demand our special attention : (1) What are the grounds on which the validity of testimony, as a source of knowledge, is to be established and (2) what are the conditions that warrant the infallibility of authority ? The answers to both of them in the various systems of Indian philosophy are more or less identical inasmuch as they assert that the very nature of the infallibility of testimony carries with it the validity of the cognition. As a matter of fact the knowledge obtained by the authority is acquired by him either through perception or inference and, hence, the validity of testimony as a *pramāṇa* is to be guaranteed on the strength of the validity of perception or inference. The same idea is conveyed in *Yoga-bhāṣya*[202] when it defines the *Āgama-pramāna* as a function of mind which is affected when a trustworthy person who has perceived or inferred something speaks it out to another individual for the purpose of conveying that knowledge to him. Thus, the validity of testimony really depends on the infallibility of authority either in the acquisition of correct knowledge or in imparting it to a second person.

To begin with the Mādhva analysis of the conditions governing the certitude and infallibility of authority, we may mention that Jaya-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāya-sudhā*,[203] defines testimony as a sentence which is free from all defects that generally creep in either during the acquisition of knowledge by the authority or in the course of its communication to the ignorant person. These defects, as enumerated by Jaya-Tīrtha, are the absence of real[204] knowledge, want of proper instruments for obtaining and imparting that knowledge, the indifference to speak and the intention to deceive and misrepresent the true fact. Therefore, according to Madhvites, the absence of these defects really constitutes the essential and necessary condition for the infallibility of authority. Vijñāna-

Bhikṣu also, in his *Yoga-vārttika*,[205] defines *āptatva* as the absence of defects, viz., delusion, inattentiveness, the intention to deceive and the want of proper functioning of the sense organs which have a close resemblance to the Mādhva constituents of *āptatva*. It is a point worthy of consideration that the conditions regarded essential in an authority are more or less identical in all the systems of Hindu Thought. The presence of these conditions in an individual and the absence of attachment and hatred in wordly affairs (*rāga*), certify his authority as regards matters divine and spiritual and only by observing these signs one may rely, without any mental reservation, on the validity of his testimony.

What is the proof that a man is really free from the various defects, viz., attachment, hatred, perversion, etc., and that he invariably possesses the true knowledge of spiritual principles in whose absence the reliance on his authority would be open to doubt and subject to revision ? As a reply it may be asserted that in every system of Indian philosophy, specially in Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Vedānta, the freedom from attachment, etc., that are the products of *rajas*, is related with the corresponding increase in the *sattva* attribute which invariably produces the true knowledge of Reality. The absence of defects is, therefore, necessarily related to the true knowledge of the spiritual principles and, hence, the authority of the person free from such defects is indubitable and inevitably certain.

Apauruṣeya (Impersonal Authority)

The absolute validity of Vedic Injunctions and the knowledge obtained from them has been differently explained in Indian philosophy The Naiyāyikas[206] uphold the view that because the Vedic sentences, though spoken by an infallible authority, are as much sentences as spoken by Kālidāsa or any other person, they have their cause in a person who creates them and speaks them out. Moreover, the destructive character of all words and sounds ultimately leads to the conclusion that the Vedas are also the creations of some person and are, therefore, *pauruṣeya*. The testimony of the Vedas in the Nyāya system is ascertained by contending that they were created by the Omniscient Lord who by assuming a phantasmal[207] body (*nirmāṇa-kāya*) revealed the Veda for the benefit of His devotees.

The Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, criticise the Nyāya standpoint as reckless imaginings that are dangerous to the very cause of the unblemished authority of the Vedas, a contention that has received an able support in the exposition of the Mādhva school. The Vedas, according to them, are eternal in themselves[208] and have not been created by any agency either human or divine. The Word along with its connotation is never subject to any destruction and hence requires an agency only for its manifestation and not for creation. The Mīmāṁsakas, who are unable to find any satisfactory reason in the concept of a Divine Entity or God, propound the validity of the Vedas by introducing the doctrine of the eternal and immutable character of the Vedic Word. The Vedas in this system are, therefore, *apauruṣeya* or Impersonal and not *pauruṣeya* as in Nyāya.

The Vedānta view, though somewhat similar to the Mīmāṁsā, adopts a line of approach which is different from both the Nyāya and the Mīmāṁsā. Like Nyāya, Vedānta accepts the weight of the argument that the Vedic words and sentences are non-eternal[209] because they are subject to destruction at the time of world-dissolution. According to them, the Lord in association with His *māyā*[210] reveals the Veda to certain beings at the beginning of each creation on an identical pattern of the Veda of the past aeon. This similar manifestation of the Veda by the Lord, in each creation,[211] is rendered possible through the latent tendencies in His mysterious *māyā* (acintya-māyā) with whom He is always associated. This conception of the revelation of the Veda in each aeon is the cornerstone of Vedānta's peculiar reconciliation of the divergent views of Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā. In so far as we view the Veda in Its revealed form in words and sentences, we may be justified in asserting that the form of the Veda is non-eternal and destructible but the Veda as such, which is manifested by the Lord in the beginning of each creation since eternity, is immutable and eternal (*nitya*). The Veda in Vedānta is both eternal and independent, as in Mīmāṁsā, and is also free from such defects that generally recur in cases of Personal Authority.

If the Vedas are revealed by Īśvara in the beginning of each creation, how can they be termed *apauruṣeya* ? According to the author of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, the conception of *pauruṣeyatva* in Vedānta means neither utterance nor origination or creation by some personality but only stands for revelation without any consideration[212] of the similar utterances in the past and, therefore, the Veda which is manifested on the very pattern of the Veda of the past aeon is not *pauruṣeya*. The essential character of *pauruṣeyatva*, as explained by Vācaspati in his[213] *Bhāmatī*,is the independence of personality in his utterance. It is this independence which is likely to effect the testimony of authority on account of his incorrect and false knowledge. But because the Vedas are not the creations of Īśvara, they are free from such defects as ignorance and false knowledge whose presence destroys the validity of personal cognition and are, consequently, self-valid. Citsukhācārya, in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, formulates another definition of *pauruṣeyatva* which really follows from Vācaspati's contention that *pauruṣeyatva*[214] consists in the complete independence of personality in his utterance. According to him, *pauruṣeyatva* is limited only to such cases in which the revelation of authority depends on the knowledge obtained through other *pramāṇas;* hence, the Vedas whose revelation through the agency of Īśvara is known only through them, and not through any[215] other *pramāṇa*, are *apauruṣeya* and not *pauruṣeya.*

It may now be clear that the definitions as formulated by Vācaspati, Dharmarājādhvarendra and Citsukhācārya describe the necessary conditions in which the Vedas stand related to Īśvara for their manifestation. The invalidity of testimony always accrues from the defects of authority that are either subjective[216] or objective and in both cases they depend on the independence of personality in the acquisition of knowledge and in its transmission through verbal communication. In order that the concept of the self-validity of Vedas be formulated, it is essential that the independence of authority be[217] disparaged. This point of view has been developed in the subsequent ideas of Citsukha and the author of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* that the authority of the Veda is apprehensible through Vedas alone and that in its manifestation Īśvara has to depend on the revelation of the Veda of the past aeon. The testimony of the Vedas, in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta, is propounded partly by ascribing an eternal character to the spiritual principles of the Veda and partly by maintaining that they have been revealed by the omniscient Īśvara who knows them directly.

The Mādhva philosophers also recognize the superior validity of testimony and its importance as the only means of knowing the transcendent realities. They are also unanimous and unflinching in their belief that the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas is a precedent condition of their validity[218]. The author of *Yuktimallikā*, while denouncing the idea of personal authority, contends that even the Nyāya concept of the omniscient Īśvara, as the creator of the Vedas and the instructor of true knowledge, is not beyond doubt because there is no certainty that He may not deceive mankind with His false statements. Buddha himself was an incarnation of God, yet he deceived people with his false teachings. Moreover, if we ask the Nyāya philosophers as to how Īśvara, who is without a body, can create the Veda, he would reply that just as the *paramāṇus* of water create *dvyaṇukas*, Īsvara also creates the Vedas and speaks them in the beginning of each creation. But then the Mādhva philosopher would question : When it is a pre-condition of verbal communication that the speaker must possess a physical organism,[219] how can Īśvara who has no physical organism, because prior to creation there was an unqualified absence of physical elements, instruct the Veda ? According to a Madhvite, it is quite illogical for the Naiyāyikas to propound the doctrine of the ejaculation of the Vedas by Īśvara while disparaging the thesis of His possessing a body. Moreover, tradition also does not impute the authorship of the Vedas to any person. The Vedas are, therefore, independent and eternal and are not the creation of any person either human or divine.

Though in Mādhva philosophy Īśvara is neither the creator nor the speaker of the Vedas—speaker in the sense that the Vedas derive their existence from the speech of Īśvara—yet He is the first exponent of the *śrutis* who gives to words, which were originally in a confused and hotchpotch condition, an order in succession allotting them priority and posteriority through the order of His own Buddhi. Just as *ghaṭa* (pot) and *maṭha* (monastery), through their limitations or *upādhis* create *ghaṭākāśa*, the *maṭhākāśa* in the eternal *ākāśa*, the eternal *Buddhi* of Īśvara creates order in the eternal though disordered words of the Veda.

This dissertation of the Mādhva conception of the Veda or the Impersonal Testimony may disclose the similarity which this treatment bears with the Śaṁkarite explanation of the Vedic testimony. Notwithstanding their unanimity on the eternal character of the Vedas and on the contention that it is Īśvara who reveals them first, the philosophers of the two schools have chosen to disagree on an important issue. As we have already mentioned, the Vedāntins express their apathy to the concept of the eternal character of words when the Mādhva philosophers contemplate their eternality both in their original hotchpotch state and their posterior systematization by Īśvara. In this the Mādhva school is more sympathetic towards Mīmāṁsā in comparison to Vedānta which clearly bears the stamp of the Nyāya influence.

Validity of Smṛti.

The concept of the validity of *smṛtis* is available in almost all the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy though there is controversy on the question as to which of the *smṛtis* are to be regarded as valid. Both Śaṁkara[221] and Madhva are in perfect agreement that the *smṛtis*[222] derive their validity from the *śrutis* whose content they explain and elaborate. But all the *smṛtis* are not valid and correct representations of the Vedas because, besides their apparent antagonism, such as in the case of the *Vaiṣṇava* and *Pāśupata smṛtis*, they being composed and dependent on the memories of their[223] human authors are likely to be affected by the defects of false knowledge and misrepresentations that are not unlikely for the persons of limited intelligence. Therefore, it is argued that only those *smrtis* should be regarded as infallible and valid that are in consonance with the *srutis*. This principle has been the basis of Śamkara's criticism of the *Sāmkhya-smrtis* as it has been of Madhva's[224] denunciation of the *Pāsupata-smrtis*.

Implication (Arthāpatti)

On the footprints of Kumārila, the Śaṁkarites also admit *arthāpatti* as a new *pramāṇa*. *Arthāpatti*, both to them and the Mīmāṁsakas[225], consists in presuming something not seen on the ground that a fact already seen or heard cannot be explained[226] without it. For instance, it is found that Devadatta, who is alive, is not in the house and this non-existence in the house leads to the implication that he is somewhere outside the house. It is the certainty about his being alive together with the perception of his absence from the house that leads us to the presumption of his outside existence.

On this issue also the Mādhva philosophers argue that it is incorrect to accord *arthāpatti* the status of a separate *pramāṇa* for this *pramāṇa* is nothing but inference in disguise. Śalāri-śeṣācārya, in his *Pramāṇa-candrikā*, shows that the so-called presumptive[227] cognition of the existence of Caitra outside the house can be reduced to an inferential cognition in the following form; 'Caitra must exist outside, because, though alive, he is absent inside : whoever is alive and does not exist at a certain place must exist in some other place, just as I myself do'. This inference, according to him, can produce the same cognition as the *arthāpatti-pramāṇa* and, hence, there are no valid grounds for considering *arthāpatti* as a novel means of cognition.

The Śaṁkarites, however, disagree with this opinion. Inference, according to them, cannot serve the purpose[228] of *arthāpatti* for in the knowledge produced through *arthāpatti* there is no agreement in presence which is the essential condition in inference. The importance of agreement in absence in inference is already discarded by Vedānta; the presumptive cognition, therefore, does not provide with any possibility of being explained through inference. As suggested by the Mīmāṁsakas, the special form in which an inferential cognition is apprehended constitutes its difference from *arthāpatti*. In inference it is the *hetu* which is known first and later on from this the *sādhya* is proved; in no case of inferential cognition we have their simultaneous apprehension. But in *arthāpatti*, without[229] the presumption of Devadatta's existence outside the house, we cannot understand his absence from the house. This simultaneous apprehension of both the factors in *arthāpatti* is a point of difference from what is ordinarily known as inferential cognition.

From this exposition it may be evident that the Mādhva interpretation of *arthāpatti* as a case of inference owes much to the fact that the definitions of both Jaya-Tīrtha and Vyāsa-Tīrtha are comprehensive enough to include the cases of presumptive cognitions, whereas, the conception of 'inference' in Vedānta precludes any such possibility. Vyāsa-Tīrtha's definition of *vyāpti* as *anupapatti* includes in it cases of both residual and implicatory character and as such the Mādhva system can afford to include *arthāpatti* within inference. On the other hand, because the conception of *vyāpti*, in Vedānta, is more specific and narrow in extension it is perfectly justified[230] for Vedānta to assume a separate *pramāṇa* for explaining the cognitions of presumptive character and also such cases where knowledge arises out of agreement in absence which have been excluded in Vedānta from the scope of inferential cognition.

Non-apprehension (Anupalabdhi)

In addition to other *pramāṇas*, Vedānta, like Kumārila, admits a new *pramāṇa*, viz., *anupalabdhi*, for the apprehension of the non-existence of a thing. Non-existence, which is considered a separate category both in Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta, requires a separate *pramāṇa* for its apprehension because none of the other means of cognition is capable of producing this knowledge. As the operation of perception is restricted to only positive existents, because of the necessary condition of sense-contact, it is incapable of generating a negative cognition of non-existence. It would also be unreasonable to suppose that the knowledge of non-existence can be acquired through inference because in the non-perception of an object there is neither any perception of the reason nor of the other factors that are necessary for inference. Therefore, the Vedantins contribute to the view that the admission of a separate *pramāṇa* for purposes of explaining the apprehension of negation is necessary; this they name after Mīmāṁsā[231] as '*anupalabdhi*' or non-apprehension.

What is important in such cases of the apprehension of non-existence that are cognized by *anupalabdhi* is not only the non-perception of the object that would have been perceived had it existed but also the certainty about the presence of all those conditions which would have produced the knowledge of the object had it not been absent at the spot, i. e., the locus of *abhāva*. It is to ensure the presence of all such conditions that the author of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, while defining *anupalabdhi* as the *asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*[232] of the cognition of negation, qualifies his definition with the clause, 'Had the object been there it would have been perceived'. Thus, it is only in a lighted spot where it would have been perceived had it not been absent[233] and not in a dark place where the eye would have failed to cognize its presence had it been present that the non-existence of the jar is cognized through *anupalabdhi*.

As mentioned before, the Mādhva philosophers disagreed with the conception of *anupalabdhi* as a separate *pramāṇa*. To them, the Vedānta advocacy is an instance of logical arrogance seeking justification for purely hypothetical presumptions when 'negation' can be apprehended through any of the three *pramāṇas*, viz., perception, inference and testimony. It is through perception that we have the knowledge of the absence of a jar[234] on the ground; the immediacy of the apprehension of non-existence is explicable only on the assumption that it is known through perception. Though a proximate non-existence in such cases is, undoubtedly, an indispensable condition, yet only this much cannot suffice for its admittance as a separate and independent source of knowledge because in that case, by a similar line of argument, one might state that in the cognition of a positive reality the non-apprehension of its negation and not the perception of the positive existence is the real evidence in the truth of the judgement that the thing exists.

According to Madhvites, the objection that because a negation is incapable of positively stimulating the sensibilities it would be imperceptible through the senses is not at all valid because there is no such condition that only positive entities are capable of sense-contact; negation may as much be an object of sense-contact as a positive entity and, therefore, its knowledge may, quite reasonably, be contemplated as a case of perception.

We have also certain instances in which negation is apprehended through inference. For example, Devadatta's blindness or lack of vision may easily be inferred in the following way : "Devadatta is devoid of vision because he is ignorant of the nature of colours". His blindness[235] is, therefore, inferred from his ignorance of the nature of colours which is invariably and unfailingly related to his blindness. Moreover, testimony may also be the means of the cognition of absence in certain cases; for example, the non-existence of the Kauravas at present is proved on the testimony[236] of the *Mahābhārata*. There is thus no justification in the Śaṁkarite or the Mīmāṁsā recognition of a separate *pramāṇa* for the apprehension of non-existence when it can be grasped through one of the three means of cognition.

By reading closely into the arguments as explicated above, it may be realized that the whole criticism hinges round the question : Is perception competent in apprehending the absence of a positive entity ? Inference and testimony do not form the crux of the problem as they either tacitly presuppose the perceptibility of negation or do not comprise conditions under which *anupalabdhi*, as a separate *pramāṇa*, is advocated in Vedānta. The conception of *anupalabdhi* is for such cases of absence where the absent entity could have been perceived had it been there and, hence, the apprehension of the absence of Kauravas is not a legitimate case for the operation of *anupalabdhi*. The competence of testimony in producing the knowledge of negation has never been denied in Vedānta, which imparts the knowledge of the non-duality of the Ultimate Reality, for the idea of the incompetence of testimony in imparting the knowledge of negation would be a fatal blow to certain foundational concepts of Advaita philosophy. *Anupalabdhi* is necessary only in such cases where we have an immediate cognition of negation, something which is beyond the mediate apprehension of testimony. The example of the apprehension of the non-existence of the Kauravas on the testimony of *Mahābhārata* does not provide us with an argument that may justify the denunciation of the Vedāntā stand.

The competence of inference as a means of the cognition of negation is also not indubitable. In the example quoted by the Mādhva philosopher, the ignorance of the nature of colours and blindness, that are stated to be invariably and unfailingly related, are themselves the negation of the knowledge of colours and visual perception. This, therefore, presupposes the question of the apprehension of negation and as such the Mādhva suggestion about the apprehension of negation through inference suffers from the fallacy of interdependence. Thus, the main and the real point of controversy is if, at all, perception can know 'absence'.

If one minutely observes the Mādhva criticism one would find that their views bear resemblance with the Nyāya standpoint that the perception of non-existence is a unitary perception of negation and its locus where the perception of the non-existence arises out of the perception and sense-contact of the locus. The main objection against the perceptibility of non-existence that it is incapable of any contact with the visual senses is neither accepted by the Mādhva thinkers nor by the Naiyāyikas. According to them, the principle that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact with it applies only to positive existents and not to negation or *abhāva* and hence negation may be cognized even without sense-contact. We may, however, contend that this restriction only to the cases of positive existents affects the cogency of the Nyāya and Mādhva arguments that the importance of the cognitive senses consists in their being the via-media of the contact between the subject and the object and that no knowledge of indeterminate objects is ever possible. This may, however, be explained by stating that though there may actually be no sense-contact with non-existence yet sense-contact with its locus may be necessary for its cognition; there is thus no derogation in the significance of sense-contact as a necessary condition in the production of perceptual knowledge. It may be argued against this that a positive entity is always a counterpositive of innumerable negations and as such we must have, immediately, a simultaneous perception of all of them which is quite impossible. What actually happens in the apprehension of the non-existence of jug, as stated in Mīmāṁsā, is that we see the ground and remember[237] the jug and thus there arises in the mind the notion of 'non-existence'. Moreover, a man might be sitting at a place where there were no tigers yet he might not be aware of them because he did not think of them. When asked in the evening, if there was any tiger at the place where he was sitting in the morning, he would recollect that there was no tiger even without perceiving the place where he was sitting in the morning i. e., the locus of the 'non-existence'. This would, however, clarify the stand taken in Vedānta that the knowledge of negation arises out of a complex working of the human mind different from both perception and inference and as such a separate form of the transformation of mind is essential for the cognition of negation or *abhāva.*

The Mādhva objection that on the denial of perception as a means of the cognition of negation the immediacy of experience would be inexplicable also appears futile and irrelevant because 'negation' when cognized through *anupalabdhi* is as much immediate in its illumination as any object of perception. The author of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* stresses this point by contending that though non-apprehension is a novel means of cognition its resultant[238] experience is always perception and that a separate *pramāṇa* is contemplated because of the fact that this cognition requires a separate mode of *antaḥkaraṇa*[239] transformation than the *pratyakṣa.* This exposition would, however, satisfy that the Vedānta vindication of *anupalabdhi* as a separate *pramāṇa* is not without justification and that the theory of the perception of non-existence either in association with its locus or independently has many flaws in its logical formulation.

D—THE RELATION BETWEEN EXPERIENCE, REASONING AND AUTHORITY.

§1. EXPERIENCE VIS-A-VIS REASONING AND AUTHORITY

All valid cognitions can be traced to the three main sources of knowledge, viz., experience, reasoning and authority. Though the knowledge produced by any of these sources sufficiently bears the stamp of validity in itself, yet at times their presentations are mutually contradictory, for instance, the contradiction of the perception of sky as blue by the later reasoning that the sky is not blue and the contradiction of the cognition of conch-shell as silver by the dictates of authority that the object is really conch-shell and not silver. Such contradictions arouse in us pertinent doubts regarding the strength of the validity of knowledge generated through experience, reasoning and authority and the relation subsisting between them. The importance of this question acquires greater significance in view of the fact that the Advaita philosophy of the falsity of world tries to disprove the actual experience of the manifold character of worldly objects on the basis of the verdict of reasoning. Not only this; the problem of the real nature of the Ultimate Reality is a question on which *śruti* is the final authority; both experience and reasoning have to bow down before its verdict. The problem of the comparative strength of these sources of knowledge is, therefore, of considerable epistemological value for both the Śāṁkara and Mādhva schools and requires discussion in this book.

Madhvācārya, while advocating the supremacy of experience in his *Tattvodyota*,[240] argues that reasoning can never set aside the knowledge acquired through experience just as an argument disproving the real character of food cannot dissuade a hungry person from eating. This example, according to Madhva, is a valid-demonstration of the superior strength of experience vis-a-vis reasoning. The examples of the sublation of invalid perception as given in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta such as the perception of snake in rope or the apprehension of white-shell as yellow are only the illustrations of the contradiction of invalid perception by a stronger and valid perception and do not demonstrate the truth of the conception that logic can annul the valid cognition of a valid perception. That ratiocination can contradict the verdict of experience is, according to Madhva, a judgement which is as illusory as the world-illusion of the Śaṁkarites. It is contended by Vyāsa-Tīrtha,[241] in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, that the stronger validity of perception vis-a-vis inference and testimony is something which is contained in the very nature of perception; perception *per se* is more valid than either inference or testimony. The deception of the East in West can never be removed either by the dictates of the authority instructing, 'It is East and not West', or by such inference as, 'This is East because the sun rises in this direction'. As Vyāsa-Tīrtha argues, this deception can be set aside only when one actually perceives the sun rising in that direction and not otherwise. This example clearly demonstrates that the validity of a cognition is ultimately dependent on perception or experience which seldom stands in need of any other means of knowledge for attesting its apprehensions. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the opinion that the validity of perception should be certified after ascertaining that its apprehensions do not contradict the knowledge produced through inference and testimony is highly preposterous as it involves the fallacy of interdependence (*anyonyāśraya-doṣa*). If perception depends on testimony and inference, what is the guarantor of the certitude of knowledge produced either by testimony or inference ? The opponent has no other choice but to embark the position that their certitude can be guaranteed only through their corroboration with what is given either in perception or experience, an argument that reveals at once the fallacy of interdependence. The validity and strength of perception is, therefore, inherent in its essential nature and is not dependent on any other *pramāṇa.* As Vyāsa-Tīrtha contends, if perceptual testimony is to be contradicted by inference then any and every inference may contradict perception and even 'fire' may be proved as cold.

Another argument in favour of the strength and validity of perception is through the causal dependence of both inference and[242] testimony on visual and auditory perception. As the data for inference and scriptural testimony is always supplied by perception, it is wrong to think that the former can invalidate the latter; the validity of inference and testimony itself depends on the validity of perception and hence the latter can never be contradicted by the former. It is wrong, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, to suppose that perception is invalidated[243] by inference or scriptural testimony. In perceptual illusions perception is vitiated by the various types of defects, the absence of which is also known by perception. From the Mādhva standpoint, perception is never false; whenever it is false, it is not perception but only wrong knowledge produced by the association of defects (*doṣas*) with the natural conditions (*sāmagrī*) of perception.

The Advaitins disparage this philosophy of the supremacy of perception by arguing that the theory that every perception is absolutely valid is contradicted both by reason and experience. In several cases, knowledge acquired through perception is contradicted both by inference and testimony and the illusions are the glaring examples of such cases. If perceptions are always valid, what about illusions and their explanations in a text-book on philosophy ?

As upheld by Madhusūdana, the doctrine that perception *per se* is stronger[244] in validity to other *pramāṇas* is hopelessly misconceived. To prove his argument he asks : What do the Madhvites mean when they emphasize the strength of a *pramāṇa* in relation to other *pramāṇas* ? If they mean the comprehension of a cognitum, not apprehended through any other *pramāṇa*, by a *pramāṇa* whose strength is desired to be established then the mediate types of cognitions would also be claimants to stronger validity in comparison to immediate cognitions because in certain cases the attributes of the cognitum are known only by mediate knowledge and not by perception. Again, if they mean by the strength of a *pramāṇa* its strength[245] in comparison to the weaker *pramāṇas* then also the weakness of perception would be easily exposed. We know that the illusion of snake in a bamboo stick is removable not by tactual perception but by visual perception; this may indicate that within perception itself one kind of perception is of greater validity than the other. It is thus wrong to argue, like Vyāsa-Tīrtha, that perception *per se* has greater validity than either reasoning or testimony.

This, however, should not create the misunderstanding that Madhusūdana was an errant sceptic about the validity of perceptual cognitions. His only intention is to emphasize the possibility of such cases where wrong perception may be invalidated either by inference or testimony. An erroneous cognition is always liable to invalidation by another *pramāṇa* whether inference, testimony or perception. The determinant of the sublation of a cognition is not its dependence on a particular *pramāṇa* but its character as incorrect knowledge; a wrong cognition is always liable to contradiction and this may be due to any *pramāṇa* to which perception is no exception. The argument that if inference is to contradict perception then any perceptual cognition would be invalidated by inference with the result that even fire could be proved as cold, is, to Madhusūdana, an example of logical[246] arrogance. What is argued is not that inference can disprove any perception but that wrong perceptions can be set aside by correct and valid inferences.

The objection that the doctrine of the contradiction of perception by inference or scriptural testimony involves the fallacy of interdependence is also irrelevant because a *pramāṇa* for its validity always requires the critical examination that it is not in opposition to other *pramāṇas*. As all the *pramāṇas* are equally valid in producing right knowledge, it is absurd and illegitimate to establish the superiority of any one of them in the *vyāvahārika* plane of existence. The presence of the opposition between the deliveries of the two *pramāṇas* means, therefore, that either of them is invalid. Thus, according to Madhusūdana, the validity of sense-perception[247] is to be ensured by critical examination which alone can certify the truth of its apprehension.

The Mādhva objection that because perception provides the data for inference and scriptural testimony its validity should not be questioned is also invalid because the mere precedence of one cognition to another[248] is no argument in favour of the strength of the preceding cognition. Had it been so, the illusory presentation of silver, by virtue of its precedence,[249] would have been more valid than the later cognition that the object is conch-shell. Moreover, the knowledge of the negation (that the object is not silver) which is preceded by the knowledge of the object negated (the silver) should, in accordance with the opponent's principle, be less valid than the latter which, however, is not true. Thus the principle that the cognition which provides the data for succeeding cognitions has greater validity is incorrect and may lead to altogether wrong conclusions. According to Śaṁkarites, what establishes the validity and strength of a *pramāṇa* is its critical examination[250] and as such inference and testimony may also, at times, invalidate a perceptual cognition.

A little recapitulation of this discussion would suggest that the Madhvites, in their fervour of enthroning perception, went to the extent of explaining scriptural testimony in consonance with the results of perception. To them, it is only in cases of transcendent verities such as God, Lakṣmī, etc., that the scriptural verdict is not to be corroborated by perception. The Advaitins considered this view as something lowering the estimation in which the validity of scriptural testimony has been taken for granted by the majority of Indian thinkers. According to them, all the *pramāṇas,* with the exception of *śruti,* pertain to *vyāvahārika* existence and are, therefore, incompetent and less valid than the *śruti* which alone is capable of imparting the real knowledge about Brahman. As all perceptions and inferences are only modifications of discursive intellect, they are incapable of comprehending the Transcendental Reality; *śruti* is the only *pramāṇa* that can make us realize the Truth.

Here we have to guard ourselves against a possible misunderstanding. The Vedānta conception of the supremacy of testimony over perception and the sublation of perceptual experience by *śruti* is only with regard to the *pāramārthika*[251] order of existence; it has no operation in the field of *vyavahāra.*

The Mādhva doctrine of the superior validity of perception is at least searching in this that the final removal of doubt about a particular cognition rests with experience. The *śruti* which imparts the knowledge of unity is nothing but a transcendent and immediate experience. What the Madhvites have over-emphasized, in their zealous advocacy of perception, is the capacity of perceptual cognition, when not associated with any defect, in not being overpowered and invalidated by inference or testimony. For ascertaining the presence of defects, one has to take resort to critical examination and thereby depend on reasoning. It is here that the Mādhva contention exhibits its weakness. The Saṁkarite contention that often inference may contradict the results of perception and that the inference of the falsity of world is more valid than the perceptual experience has such solid foundation that it can stand the vehemence of the assaults of the Mādhva criticism.

§2. REASONING VIS-A-VIS SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY

The supremacy of scriptural testimony over reasoned knowledge is not the privilege of only one system of Indian philosophy. As rightly observed by Prof. Mukerji, in his *The Nature of Self,* "An implicit faith in Revelation with its consequent distrust of independent thought, it is well known, is claimed to be the privilege of the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy in general and the Vedānta school in particular." The Vedānta of Śaṁkara, which adopts a somewhat agnostic attitude towards the efficiency of logic and reasoned knowledge in grasping the Ultimate Truth, iterates the efficacy of Revelation in imparting the knowledge of Reality. Śaṁkara's distrust of reason, as would be clear from his various commentaries,[252] rests on the argument that logic being associated with the frivolities and shortcomings of the logician is never an infallible instrument of the knowledge of Reality.

"Reasoning, in so far as it is independent of traditional authority (*nirāgama*), has nothing to check its immethodical desultoriness and, consequently, conclusion, however, carefully obtained cannot be placed above the risk of refutation by a more powerful dialectician. The defect, it is said, is inherent in human reason which is different for different men and it vitiates all conclusions obtained through independent thinking."[253] The correct knowledge of Truth, therefore, is obtainable only through the Veda or the scriptural testimony which being eternal is liable to vitiation or error at any time whether past, present or future.

Śaṁkara's scepticism of reason as an independent instrument of knowledge about reality has often been misunderstood as the claim of a misologist who fails to recognize any importance of reason in delivering to mankind the knowledge of the Ultimate Truth. But such a reading of Śaṁkara's philosophy would not only be an injustice to him but would also be a callous distortion of what he sincerely believed to be the right path for the deliverance of humanity. Śaṁkara's own exposition of his system, in his monumental commentaries, his refutation of the rival schools and his bold assertion that the philosophy of Advaita is really the purport of the scriptures would go a long way to dispel the ignorance of many of his critics who have waxed eloquent in condemning him as having been swayed in the whirlwind of philosophical dogmatism. Dr. W. S. Urquhart, one of the great critics of Vedānta whose missionary zeal and ecclesiastical enthusiasm never allowed him to have the correct vision of Śaṁkara's philosophy, writes : "Śaṁkara's apparent abdication of private judgement, his reliance on instruction imparted by another, and his abhorrence of unfettered thought are disconcertingly suggestive of the narrowness of the European medieval philosophy and seems to place a chasm between Vedāntic and modern speculation."[254]

But this exposition of Śaṁkara's philosophy of reasoning is an incorrect enunciation of his views. What Śaṁkara was against was the independent application of reasoning in the comprehension of the ultimate nature of Truth[255] without verifying its results[256] from scriptural revelation. For Śaṁkara, the nature of Truth or Brahman can be obtained only[257] through scriptures; yet, for the right understanding of the Vedic Word or the Holy Writ we have to fall back upon reasoning. It is thus scripture, with the help of reasoning, that can reveal to us the true nature[258] of the Absolute and impart us the vision that may lead to our emancipation. In this connection we may refer again to the remarks of Prof. Mukerji. "That is, it is not reason as such but the misuse of the reasoning faculty which misses the truth but as it is extremely difficult to steer clear of the infinite sources of error in our reasoning processes and as it is not always easy to detect the logical aberrations of an accomplished dialectician, the agreement of our reasoned conclusions with the scriptures provides the safest criterion for us, that we are not so far off the right track."[259] Scripture, therefore, has a supremacy over reasoning in the comprehension of the ultimate reality because the findings of reasoning in this regard are doubtful unless they have been corroborated by scriptural testimony. We must, however, be cautious of one misunderstanding that may stealthily creep in and create with us an impression that the consideration of the supremacy of one source of knowledge means the invalidity of the other source. "The different sources of knowledge, it is said, do not conflict with one another as they pertain to different objects; each is valid within its proper field; but when two conflicting judgements are made about the same object one of them must be false."[260] The supremacy of scripture in comprehending the nature of Truth over reasoned knowledge, therefore, means that Logic or Reasoning is fraught with dangers of its own inherent profanation which makes us sceptic about its efficiency in comprehending the Absolute and not that either reasoning is useless in worldly matters or it is not a pointer to the probable nature of Truth.

This exposition of Śaṁkara's point of view on the supremacy of testimony over reasoning is something not in much discord with the Mādhva contention which, in the very strain of the Śaṁkarite argument, avows that the transcendent realities such as God, *Lakṣmī*, etc.,[261] are knowable only through *Āgama*. The Mādhva philosophers proclaim a very courageous stand that there being no other *pramāṇa* in the existence and the nature of God there can be no question of the contradiction between[262] reasoning and scripture. Though the nature of *Viṣṇu* is knowable only through scriptures and His existence, being transcendent, is beyond the comprehension of reasoned knowledge, yet what is given in scriptures is to be rightly comprehended on the basis of logical argumentation. According to Jaya-Tīrtha, all *pramāṇas* have their own validity within the ambit of their operations and it would be illogical to argue that because one argument is within the probability of being disproved by another the validity of reasoning should be a subject of distrust. It is only invalid reasoning, as Jaya-Tīrtha puts it,[263] that can be set aside by another reasoning and not valid argumentation which, like the other sources of knowledge, has its own validity. No *pramāṇa*, according to him, has any supremacy over the other so long as both of them are valid and unvitiated. But when any of them becomes the topic of distrust or doubt its validity is to be justified on the basis of experience which, in Mādhva philosophy, possesses an indubitable certitude. *Āgama* being itself a pronouncement or the teaching of God, whose perception is beyond any possibility of error, is the final word on transcendent matters but when in *vyavahāra* the scripture appears to contradict reason the real truth is to be understood on the basis of[264] experience because an unvitiated experience of man has to be in agreement with the perception of God.

E—THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE

Even after obtaining a thorough knowledge of the various means of knowledge one may find that his mind is still clogged with doubts that cloud his conviction about the correctness and truth of the apprehensions of knowledge. If the presentations of knowledge are really valid, wherefrom comes this certainty ? Is it imbedded in the very nature of knowledge or it depends on something else to confirm the accuracy of its correspondence with its object ? In replying this question, which forms the cornerstone of the structure of epistemology, the Indian thinkers associate themselves with two divergent views, the one maintaining the self-validity of knowledge and the other professing that this validity is dependent on certain extraneous conditions lying outside the nature and existence of knowledge. Of these, the chief exponents of the former view are the schools of Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta, whereas, the latter standpoint claims the Naiyāyika as its principal veteran. As Śaṁkara and

Madhva belong to the same group (as different interpreters of Vedānta) their views on this problem are only different interpretations of the doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge. Here, we do not have much scope for mutual criticism and controversy; we have only two aspects of the same truth.

§1. THE PARATAḤ-PRĀMĀṆYA VIEW OF NYĀYA

It may be recalled that the Nyāya school, which explained the fact of knowledge as produced by certain[265] objective collocations of conditions, maintained its validity through agreement with objective facts and its dependence on those conditions. According to them, these collocations[266] of conditions only assure the production of knowledge and not the validity of its correspondence with the objective phenomenon. If the production of knowledge can testify its own validity, then there is, hardly, any possibility of an illusion or error with the result that even a mirage can satisfy the practical need of quenching our thirst. The perception of a mirage is called invalid simple because when proceeding in accordance with its perception we do not find anything that can serve the purpose of water. The validity of knowledge, therefore, depends on the fulfilment of our practical needs. Knowledge, therefore, should not be regarded as self-valid. According to Nyāya, its validity is to be comprehended through something else (*parataḥ-prāmāṇya*).

Thus, the doctrine of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya*, in Nyāya, is a direct corollary of its conception that knowledge is a product of certain collocation of conditions, a philosophy that degrades knowledge from its high pedestal of glory to which it is placed in the schools of Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta. The Vedānta conception of the foundational character of knowledge, as discussed in the preceding section, discards the Nyāya theory as purely hypothetical which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. One would be at a fault to apply the ordinary notion of causation, regulating the events of physical phenomena, to knowledge which enjoys the special prerogative of illuminating itself and the objects. Knowledge is different from all other phenomena inasmuch as it stands above them and illumines them all and in doing so carries with them the certainty of its illumination. What we call, as Prof. Dasgupta writes, "agreement with facts of practical experience is but the agreement of previous knowledge with the later knowledge; for objective facts can come to us directly but only through the evidence of knowledge and they have no other certainty than what is bestowed on them by knowledge."[267] The truth about knowledge is not that it is caused by objective phenomena but that they depend on knowledge for being known. The *paratahprāmāṇya-vāda* (the doctrine of other-illuminacy) is a sort of **hysteron-proteron** where the facts about knowledge have been misrepresented to derogate it from its unique status as a self-illuminating and foundational principle.

§2. THE VEDĀNTA CONCEPTION OF SELF-VALIDITY

In the schools of Indian philosophy the problem of the self-validity of knowledge is considered from two different angles : one from the point of its origin (*utpattau*) and the other in the revelation of knowledge itself (*jñaptau*). For both Śaṁkara and Madhva, knowledge is self-valid from the point of its origin as well as in the nature of its illumination. Citsukhācārya, in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, describes the self-validity of knowledge, in its origin, as the production of knowledge only[268] by its conditions (*sāmagrī*) without the presence of other irrelevant conditions; it is the presence of such extraneous and unnecessary conditions that invalidates the cognition produced by them. Every false and invalid knowledge, according to Citsukha and other Śaṁkarites, consists in being [269] generated by such conditions that are not essential for the production of knowledge along with such factors that are requisite for the production of knowledge. It is due to such defects that knowledge which is self-valid becomes invalid.

This view has the concurrence of the Mādhva school which interprets the idea of the self-validity of knowledge, from the point of its origin, as production through such conditions alone that generate[270] knowledge; thus, the causes which are responsible for cognition also produce the validity of knowledge. Invalidity, on the other hand, is explained as due to the conditions that are other than those that cause the cognition itself. It is thus clear that the opinions of both the schools of Śaṁkara and Madhva are almost identical and work on the same lines against the antagonistic standpoint of the Nyāya philosophers.

This theory is criticised by Udayanācārya, in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, where he contends that knowledge[271] being an effect, such as a jar, is dependent on causes other than those which produce a cognition. As out of the two attributes, i. e., 'jarness' (*ghaṭatva*) and 'earthness' (*pṛthivītva*), that subsist in a jar, 'jarness' is caused by conditions that are different from those which produce 'earthness', valid knowledge is also determined by conditions other than those which cause a cognition because 'validity' (*pramātva*) and 'cognizedness' (*vijñānatva*) are two different attributes. Moreover, according to Udayana, the doctrine that the validity of knowledge is assured when it is caused by conditions that determine the acquisition of knowledge will ultimately lead to the truth of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*. If the invalidity of a cognitive presentation depends on the presence of certain defects that are apprehended later on by knowledge contradicting the previous knowledge, e. g., the knowledge of the conch-shell contradicting the prior knowledge of the silver, then it is clear that the validity of knowledge has ultimately to depend on the absence of a contradictory knowledge. Is it not a sufficient proof of the thesis that the validity of knowledge is other-dependent, i.e., *parataḥ-prāmāṇya* ? Ths absence of the contradictory knowledge thus certifies the correctness of a cognition and as such, according to Udayana, the Vedānta conception of the self-validity of knowledge is illogical and unjustified.

An examination of this view would bring to light that Udayana's criticism against the Vedānta view has its reason in the hypothesis that 'cognizedness' and 'validity' are two different attributes, a supposition that is considered fundamentally incorrect by Citsukha for whom valid knowledge and cognition are one and the same. As valid cognition in its nature is always a fact of knowledge, it is irrelevant, according to Vedāntins, to assert that its validity is determined by conditions other than those which cause the manifestation of knowledge. The essential conditions for the manifestation of knowledge are themselves sufficient to certify the truth of its presentation provided they are not affected by the presence of any defect which invariably invalidates it. Thus, the essential character of right knowledge, in Vedānta, is determined by the collocation of conditions that produce knowledge without being associated with such defects that obstruct its natural self-illumination and validity. For both Śaṁkara and Madhva, knowledge, if it is produced through the necessary conditions required for the generation of knowledge, is always valid; it is, therefore, self-valid and not other-valid as propagated in Nyāya.

In reply to Udayana's criticism, the Vedāntins assert that the necessary condition[272] of the absence of defects is insufficient to prove the judgement that the validity of knowledge is *parataḥ* The validity of a cognition can be *parataḥ* only when it depends on positive extraneous conditions and not on the denial of certain factors. The mere fact that the absence of defects is necessary for the validity of knowledge cannot destroy its character as *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*. Because the presence of defects is essential for invalidating a cognition, invalidity, according to the followers of both Śaṁkara and Madhva, is always *parataḥ*; validity is *svataḥ*, whereas, invalidity is *parataḥ*.

A similar treatment is also given to the problem of the validity of cognitive manifestation (*jñapti*). As explained by the author of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, the validity of *jñapti*,[273] which is a particular form of *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti*, is apprehended by the *sākṣin* along with the apprehension of the *vṛtti*-cognition. As the *sākṣin* is the ultimate unifying principle which comprehends the forms of *vṛttis*, it also apprehends the validity of cognition. Thus, in Vedānta, the concept of the self-validity of cognitive presentation means its comprehension by the *sākṣin*.

§3. MĀDHVA CONCEPTION OF SELF-VALIDITY

In Mādhva philosophy, we have almost an identical approach to the problem of the self-validity of the cognitive presentation (*jñapti*), the only difference being in the nature of the *sākṣin*. Both Vyāsa-Tīrtha and Vādirāja are of the opinion that the validity of knowledge is known through the agency of the *sākṣin* which, as they contend,[274] is the basis and the subject of all knowledge when this knowledge is not associated[275] with conditions that are detrimental to its validity. The *sākṣin*, according to them, has the unfailing natural power (*sahaja-śakti*) to cognize and to comprehend the validity of knowledge that can be restrained only in the presence of obstacles. Just as the natural heat of fire is rendered ineffective through[276] *mantras* or in the presence of *maṇi*, the natural capacity of the *sākṣin* to apprehend the validity of knowledge is held in abeyance due to the presence of obstructions.

Vādirāja, in his *Yuktimallikā*, introduces the agency of *manas*,[277] along with the agency of the *sākṣin*, in apprehending the certitude of knowledge which, however, is a novel and original contribution to Mādhva philosophy. His argument in favour of this contention is an inference from his almost certain hypothesis that *manas* is an organ responsible for the appearance of doubt. Unless the agency of *manas* in the comprehension of the validity[278] of cognition is above doubt, it is impossible to explain the agency of *manas* in the creation of doubt for, as Surottama Tīrtha contends, only that organ is susceptible of introducing doubt about the certitude of cognition that has the capacity of being instrumental in the production of that cognition; the eye can never doubt the validity of the cognition of smell which is the object of another sense organ. Thus, the two *indriyas*, viz., the *manas* and the *sākṣin*, are instrumental in grasping the validity of knowledge but because the former is liable to produce invalid knowledge, on account of its qualities such as attachment, unsteadiness and the fear of undergoing the hard task of correctly knowing an object, the agency of *sākṣin* in apprehending the validity of knowledge is absolutely essential. Thus the idea of the self-validity of knowledge, in Mādhva philosophy, stands for its comprehension[279] by the *sākṣin* unobstructed by any of the defects—a thesis almost similar to the one propagated by the Śaṁkara School of Vedānta.

This narration of the philosophical position of the Śaṁkara and Mādhva schools on the problem of the validity of knowledge would justify their emphasis that knowledge has the innate capacity of correctly illuminating its object. To them, the absence of defects is itself the guarantor of the validity of knowledge because, ordinarily, the rise of knowledge is supposed to carry with it the conviction about its validity. Besides this appeal from experience, logic may also certify that the doctrine of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya* has its station always on the brink of a precipice that is sure to lead to an unfathomed abyss of the regressus-ad-infinitum and an unending[282] series of doubts and suspicions bringing all normal life to a standstill. Thus, to both the schools of Śaṁkara and Madhva knowledge is self-valid and does not depend on anything else for its certainty. This conception of the self-validity of knowledge accords to it a unique position against all other phenomenal objects and while establishing its superiority over other existents justifies its foundational character.

F—FALSE KNOWLEDGE (*AVIDYĀ*)

§1. INTRODUCTORY

The problem of error is no less significant than the problem of right knowledge. A discussion into the forms of false and invalid cognition and the conditions responsible for their generation is important not only as a supplement to a correct understanding of the problem of valid knowledge but also for a correct realization of the Ultimate Reality. In Nyāya philosophy we have a three fold classification of wrong knowledge, viz., doubt (*saṁśaya*), perversion (*viparyaya*), and *tarka*. Doubt, according to them, is the knowledge of an object as having contradictory attributes, e. g., the uncertainty whether the object in front is a post or a man; perversion is the certainty about an appearance in the substratum of its denial and *tarka* is the non-apprehension[283] of any contradiction involved in the process of ratiocination culminating in the fruition of knowledge. ~~Out of~~ these three forms of incorrect knowledge as enumerated in the Nyāya system, the first, viz., 'doubt' is, in the strict sense of the term, not knowledge at all. The element of certainty so essentially required in an appearance of knowledge, whether true or false, is completely wanting in 'doubt' which, to all opinion, is nothing more than an indecision about the real character of the object in view. It is why in all the systems of Hindu philosophy, with the solitary exception of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, 'doubt' is not reckoned amongst the types of invalid knowledge. Though *tarka* is a form of false knowledge yet it should rightly be included in *viparyaya* because essentially it is a wrong presentation in the locus of its denial. The difference between *tarka* and *viparyaya* consists in the fact that, whereas, the former is mediate in character the latter is always immediate. This point is not overlooked even by the commentators on Nyāya who argue that *tarka* could easily be included in *viparyaya* but for the fact that it is produced through the mediate process of *anumāna*. This point is emphasized by the other systems of Indian philosophy as well, e. g., Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Śāṁkara-Vedānta and the Mādhva school of Vaiṣṇavism, and they are all in agreement in their conviction that *viparyaya* is the only form of false knowledge. Thus the problem of error is nothing but an enquiry into the origin and genesis of *viparyaya* which is called *adhyāsa* in Vedānta philosophy. We, therefore, undertake to discuss the conception of *viparyaya* or illusion and then investigate into the principles governing this false-appearance.

§2. THE DOCTRINE OF ILLUSION

The problem of illusory appearance and its psychology is one of the very important and favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy and is an issue of controversy that has aroused good deal of heated debate and divergence of opinion amongst the thinkers in India. The most important example of illusion, in Indian philosophy, is the illusory appearance of a piece of broken conch-shell as a piece of silver or the appearance of a rope as snake. That there is the fact of illusion is denied by none; the difference of opinion is only with regard to its cause, its origin and its genesis and we may, therefore, discuss these points in the light of the opinion accorded by the various important thinkers with special reference to the Vedānta and the Mādhva standpoints.

Shortcomings of Akhyāti-vāda of Mīmāṁsā

According to Mīmāṁsakas, illusion has its cause in the non-apprehension of the difference between the knowledge and the character of its object eventuated through the presence of certain defects. In the illusion of silver in the conch-shell the features common to conch-shell and silver are observed by the perceiver. Due to certain weakness of his mind or defect he is unable to distinguish between the idea of silver, which occurs to him through memory and past *saṁskāras* that rise to the conscious level by virtue of the similarity which the object in view bears with the real silver, from the real silver which was perceived by him in the past and this non-distinction creates the illusory presentation of the object in view as silver. The illusory perception in this case, according to Mīmāṁsakas, is due to the admixture of 'remembrance' and 'apprehension' and because remembrance is always a source of invalid knowledge, as contended by Prabhākara, the idea of the silver produced in conch-shell is also invalid. The certainty and validity with which a deluded individual stoops to pick up the conch-shell in his deception is also explained through the non-discrimination of the apprehension as 'this' and the presentation of remembrance as 'silver'.

On a critical analysis of the Mīmāṁsā interpretation of illusion known as *akhyāti-vāda* it may be found that this school, instead of satisfactorily explaining the fact of illusion, depends on an assumption which besides involving logical contradictions leads to many shortcomings that overlook the real character of illusory appearance. It is difficult to justify the Mīmāṁsā thesis that the appearance of illusion is due to the non-differentiation[285] of the object of apprehension and the object of recollection because this absence of distinction cannot be consistently established in view of the denial of the category [286] of negation which the Mīmāṁsakas so ardently uphold. Moreover, the Mīmāṁsakas who are the protagonists of the doctrines of the self-luminosity and the self-validity of knowledge also admit that the differences amongst [287] the various existents in this world are contained in their very nature which, however, means that the cognitive illumination of an object carries with it the revelation of its difference. But against this the Mīmāṁsakas assert that in cases of illusory perception the difference between the two entities remains unapprehended which, however, is indefensible in face of the apparent contradiction that an entity cannot be both illumined and unillumined. The theory of the non-apprehension of the difference between the two entities, which the Mīmāṁsakas try to establish, cannot be justified because both non-apprehension and the idea of the two entities cannot simultaneously exist; the very idea of the related entities carries with it the cognition of difference and, consequently, the rebuttal of the conception of the non-difference between them.

Moreover, the conception of the non-difference[288] cannot successfully explain the behaviour of the deluded individual who, at the sight of the illusion of silver, is tempted to pick it up because all behaviour on this earth depends on positive apprehension of object and not on negative non-differentiation. The explanation that the activity of the deluded individual is rendered possible through[289] the similarity of the object of apprehension and the object of remembrance is hardly justifiable because similarity can never produce the certainty requisite for the active behaviour towards an object. It is difficult to find a man who can milch a *gavaya* because it is similar to a cow. Thus it may be concluded that for a satisfactory explanation of the activity of the deluded individual it is essential that the positive apprehension of the appearance be considered necessary without which all interpretations of illusion would miserably fail like the Mīmāṁsā theory of *akhyāti*.

Weakness of Nyāya Anyathākhyātivāda

The significance of the point of view that positive manifestation of the object of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell as 'silver' is an indispensable proposition had also been realized by the Nyāya school when they maintained that one actually has the immediate apprehension as silver caused by the false identification of the 'conch-shell' and 'silver'. According to the Naiyāyikas, it is illogical to conceive that the superimposed entity, in a case of illusion, is absolutely non-existent because absolute non-existence is neither susceptible to manifestation nor can it explain the fact of sublation by later experience because sublation presupposes the prior existence of the superimposed entity. Thus, according to the Nyāya philosopher, the only way out of this muddle is to contend that the silver has a real existence somewhere else. The remembrance of this silver together with the malobservation of the conch-shell rendered possible through the operation of defects creates a false identification of the silver and the conch-shell and thus we have the false knowledge of the conch-shell as silver.

This exposition of the Nyāya doctrine of illusion, known as *anyathākhyātivāda*, would indicate that though this school is conscious of the important fundamental of knowledge that the character of a cognitum is in strict agreement with its cognition yet it has failed to carry out the analysis of this principle to the extent of correctly appreciating the real character of the superimposed entity in illusion. It is unintelligible as to how, in the case of its illusion in the conch-shell, silver which has its existence somewhere else can become the object of immediate perception without any sense-contact (*samprayoga*). If the existence outside the locus of its presentation to knowledge is capable of appearance and illumination with reference to that locus then it would tacitly assume the Mādhyamika standpoint that an absolute non-existence or *śūnya* is also susceptible to appearance or revelation, a theory vehemently criticized by the Naiyāyikas. Moreover, as a rule, the [290] existence of an entity cannot destroy the absolute non-existence with reference to another entity and, consequently, assert its existence; hence, to maintain the immediate appearance of the silver which really exists somewhere else would be like establishing the existence of a flower in the sky because of its existence somewhere else in the garden, an argument that is highly preposterous. The Naiyāyikas, therefore, argue that it is inessential for an illusory appearance to be in contact with knowledge; to them the illusion of silver has its cause in the old *saṁskāras* and memory, as in the case of recognition, with the operation of defects. But the knowledge having its ground in memory and the *saṁskāras*, such as recognition, is justifiable only when the past cognition, which is at the root of memory, also refers to the same object[291] of experience. The recognition of a person is valid because both memory and the present cognition refer to the same object. In the illusion of silver the object of memory is the silver in the shop, whereas, its *adhyāsa* (illusory appearance) has its locus in the conch-shell. How can then the fact of illusion be explained on the analogy of recognition ?

Moreover, the analysis of the posterior judgement, 'This is not silver', would suggest that the meaning of this sublation is not the denial of the identity of the conch-shell and the silver existing somewhere else, as in Nyāya, but the negation of silver apprehended as 'this' in the locus of its appearance. Thus, if the manifestation of an absolutely non-existent entity is irrational, its existence outside the locus of its appearance is beyond comprehension and without any logical justification. For a correct explanation of the immediate character of the experience of the illusory silver it is important that its appearance in the conch-shell should somehow be accepted. This, as a matter of fact, should be the starting point of a really fruitful examination of the problem of illusion.

Inadequacy of Asatkhyātivāda

In their explanation of illusory appearance, the Śūnyavādins take up a totally different stand by vindicating the theory of its absolute non-existence. According to them, illusion is the knowledge that illumines the absolutely non-existent silver and the power of its illumination is called *avidyā*. As the Buddhists deny any permanent entity and are complete momentarians, every illusion to them is caused by the latent tendencies (*vāsanās*) of the[292] preceding illusion. The fact of illusion is a mere causal presentation of knowledge having no existence in all time and space.

As it is well known, this doctrine has been rejected by almost all other thinkers of Indian philosophy for divers weighty reasons. Firstly, if the silver be absolutely non-existent it would be difficult to explain how a non-existent entity can be the object of immediate experience. As a matter of fact, there can be no cognition without a cognitum and, hence, if silver be absolutely[293] non-existent it must remain unapprehended for ever. Moreover, the power of *avidyā* is inexplicable and beyond justification in the context of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness and Nihilism.

Inadequacy of Satkhyātivāda

Diametrically opposed to the *asatkhyāti* of Buddhism is the *satkhyātivāda* of some for whom the illusory silver is absolutely real and exists in the conch-shell through the *pañcīkaraṇa* process. This explanation too fails to interpret correctly the appearance of illusory silver in the conch-shell because *pañcīkaraṇa* is a process which is restricted only to the *pañcabhūtas*. The *pañcīkaraṇa* process cannot operate amongst the *bhautika-padārthas* as this would inevitably lead to the creation and appearance of any entity in any substratum; possibly, silver may appear and be perceived in a column or a post which is something ridiculous. It is thus clear that the conception of the reality of silver and its creation through the *pañcīkaraṇa* process is a far fetched conception without any logical justification.

The Vedānta Doctrine (anirvacanīyakhyāti)

This account of the prominent theories on the problem of illusory appearance would bring to light the dubious character of such arguments that either try to explain its nature as cast between the two intellectual moulds of 'real' and 'unreal' or attempt to trace its genesis either to the non-apprehension of difference or to the false identification with an entity with which there is no ocular contact. The shortcomings of such theories and the conviction that all immediate apprehension require positive manifestation of the object inculcated in the Vedāntins the idea that the illusory silver is something that belongs to a different order of reality. Śaṁkara, in the introduction to his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, defines *adhyāsa* or superimposition, of which illusion is an instance, as an[294] appearance in a different substratum in the form of the object cognized in the past. This definition was so interpreted by the later commentators such as Vācaspati[295] and the followers of the Vivaraṇa school[296] as to mean by *adhyāsa* an *anirvacanīya* appearance in a real substratum similar to the form of an object existing somewhere else. Thus the appearance of silver, according to Vedānta, is the actual manifestation of the *anirvacaniya* silver in the substratum, i. e., the conch-shell, caused by *avidyā*, the mysterious and all pervading principle.

It may now be asked : What is the meaning of *anirvacanīya* appearance ? Is there any proof for the doctrine that illusory appearances belong to this order of reality ? We have already discussed, in detail, in the second chapter of this book, the nature of *anirvacanīya* existence, its definition and the possibility of justifying an order of existence which is different from both being and non-being. As we have already observed, the Śaṁkarites meant by falsity or *anirvacanīyatā* the immediate appearance of an entity which is the counterpositive of absolute negation with reference to the substratum in which it is cognized or its nature as both different from being and non-being meaning thereby that an *anirvacaniya* existence has an actual appearance with reference to a particular substratum and is incapable of comprehension within the logical moulds of either existence or non-existence. This *anirvacanīya* appearance, according to them, continues so long as there is the absence of the real knowledge of the substratum and is removed, consequently, only at the dawn of such knowledge. Because the appearance of silver in the conch-shell is sublated later on by the true knowledge of the conch-shell and is the counter-entity of absolute negation, it is surely an instance of *anirvacanīya* existence or appearance.

As regards the second question, the Advaitins reply that the inexplicable character of the illusory silver can be proved through *anumāna* and *arthāpatti* (implication). Citsukha, in his *Tattvapradīpikā*,[297] gives the following inference for the *anirvacanīya* existence of the illusory silver :

"The topic of discussion (silver) is *anirvacanīya*, because it is sublated,

That which is not *anirvacanīya* is not sublated, e. g., Ātman."

The validity of this inference depends, firstly, on the truth of the reason (the sublation of silver) and, secondly, on the *vyāpti* between the reason and the probandum (the concomitance between sublation and *anirvacanīyatā*). The truth of the judgement that illusory silver is subject to contradiction is a fact in experience and is beyond any shadow of doubt. The truth of the concomitance between *anirvacanīyatā* and sublation is, however, a point for consideration. From the criticisms of the various doctrines of illusion, as discussed above, one may be convinced of the truth of this *vyāpti* yet the Vedāntins venture to establish it through what is known as the *arthāpatti-pramāṇa.* We have already observed that in Vedānta the main purpose of recognizing *arthāpatti* or implication is to prove the existence of *avidyā* and its character as inexplicable. Thus, *arthāpatti* is the most important instrument in seeking a justification for the *anirvacanīya* character of the illusory appearance.

In *Nyāya-makaranda* we have an illuminating discussion on this problem. According to its author, the function[298] of *arthāpatti* consists in establishing that the illusory appearance of silver can neither be existent (*sat*), as it would then never be liable to contradiction, e. g., Ātman, nor can it be non-existent (*asat*) because a non-existent entity is never subject to any manifestation or appearance such as the hare's horn; hence, silver which is an object of knowledge and is also liable to posterior sublation must be different from both existence and non-existence. But, if a thing is non-existent how is it an object of cognition? To this the Śaṁkarites reply that what renders an appearance worthy of cognition is not its character as existent, as imagined by many realistic schools of Indian philosophy, but its character[299] as 'different from non-existence'. Similarly, the determining condition of 'sublation, is not the absolute non-existence of the appearance but its character as 'different from absolute existence'. Thus, the illusory silver which is both an object of cognition and is susceptible to later contradiction at the dawn of the right knowledge of the substratum (i. e., the conch-shell) is different from both 'existence' and 'non-existence'. In other words, it is *anirvacanīya.*

The opponent may file an objection. The later knowledge. 'This is not silver', sublating the preceding deception demands only the absolute negation of silver in its substratum. It justifies the view that even such appearances that are absolutely non-existent, as upheld by Patañjali in cases of *vikalpa*,[300] may also be the objects of illusion and deception. It is not only unnecessary but also incorrect to think of a different order of existence of the illusory silver when its appearance can be logically explained on the presumption that it is 'non-existent'. The Advaitins reply this objection by arguing that in the judgement, 'This is not silver', what is intended by silver is the real or *laukika* silver[301] and not any other form of silver (for example, *anirvacanīya* silver). The proposal of comprehending *anirvacanīya* silver within the word 'silver' in the above judgement would destroy the possibility of its being known because what is absolutely non-existent is never the object of cognition. Sublation of the illusory silver would, on the other hand, mean the denial of the real silver in the conch-shell and also the removal of the inexplicable silver through the right knowledge of the conch-shell.

Let us now discuss another important question of this problem--the psychological genesis of illusion. Nṛsiṁhāśrama, in his commentary on *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*,[302] undertakes a detailed description of the process of illusion and throws a flood of light on some of the interesting aspects of the Vedānta psychology of illusion. According to him, when the jaundiced eye is in contact with conch-shell the internal-organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) atonce gets transformed into a *vṛtti* in the form as 'this', the general characteristic (*sāmānyākāra*) of the object. Usually, in right knowledge, both the general (as 'this') and the specific features of the conch-shell (such attributes as lustre, solidity etc.) are cognized but because the eye is affected by jaundice (the defect) the usual illumination of the specific character is obstructed and there is only the transfiguration of the internal organ as 'this' or in its form as bare existence. The limitation of consciousness too is by this very type of *vṛtti* that manifests itself as 'this'. The objective consciousness, the substratum of conch-shell, is determined by the two aspects of *avidyā* veiling the general and specific characters of the conch-shell. At the time of sense-contact, when the *vṛtti* in the form as 'this' limits the consciousness, the 'this' aspect of *avidyā* is removed and there is the cognitive illumination of the general existence of the object. But the *avidyā* pervading and veiling the specific aspect of consciousness remains intact; there is, however, a disturbance in this aspect of *avidyā* due to the presence of certain accessory conditions such as the latent *saṁskāras* of silver etc. On account of the association of these latent tendencies of the silver the *avidyā* veiling the specific consciousness is transformed (*vivarta*) into the inexplicable silver and becomes the object of cognition along with the 'this' aspect of the object by virtue of coexistence.

This explanation of the psychological genesis of illusion, however, requires further elucidation on two important points, viz., the function of defect and the contribution of the past *saṁskāras* in creating an illusion. The contribution and significance of defect (*doṣa*) in the generation of illusion and its appearance has always been a controversial question specially with regard to its capacity of producing a different knowledge besides the obstruction of the apprehension of the real qualities of the object. According to some thinkers, e. g., the Mīmāṁsakas, the function of the defect simply consists in destroying the natural operation of the innate capacity of an entity and not in the efficacy of bringing about an entirely different fruit. As argued by them, the seed of the *śāli* tree, howsoever dipped in oil, can never turn into the seed of the barley plant. This view is vehemently criticized by the Vedāntins for whom the defects besides destroying the natural capacity of a thing also cause a different effect. By way of illustration, they cite the instance of a reed plant which after being burnt by a wide conflagration becomes capable of creating the stock of a plaintain tree. Similarly, such defects as jaundice, besides impeding the right illumination of the specific features of the conch-shell also create the false appearance of the silver. This deception is impossible, according to Vedānta, without remembrance, its accessory condition, which governs the form of the inexplicable transformation and appearance of *avidyā*. Had there been no *past-saṁskāra* even a post could appear as a snake or silver. This is what Śaṁkara meant by defining *adhyāsa* as '*Smṛti rūpaḥ paratra pūrva dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*'.[303]

This exposition of the Vedānta theory of illusion is sufficiently indicative of the importance which the doctrine of illusion acquires in the enunciation of the principle of *avidyā* which to all learned opinion is the cornerstone of Vedānta philosophy. As it is a cardinal doctrine which provides Vedānta with an instance for examining the machinations of the inexplicable principle of Nescience, it has been constantly made the targe of hostile criticism by the philosophers of the Mādhva school. A perusal of some of the important works of Mādhva philosophy would manifestly express that the bulk of the Mādhva criticism, on this point, is allotted either to the refutation of the definition of *anirvacanīyatā* as '*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*' or to the denunciation of the possibility of establishing the *anirvacanīya* character of illusory appearance. The main arguments as incorporated in the Mādhva criticism against the Vedānta definition of *anirvacanīyatā* have their foundation mostly in the criticism that this definition of *avidyā* is a violation of the Law of Excluded Middle. As all important criticisms and counter-criticisms on the problem of the definition of *anirvacanīyatā* have already been discussed at length in our chapter, *The Nature of Reality and Falsity*, it would be no use elaborating them any more in this chapter. We would better turn to the next question of the possibility of seeking a rational justification for the inexplicable character of illusory presentation.

Mādhva Anyathākhyātivāda and Refutation of Vedānta View

We have already stated that the Śaṁkarite enunciation of the *anirvacanīya* character of the conch-shell-silver has its justification in the fallacious character of the logic that tries to understand it either as real or unreal because of its inadequacy in explaining the immediacy contained in all illusory presentations. This claim is repudiated by the Mādhva critics on the ground that it is not impossible to maintain the immediate character of the appearance of silver in the conch-shell while asserting that its nature is absolutely non-existent like the hare's horn. The Mādhva theory of illusion, which they term as *anyathākhyātivāda*, justifies the possibility of even an absolute unreality becoming a percept. Had this been not so how the Advaitins could have ever understood the import of what they call *asadvilakṣaṇatva* or the difference from[304] unreality which forms part of their definition of *mithyātva* ? Because the knowledge of the difference is always relative to the knowledge of its counter-entity, the apprehension of 'unreality' is essential for understanding the meaning of 'difference from unreality'. The knowledge of silver in the conch-shell is an example of error that is defined by the author of *Pramāṇa-candrikā* as 'a cognition consisting in the conscious certitude that a thing exists just where, as a matter of fact, it does not exist,[305] and is caused by the appearance of the 'this' or[306] the substrate (the conch-shell) in the form of the unreal silver.' The appearance of an object of cognition (the conch-shell) in a form different from what it is (i. e. the silver) is what the Madhvites intend by the term *anyathākhyāti*. In Vyāsa-Tīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta* we have a description of the process of illusion that is in consonance with the basic conception of the Mādhva theory of illusion—the doctrine that what is absolutely unreal may become the object of illusory apprehension. The 'this' (*idamaṁśa*) or the [307] content-less substrate of the conch-shell after coming in contact with an eye affected by jaundice appears as silver on account of the past *saṁskāras* of silver that are aroused at that moment. The immediate appearance of the silver is neither due to any malobservation, as upheld in Mīmāṁsā, nor due to the *anirvacanīya avidyā* of the Vedāntins; it is an unreal appearance of the cognitum in a different form rendered possible by the latent tendencies of the mind and the defects of the cognitive organs.

Let us now brood a little over the implications of the Mādhva contribution to the problem of illusory appearance. If without even the shadow of the real, something that is absolutely unreal may become an object of immediate appearance, is it not a doctrine that is strictly parallel to the Buddhist *asatkhyātivāda* ? Is it at all possible for the Mādhva philosopher to draw a distinction between his doctrine and those of the Buddhists ? The Madhvites are not unaware of this lurking danger in their explanation of illusion. Jaya-Tīrtha, in his commentary on *Tattvodyota*, raises this point and argues that their view is not the same as those of the Buddhists because they do not maintain the appearance of silver without a substratum. From the Mādhva point of view, what makes a difference between the Bauddha *asatkhyātivāda* and the Mādhva *anyathākhyātivāda* is the emphasis on the importance of substratum forming the basis of the absolutely unreal illusory appearance. Because of their faith in the doctrine of momentariness the Buddhists cannot recognize, without involving self-contradiction, any perdurable substratum forming the basis[308] of illusion. The Madhvites have, however, no such difficulty and they regard the conch-shell as the cognitum misrepresenting itself as 'silver' under the influence of defects. Yet it is true that 'silver' in Mādhva *anyathākhyātivāda* is as unreal and non-existent as it is in the Buddhist doctrine of illusion. But, if the 'silver' is unreal how can it be the object of immediate apprehension when no contact of the eye with the silver is possible ? It is the first principle in the theory of perception that the object[309] of perception is related with one of the cognitive senses through what is known as the relation of contact. The Madhvites too do not disregard this fundamental position but they find it unnecessary and irrelevant to emphasize always that the object of contact is always the object of apprehension. As explained by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the eye, in the illusion of silver, contacts not the silver but the conch-shell, the ground of illusory appearance. Due to the association of defects and the latent tendencies of 'silver' coming to the surface of the mind the conch-shell presents itself as 'silver'. In reality, it is the conch-shell that is the object of illusion; the immediacy of apprehension is also the immediacy due to conch-shell, not as conch-shell with all its specifications but as a content-less substrate giving rise to the false appearance of silver. The idea of immediacy contained in the apprehension of silver is a transfer of the rights of the conch-shell to it which is generally mistaken as something pertaining to the silver. Thus, for the Madhvites, absolute unreality of the illusory percept is a proposition which has the sanction of reason and any other explanation of this percept, whether real or both real and unreal, would be preposterously illogical. With this background it may now be easy for us to understand the implications of the Mādhva criticism of the Śāṁkara school on this particular issue. As we have mentioned before, the Śaṁkarites employed the argument from implication as the chief defence of their doctrine of the *anirvacanīya* character of illusory appearance. It is but natural that the Mādhva philosophers have chosen it as the most strategic position in the fortress of the Śaṁkarite definition for concentrating their attack. Vyāsa-Tīrtha asks : What the Advaitins really mean when they assert that if the silver be non-existent it cannot be apprehended ? Do they mean (1)[310] that what is unreal (*asat*) is never an object of knowledge ? Or, do they mean (2) that the denial of its objectivity to knowledge is with regard to its character as existent ? The first alternative is untenable because the proposition that what is unreal is never an object of experience would stop for ever the usage of the word 'unreal' in our language. Unless we know the unreal how can we subject it to linguistic usage and analysis ? The contradiction which such an idea of the 'unreal' would introduce in the Śaṁkarite partial definition of *anirvacanīyatā*, i. e., *asadvilakṣaṇatva* (difference from the unreal) is obvious. Unless the 'unreal' is known how can 'difference from unreal' be apprehended ? It is thus clear that the interpretation of the phrase 'if silver is unreal, it cannot be apprehended', while construing by the word 'unreal' 'denial of the objectivity to knowledge', is inconsistent with some of the conceptions of Śaṁkarite philosophy. As regards the other alternative at (2), Vyāsa-Tīrtha suggests certain additional enquiries : Does it mean objectivity to valid cognition or to erroneous cognition ? Consideration of objectivity to valid cognition is a proposition which is acceptable to the Madhvites as they do not recognize the existence of silver in the conch-shell. The alternative that the denial of objectivity to knowledge is with regard to erroneous cognition is apparently illogical because this would mean that 'silver' is not an object of false cognition or illusion, a conclusion that is prima-facie absurd. The Śaṁkarite argument that had silver been unreal it would never have been perceived is without any justification. Unreal entities may as well be known and be the objects of false and illusory cognitions.

An astute examination of this aspect of Mādhva criticism would indicate that there is a fundamental difference in the Mādhva and the Śāṁkara approaches on the question of the essential determinants that warrant 'sublation' and 'perceptibility'. According to the Śaṁkarites, the reason of the imperceptibility of an object[311] is always its character as absolutely unreal; therefore, if a thing is different from absolute unreality it may become the object of experience and perception. Similarly, it essentially follows from the law of non-contradiction that what is not real (*sat*) is always liable to contradiction (*bādha*) and sublation. The Śaṁkarites, therefore, argue that the essential determinant of contradiction is the character of the thingas different from reality. To the Madhvites this formulation of the determinant of 'perceptibility' and 'contradiction' is illogical and cumbrous. It is simply irrelevant to think of *sadvilakṣaṇatva*[312] and *asadvilakṣaṇatva* as the determinants of 'sublation' and 'perceptibility' respectively when other easily understandable determinants can be formulated. If a thing is non-existent, it is liable to sublation; if it is existent it is perceptible. Thus, non-existence (*asatva*) and existence (*satva*) are, from the Mādhva point of view, the determinants of sublation and perceptibility. We have already explained that the Śaṁkarites conceived of the inexplicable *avidyā* chiefly for explaining perceptibility and sublation of an entity or illusory appearance. This logic is quite repugnant to the Mādhva philosopher whose argument may appear to be quite simple. Because unreal entities are capable of becoming objects of illusory appearance, it is simply cumbrous and futile to introduce the principle of *avidyā* whose nature is described as different from both being and non-being.

Vedānta Rebuttal of the Mādhva Criticism

A counter-criticism of the above refutation is readily available in Madhusūdana's spirited and well-guarded defence in his *Advaita-siddhi.* Here the point of his criticism is the Mādhva formulation of the unreal entities becoming objects of perception. According to him, unreal entities can never become objects of knowledge and possess such immediacy as is required in cases of illusory apprehension. The criticism that the denial of the knowledge of 'unreal' is inconsistent with the common usage of this word in language and the Vedānta concept of *asadvilakṣaṇatva* is unjustified because the Advaitins do recognize the apprehension of absolute unrealities such as the hare's horn. Much like the Yoga system[313] the apprehension of the word 'hare's horn' is also a *vikalpa*[314] which is different from knowledge because it is neither objective nor immediate.[315] The apprehension of such cases of pure fiction is different from knowledge whether it be of the real or of the illusion. What constitutes this difference is the absence of any substance or substratum to which the cognition may refer. These fictions which pertain to a third category of apprehension, so to say, can never be the objects of knowledge as the Mādhva philosophers are prone to think.

The Mādhva explanation of the appearance of immediacy in cases of illusion through the association and operation of the latent *saṁskāras* of the object of illusion, as propounded in their theory of *anyathākhyāti*, is not at all satisfactory because on the findings of this theory the apprehension of silver would be 'memory' and not 'perceptual-cognition'. The principal causality of cognitions consists in their objects and not in remembrance which is only an auxiliary condition in their production. Not only this, Vyāsa-Tīrtha's defence of the sense-object-contact as a necessary condition in the direct and immediate character of the apprehension of illusory silver by introducing his novel interpretation that this contact is between the eye and the conch-shell, as substratum and not with all its specifications as conch-shell, is also without any logic. It is one of the fundamentals of perception that immediacy is something that cannot be dissociated from cognition and that the object of immediacy is always identical with the object of cognition. When the Madhvites argue that the object of contact is conch-shell and the object of apprehension and immediacy is silver they flagrantly violate the basic principle of epistemology. On the problem of the interpretation of the word '*pratīti*' in the famous Vedānta argument from *arthāpatti*, '*asacceta na pratīyeta*', about the nature of the illusory appearance, Madhusūdana contends that '*pratīti*' may mean[316] either (1) apprehension of the object as existent (*satvena pratītyabhāvaḥ*) or (2) some general apprehension which is both direct and immediate. Vyāsa-Tīrtha's objection that the interpretation of *pratīti* as some sort of general apprehension would lead us to an inexhorable paradox—the paradox that unreality cannot be known—is to Madhusūdana a deliberate misrepresentation of the Advaita position. What the Advaitins deny is not the apprehension of 'unreality' as *vikalpa* but the possibility of an unreal entity being the object of immediate apprehension such as is available in the apprehension of the conch-shell-silver. Because of the immediate character of the apprehension of silver the very idea of attributing absolute unreality to it would be an example of pure fantasy. Moreover, the doctrine that illusory silver is real is also untenable because of the experience of its later sublation. Non-contradiction, which is the only criterion of reality, demands that the real should not be contradicted. How can conch-shell-silver then be real ? The truth about this great paradox of experience is otherwise. It is the sustenance of its character as *anirvacanīya* (different from both 'being' and 'non-being').

The last, but not the least, important problem for consideration is the Mādhva contention that 'being' and 'non-being' are the determinants of 'perceptibility' and 'sublation'. An examination of this question would reveal that these do not constitute the sure determinants of perceptibility and sublation. The argument that[317] in order to be perceptible the object must be real is inadmissible as it contradicts the fact of the cognition of silver which, according to both the Mādhva[318] and the Śāṁkara schools, is unreal. If it be essential for the perception of an entity that it should be real then the conch-shell-silver would never be an object of immediate apprehension. Similarly, the other determinant is also untenable because no one knows before sublation that the silver is unreal; it is only after its sublation that its unreality is understood.

Citsukha, in his commentary on *Nyāya-makaranda*, discusses this[319] point in detail and contends that both perceptibility and sublation are available in the illusory appearance of silver; it is impossible to conceive the two contradictory determinants, i. e., 'being' and 'non-being' as subsisting in the same entity. In order that the silver be contradicted, its nature should be unreal; in order that it be perceived or apprehended it should be real which is highly preposterous. Thus, according to Citsukha, *sattva* (reality) and *asattva* (unreality) are never the determinants of perceptibility and sublation. It is for explaining this paradox that the Advaitins imagine of a third order of existence which is different from both *sat* and *asat* and to which the conch-shell-silver belongs. What obstructs the sublation of an appearance is the fact that it is real and, thus, to be sublated is to be different from reality. Similarly, the absence of apprehension is possible only when the entity is absolutely unreal and as such to be perceptible is to be different from absolute unreality. It is also not impossible to conceive these two determinants in a single principle which though belonging to a different order of existence comprises in itself both being and non-being.

§3. AVIDYĀ AS THE MATERIAL-CAUSE OF ADHYĀSA

After this rather lengthy discussion on the problem of the nature of illusions or *adhyāsa* it is but natural that one should enquire into its cause. What are the causes of these illusory impositions ? Are they brought into effect by an instrumental-cause alone or they have some material-cause also ? A study of the works of Vedānta would indicate that the Advaitins regard both the material and the instrumental causes necessary for the production of an effect. In the present case, i. e., illusory cognition, the beginningless flow of the latent *saṁskāras* of the objects or the[320] *anādivāsanā*, as it is called, is the instrumental-cause. Yet this instrumental-cause alone is insufficient for the appearance of an *adhyāsa*. As argued by Vimuktātman, in his *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, instrumental-cause[321] alone is insufficient to produce an effect and, therefore, for all types of effects the presence of a material-cause is invariably essential. What then is the material-cause of illusions ? What is its nature and definition ? Is there any *pramāṇa* that may independently prove its existence ? These are some of the important questions whose discussion in the light of the explanations accorded in the Post-Śaṁkarite literature appears necessary.

During our discussion in the preceding pages we have frequently referred to the Vedānta conception that attributes the material causality of false cognitions and illusory impositions to *avidyā*. The principle of *avidyā* is the material-cause of every illusion or *adhyāsa*; it is called *avidyā* because of its natural opposition to the knowledge (*vidyā*) of the substrate of illusion.

As regards the question of the nature of *avidyā*, it may be contended, on the lines led by the authors of *Iṣṭasiddhi*, *Pramāṇamālā* and others, that the nature of the material-cause (*pariṇāmikāraṇa*) and its effect must always be the same; because the illusory effects are *anirvacaniya* in nature, their material-cause must also belong to the *anirvacanīya* order of existence. Moreover, if we acquiesce in the presumption that the nature of *avidyā* is real then, following the argument that the effect always bears the order of existence of the material-cause, we should conclude that illusory manifestations, its effects, are also real, a conclusion that would contradict the Vedānta theory of *anirvacanīyakhyāti*. Similarly, it may be argued that the nature of *ajñāna* is not unreal. The logical conclusion of the assumption that the nature of *avidyā* is unreal would deprive all illusions of their capabilities of producing effect (*arthakriyākāritva*). But illusions are not without *arthakriyākāritva*; the illusions and their material-cause, the *avidyā*, also belong to an order of existence that is neither real nor unreal. The nature of *ajñāna*, therefore, is inexplicable or *anirvacanīya*.

Definition of Avidyā

Though the description of *avidyā* as an *anirvacanīya* principle is an essential description of its nature yet a detailed narration of its characteristics for the purposes of forming a definition may be considered indispensable.

The Advaitins, such as Citsukha,[322] Madhusūdana[323] and others, define *ajñāna* as a positive, beginningless principle that is removable by knowledge. According to them, *ajñāna*, which is the material-cause of all false and illusory impositions, has three characteristics : (1) it is positive, (2) it is beginningless and (3) it is removable at the rise of knowledge. While discussing the definition of *mithyātva* in the third chapter of this book it has been explained at length that *jñānanivartyatva* (to be removable by knowledge) constitutes one of the essential conditions of false cognition. But there is sufficient justification for doubting the definition of *ajñāna* as a beginningless and positive principle specially when in our everyday life we understand by the word '*avidyā*' the absence of knowledge. How do the Śaṁkarites justify their contention that *ajñāna* is a positive principle veiling the natural illumination of consciousness in opposition to the general opinion that it is a negative concept meaning the negation of knowledge? Moreover, the absence of the cognition of an object, whether real or illusory, does not imply that it is concealed by a beginningless principle obstructing its manifestation to knowledge. How can then the Śaṁkarites define *avidyā* as a beginningless and positive principle ?

Let us now first of all discuss the statement that *avidyā* is positive. Nṛsiṁhāśrama, in his commentary on *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, argues[324] that the positive nature of *ajñāna* can be inferred from the judgement, 'I do not understand what you say'. This judgement is inexplicable in the light of the negative concept of ignorance, i.e., the denial of knowledge, because we have, in this case, the simultaneous occurrence of both knowledge and ignorance. To the Advaitins this judgement is indicative of both awareness, caused in an individual by the speech of a second person, and the ignorance about the meaning of his speech. The compresence of both knowledge and ignorance in a single judgement is contradictory and is inexplicable on the assumption that *avidyā* is the denial of knowledge. In *Iṣṭa-siddhi*[325] we have another argument justifying the positive character of *avidyā*. If we admit the doctrine that *avidyā* is the material-cause of illusory impositions, we cannot avoid the conclusion about its positiveness because the positive character of the material-cause is concomitant with its existence as material-cause. It is a fundamental condition of a material-cause that it has an agreement in presence (*anvaya*) with its effect, in other words, it has invariably to form the constituent of the existence or the appearance of its effect. But, this agreement in presence is impossible in such principles that are negative in character for this would entail the coexistence of both position and negation, a position that is self-contradictory. If it be argued that negation can also be contemplated as the material-cause of a positive entity, from the *vyāvahārika* point of view, then we would be facing the paradox of the production of reality from unreality, a conclusion violating the dictates of both logic and testimony. As the *Gītā* says, "Neither the position of unreality can be known nor the negation of reality".[326] Hence, according to Advaitins, the theory that *avidyā* is different from negation or is positive is a proposition which is above doubt. It is necessary to understand in this connection that by their concept of *avidyā* as a positive principle the Advaitins desire to express only its non-negative character. As the phenomenal manifestations of Nescience are cognizable by the various means of cognition (*pramāṇas*) it is essential that their character as different from negation be established because negation is never an object of apprehension acquired through any of these *pramāṇas* with the solitary exception of *anupalabdhi*. The Advaitins have, therefore, left no stone unturned in proving that *ajñāna*, which is the material-cause of all illusory and phenomenal manifestations, is different from negation.

Śaṁkara, while discussing the fact of superimposition of the subject and object in his famous introduction to the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*,[327] observes that the superimposition which is responsible for all egoistic behaviour or *vyavahāra* is *naisargika*. As this *ajñāna* is the cause of the eternal continuity[328] of the *adhyāsa* between the self and the not-self, it would be worthy to consider it as beginningless or *anādi*. Moreover, we cannot conceive of *avidyā* as the material-cause of this great world-order without attributing to it the sense of its transcendence in time with reference to origin. According to the great authorities of Advaita Vedānta, if an entity has a[329] beginning in time it should be an effect caused by some other entity and, therefore, if *avidyā* is to be conceived as having a beginning in time it must have another cause and that too another leading to the fallacy of regressus ad infinitum. Again, as we have already argued, because *avidyā* is the material-cause of the world-order it must invariably have an agreement in presence with the manifold objects in phenomena. But, an effect cannot have any agreement in presence with another effect just as a dish cannot have any agreement in presence or be a constituent of a jar. As such it is impossible for an effect to be the material-cause of another effect. All arguments in favour of establishing a temporal beginning of *ajñāna* thus lead either to the fallacy of the regressus ad infinitum or are suicidal to the very concept of the material causality of *ajñāna*. In order to escape from these logical inconsistencies and contradictions the Advaitins conceive of *avidyā*, the principle transcending all beginning in time. This *avidyā* which is contemplated as the ground of all false knowledge and is responsible for the fall of the individual soul is defined as beginningless, positive and subject to removal by true knowledge.

Proofs for the Existence of Ajñāna

The Post-Śaṁkarites contend that the existence of *ajñāna* can be proved by three *pramāṇas*, viz., *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, and *arthāpatti*. According to them, *ajñāna* can be directly apprehended by perception. Such judgements as, 'I am ignorant', 'I do not know what you mean' and 'I have slept happily and have not known anything during the sleep' are suggestive of the existence of a principle which, like darkness, veils the natural self-illumination of the all pervading consciousness. Without admitting this principle no logical and consistent explanation of any of these judgements is ever possible. Whether there is any possibility of analysing these judgements without recognizing the positive principle of *ajñāna* is a question that is postponed for discussion during the course of the evaluation of the Mādhva criticism.

According to the Vivaraṇa school, the existence of *ajñāna* can be proved by the following inference :

"A valid cognition is associated with a positive veil upon its object which is removable by the cognition itself and is different from *prāgabhāva* (negation prior to existence),

Because it illumines an hitherto unillumined object,

Like the first ray of lamp in pitch-darkness."[330]

Here it may be observed that this inference derives its strength from the Advaitin's conviction that illumination, in a cognition, means only the removal of the impediment. It is, probably, with this view that the Śaṁkarites, in their oft-quoted illustration of light and darkness, analyse *tamas* as a substance.

Arthāpatti is also adopted as one of the *pramāṇas* for establishing the existence of *avidyā*. The main contention in this *pramāṇa*, as elaborated in the Post-Śaṁkarite texts, is the assertion that in the absence of *ajñāna* it is impossible, firstly, to explain the non-manifestation of the eternal bliss in the *jīvātman* and, secondly, to explain the material-cause of all sorts of deceptions and illusions.

These two facts can be explained only on the assumption of *avidyā* as a positive and veiling principle.

While discussing the nature of illusion, we have observed that the argument from implication is contemplated as the chief instrument in proving the existence and manifestation of *avidyā.* It has always been a conviction with the Advaitins that without the presumption of *ajñāna* no satisfactory explanation of *adhyāsa* is ever possible. As Prakāśānanda explains, in his *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī,* the existence of *avidyā* can be established only through *arthāpatti* or the presumptive[331] evidence.

Testimony also stands evidence to the existence of *avidyā.* In chapter VIII of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad,* we come across the *mantra*[332] that declares that the objects of one's desire being really contained in the very self of the deluded individual are not discerned by him, because of being veiled by falsehood (*anṛtāpidhānā*) like the gold which after being buried deep in the ground remains unnoticed because of the earth over it. Śaṁkara, in his commentary on this *mantra,* interprets *anṛta* as *avidyā* which causes the ignorance and deception of Reality. There are several other *śrutis* that refer to the principle of *ajñāna* such as '*Māyantuprakṛtiṁ vidyān māyinaṁ tu maheśvaraṁ*',[333] '*Tama āsīt*',[334] '*Nīhāreṇa prāvṛtāḥ*',[335] '*Bhūyaścānte viśvamāyānivṛttiḥ*',[336] '*Ajāmekāṁ lohita śukla kṛṣṇāṁ*',[337] '*Avidyāyāmantare vartamānāḥ*',[338] etc.

Mādhva Criticism

The Śaṁkarite philosophy of *ajñāna,* as explained above, happens to be a topic of vehement criticism in the writings of Jaya-Tīrtha, Vyāsa-Tīrtha and other authorities of Mādhva philosophy according to whom *avidyā* is nothing but the absence of knowledge[339] or *vidyā.* In asserting this they have levelled the charge that the Śaṁkarite definition of *avidyā* suffers from the fallacies of both narrow and wide extension. While explaining the fallacy of wide extension, Vyāsa-Tīrtha contends, in his *Nyāyāmṛta,* that[340] this fallacy can be found in all the three constituents of the Śaṁkarite definition of *avidyā.*

As regards the first definition, i. e., *bhāvatva* (positiveness) it is argued by him that if *avidyā* be contemplated as the material-cause of all superimposed entities, as proposed by the Śaṁkarites, then the material-cause of the absence of[341] jar on the ground (*abhāva*), whose superimposed character is repeatedly asserted by the Vedāntins, should be traced in *ajñāna*. It would thus mean that *ajñāna*, which is positive, is the material-cause of the absence or negation which is apparently self-contradictory. If position were the material-cause of negation then, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, unreality would also be the material-cause of reality. Can there be a conclusion more fantastic and preposterous in the field of logic than this ? The only solution of this difficulty is to accept that *avidyā* is not the cause of the absence of jar on the ground. The fallacy of narrow extension is, therefore, manifest.

For demonstrating the *ativyāptidoṣa* in the second constituent, i. e., the *anāditva* of *avidyā* in time, Vyāsa-Tīrtha takes up the case of ignorance veiling the consciousness determined by the conch-shell. He argues that because the consciousness limited by conch-shell has a beginning in time the *avidyā* related to it must also have a beginning in time. This ignorance should, therefore, be excluded from the definition of *ajñāna* as beginningless. If the Śaṁkarites argue that the object of ignorance, in this case, is not the consciousness as limited by conch-shell but the pure-consciousness (*śuddha-caitanya*) which is beginningless and, as such, there is no difficulty in maintaining the beginningless character of Nescience even then, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the Śaṁkarites would not find themselves out of the woods. The conception of pure-consciousness as the object of ignorance would create fresh difficulties. At the time of the true knowledge of conch-shell, the beginningless *avidyā* as a whole would be subject to destruction with the result that the perceiver would find an easy and immediate deliverance.

Not only this, the Vedānta contention that *avidyā* is removable at the very rise of knowledge is not true in all cases. Nescience which veils the pure-consciousness of Brahman is not liable to cessation through knowledge because Brahman is not the object of cognition or pervasion by the *vṛttis* of *antaḥkaraṇa*. Moreover, the behaviour of the emancipated soul in the *jīvanmukti* state, which is rendered possible only through the operation of *prārabdha-karma*, is indicative of the truth that *avidyā*, which is the material-cause of these *karmas*, remains unsublated even at the rise of true knowledge. In cases of *sopādhika* illusions also, the *avidyā* remains undestroyed notwithstanding the fact that we have a true cognition of their substrata (*adhiṣṭhāna*). The glaring example of such an illusion is the topsyturvy reflection of trees in water, a case of *sopādhika* superimposition where the knowledge of the trees, the *adhiṣṭhāna*, is incapable of its destruction.

The Śaṁkarite definition of *ajñāna* also suffers from the fallacy of wider extension because it includes within its scope the relation between *ajñāna* and the pure-consciousness. This relation, according to Madhvites, does not belong to the *anirvacanīya* order of existence. If the character of the relation between pure-consciousness and ignorance be *anirvacanīya* then the conclusion that it too has its cause in *avīdyā* would be inevitable. In order to explain the relation between this *avidyā* and Brahman, a second *avidyā* may be necessary and so on ad infinitum. Yet this relation between the pure-consciousness and *ajñāna* has its cause in *avidyā* because it is a fact in the universe; all facts, according to Vedāntins, have their material-cause in *avidyā*. The failure on the part of the Śaṁkarites in explaining the relation between the pure-consciousness and *ajñāna* as *anirvacanīya* manifests, without any ambiguity, the lurking fallacy of wider extension in their definition.

It is further asserted by Vyāsa-Tīrtha that the Vedānta conception of *avidyā* as both different from being and non-being is inconsistent with their idea of beginninglessness because a beginningless entity is never subject to destruction, not even by knowledge. An entity that is beginningless and is different from *abhāva* in its nature is never subject to any destruction, for example, Ātman. In view of this proposition if the Vedānta conception of the natural antagonism between knowledge and ignorance is to be upheld, it would be wise to withdraw the epithet 'beginningless' from the definition of *ajñāna*. Here we have an important fundamental for discussion. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, there is a relation of invariable concomitance between the *sāditva* of a positive entity and its destruction; if an entity has a beginning its destruction is almost self-evident. To the Advaitins such a thesis would not be a correct appraisal of the idea that is conveyed by the word 'beginingless'. According to them, the circumstance of the termination or continuance in time of an existent has its reason only in the presence or absence, respectively, of a competent adversary (*virodhī*) irrespective of the situation whether it has a beginning in time or not. The presence of a competent adversary is in itself sufficient to bring about the destruction of an entity. Even if the proposition of the indestructibility[342] of a positive and beginningless entity be justified it would not repudiate the doctrine of the cessation of *avidyā* by knowledge because the nature of *ajñāna* is not positive in the sense in which the Mādhva philosophers take it to be. The positiveness (*bhāvatva*) of *ajñāna* means not actually position but difference from negation which can very well be liable to destruction, for example, 'negation prior to existence'. In reply to this argument from the Advaitins side, Vyāsa-Tīrtha contends that the theory of the destructibility of an entity in the presence of a competent adversary is incapable of justifying the removal of the beginningless and positive *ajñāna*. According to him, the absence of association with a competent adversary causing the destruction of a positive entity is directly related with its character as beginningless; as such *avidyā* which is beginningless would never have a principle to destroy its existence. Further, if only the nature of an entity as different from being were a sufficient ground for its removal then both absolute negation and negation posterior to destruction would meet the same fate. But, no one ever knows the destruction of these two types of negations. The destrucibility of *anirvacanīya* existents, however, creates further problems. The state of liberation, which, according to Śaṁkarites, is *anirvacanīya*, may quite reasonably be contemplated as liable to destruction with the result that the jīvātman would again be subject to bondage of birth and rebirth even after emancipation.

The Vedānta doctrine of *avidyā* as the material-cause of world-illusion is not in agreement with their own doctrines that propagate, firstly, the material causality of Brahman as determined by *māyā* and, secondly, that both *māyā* and Brahman form the material-cause of world-phenomena like the two strings of a rope. For the exposition of the material causality of *avidyā* it is almost imperative that its supremacy be acknowledged in spite of the fact that it is opposed to the Vedānta thesis that Brahman is the material-cause of world.

Moreover, the utility of the conception of positive *avidyā* as the material-cause of illusion can be justified neither by means of an analysis of its object nor by undertaking an examination of its appearance as a form of experience. Because the object of an illusion is different from *sat*, as contended by the Śaṁkarites, and is absolutely unreal as propagated in the Mādhva system, one would rather wonder the very idea that it has its cause in *avidyā* which is positive. The object of illusion being of the nature of *abhāva* (negation) would never stand in need of a material-cause.

This description of the Mādhva criticism of the Śaṁkarite definition of *avidyā* may reveal that in this part of their criticism the Mādhva philosophers have confined themselves only to the question of the possibility of defining and expatiating the nature of ignorance as upheld in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta without casting reflections on the validity of such proofs and arguments that have been empolyed by this school for defending the existence of *avidyā*. There is another part of their criticism that is still more vigorous and slashing, the part which discusses the validity of the proofs for the existence of *avidyā* and is worthy of our consideration in these pages.

It has been argued by the Śaṁkarites that *ajñāna* is capable of being directly intuited through perception and they have cited such illustrations as, 'I am ignorant', 'I have not known anything' etc. Vyāsa-Tīrtha, however, argued against[344] this that what is taken to be the perception of ignorance as a positive entity is nothing but the perception of the negation of knowledge. According to him, the judgement, 'I am ignorant', should be explained as the experience of the absence of knowledge; it really means, 'there is no knowledge in me', just as the 'potless ground' in its correct linguistic analysis means nothing else but 'there is no pot on the ground'. Another difficulty with regard to the existence of *avidyā* may be felt in the explanation of the experience 'I do not know pleasure'. Because *ajñāna* is removable through *vṛtti*-contact and because the operation of *vṛtti* in the perception of pleasure and pain is denied in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta it is difficult to understand how *avidyā* in the experience 'I do not know pleasure', can be removed. If the Advaitins contend that the perception of the ignorance of pleasure is removable by mediate knowledge, they would be asserting this only in contradiction of their own position. "In mediate knowledge since the illumination does not proceed by direct removal of the veil of *ajñāna*, the theory that all knowledge which does not involve the removal of *ajñāna* involves an intuition of positive ignorance would land us into the position that, when something is known in mediate knowledge, one should feel as if he did not know it since no *ajñāna* is directly removed here".[345]

Moreover, because there is no veil of ignorance on the material objects (*jaḍa-padārthas*) any perception of ignorance relating to it would not be satisfactorily explained on the assumption of the theory of positive Nescience. It may, however, be argued that though there may not be any *ajñāna* veiling the material objects yet the creative aspect of *ajñāna*, which is present in all material objects, would make the experience of their ignorance possible. Vyāsa-Tīrtha replied this by contending that if the objectivity of the *avidyā* of a material object were to be created simply by *vikṣepa* or perversion then even the delusive words of the speaker that the object is not a jar would create a false impression on his mind; but, this never happens in our common life. So, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, it is quite illogical to uphold the view that the *vikṣepa* power of *ajñāna* can render all material phenomena as the objects of ignorance without the operations of the veiling aspect of Nescience. Thus, to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, it would be more consistent to interpret such judgement as 'I do not know' as indicating the absence of knowledge than the venture of explaining them as suggestive of a positive principle veiling the natural illumination of knowledge.

The negative interpretation of ignorance as given by the Mādhva philosophers is objected to by the Advaitins who argue that because in the knowledge of 'negation' the knowledge of its counter-entity is also comprehended, the ignorance of the knowledge of Brahman, on the basis of such an interpretation, would necessarily involve the knowledge of Brahman in some way which cannot be readily accepted. But the Mādhva philosophers reply that the Advaitin's contention is favourable only to his adversaries who can benefit from the contradictions that it would create in view of other conceptions of Advaita philosophy. It is one of the foundational concepts of Advaita philosophy that the knowledge of Brahman is the ultimate means of deliverance. In other words, the knowledge of Brahman has a negation prior to existence (*prāgabhāva*). Now, if the Śaṁkarite proposition that the knowledge of negation comprehends the knowledge of the counterpositive be true then the knowledge of the *prāgabhāva* of Brahman-realization would require the knowledge of Brahman-jñāna which is prima-facie inconceivable. In view of such a preposterous conclusion, the validity of the Śaṁkarite contention, which is self-contradictory, should only be disfavoured.

Another lacuna may be discovered in the Vedānta philosophy of *ajñāna* that preaches that the natural opposition between *jñāna* (knowledge) and *ajñāna* (ignorance) is cognized along with the knowledge of ignorance. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, if the Śaṁkarite theory of the removal of positive Nescience by knowledge and the impossibility of their simultaneity be accepted then it would be difficult to explain the perception of the opposition of *jñāna* and *ajñāna*. The knowledge of the opposition here being a kind of knowledge would destroy in its very occurrence the presence of *ajñāna*; this would consequently render impossible the immediate cognition of *ajñāna* as a positive entity. Thus, the Advaitins would be caught up here within the two horns of dilemma; that with the knowledge of such an opposition there would be no knowledge of ignorance as a positive entity and without such knowledge of opposition there would be no knowledge of *ajñāna* for opposition is the essential concept of *ajñāna*. Thus, to the Mādhva philosophers, the Advaitins have engaged themselves in a fruitless task of seeking a justification for their ill-conceived concept of *avidyā* as a positive and beginningless principle when *avidyā* can be explained with less trouble and more consistency as the absence of knowledge. A linguistic analysis of the word '*ajñāna*' as 'jñāna' preceded by the particle 'a' also denotes that it stands for a negative concept and not for a positive principle as contemplated in the Śaṁkara School of Vedānta.

In his refutation of the Śaṁkarite inference, Vyāsa-Tīrtha, first of all, devotes himself to the examination of the *pakṣa*, i. e., 'valid cognition'. According to him, there are certain forms of valid cognition that are exceptions to the postulation made in the *pratijñā* and, therefore, prove that the *pakṣa* has a wider extension. Pleasure and pain are such forms of valid cognition. As explained by the Śaṁkarites, their illumination is not through the medium of *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttis* and so it would be illogical to comprehend them within the term 'valid cognition' occurring in the *pratijñā*. The term 'valid cognition' may be reinterpreted so as to stand only for those forms of valid cognitions that are known through the medium of *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttis*. But then mediate cognitions having mediate *vṛttis* would also require the removal of the veil of *ajñāna*. How will the Advaitins, then, escape the contingency of the immediacy of experience which is necessarily associated with the removal of *ajñāna* and the consequent illumination of consciousness ?

Again, it would be incorrect for the Śaṁkarites to assert that knowledge is produced only through the removal of the veil of *ajñāna*. In this case, knowledge may be conceived either as *vṛtti-jñāna* or as pure-consciousness; neither of these can testify the validity of the concept that their illumination is only through the removal of the veil of ignorance. If knowledge may mean the *vṛtti-jñāna* then it being itself false and illusory there is no possibility of any imposition on it with the result that the doctrine of the veil of *ajñāna* over it would be proved irrelevant. On the other hand, if by knowledge be meant pure-consciousness as revealed by *vṛtti* then, since such a consciousness is the support or the ground of *ajñāna*, it would not be valid to consider it as a principle destroying the *ajñāna*. Thus, the very concept that knowledge is produced through the removal of the sheet of *ajñāna* is itself illogical.

It is clear from the Vedānta inference that the reason for the statement in the *pratijñā* is the illumination of the unmanifested state of the object of knowledge. Vyāsa-Tīrtha proposes to discuss the validity of the *hetu* by subjecting Brahman-knowledge, a form of valid cognition, to critical examination. On the question of Brahman-realization the Advaitins have expressed the view that it is manifested not by any other principle but itself; in other words, it is self-illumined. The *hetu* (reason) as suggested in the Śaṁkarite inference is, therefore, inapplicable to all cases governed by the *pratijñā*.

Moreover, the concept of the removal of *ajñāna* is inconsistent with the doctrine that it is beginningless because a beginningless entity is never subject to destruction. The manifestation of the unmanifested does not mean that the non-manifestation is due to a positive principle but means only the absence of manifestation. According to Madhvites, illumination only means the removal of its *prāgabhāva* and nothing else.

It has been mentioned that the Śaṁkarites employed *arthāpatti* for showing the importance of *avidyā* in whose absence neither the non-manifestation of the eternal bliss in the individual soul nor the material causality of delusion is ever possible. Vyāsa-Tīrtha, however, argues against this by asserting that it is simply futile to imagine of either the material causality of delusions or to find some reason for the non-manifestation of unlimited bliss in the individual soul. According to him, illusions do not require a material-cause. If it were so, they would require some instrumental-cause as well: What would then be this instrumental-cause ? God or soul ? Both of them are, however, incapable of creating illusions. Because God is omniscient He cannot be the author of such illusions and the incapacity of the individual soul is apparent. One would be simply wasting his intelligence and energy in his discovery of the material-cause of illusions.

The argument of the limitation of bliss is disparaged by the Madhvites on the ground that the individual soul is never the seat of unlimited bliss. It is only the prerogative of Brahman or *Paramātman* to be the locus of the unlimited, unconditioned and effulgent bliss. There is thus no sense in explaining the absence of unlimited bliss in the jīvātman through the principle of *avidyā* when the jīva, in its very nature does not possess *niratiśaya-ānanda*.

The Mādhva philosophers also decline that the Vedānta doctrine of *avidyā* is supported by *śrutis*. The *śrutis*, as quoted by the Advaitins, have a different meaning. The word '*anṛta*' means an evil action, '*ajñāna*', '*avidyā*' and '*nīhāra*' refer[346] to *prakṛti* and the word '*māyā*' is used in the sense of either *prakṛti* or the mysterious and the wonderful power[347] of the Lord. The *Gītā* also speaks of the '*māyā*' as the inexplicable and divine power of the Lord when it says that those who are earnestly devoted towards the Lord alone are capable[348] of escaping His *māyā*. None of these are used in the sense of *ajñāna* as explained in the Śaṁkarite literature. To the Mādhva philosophers, *avidyā* means only the absence of knowledge and is not at all responsible for the creation of the world-order as the Śaṁkarites have endeavoured to explain. The intention behind the concept of *avidyā* as responsible for the miseries of human life is only to inculcate the idea that the absence of real knowledge of ultimate nature of things and Iśvara fails to evoke his blessings that are necessary for the emancipation of man.

Śaṁkarite Reaction and its Evaluation

Let us now discuss in short the Śaṁkarite reaction to the Mādhva criticism to which Madhusūdana has contributed much in his *Advaita-siddhi*. But for Madhusūdana's defence in this monumental work, the Vedānta position would have been completely eclipsed by Vyāsa-Tīrtha's terrible onslaught. We would naturally find much light to dispel the darkness let loose by Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism in Madhusūdana's magnum opus.

While discussing the fallacies of *avyāpti* and *ativyāpti*, as pointed out by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, Madhusūdana asserts that the opponent's criticism is rooted in an erroneous apprehension of the Vedānta position. The objection that *ajñāna* cannot be the material-cause of illusory *abhāva* because of the essential difference in their nature is due to a wrong understanding of the Vedānta concept of *bhāva* or position that is attributed to *avidyā*. It is not that which the realists generally understand by 'position'; it is simply difference[348] from negation.

The interpretation of '*bhāvatva*' as difference from negation has its own merits in successfully explaining and justifying the doctrine that *avidyā* is the material-cause of illusory negation. But, how can there subsist a relation of cause and effect between things of different generalities (*jātis*) ? 'Difference from negation' has to all experience a different generality than negation. Here we have an important issue for discussion, the determination of the character of cause for being in relation to the effect. Madhusūdana undertakes a brilliant discussion, in his *Advaita-siddhi*, on this issue and formulates a principle that is to be taken as a gospel truth. According to him, the relation of cause and effect is possible [349] neither between entities that are absolutely similar nor between those that are absolutely dissimilar. If the effect, both in form and matter, be the same as the cause why should there be any manifestation of the effect ? On the other hand, if it be absolutely different from the cause, both in form and matter, no relation between them would be conceivable. The truth about causality is that it is possible only between things that are both similar and dissimilar. The cause is always both similar and dissimilar from the effect. It is similar in the order of existence and dissimilar in the mode of its manifestation, i. e., its form.

The application of this principle to the problem of the material causality of illusory negation would reveal that the Advaitins have a ground for enunciating the thesis that *avidyā* is its material cause. Because both *avidyā* and illusory negation belong to the *anirvacanīya* order of existence they are similar. They are dissimilar in the form of their manifestation; whereas, *avidyā* is primal, illusory negation is manifested *avidyā*. Thus, the cause, in this case, i. e., *avidyā* is both similar and dissimilar to the effect.

Vyāsa-Tīrtha's objection that because the *ajñāna* pervading the conch-shell-consciousness has a beginning, the definition of *ajñāna* as beginningless suffers from the defect of narrow extension is also irrelevant. According to Madhusūdana, the ground of *avidyā* pervading the conch-shell is, however, not the consciousness determined by conch-shell but the pure, infinite and beginningless Brahman-consciousness. This ultimate consciousness is determined by the conch-shell without bringing in any[350] limitations to it on the analogy of the limitation of absolute negation by 'time' in the Nyāya school. Just as the temporal limitation and determination of absolute negation is only conceptual, the idea of the determination of Brahman-consciousness is only conceptual; it by no means subjects Brahman consciousness to real limitation. There is thus no *avyāpti-doṣa* in the Vedānta definition of *avidyā*.

Again, the objection that because Brahman is not cognized through *vṛtti-jñāna*, the eternal and beginningless sheet of Nescience, veiling its illumination, would always remain undestroyed is also incorrect. Though the pure and transcendental aspect of Brahman is non-cognizable and is beyond the grasp of *vṛttis*, yet the Brahman, as determined by *avidyā* in its determined form, is known through the *vṛttis* (for then the very purpose of *śrutis* as capable of imparting the supreme knowledge of the ultimate reality would be defeated). The *antahkaraṇa-vṛttis*, therefore, while cognizing the determined aspect of Brahman bring the final destruction of *avidyā*. It is also wrong to contend that the behaviour of the *jīvanmukta* is a proof of the fact that *ajñāna* is not completely annihilated by the knowledge of the supreme reality. According to Madhusūdana, though, in this case, the ultimate cessation may be delayed due to the absence of such impediments as the *prārabdha-karma* and other conditions yet these are also liable to cessation through knowledge. The mere delay in total annihilation due to certain obstructions does not necessarily invalidate the causality of knowledge in the removal[351] of ignorance. Thus, Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism that the definition of *avidyā* suffers from *avyāpti-doṣa* is an instance of fallacious argumentation.

Let us now discuss Madhusūdana's counter-criticism of the fallacy of wider-extension as pointed out by Vyāsa-Tīrtha in his criticism of the Vedānta definition of *avidyā*. The Śaṁkarites have absolutely no hesitation in admitting that the character of the relation between Brahman and *avidyā* is *anirvacanīya* and that it is a product of Nescience. The objection that the beginninglessness of *avidyā* is inconsistent in view of its liability to cessation because beginninglessness and indestructibility are essentially related is founded on irrational conviction. The Mādhva proposition that whatever has a beginning in time is subject to destruction and the beginningless entity is never an object of destruction is a point of scathing criticism in *Advaita-siddhi*. According to Madhusūdana, if *sāditva*[352] and *anāditva* be the real determinants of destructibility and indestructibility then it would be difficult to explain the cessation of 'negation prior to existence' (*prāgabhāva*) and the indestructibility of 'negation posterior to existence' (*pradhvaṁsābhāva*). *Prāgabhāva*, which has no beginning in time, is subject to destruction when its counter-entity is produced, whereas, *pradhvaṁsābhāva* which comes into existence at a particular point of time remains undestroyed for ever.

Here, Madhusūdana reasserts the Advaitic contention that the real determinant of 'destructibility' is the presence of a competent adversary. A thing is destroyed when it comes in contact with a capable adversary and not by virtue of its nature as having a beginning in time. The argument that *avidyā* being beginningless should not be subject to destruction on the analogy of Ātman is also unsound. According to Śaṁkarites, the eternality of Ātman is neither on account of its beginningless character nor due to its nature as different from being; it is due to its nature as supreme reality or *ātmatva*, as it is called, underlying the variegated forms of phenomena. On account of the presence of *ātmatva* as *upādhi* it would be illogical to criticise the destructibility of *ajñāna* on its analogy. Nescience which is different from being and non-being and belongs to the *anirvacanīya* order of reality is thus eternal and subject to removal at the rise of the true knowledge of Ātman. In this connection it had been argued that because the removal of *ajñāna* is itself *anirvacanīya* it would be subject to destruction and would result in the denial of the removal itself. A careful study of the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta would, however, reveal that the destruction of *avidyā* is comprehended by them as identical with the Ultimate Reality. As the author of *Iṣṭa-siddhi* puts it, 'the removal of Nescience and, consequently, of the whole phenomena is nothing but the true manifestation and illumination of the Ultimate Reality or[353] Ātman'.

In *Advaita-siddhi* we have also a discussion on Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism of the doctrine that *avidyā* should never be regarded as the material-cause of illusion. We know that Vyāsa-Tīrtha criticised the Vedānta position on two grounds, firstly, because of its inconsistencies with the other theories of Advaita philosophy professing the material causality of Brahman and, secondly, due to the fact that a positive entity cannot be regarded as the material stuff of unreal illusion. Madhusūdana replies these charges by arguing that the doctrine of the material causality of *avidyā* is upheld chiefly by those who, e. g., Prakāśānanda,[353] maintain that *māyā* is really the material-cause of the world-illusion, whereas, Brahman is only the ground or the *adhiṣṭhāna* for those who decline to admit the figurative usage of the material causality of Brahman. The importance that is attached to *māyā*, as a causal principle, in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta has led to a pregnant tendency that attaches only a figurative importance to Brahman; this has, probably, its reason in the fear that the attribution of real causality to Brahman would destroy its immutable character.

The objection that because *avidyā* is positive it cannot be the material stuff of illusion is also absurd because it displays a wrong understanding of the essential condition determining material causality. According to Madhusūdana, 'presence[354] in the effect', not positivity, is the condition that governs the material causality of a thing. Notwithstanding the positive character of *avidyā*, its presence in the various instances of illusion is sufficient to justify its status as a material-cause.

Besides this defence of the definition of *ajñāna*, the Advaitins have reinforced new arguments for strengthening the weaker spots of their doctrine of *avidyā*, specially on the question of the *pramāṇas*. The philosophy that *ajñāna* can be attested by perception has been defended by the Advaitins against the Mādhva refutation that such cognitions as 'I am ignorant', 'I know neither myself and the other', 'I have slept happily and have not known anything', etc., refer only to the absence of knowledge and not to any positive *ajñāna*. According to them, negation, which is cognizable only through *anupalabdhi*, is never the object of immediate perception for the simple reason that the perception of negation at a place is also associated with both the perception of the substrate and the perception of the counter-entity of negation. Madhusūdana takes great pains, in his *Advaita-siddhi*, to display that the judgement, 'There is no knowledge in me' should not be regarded as referring only to the absence of knowledge in the individual soul. According to him, if the sentence is to mean the denial of knowledge in its generic form as knowledge then it would contradict its own assertion because of the fact that the judgement, 'There is no knowledge in me', is also a form of cognition. If the sentence were to refer to absence then, according to him, the perception of the *pratiyogin* would be essential. But the perception of the counter-entity would invariably destroy the perception of negation and hence the contention that the sentence indicates the immediacy of the experience of the absence of knowledge would fall on the ground like a house of cards. Thus, according to Advaitins, the judgements, 'There is no knowledge in me', and 'I am ignorant', both having the same objects of experience, refer to an entity that is different from negation.

It has been contended by Vyāsa-Tīrtha that if every ignorance is something different from negation of knowledge and is removable only through *vṛtti-jñāna* then, while giving allowance to the Śaṁkarite thesis that the knowledge of pleasure and pain does not depend on *vṛtti-jñāna*, it is difficult to imagine how the knowledge, 'I am ignorant of pleasure and pain', can be removed at all. We have already mentioned in the foregoing pages, while describing the Śaṁkarite point of view on the genesis of knowledge, that the knowledge of pleasure, pain and illusion is not caused by the operation of the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttis* but is acquired through the *sākṣin* or the eternal witness. As explicitly acknowledged by the authors of the Vivaraṇa school, the *sākṣin* apprehends both cognition and ignorance and thus renders possible both the knowledge of ignorance and of the opposition between ignorance and its cognition. The significance and the necessity of the operation of *vṛttis* and the removal of objective *ajñāna* by their contact is only for explaining the perceptual immediacy which is only in cases of immediate experience. Thus, consciousness of pleasure and pain in the individual soul is arrived at only through the *sākṣin* and not through *vṛtti*-contact.

The next objection that because the material objects are not the seats of *ajñāna* how would their knowledge be explained in accordance with the Śaṁkarite theory of the essential removal of *ajñāna* is also ill-conceived because it misinterprets the Vedānta position. A perusal of the works of Advaita philosophy would indicate that they, explicitly or implicitly, acknowledge the doctrine that the material objects are nothing but transformations of *ajñāna*.

Both material objects and the ignorance about them in the individual soul have *mūlāvidyā* as their material-cause. Cognitions, thus, only remove the ignorance of the jīvātman about the objects or *tūlāvidyā*, as it is called, and not the Primal Nescience which is subject to destruction only at the true knowledge of Brahman.

Vyāsa-Tīrtha's objection against the Vedānta thesis that the knowledge of the counterpositive is a prerequisite of the knowledge of negation by discovering a contradiction in the *prāgabhāva* of Brahman-knowledge is also replied by Madhusūdana. He explains, in his *Advaita-siddhi*, that the counter-entity of the[355] *prāgabhāva*, in this case, is not actually Brahman but the knowledge of Brahman-realization. Because the knowledge of the counter-entity is not Brahman-realization, there is no reason for the fear that the knowledge of the counterpositive, in this case, would lead to deliverance. Here it is important to understand that from the Advaitin's point of view the counterpositive is to be known not generally but specifically. When it is said, 'There is no jar at this place', the jar is conceived only with a specific form and as determined by spatio-temporal conditions. One knows the jar, the counterpositive of negation, not through perception but through *anupalabdhi*. Both the counterpositive and its corresponding negation are known through[356] *anupalabdhi*.

But how the knowledge of the opposition of *jñāna* and *ajñāna* would be possible in accordance with the Śaṁkarite theory that the knowledge of the counter-entity is an essential condition in the knowledge of negation ? Vidyāraṇya, while discussing the perception of *ajñāna*, in his *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha*, contends that though the negation or the absence of specific cognitions is cognizable through *anupalabdhi* the absence of knowledge as such, in its general form as devoid of any objective determination, is apprehended always by the *sākṣin* or the eternal witness. Thus, both knowledge and ignorance are apprehended equally by the *sākṣin*. There is, however, no question of the removal of *ajñāna* because there is no operation of the *vṛttis* of *antaḥkaraṇa*. The opposition between *jñāna* and *ajñāna* is, therefore, apprehensible through the *sākṣin* without involving any contradiction as demonstrated by the philosophers of the Mādhva school.

Let us now discuss the Mādhva objections against the inferential arguments employed by the Śaṁkarites for proving the positive and beginningless character of *ajñāna*. As we have already narrated, the first objection, as occurring in *Nyāyāmṛta*, is that it is difficult to understand the proper implication of the minor term 'valid knowledge' in the Śaṁkarite inference because it involves both the *avyāpti* and *ativyāpti-doṣas*. In *Advaita-siddhi*, the term *pramāṇa-jñāna* or 'valid-knowledge' as occurring in the inference is reinterpreted as *pramāṇa-vṛtti* or the modifications of the mental psychosis. This explanation of 'valid-knowledge' would satisfactorily exclude all such cases, e. g., the knowledge of pleasure and pain, that are directly intuited by the *sākṣin*. While comprehending the meaning of '*pramāṇa-jñāna*' as '*pramāṇa-vṛtti*' one should be cautious that it has to be narrowed to the extent of excluding the substantive part of all cognitions or the *vṛtti* as 'this' because the 'this' or the 'being' aspect is never subject to any ignorance and is comprehended always as reality by the *sākṣin*. It is why the Advaitins argue that the illusion or erroneous knowledge is only with regard to the specific characters of the object and not with regard to its general existence as 'this'.

This intention of the term 'valid knowledge' was envisaged by Vyāsa-Tīrtha when he criticized that such an interpretation would lead to the inclusion of mediate knowledge also within its denotation and would consequently result in the immediate character of its presentation. But one would do well to remember that Vyāsa-Tīrtha himself recognized the subjective ignorance of the knower in all cases of mediate knowledge. The inclusion of mediate knowledge within the extent of the term 'valid knowledge' would neither create any contradiction nor lead to the consequence of the immediacy of its cognition. Vyāsa-Tīrtha appears to have overlooked the essential condition of perception, the condition that the removal of objective ignorance and the identity of the objective consciousness and the subjective consciousness is necessary for the immediacy of cognition.

As regards the objection about the reason in the Vedānta inference it may be asserted that illumination in knowledge, as in light, always contains an inherent opposition to non-illumination. There is no inconsistency in the argument that the self-illuminating consciousness is opposed to non-illumination. The *hetu*, therefore, does not suffer from the fallacy of insufficient reason as contemplated by Vyāsa-Tīrtha.

Vyāsa-Tīrtha's objection against the employment of implication (*arthāpatti*) may also be replied by referring to our discussion on the definition of *avidyā*. It has been explained that both material and instrumental causes are necessary for the production of an effect. The Śaṁkarites do not undermine the efficacy of instrumental causality in the production of false cognitions and illusions. These have their instrumental causality in the beginningless and the perennial flow of the *citta-vāsanās* as elaborately explained by the author[357] of *Pramāṇa-mālā*. The Mādhva objection that because there is no instrumental-cause of illusions the conception of material causality of illusion in Vedānta is illogical appears to be quite unsound. Yet the objection that because unlimited bliss is an essential attribute of Īśvara alone, the explanation of its non-manifestation in the jīvātman through *avidyā* is nonsensical is more searching. A satisfactory reply to this criticism can be given only if it is proved that the individual soul is identical with Brahman and that the jīvātman, in reality, is nothing else but Brahman, a point to which we propose to return in our chapter '*Identity and Difference*'.

After describing and evaluating the Vedānta reply to the various criticisms launched by Vyāsa-Tīrtha against perception, inference and *arthāpatti* used as instruments for proving the existence and nature of *avidyā* we come to the final but not the least important of all the *pramāṇas*, viz., the *śruti*. We have already discussed the validity and significance of the argument from testimony and the sense of the certitude and reverence with which it has been received by the philosophers in India. The point now at issue is whether the concept of *avidyā*, in all its shades and implications, is supported by the *śruti* and whether the Mādhva criticism and the interpretation of the particular *śrutis* on which the Śaṁkarites have relied upon is true.

Testimony too does not favour the Mādhva criticism so much as believed by the followers of Madhva. The word '*anṛta*' occurring in chapter VIII of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* is explained by them[358] as an evil action on the ground that '*ṛta*' is used in the sense of a good deed. This explanation is dissatisfactory because the Ātman, which is the theme of discussion in chapter VIII of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, is described in the *śruti* as free from all kinds[359] of *dharma* and *adharma*; it would, therefore, be irrelevant to think that it is effected by bad deed. If it be urged, for the sake of argument, that the attribution of demerit here is *mithyā*[360] then without the principle of *avidyā* this false imposition would also be inconceivable. Moreover, because there is a complete destruction of all *karmas* in the deep-sleep-state[361] the interpretation of *anṛta*, veiling the *satya-karmas*, as an evil action would be meaningless. The *śruti* clearly indicates by quoting the example of earth covering the gold that the principle obstructing the manifestation of Reality is a beginningless and positive principle and not merely demerit which cannot be conceived to veil at all (*anṛtāpidhānā*).

The words '*avidyā*', '*ajñāna*' and '*nīhāra*' in the *śrutis* do not stand for *prakṛti* as believed by the Mādhva interpreters. If the *śrutis* preaching the removal of *ajñāna* or *avidyā* through knowledge be true then they should not stand for *parkṛti*, which, according to Mādhva philosophy, is indestructible. The *Gītā* also uses the word *ajñāna* in the sense of a veil when[362] it refers to *ajñāna* as covering the *jñāna* like the phelgm of the mother's womb. The contention that the word '*māyā*' means only the power of the Lord and it does not mean either the falsity or the character of being removed by knowledge is also repudiated by the Śaṁkarites who argue that it is not impossible to find the usage of '*māyā*' in the Vedas in the sense of falsity or annihilation by knowledge. They quote the mantras '*Bhūyaścānte viśvamāyānivṛttiḥ*',[363] '*Māyāṁ ekāṁ taranti*[364] *te*' in their support.

The usage of the word '*māyā*' in the *śrutis* is manifold. Besides a few cases, it is, however, difficult to testify that the word '*māyā*' is actually used in the *śrutis* in the sense in which it has been used in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta. Probably, the mantra, '*Māyeta sā te yāni yuddhānyāhurnāddyaḥ śatruṁ nanu purā vivitse*',[365] is the earliest reference of the usage of '*māyā*' in the sense of illusion. The Mādhva contention that, in the *śrutis*, '*māyā*' really stands for the power of God cannot be easily disparaged. As such the question of the usage of *māyā* can be answered only with reference to the particular *mantra* in which it occurs. However, it is when we undertake a collaborative and harmonious interpretation of the different *śrutis* that we find the justification of the doctrine of *avidyā*.

CHAPTER V

IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

§1. INTRODUCTORY

Our discussion on the nature and status of knowledge in the philosophies of Śaṁkara and Madhva in the preceding chapter would, to a great extent, vouchsafe the truth of the conviction that the ultimate structure of a philosophical position is determined, largely, by the answers which such a system has to provide to the queries in the field of epistemology. It is not difficult to understand that Śaṁkara's theory of foundational consciousness as the presupposition of all knowledge and its character as partless and attributeless is the basis of his conception of the Ultimate Reality as immutable, transcendental, distinctionless, beyond definition and one. In striking contrast, Madhva's conception of knowledge as always determinate and objective with its infinite relations with the objects could never be synthesized in a higher and a universal principle, comprehending in itself both the subject and the object. In view of these presuppositions his theory of knowledge was bound to result in the metaphysic of difference as an ultimate category with an acute emphasis on the formulation of a pluralistic conception of universe such as propounded by other realists who treaded the same beaten path. Whereas the Śaṁkarite philosophy is an enunciation of a reality without distinction or a second, from the ultimate point of view, the Mādhva philosophers are firm in their conviction that the manifold character of world, even from the ultimate standpoint, can never be disparaged by any array of dialectical skill. In naming their systems as '*dvaita*' and '*advaita*', the philosophers of these two schools have expressed their cognizance of the most fundamental difference in their philosophies.

An analysis of the concepts of identity and difference is important not only for the understanding of the controversy that has been raised on this issue in the philosophies of Śaṁkara and Madhva but also for examining the truth of the concepts that are vital to the foundations of these systems. Our examination would, firstly, be directed towards the concept of 'difference' without a proper understanding of which the comprehension of 'identity' is impossible. Moreover, as Madhusūdana mentions in the beginning of his *Advaita-siddhi*, a successful exposition of the falsity of the concept of difference would justify the truth of 'identity' or *advaita*, in other words, the truth of the *advaita* depends[1] on the falsehood of *dvaita* and vice versa.

§2. THE NATURE AND MEANING OF DIFFERENCE

In Indian philosophy the schools propounding the ultimate reality of difference may be broadly classified into two : (1) the advocates of identity in difference or difference in identity (*bhed-ābheda*) and (2) the protagonists of pure-difference. The former group, with its chief advocates in the school of Bhāskarācārya and the Tridaṇḍī School of Jainas, conceives the presence of difference in identity on the analogy of the cause and effect where the effect is both identical and different from the cause. The second class of thinkers maintaining the existence of pure-difference, i. e., in abstraction of 'identity', mostly adopt the following positions[2] :

(1) Difference forms the nature (*svarūpa*) of the substrate.

(2) Difference is the mutual-negation (*anyonyābhāva*) between the substrate and the counter-entity.

(3) Difference is the dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) between two entities.

(4) Difference is a separate substance because it is an object of our perception.

The first of these positions is upheld by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system, the second by a particular school of Naiyāyikas, the third by the followers of Kumārila and the last by the advocates of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. For Prabhākara difference is nothing but the very nature of the ground of its appearance. As such his position is identical with the first group of our classification. Kumārila's position though identical with that of Prabhākara admits of a difference on the question of the *pramāṇa* through which difference is cognized. Whereas in Prabhākara's view the perception of the substrate would result in the perception of difference, Kumārila thought that because difference is a kind of absence it must be known only through *anupalabdhi*. Because in the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā difference is the dissimilarity between two entities we reckon it in the third group of our classification. The Vaiśeṣika philosophy of difference as a separate substance is, however, a direct corollary of their epistemological presupposition that the object of *pramāṇa* is always some kind of substance.

These four philosophical positions, apart from the doctrine of identity and difference, are the possible explanations about the nature of difference whose ultimate reality is not questioned. The Mādhva approach to this problem is almost similar to that of the first group because they, while professing its ultimate reality, maintain that it is, in its form and nature, identical with the locus. All these four positions have been made the target of criticism in the works of Advaita philosophy. The Śaṁkarites endeavoured to show that the doctrine of the ultimate reality of difference with all these four shades of meaning is logically inconceivable; it has only what is known as the superimposed truth. The Śaṁkarite position, as these pages would reveal, does not justify itself on the basis of positive arguments in its favour but on the weakness of the philosophy of the ultimate reality of difference. Thus, for the proper comprehension of the Advaita position it is expedient that we undertake an exposition of the Vedānta criticism of difference.

§3. VEDANTA CRITICISM OF DIFFERENCE AND FORMULATION OF IDENTITY

To begin with the criticism of the category of difference, from the Śaṁkarite point of view, we would, first of all, undertake an examination of the doctrine that difference constitutes the nature or *svarūpa* of the substrate. While investigating the propriety of this conception, Citsukha asks in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, "Is this concept of difference related to such concepts as the locus (*dharmin*) and the counterpositive (*pratiyogin*) ? Or, is its perception conditioned by either of these ?"[3] The Advaitins are, however, unanimous in their opinion that the concept of difference as unrelated with the concepts of the substrate and the counterpositive is logically absurd and is opposed to the verdict of experience. At times we come across such doctrines as enunciate the view that 'difference' is the inherent nature of all existents, whereas, the ideas of its relation with the 'locus' and the 'counterpositive' are only later superimpositions of intellect. Even in indeterminate perceptions, according to them, we have the existence of *bheda* (difference) which is identical with the form of the *dharmin* (entity); the concepts of relation either to the locus or the counterpositive are only posterior determinations of the prior indeterminate perception. The Śaṁkarites have, however, no sympathy for such doctrines as have their foundation more in the irrational approach of imagination than the rational thinking of intellect. Though the Śaṁkarite explanation of the category of difference and its cognition also recognizes its purely conceptual and superimposed character caused by the illusory impositions of *avidyā*, yet they do not condescend to the reality of difference and its identity with the locus of appearance (*dharmin*) either in the stage of indeterminate perception or in its posterior determinations. In the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta the object of experience is only the entity, as complete[4] unity, and not its difference; all difference is a matter only of false superimposition and subjective attribution. The Vedāntic judgement, therefore, is quite different from the opponent's proposition asserting the reality of difference as identical with the locus and the ideas of the 'locus' and the 'counterpositive' as imported from outside. For the Śaṁkarites the very idea of difference without the corresponding ideas of the 'locus' and the 'counterpositive' is not only inconceivable but is highly preposterous.

With these presuppositions the Śaṁkarites proceed to examine and criticize the doctrine of *svarūpabheda*. Kāśmīraka Sadānanda, in his *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, argues that the[5] theory of *svarūpabheda* is inconsistent with what comes to us through experience. No one can imagine that the difference of a 'jar' from every other entity is identical with the 'jar' while at the same time identical with them. If it were so, all existents would have only difference as their nature resulting ultimately in the essential identity of all things. Such a conclusion would easily display the futility of antonyms and other words in language. If linguistic analysis is at all a prudent method in philosophical examination, it would certainly lead to conclusions that are at variance with the doctrine of *svarūpabheda*.

Śrī Harṣa's criticism, in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*, is even more vehement. According to him, if difference be the nature of an entity then, because the concept of difference is always in relation to its counterpositive, it would be illogical to deny the presence of the counterpositive in the locus. Because 'difference'[7] is a limited concept and is conditioned by the concepts of the '*dharmin*' and the '*pratiyogin*' the doctrine of its essential identity with the *dharmin* would effectually prove its identity with the *pratiyogin* (counterpositive). For example, if the difference of 'jar' from 'cloth' be identical with 'jar' then the cloth, by virtue of being the counterpositive, would be identical with the jar. It may be argued against this conclusion that our knowledge of 'cloth' as different from 'jar' is not due to the perception of cloth but is only a posterior association caused by the consciousness of 'jar', the counterpositive of 'cloth'. It would, therefore, be foolish to conclude the identity of the jar with the cloth; the jar merely denotes its difference from the cloth and is not actually contained in the nature of difference.

The theory of the denotative function of the counterpositive has been elaborately dealt with by Śrī Harṣa in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*. According to him,[8] the natural implication of this theory would be the proposition of indeterminate difference which is prima facie contradictory. It is impossible to think of difference without being related to the counter-entity. Moreover, if difference be the very nature of cloth how can this be denoted by a jar ? Can the character of lotus as blue be ever denoted by anything that is either yellow or white ? The very proposition that the essential nature of an object is revealed or denoted by another entity is, according to Śrī Harṣa, manifestly incongruous.

Let us now undertake an examination of the concept of the counterpositive with reference to the doctrine that difference constitutes the essential nature of its substrate. Following Śrī Harṣa's argument we may ask : What is actually meant by the counterpositiveness of 'jar' in the perception of the difference of 'cloth' from the 'jar' ? Is it the very nature of the jar or is it its quality ? The first alternative, according to Śrī Harṣa, would lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the locus of difference or the cloth is identical with the jar because the cloth, being the locus, is included in the concept and the nature of the counterpositive. The other alternative has its own crown of thorns. Because the locus, as locus, is associated with the essential character of the counter-entity it would also become the attribute of the jar. The opponent might try the old remedy by contending that the counterpositive is merely denoted or defined (*nirūpita*) by the locus and does not entail its actual presence. But such a suggestion would mean that the counterpositiveness of the jar in the perception of 'cloth' as different from 'jar' is denoted by 'cloth', whereas, the counterpositiveness of 'cloth' is denoted by 'jar', a clear case of the fallacy of interdependence. Śrī Harṣa further argues that because[9] no idea of the relation between the *dharma* and the *dharmin*, besides one of identity, is logically sustainable, it is difficult to understand how counterpositiveness can ever be different from the jar, its substrate. The theory of the identity of the jar and its counterpositiveness would, however, be open to the same criticism that has been discussed above.

In Nṛsiṁghāśrama's *Tattvabodhinī* we have a new argument against the doctrine[10] of *svarūpabheda* that asserts that because difference is of the nature of separation (*vidāraṇātmaka*) its identity with the substance or its locus would end in the dual character of the substance destroying its unity and exposing it to the charge of being void in character. Moreover, what is relative is never the real nature[11] of a thing; as such, difference which is a relative concept must also be admitted as false. There can, however, be no identity between what is essentially relative and what is essentially unconditioned. How can there be any identity between substance, which is essentially unconditioned, and difference that is essentially relative ? Moreover, if difference be the nature of an entity it is impossible to explain how, while perceiving[12] the entity, any suspicion or perverse knowledge about it can be possible. As the perception of the entity would also entail the perception of its difference, there would be complete absence of the non-apprehension of difference, the essential condition of doubt and false knowledge. Lastly, the doctrine of *svarūpabheda* is inconsistent with a patent experience about difference. As Nṛsiṁghāśrama puts it,[13] the difference of the jar from the cloth qualifies the concept of its substrate, the jar. But if both the jar and its difference be essentially one how can they stand in such a relation (the relation between the quality and the qualified) that demands their separate existence ? There is no conceivable via-media of explaining this important experience about difference while standing on the foundations of the philosophy of *svarūpabheda*.

The attributive theory of difference as propagated in the realistic schools such as Nyāya is also no better alternative. The concept of difference as an attribute is mostly conceived and explained in such different ways as mutual negation (*anyonyābhāva*) or separation (*vaidharmya*). The Śaṁkarite criticism against this theory, firstly, undertakes the analysis of the concept of difference as an attribute, in general, and then its examination in the specific forms mentioned above.

A proper study of the works of the prominent Post-Śaṁkarite philosophers such as Śrī Harṣa, Citsukha and Kāśmīraka Sadānanda would reveal that their method of criticism always consisted, firstly, in the examination of the genesis of the experience of the fact under reference and, secondly, in the investigation of what may be called its ontological consistencies. For a proper understanding of the Śaṁkarite point of view and the criticism of the attributive theory of difference it may, however, not be unwise to follow the same method. While discussing the genesis of the experience of difference, in his *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, Kāśmīraka Sadānanda asks :[14] If we pin our faith in the doctrine of the attributive character of difference while having the foundational belief that the idea of difference is always relative to the 'locus' and the 'counterpositive', how do we have the perception of difference ? Are the perceptions of the locus, the counterpositive and the difference between them in succession ? Or, are they simultaneous ? If the perceptions be sequential, to which of them are we to assign priority ? If it be taken that the perceptions of the locus and the counterpositive are causal and they precede the perception of difference we have, then, to ascertain, firstly, whether they are so by virtue of their essential nature or by dint of their character as the 'locus' and the 'counterpositive'. Let us consider the proposition that the perceptions of the locus and the counterpositive cause the perception of difference because of qualities essential to their existence. But there are cases when even the knowledge of the essential characters of the two entities cannot produce the knowledge of their difference. For example, when both water and milk are mixed their difference becomes imperceptible. How can, then, it be taken that the knowledge of the locus and the counterpositive can bring about the knowledge of the difference ? As regards the second alternative it is easy to understand that the perception of difference is impossible without the perceptions of the locus and the counter-entity. We would only be entrapping ourselves in the fallacy of interdependence if we first attribute the causality of[15] the perception of difference to the experience of the locus and the counter-entity and then uphold that their perception is inexplicable without the prior perception of difference.

Simultaneity is also no better explanation of these perceptions. We have only two alternatives; either to explain them as quality and qualified or to posit their (the perceptions of locus, counter-entity and difference) existence as unrelated and separate though coexistent like the five fingers of a hand. But neither of these positions can give a satisfactory answer to the problem of the perception of difference. As argued by Citsukhācārya, in his *Tattva-pradīpikā*, it is futile to think[16] of their coexistence either on the analogy of the quality and the qualified or as separate existents like the fingers of a hand because the knowledge of difference is always preceded by a prior notion of the locus and the counter-entity that are never coexistent. The Śaṁkarites, therefore, contend that every investigation into the genesis of the experience of difference ultimately leads us to the unassailable conviction that all difference is inexplicable and, therefore, false or illusory.

The truth of the judgement that difference is false or illusory may also be verified by investigating into the ontological consistencies of the event of difference. If difference be an attribute, is it identical with the substrate or different from it ? If identical, how can, then, it be asserted that difference is different from the substrate ? In other words, the hypothesis of the identity of the *bheda* and the *bhedin* would prove the truth of the proposition that *bheda* is illusory or unreal. The second alternative is also a storehouse of irreducible complications, the most apparent of which is the fallacy of regressus-ad-infinitum. If difference is different from the substrate, is it so by virtue of its own existence or has its reason in a second difference ? The first alternative is inadmissible because we may then very well argue that the causality of an event is innate which is denied both by the Vedāntins and the realists. We are, therefore, left with no other alternative but to admit the truth of the proposition that difference is rendered different from its substrate only by another difference (*bheda*). The same argument may, however, be repeated to bring to light the inherent fallacy, the inexorable regressus-ad-infinitum. We may thus, in the words of Citsukhācārya, confess that the attributive theory, as it suffers from the fallacies of the regressus-ad-infinitum and mutual-dependence, is not a consistent logical explanation of the phenomenon of difference. It only justifies the truth of the contention that the nature of difference is inexplicable and is only an illusory appearance in the substratum.

Besides this general criticism of the category of difference, the Post-Śaṁkarite philosophers have marked logical inconsistencies in its diverse forms as 'mutual-negation' and 'separation'. Sarvajñātamuni's criticism of 'mutual-negation', in his *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*,[17] is a faithful account of what the Advaitins generally believe about the logical status of 'mutual-negation'. According to him, the concept of 'mutual-negation' always depends on the idea of 'separation' which in its part is always related to the concepts of the 'locus' and the 'counter-entity'. Separation, on the other hand, presupposes the mutual negation of the terms, i. e., the *dharmin* and the *pratiyogin* which shows that the ideas of 'mutual-negation' and 'separation' are interdependent. Besides this, as argued by Citsukha, we have no differentia to distinguish between mutual-negation and absolute-negation specially when both of them have the same entity as the counterpositive. When the jar is denied in the cloth, while positing the difference of the jar from the cloth, we assert its absolute non-existence in the cloth. Thus, the jar is the counterpositive of both absolute-negation and mutual-negation. If difference be identical with mutual-negation, it should also be identical with absolute-negation, a contention that is disfavoured unequivocally by all the realists and the protagonists of the attributive theory of difference. The other form of difference, i. e., separation (*vaidharmya*) may also be discarded on the basis of the arguments already discussed above. As Citsukha argues, this separation would require[19] another separation and so on ad-infinitum involving us in an endless regress.

From the virulence of the destructive criticism of the Vedānta philosophers, as reproduced above, it may occur that no realistic proposition about the existence and nature of difference can stand the acid test of logical examination. Yet in Indian philosophy an attempt has been made, from a different angle of vision, to establish the truth of the proposition that difference is real by upholding the philosophy of *bhedābheda*, a doctrine that has obtained active support from such eminent philosophers as Bhartṛprapañca, Bhāskarācārya and Rāmānuja. Notwithstanding their minute differences, they recognize that each existence has a twofold aspect, one its causal form and the other its form as an effect. The earthen pots such as jar, dish, etc., are identical as forms of clay (the causal aspect) but they are undoubtedly different as jar, dish, etc. (the effects of clay). They are thus both identical and different from each other. Similarly, the other objects in phenomena are also neither purely non-differentiated, as supposed by the Advaitins, nor absolutely different as contemplated in the various realistic philosophies. They are both identical and different where the reality of identity is not the least lower than the reality of difference. The whole world with its variegated objects, as presented to our knowledge, is non-different from its cause—the Brahman. It is this conception of *bhedābheda,* the philosophy that a thing is both identical and different, that is the foundation of Rāmānuja's *viśiṣṭādvaita* or the philosophy of Qualified Monism.

The *bhedābheda* explanation of difference is also no satisfactory answer to some of the deeper problems raised regarding the experience of difference. The analytic approach in their dialectics and the methodology of their criticism is so reminiscent of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti that one, at times, feels a little sceptical about a real difference in the method of criticism followed by the two systems—the Vedānta and Buddhism.

It has been elaborated above that the *bhedābheda* view ascribes to things their identity and difference on account of certain qualities that they possess. What are these specific determinations that prove the identity and difference of things ? Are they[20] identical or different ? The former would prove that the specific determinations of identity and difference are the same; in other words, there would be either identity or difference between things and no identity and difference. With regard to the latter position the Advaitins further argue : What is the relation between the determining characters and their substrates ? Are they identical or different or both identical and different ? The first two alternatives are, however, inadmissible because no substance-attribute-relation is conceivable between things that are either completely identical or completely different. The only possible relation between the substance and the attribute is that of identity and difference. The position, in the end, comes to this that the specific characters distinguishing the identity and difference of things get related to their substrate in such a way that they are both identical and different. But, can this be an end to our troubles ? The whole logic may again be applied to the relation of identity and difference between the determining characters and their substrates and may be continued on the path leading to infinite regress, the abyss from-which reason knows no return. On account of these logical incompatibilities and inherent paradoxes in the philosophy of *bhedābheda* the Advaitins feel confident that this theory is also no better choice. As a matter of fact, the recognition of the category of difference as a real fact is itself impossible. All these doctrines, through their failures, only establish the truth of the Vedānta philosophy of the illusory character of difference.

§4. MĀDHVA DEFENCE OF DIFFERENCE AND CRITICISM OF VEDĀNTA IDENTITY.

In Mādhva philosophy the status of difference which is the essential nature of the terms or the entities related is absolutely real. If A is different from B, then the difference between them is the essential nature of both A and B. This theory is the direct corollary of the Mādhva presuppositions in the field of epistemology that emphasize the character of knowledge as differentiated and attributive. The apprehension of an entity as conditioned by certain attributes naturally implies its difference from other entites that are revealed to knowledge with separate attributes and relations. Difference, thus, is neither a separate quality nor category but forms the nature or essence of the cognitum. It is why Vyāsa Tīrtha so often asserts that difference is but another name for the qualified or differentiated entity whose representation to knowledge creates the relational concept of difference. The idea of difference as identical with the *svarūpa* of the *dharmin* is a positive concept because its ideatum is positive and qualified. But as a positive and finite entity, to follow the Mādhva line of argument, always implicitly carries[23] with it the certainty of its absence in another entity, difference may also be explained as mutual-negation. The definition of difference as mutual-negation is but another aspect of its positive concept to which it appears as a counterpart in our intellectual understanding. The Madhvites, therefore, conclude that difference is identical with its *dharmin* and is, consequently, real and as numerous as the variety of the representations of the *dharmin* (substrate) to our knowledge in relation to other manifold existents in the world.

This philosophy of difference, which is known as *svarūpabhedavāda*, is naturally antagonistic to the Śaṁkarite philosophy of the falsity and inexplicability of difference. In the exposition of their own point of view, the Mādhva philosophers have rightly taken up not only a counter-criticism of the Vedānta criticism of *svarūpabhedavāda* but also a denunciation of the Vedānta position. In their criticism of the Śaṁkarite philosophy of difference they have endeavoured to show, firstly, that the Śaṁkarite arguments are inconsistent as well as contradictory and, secondly, that their argument against *svarūpabheda* may equally be used against the Vedānta philosophy of Pure Identity.

We have observed that the Śaṁkarites denounced the theory of *svarūpabheda* on the ground that a relative concept cannot be identified with the substance which is always unconditioned, undifferentiated and non-relational. This criticism has its foundation in the Śaṁkarite's reasoned belief that the Absolute Reality is always unconditional and the relative is only an appearance superimposed,[24] somehow, on the unconditioned Absolute or Brahman. The argument that the relative can have no relation with the unconditioned or the undifferentiated is, according to Mādhva philosophy, too clumsy and divorced from truth. It would not be difficult to find logical justification for the conditioned representation to knowledge of a really unconditioned and undifferentiated substance. As upheld by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, the same[25] entity may, through a difference in its presentation to knowledge, appear both relative and non-relative; in one form it may be relative while in other it may be non-relative. This point of view may be illustrated by referring to the negation which, as a mere percept, is not related to any substance or category. But, when the same negation is associated with some entity, e. g., a jar, or some temporal conditions such as negations prior and posterior to existence, it becomes related. There is, therefore, no violation of the principles of human understanding in upholding the view that Brahman, which, according to Advaitins, is the transcendence of all relations mainfests Itself in such diverse relative forms as the *prakṛti* and the jīva justifying the existence of the category of difference.

Moreover, as argued by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the Advaitins have themselves implicitly accepted the principle that a non-differentiated entity is capable of manifesting itself as conditioned and relative. The unity of jīva and Brahman is a relative concept as it refers to the two different substances, viz., jīva and Brahman. The Advaitins also recognize the presence of class-concepts in individuals and by doing this they express their implicit faith in the validity of the concept that an entity may be both relative and non-relative in accordance with the difference in their perception.

All objects may be viewed from two different angles of vision, firstly, in its own existence as unrelated to any other object and secondly, as related to other objects of world. When we apprehend a jar without having any idea about its relation to other objects, e.g., a glass or a window pane, its existence appears to us non-related but when we think of the same jar as different from a glass or a window pane it acquires in our mind a relative existence. It would, therefore, be not only illogical but against all common sense standard to argue that an entity cannot be both related and non-related at the same time. It might be argued against the Mādhva position that it would entail the coexistence of both position (*bhāva*) and negation (*abhāva*) which is contradictory. But such an assertion has its ground in the wrong conviction that *bhāva* and *abhāva* cannot have an identical ground. Experience provides ample justification for this conviction. Every entity though positive is the substrate of the denial of all other entities. The Madhvites, for themselves, justify the coexistence of position and negation through the category[26] of *viśeṣa* which is conceived in this system for explaining all otherwise inexplicable problems such as the relations between the substrate and its attributes, identity and difference, etc.

It has been argued by the Advaitins that because the concept of difference is invariably related to the counterpositive the doctrine of *svarūpabheda* would automatically end in the identity of the counterpositive and the substrate. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the Śaṁkarite criticism has its basis in the incorrect proposition that the *pratiyogin* essentially forms part of the nature of difference which has been conceived by the Advaitins, though wrongly, as a substance for purposes of their criticism. The identity of the counterpositive and the substratum of difference is comprehensible and justifiable only on the assumption that difference is also a substance. But nowhere in the exposition of their doctrine of *svarūpabheda* the realists have ever made such a claim. For them, the necessity of the idea of the counterpositive in an apprehension of difference is only denotative and not essential. What is meant by this assertion is that the function and necessity of the idea of the conterpositive is restricted only to the denotation of the *dharmin* as different from itself (counterpositive) and not the identity of its nature with the essential nature of difference. If 'cloth' be the counterpositive of its difference from the 'jar', the idea of the cloth simply completes the relative concept of difference; it does not for this reason form part of the nature of difference or be identical with the substrate. The Śaṁkarite criticism that the doctrine of *svarūpabheda* entails the essential identity of the counterpositive with the substrate of difference and, consequently, the ultimate unity of the whole world is only due to their misunderstanding about the functioning and the part which the conceptual knowledge of the counter-entity plays in producing the knowledge of difference.

Similarly, the criticism, as available in the works of Citsukha, Nṛsiṁghāśrama and Kāśmīraka Sadānanda, that because difference, in its nature and form, is just like separation (*vidāraṇātmaka*) the doctrine of the identity of difference with the substrate would carry us to the distressing conclusion that the nature of the substrate is only void is also invalid. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, this criticism is due to a serious misunderstanding about the concept of difference as it occurs to us in our experience. The Advaitin's criticism is based on the presupposition that the nature of difference is causative and is instrumental in creating the idea of separation. It is this presumption alone that can account for such a contention as the argument that the identity of difference with its substrate would ultimately reduce an entity to an insurmountable void. But the truth of such a presupposition is neither logically nor empirically verifiable. As contended by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, difference is not the cause of separation but[28] separation itself; it is more of an effect than a cause. This separation or division between things is just another name of mutual-negation which, according to Madhvites, is the real meaning of 'difference'. What the Madhvites intend by difference is mutual-negation[29] between entites which is but another aspect of their positive existence and has, as such, been comprehended as identical with them.

Moreover, it has been argued by the Advaitins that with the assumptions of the doctrine of *svarūpabheda* it would be impossible to explain 'doubt' and 'suspicion' and the relation between quality and qualified. But, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, such a criticism is irrelevant. The non-apprehension of difference, the precedent condition of doubt, is inexplicable on the basis of the presence of defects such as similarity, etc., even if the difference be perceptible along with the perception of the substrate (*dharmin*). As each entity, according to Madhvites, is qualified by its innumerable differences from all other entities the knowledge of any one of them might be associated with defects such as similarity, remoteness, etc. In order to explain, it may be illustrated that a conch-shell is different from all entities other than itself, such as silver, gold, etc., thatarethe counterpositives of the differences having the conch-shell for their substrate. Though the difference from gold, diamond, etc., may also be perceptible along with the perception of the conch-shell, yet its similarity with silver might obstruct the apprehension of their difference and, consequently, produce the doubt whether the object of knowledge is conch-shell or silver. When the similarity is so great and persuasive as to obliterate even the slightest sense of difference the conch-shell may be erroneously taken as a piece of silver. The Madhvites, therefore, argue that 'doubt' is explicable through the non-apprehension of the counterpositive rendered possible by the association and influence of defect. It may be observed that the Mādhva philosophers were capable of explaining the problem of doubt as they maintained each and every entity in the world as qualified by the infinite variety of differences. If its difference from one entity is a matter of doubt its knowledge as different from the other is not necessarily dubitable and, hence, the apprehension or the non-apprehension of the difference of an entity with regard to different counterpositives is logically sustainable.

Nṛsiṁhāśrama's objection that on the assumption of the theory of *svarūpabheda* it would be difficult to explain the relation of quality and qualified between an entity and its difference on the ground that a single entity cannot be both quality and qualified may also be replied by adhering to the principles of epistemological realism that have been adopted by Madhva and his followers. Because knowledge in Madhva is always determinate it is but natural that his school should emphasize the importance of the relation between the quality and the qualified in all cases of knowledge including the perception of difference. As we have already mentioned, the Mādhva philosophers discovered a special[30] category, viz., *viśeṣa*, to explain all such relations as that of quality and qualified, identity and difference, etc. The relation of quality and qualified between an entity and its difference is also explicable through this mysterious category, viz., *viśeṣa*.

This is, in short, a narration of the Mādhva defence of their philosophy of difference, the doctrine of *svarūpabheda* from the repeated attacks of the Post-Śaṁkarite veterans who exhibited a spirit of iconoclasm in their zeal to destroy the image of difference. Besides this, the Mādhva texts also contain a spirited denunciation of the Vedānta formulation of identity. Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, asks :[31] Is the unity of the individual soul and other phenomenal objects with the Ultimate Reality or Brahman real and different from It or is false and superimposed ? If real and different, then the Śaṁkarite philosophy would be facing the catastrophe of the destruction of their monistic position. The other alternative is even more harmful in the interest of the Śaṁkarite point of view. The supposition that the unity is false is, in other words, an assertion that diversity is true. Moreover, if the Advaitins argue that by falsity they mean only the superimposed character of unity then, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, they would only be justifying the truth of the philosophy of pluralism. It is an elementary principle in the philosophy of superimposition that the knowledge of the substratum does not sublate the knowledge of the entity opposed in character to the superimposed object. Now, if the unity between the jīvātman and Brahman be superimposed on Brahman then the knowledge of Brahman would assert the truth of the opposite of unity, i. e., diversity. In this way, Vyāsa-Tīrtha and the other followers of Madhva have demonstrated that the conception of unity as an ultimate fact is not sustainable: instead, the philosophy of the absolute truth of diversity is amenable to reason and is empirically verifiable. After all, it is experience that is the final authority about the truth of a judgement and its verdict is certainly in favour of the philosophy of pluralism.

§5. EVALUATION OF MĀDHVA CRITICISM

From the above exposition of the Mādhva criticism of the Vedānta philosophy of identity and the refutation of the absolute reality of difference it may be gathered that the Mādhva philosophers have, at times, misrepresented the Vedānta position. As discussed by Madhusūdana, in his *Advaita-siddhi*, the[30] Advaitin's refutation of the reality of difference is only from the transcendental standpoint and not from the *vyāvahārika* point of view; difference is, therefore, sublatable only at the dawn of the true knowledge of the Absolute Realitv. The Vedānta attack on the category of difference does not constitute the denial of its experience but means only an assessment of its correct status in the ultimate structure of Reality. This also disproves the validity of the argument that because difference is known through perception its reality is beyond doubt. Because perception is an instrument in the *vyāvahārika* order[33] of reality it cannot warrant the validity of its presentations from the ultimate standpoint. The sublation and the denial of the category of difference in the Śaṁkarite philosophy does not, therefore, present any contradiction with what is given to us in experience or perception the validity of which is limited to the order of the reality to which they themselves pertain.

Before ending this chapter it is essential to give an account of Madhusūdana's criticism of the Mādhva doctrine of *svarūpabheda* and his contention that because the category of difference is inconceivable in all the different forms mentioned above its reality, from the absolute standpoint, is questionable. According to Madhusūdana, it is illogical to argue that difference which is a relative concept is identical with the *dharmin* whose essential nature is unconditioned for the simple reason that an unconditioned reality cannot, in its essence, be conditioned and relative; its conditional appearance is only an illusory superimposition on the unconditioned nature of Reality. The Mādhva assertion that an entity can be both relative and unconditioned is not only incompatible but is logically absurd. This proposition is the simple violation of the law of identity and the criterion of reality as non-contradiction. Not only this, it would also follow from this proposition that both *bhāva* (position) and *abhāva* (negation) can exist together. Vyāsa-

Tīrtha's argument that every object is *bhāva* in itself and *abhāva* with reference to other objects is not a satisfactory answer to the Advaitin's objection. When the Advaitin denies the coexistence of position and negation he intends by negation only that negation that has for its counterpositive the object whose existence is posited. The simultaneous existence of *bhāva* and *abhāva* with regard to different counterpositives is denied not even by the Advaitins. In this case, 'relativity' or 'conditionality' is the counterpositive of the negation implied in the term 'unconditioned' and, hence, relativity and unconditionality can never coexist. The concept of relativity is only an illusory appearance caused by the principle of *avidyā* like all other objects in phenomena. Thus, the category of difference, being a relative concept, cannot be identified with the nature of the *dharmin* as professed in the doctrine of *svarūpabheda*.

The Mādhva reply to the Śaṁkarite criticism that the doctrine of *svarūpabheda* would entail the identity of the substrate (*dharmin*) and the counterpositive (*pratiyogin*) and, consequently, the identity of all phenomena may be rejoined by referring to the criticisms of Śrī Harṣa, Citsukha and others who unanimously uphold the view that the denotative character of the counterpositive is incompatible with the Mādhva theory of the reality of difference. If difference be real and identical in essence with the *dharmin* then there would be no justification in denying the presence and reality of the counterpositive whose idea is necessarily related to the cognition of difference. According to Madhusūdana, the perception of difference always carries with it the *pratīti* of both the *dharmin*[84] and the *pratiyogin* with reference to the same locus (*samānādhikaraṇa pratītiviṣayaḥ*). When it is said that the 'jar' is not 'pot' one has simultaneously two ideas, i.e., 'jar' and 'pot' with reference to one object only, viz., the 'jar'; these two ideas are connected by the idea of denial which too is experienced with reference to the same substrate. If the Mādhva theory of *svarūpabheda* and the reality of difference be acceptable then the presence of the pot in the jar or the *dharmin* should also be maintained. At the face of it, this argument may appear ludicrous because no one can sensibly profess the reality of the pot in the jar with which its difference is experienced. The Advaitins too do not believe in the identity of the counterpositive and the *dharmin* in the field of *vyavahāra* but only assert that the proposition of the reality of difference and its identity with the nature of the substrate would force upon us the conclusion of the identity of the *dharmin* and the *pratiyogin*. The only way out of this muddle is the doctrine of the illusory character of difference. All relations, according to Advaitins, are purely conceptual and superimposed and do not possess any reality from the transcendental standpoint. Because difference is also a kind of relation the conception of its superimposition on the identity of the *dharmin* is no outcome of an immature mind. The Mādhva philosophers themselves acknowledge that difference is an aspect of the thing by which they indirectly suggest that the category of difference is conceptual and depends on human understanding. Had the Mādhva philosophers carried their argument to its logical development they would have, probably, arrived at the same conclusion.

Let us now examine the Mādhva proposition about the nature of difference as effectual and not causative. As explained by Madhusūdana, this interpretation[35] cannot save the Mādhva philosopher from the inevitable paradox of difference. It is a point beyond suspicion that division is always related to the entity divided. The theory of *svarūpabheda* would mean that the jar which is identical in nature with its difference is constituted of at least two parts. These two parts being again different may be conceived to involve the same process of division. But because this division requires parts it would also require[36] another such process and so on ad-infinitum. This paradox of infinite regress may again be arrived at when we imagine that an entity, e. g., a jar, is made up of several[37] parts, characters and variety of atoms. These parts or atoms would naturally differ from each other and the difference in each case would be essentially identical with the particular part which is conceived as the *dharmin*. As difference is the other name of separation or division, these parts or atoms would be comprised of other parts to the extent that even the nature of the single atom of the jar would fail to be specified. Such a failure in the assertion of the exact nature of an atom, according to Madhusūdana, suggests that the real nature of 'jar' which is the aggregate of all these atoms and characters is a mighty challenge to our understanding. From all this it is clear that the doctrine of *svarūpabheda* would either lead to the paradox of the regressus-ad-infinitum or to the unpalatable conclusion that the real nature of the substrate of difference is *śūnya* (void).

This examination of the nature and the status of the category of difference would easily disclose the realist's failure in his attempt to defend the reality of difference from the virulent attacks of the various philosophers of the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta who concentrated their might in proving the proposition that the category of difference is imaginary and is only a phenomenal appearance. As remarked by Prof. Dasgupta, "This defence of difference appears, however, to be weak when compared with the refutations of difference by Citsukha in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, Nṛsiṁghāśrama Muni in his *Bhedadhikkāra* and others."[38]

The denunciation of the category of difference is an indirect assertion of the truth of identity. The Vedānta formulation of the pure-identity of the Absolute Reality or Brahman has its logic not so much in positive arguments but in the refutation of the category of difference and the scriptural testimony that the 'reality is one without a second'.[39]

This exposition of Śāṁkara philosophy may be a source of severe disappointment to some, both in the East and the West, because the doctrine of Pure Identity is generally received with less sympathy than what is due to it in view of the strong arguments in its support. Probably, the reason for this apathy is the unconscious fear at the loss of personal identity. But if the philosophy of foundational consciousness with its corollaries be empirically justifiable, as occurring to some thinkers of the West, e. g., J. Cook Wilson, it is unthinkable how the force of these arguments can be minimized. This psychological fear and the sense of alarm at the loss of diversity and personal identity has often reflected itself in the modern interpretation of Śaṁkara's Vedānta where it has been reinterpreted so as to accomodate the conceptions of unity in diversity and diversity in unity. As these pages must have revealed, neither Śaṁkara nor any of his followers ever intended to safeguard the reality of difference in the ultimate structure of Reality. There can possibly be no greater disaster to philosophy than the imposition of an alien concept on a doctrine that is repugnant to its inclusion. Śaṁkara and his followers have consistently and always upheld the view that duality completely merges itself in Pure Identity when the real knowledge of Truth dawns upon the blessed enquirer.

CHAPTER VI

CAUSATION

§1. INTRODUCTORY

In Indian philosophy the problem of causation generally confronts us with a double objective; firstly, with regard to the nature and the status of this principle as a valid explanation of all events and, secondly, as an investigation into the principle that may be regarded as the world-cause. The results of the investigations of the various schools, in this connection, have given to the history of Indian thought the doctrines of *asatkāryavāda*, *satkāryavāda* and also the controversy whether Brahman is the instrumental-cause or the material-cause or both of this world. The enquiry into the nature of the factors responsible for the production of an event and their relations has brought to us three different conclusions : (1) that the effect is different from the cause, (2) that the effect is both different and non-different from the cause and (3) that the effect is identical with the cause. The application of these to the problem of world-creation may be found in the various theories about creation in some of the important schools of Indian philosophy. The Naiyāyikas who are of the opinion that an effect is always a novel creation[1] and is obviously different from the cause have given us what is known as the doctrine of *ārambhavāda* or the theory asserting that creation has definitely a beginning and is produced out of the eternal atoms, its inherent-causes (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). The second view that the effect is both different and identical with the cause has claimed a host of supporters not only from the schools of Sāṁkhya and Yoga but also from the important commentators of Vedānta like Bhartṛprapañca, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, etc.; their appraisal of the doctrine of *bhedābheda* between the effect and the cause is clear from the theories of creation as propounded in their philosophies. In the schools of Sāṁkhya and Yoga, the world being evolved from the *prakṛti* is non-different from it in the sense that it is just an aspect[2] of *prakṛti* which could not be manifested before the event of creation took place. Similarly, in the schools of Bhāskara and Madhva,[3] because the world is a modification of Brahman and *prakṛti* respectively, it is both identical and different from them. The third outlook that views the effect as absolutely non-different from the cause has only a solitary claimant in the whole of Indian philosophy, the Śaṁkara School of Vedānta. For the Advaita philosophy of Śaṁkara, world-phenomenon is nothing but Brahman and the whole creation with all its Name and Form is only due to words[4] (*vācāraṃbhaṇaṁ*) just as a pot made of clay is nothing else but clay.

The problem of creation has been viewed from a different angle also by seeking an answer to the question whether the effect is a novel creation or was existent in the cause prior to its creation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy according to which an effect is always different from the cause—the invariable, unconditional and immediate antecedent—explained that the effect was absolutely non-existent in the cause, a doctrine that is known as *asatkāryavāda*. In opposition to the Nyāya explanation of the reality of effect, the Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems found a more logical presupposition in the idea that the effect is both identical and different from the cause for explaining the different aspects of 'effect'. According to them, 'effect' is only an evolution or the transformation of the cause in which it existed, in a nascent form, prior to creation. The world, according to Sāṁkhya, is a transformation or a real manifestation of the Primordial Matter in which it lay in an unmanifested state prior to its creation or manifestation. Here, the production of the effect is not the creation of a novel entity but is only a manifestation of something that was already existent in a nascent form. This conception of Sāṁkhya philosophy positing the existence of the effect, in a nascent form, in the cause is known as *satkāryavāda* or *pariṇāmavāda*. Almost all systems of Indian philosophy appreciating the idea of cause as both identical and different from the effect (*bhedābheda*) have, one way or the other, introduced the doctrine of *satkārya* in their philosophies.

The Vedānta contention is, however, different. The fundamental presupposition of Vedānta philosophy that an effect is absolutely non-different from its cause and its appearance in name and form is a deception created by language could justify the truth of only one judgement in which the world-phenomena lose all their existence apart from Brahman. According to Vedānta, the phenomena are nothing but Brahman and their appearance in name and form have no reality. The criticisms of Śaṁkara and his followers against the rival schools, viz., Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya and Yoga would clearly indicate that they were firm in their belief 'that in whatever way we seek to find the real nature of the causal principle from the interminable series of cause-effect-phenomena we fail. All the characteristics of the effect are indescribable and indefinable *ajñāna* or *māyā* and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in themselves or in relation to one another we fail for they are all carved out of the infinite and are illogical and illusory'.[6] It has been an untiring effort on the part of the Vedāntins to enunciate the position that we cannot logically account for the real appearance of the world which has no reality apart from Brahman. The fact of creation is, therefore, not a real transformation but only an illusory manifestation or *vivartta* of the cause or Brahman.

This position which is different from the *satkāryavāda* of Sāṁkhya is called *vivarttavāda* in Vedānta. Though the Vedānta view on the problem of the existence of the effect prior to its creation is also known as *satkāryavāda* yet it is fundamentally different from the *satkāryavāda* of Sāṁkhya. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of causality in Vedānta is not *satkāryavāda* but *satkāraṇavāda* because of the Vedantic emphasis only on the reality of the cause with its consequent denial of the reality of the effect. For a clear understanding of the Vedānta conception of causality it is expedient to discuss, a little at length, the *pariṇāma* view of Sāṁkhya and the *vivarttavāda* of Vedānta. It is only by correctly visualizing the difference between them that the Vedānta philosophy of *vivartta* can be fully comprehended.

§2. THE VEDĀNTA CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY

Pariṇāmavāda and Vivarttavāda

The *pariṇāmavāda*, as explained in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system and in the philosophies of some of the interpreters of Vedānta, e.g., Bhāskara, defines the effect as a real transformation or modification of the cause. In Sāṁkhya, the world is evolved out of *prakṛti*, whereas, in Bhāskara's formulation[7] of Vedānta it is a real modification of Brahman. In both, it is a real transformation modifying the cause itself without which it would be difficult to account for the effect as a real product evolving out of the conditions imbedded in the cause itself. Moreover, the effect, according to this view, is always different from the cause in the sense that it is not the cause itself but is some novel manifestation that had, hitherto, been lying unmanifested in the cause. This assertion about the difference of the effect from the cause is in agreement with the *bhedābheda* position which is an important presupposition in the *pariṇāma* view of causation. Unless the effect be different from the cause it would be losing its identity and the *bhedābheda* position would be transcending its logical barriers to merge in the Advaitic philosophy of *abheda*.

Another important presupposition of *pariṇāmavāda* is the contention that the effect has the same order of being as the cause. The world which is a modification, whether of *prakṛti* or of Brahman, is as much real as its cause[8] unlike the *vivartta* view explaining the effect as of a lower order of being than the cause. Thus, in this theory, the effect is a real transformation of the cause, is different from it and belongs to the same order of reality. As correctly defined by Appaya Dīkṣita, '*pariṇāma*[9] is the real transformation of a thing belonging to the same order of reality.'

From the above account of the doctrine of *pariṇāma* it may not be difficult to realize that this theory cannot be consistently upheld by those who sympathetically approve the view that Reality is transcendental, immutable and partless. For divers reasons the Advaitins appear to be dissatisfied with the *pariṇāma* view of causation that presents apparent contradictions to some of the principal tenets of Vedānta philosophy. On the assumption that the world is a real transformation of Brahman it devolves on us that we should acknowledge some sort of modification in the essential nature of Brahman which is opposed to the most fundamental presupposition of Vedānta asserting the partless character of Brahman. Moreover, the philosophy of world as a modification of Brahman would prove that either this profane, impure and empirical universe should possess the essential qualities of Brahman such as pure-knowledge, truth, etc., or Brahman itself should be effected by the impure qualities of the world. The tacit assumption that the being of the effect is equal to that of the cause is quite repugnant to the Vedāntins who are disagreeable to grant the world-phenomenon the same status of reality as its cause. The being of the world, according to Vedānta, is *anirvacanīya* and as such different from the *pāramārthika* reality of Brahman. The world, therefore, according to Vedānta, should not be assumed as the *pariṇāma* of Brahman.

Because in *pariṇāmavāda* the difference between the cause and its effect is asserted, the contention that it is a valid doctrine of causation would decry the famous *Upaniṣadic* tenet that all becomes[10] one through the knowledge of one. The supporters of *pariṇāmavāda* may explain this particular *Upanisadic* text by contending that even by assuming the *bhedābheda* view, which has the sanction of experience, the proposition that all becomes one through the knowledge of one may not be denied. The Advaitin's reaction to this view is clear from Vācaspati's stand, in his *Bhāmatī*, that the co-existence[11] of *bheda* and *abheda* as contemplated by the protagonists of the *bhedābheda* schools is quite impossible. Because 'difference' is an inexplicable category it cannot be reconciled with 'identity'. Due to these implicit contradictions in the doctrine of *pariṇāmavāda*, the Advaitins, who thought of the Reality as one, immutable, indeterminate, conscious Absolute, conceived of a different doctrine of causality and creation which is known as the doctrine of *vivartta*.

In the important texts of Advaita philosophy, *vivarttavāda* is defined as the theory of causation that explains the effect as an inexplicable appearance, in a different form, of the cause without actually[12] modifying the cause itself. The world-phenomenon, according to this theory, is only an *anirvacanīya* appearance[13] of Brahman and not its actual transformation. Though the production of the world-order in this view is also a manifestation, yet the concept of manifestation here is different from the philosophy of manifestation of *pariṇāmavāda*. The manifestation in *vivarttavāda* is *anirvacanīya*, whereas, in *pariṇāmavāda* it is real. Another important proposition of the doctrine of *vivartta* is the assertion that the effect is not different from the cause and the order of its being is not equal to that of the cause. Brahman, which is the cause of world-phenomenon, has, therefore, a higher order of truth than the world-order, the effect.

We may, however, sum up the important aspects of *vivarttavāda* and their difference from *pariṇāmavāda* as follows :—

(1) The effect[14] in *vivarttavāda* is an unreal transformation, whereas, in *pariṇāmavāda* it is a real transformation.

(2) The appearance of the effect in *vivarttavāda* does not effect the nature of the cause at all, whereas, in *pariṇāmavāda* it actually modifies the nature of the cause.

(3) In *vivarttavāda* the effect is not different from the cause but in *pariṇāmavāda*, which presupposes the doctrine of *bhedābheda*, its difference from the cause is maintained.

(4) The order of the being, of the effect, in *vivarttavāda* is different from the order of the being of the cause, whereas, in *pariṇāmavāda* the two are not different.

Notwithstanding these areas of dispute between the points of view of the *vivartta* and the *pariṇāma* conceptions of causality there is at least one point of agreement between these philosophies and that is their conception that the effect is a transformation of the cause to which it really belongs. Śaṁkara's criticism of the Nyāya *asatkāryavāda* and his defence of *satkāryavāda*, in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, indicates this point of agreement. Though Śaṁkara also defends the philosophy[15] of *satkāryavāda* yet it would be a gross misunderstanding to interpret it on the lines of the *satkāryavāda* of either Īśvarakṛṣṇa or Bhāskarācārya. It is true that *pariṇāmavāda* obtains a place in Vedānta but this is only with regard to phenomena having their highest cause in the[16] *Avyakta* or the unmanifested state of Name and Form. Within the ambit of phenomena the philosophy of production as a real transformation has a place but when one tries to understand the nature of causation between Brahman and the phenomenal cosmic order including the *Avyakta* this conception of production fails him miserably. It is only through *vivarttavāda* that the phenomena become understandable in view of their ultimate reason, the Absolute or Brahman. In reality, both *pariṇāmavāda* and *vivarttavāda* are important for the understanding of Vedānta philosophy. As the author of *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* remarks, "The *pariṇāma* view is the first stage of *vivartta*". Later[17] on he propounds the philosophy of the three stages in Vedānta where *pariṇāmavāda* acquires the first stage, the *vivarttavāda*[18] the second and the last stage is the very transcendence of the principle of causation. It is only when one gets initiated into the first two stages, viz., the *pariṇāma* and the *vivartta*, that he becomes eligible to the comprehension of the highest state transcending the necessary and universal, though phenomenal, principle of causality.

The conception of the transcendence of causality has been elaborately discussed by the later Śaṁkarites. e.g., Śrī Harṣa, who have endeavoured to explain that the status of the principle of causation is a matter only of *vyavahāra* and its application for the understanding of the relation between phenomena and the Absolute is not only futile but logically invalid. "The Vedantist does not deny the belief in causality in an ultimate conviction which no amount of logical argument can succeed in dislodging from the human mind. Ontologically the Vedantist holds that the belief in causality is as much a superstition of ignorant minds as the belief in the identity of the soul with the body. But this logical difficulty is not derived from his metaphysical theory. In the arena of logic he does not call in aid the metaphysical argument. He takes for granted that causality is an ultimate fact and is repugnant to doubt. Though the Vedantist does not believe in the absolute validity of causality as a metaphysical fact he accepts it as a valid empirical principle and logic also does not presuppose more than empirical validity."[19]

Causality of Brahman

After this discussion on the nature and the status of the principle of causality the next question is : What is the world-cause ? Vedānta which maintains that there is only one Reality, viz., Brahman, is naturally led to conclude that Brahman is the cause of world-appearance. We have stated elsewhere that Brahman, according to Vedānta, is the material as well as the instrumental cause of the world-order; material in the sense that it is the substratum of the *anirvacanīya* appearance of Name and Form. While, interpreting the *śruti*, '*Tadaikṣata bahusyām prajāyeya*', Śaṁkara explains[20] Brahman as the instrumental-cause whose desire[21] manifests the world in its manifold forms. Śaṁkara's philosophy of Brahman as both the material and the instrumental cause has its reason more in the scriptures than in logic. As he himself argues, "The presence of both the material[22] and the instrumental causes in the same principle should not be denied on the ground that it is nowhere available in the world. Here it should not be compared with[23] worldly experiences. The causality of Brahman is not an object of inference as it is comprehensible through the testimony of scriptures alone."

Sarvajñātamuni, the author of *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, contends that[24] the material causality of world really belongs to Brahman though its causality is possible only through the instrumentality of *māyā*. As the softness of earth is indispensable, though only instrumental, for the creation of pot, *māyā* is also necessary for rendering the ultimate and the *pāramārthika* reality of Brahman as the material-cause of cosmic superimposition. Thus, *māyā*, though not actually the *upādāna-kāraṇa*, is the instrumental-cause or *dvāra-kāraṇa*[25] as called by Sarvajñātamuni.

Vācaspati Miśra, on the other hand, thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause of the world-appearance through *māyā* as associated with the jīva, i. e., *avidyā* which is only an accessory cause or the *sahakāri-kāraṇa.*[26] Vācaspati's difference from Sarvajñātamuni, therefore, consists only in the fact that, whereas, he accords to *māyā* a little inferior position by calling it 'accessory' the author of *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* thinks that *māyā* is persistent even in phenomena that are the effects of Brahman.

The tendency of attributing to *māyā* an important position in the material causality of cosmic superimposition is, however, more pronounced in the Vivaraṇa school which had, for the first time, the courage of formulating the conception that Pure-Brahman without the association of *māyā* is quite incapable of acting as a material-cause. In their opinion both Brahman and *māyā* together form the material-cause of the world-order. The association of *māyā* with Brahman for the purposes of the world-creation is explained in the Vivaraṇa school in the following three ways.[27]

(1) Like the two twisted threads in a rope, both *māyā* and Brahman form the material-cause of the world.

(2) *Māyā* is the power of Brahman and is directly the material-cause of world. As power always depends on the powerful, *māyā* is also dependent on Brahman and, hence, the material causality of world as attributed to Brahman in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahma-sūtra* is only figurative.

(3) *Māyā* which is illusorily imposed on Brahman is really and directly the material-cause. But as this *māyā* is non-existent apart from Brahman, its support or substratum, It is considered as the *upādāna-kāraṇa* of world-phenomenon.

In Prakāśānanda's *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī*, we have the culmination of the tendency of according supremacy to *māyā* in the causality of world. He is of the view that the material-cause of world-phenomenon is really[28] *māyā* and not Brahman; the material causality of the world-order is, however, figuratively attributed to Brahman because of His being the support and the substratum of the cosmic principle of *māyā*.

§3. MĀDHVA CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY

Cause is defined, by the author of *Pramāṇa-candrikā*, as the unconditional and invariable antecedent of the effect and the effect as that which is negated by the negation consisting in the antecedent non-existence. This conception which closely resembles the Nyāya view of causation is bound to deliver the same results that have been anticipated by the authors of Nyāya. The effect, according to Mādhva philosophy, is, therefore, non-existent prior to its coming into existence.

The Mādhva school of philosophy conceives of two kinds of causes,[30] the material-cause and the instrumental-cause. The cause that suffers transformation is the material-cause, e. g., the lump of clay as the cause of jar or *prakṛti* as the cause of the universe, whereas, the cause producing the effect without actually undergoing transformation is known as the instrumental-cause or *nimitta-kāraṇa*, e. g., the unseen moral force as the cause of the universe or the potter's stick as the cause of jar. The universe is not the effect of only one cause, conceived as both material and instrumental, as propagated in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta, but of two different eternal causes. According to them, *prakṛti* is the material-cause of world and Brahman is its instrumental-cause. Brahman cannot be the material[32] as well as the instrumental cause of world because the simultaneous existence of these causes in a single principle is extremely illogical.

The relation between the effect and the material-cause may be explained on the basis of the conception of *bhedābheda* according to which a jar is both different and identical with the clay. In its aspect as a jar it is a purely novel creation and is different from its cause, the clay, but in its aspect as a form of clay it is identical with the cause. On the question of the existence of the effect prior to creation the Mādhva opinion resembles the *asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya. The author of *Padārtha-saṁgraha* clearly indicates that the effect prior to creation, in its form as effect, is non-existent. The Mādhva conception of causality is, therefore, quite opposed to the Vedānta view on this question which it has criticized by discovering logical anomalies and contradictions in their explanation of the material and the instrumental causality of Brahman.

§4. MĀDHVA CRITICISM OF THE VEDĀNTA CAUSALITY

Criticism of the Material Causality of Brahman

Jaya-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāya-sudhā*, enunciates the view that the idea of material causality is essentially related to the[33] *pariṇāma* view of causation. According to him, the material-cause is always a *pariṇāmi-kāraṇa* and the effect always a real transformation of the cause. This transformation is generally[34] of two kinds, (1) the transformation of the quality (*dharma*) and (2) the transformation of the qualified (*dharmin*). Thus, whenever, there is any transformation of the cause into the effect it is either of the attributes of the cause, e. g., the change in the colour of the mango, or of the essence of the cause such as the transformation of the milk into curd. While applying this principle of *pariṇāmi-kāraṇatva* to the problem of the material causality of Brahman, Jaya-Tīrtha argues that any attempt to prove Brahman as the material-cause would establish His character as modified which is against scriptures proclaiming His nature as above all modifications (*vikāra*). Moreover, according to Jaya-Tīrtha, every modification is dependent[35] and requires a second principle to initiate the change. But, because Brahman is non-dual how can it undergo any change ? Jaya-Tīrtha, therefore, concludes that the Śaṁkarite thesis of Brahman as the *upādāna-kāraṇa* is unwarrantable. On the contrary, he formulates that the idea of the material causality of world is intelligible only with reference to *prakṛti* which is[36] dependent on Brahman. *Prakṛti* alone should be considered as the material-cause of world-phenomena and not Brahman which is only an instrumental-cause.

It is necessary to mention, in this connection, that, according to Jaya-Tīrtha and other Mādhva philosophers, *pradhāna* or the Primordial Matter forms the body of *Paramātman* which actually evolves into the different phases of creation and into which, at the time of *pralaya* (dissolution), the various evolutes dissolve. It is because *prakṛti* forms the body[37] of Īśvara that the *śruti* refers to the material causality of Brahman. In fact, it is the *Pradhana* that is the material-cause and not Brahman. It is one of the logical presuppositions of the concept of material causality that the attributes of the cause[38] pass into the effect. Thus, when the Advaitins speak about the material causality of Brahman which is a conscious and intelligent principle it must follow as a consequence that the world, the effect, is also conscious. But the non-conscious character of world is recognized even by the Advaitins. How can such a world be the material-effect of the most supreme principle, the Brahman ? From this exposition of the Śaṁkarite interpretation of material causality it is not difficult to realize that the Śaṁkarites find themselves uncomfortable in explaining the concept of the material causality of Brahman. This difficulty is, probably, the reason of the gradual tendency in the Post-Śaṁkarite literature of according to *māyā* a place in the material causality of the world-phenomenon which is quite conspicuous in the Vivaraṇa school. The three alternative positions of the material causality of Brahman in association with *māyā*, as explained by the authors of this school, have been adopted as the *pūrvapakṣa* for purposes of criticism. We may, therefore, discuss this criticism in short and then pass on to the problem of the instrumental causality of Brahman.

According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the view that Brahman, as qualified by *māyā* like the two strings of a rope, is the material-cause of Brahman is unsatisfactory for several reasons. Firstly, if the analogy[39] as suggested by the Vivaraṇa school be true then Brahman like *māyā* would also be subject to modification just as when the two strings are knit to form a rope they belong to the same order of reality and are subject to the same modifications. If *māyā* can be subjected to modification as acknowledged by the Vivaraṇites then Brahman would also be changeable in character. Again, if Brahman whose nature is *satya*, *jñāna* and *ānanda* be the material-cause of world, it should also possess the specific attributes of Brahman such as pure-existence, knowledge and bliss because it is one of the important presuppositions of material causality that the effect should possess the principal attributes of the cause.

The second view that the material causality of Brahman may be explained by introducing *māyā*, the power of Brahman, is also illogical. Firstly, such a conception of Brahman would establish Its nature as qualified creating contradictions with the Śaṁkarite idea of Brahman as unqualified and indeterminate. Secondly, if the Advaitins favour the view that Īśvara or Qualified Brahman is really the material-cause of the world-order then the Vedānta view would appear another version of *pariṇāmavāda*.

The third position, as upheld by Prakāśānanda is criticized by Vyāsa-Tīrtha on the ground that the concept of the material causality is not the same as being the substratum of a thing. Language also cannot furnish an instance where the term 'material-cause' is used in the sense of the ground of illusory manifestation. It would, therefore, be illogical to imagine that because Brahman is the ground of *māyā*, the primary material-cause, It may also be taken to be the cause of the world-order.

Criticism of the Instrumental Causality of Brahman

Notwithstanding the fact that the Mādhva philosophers formulate the doctrine that Brahman is the instrumental-cause of world-creation, they have criticized Vedānta philosophy on this point also. Their criticism, however, does not doubt the validity of the idea of Brahman as the instrumental-cause but only that such a causality is inconceivable in the context of other presuppositions of Vedānta philosophy. Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*,[41] gives four possible interpretations to the concept of instrumental causality and by his method of reductio ad absurdum proves them all as utterly inconsistent with the elementary principles of Śaṁkarite philosophy. The interpretations of instrumental causality, as given by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, are as follows :—

(1) As the ground of illusory manifestation, e. g., conch-shell with regard to silver.

(2) As the percipient of false superimposition (*adhyāsa*).

(3) As the capacity of creating illusions like a magician.

(4) As the principle having the material-cause for its object which it utilizes for further creation, e. g., a potter.

The first meaning of *nimitta-kāraṇatva* is insupportable as it is just what the Śaṁkarites intend by material causality. To attribute the same meaning to both material and instrumental causality is prima facie invalid. The second position is also untenable because the idea of the instrumental-cause presupposes its ignorant character. Now, there are only two possibilities; either Brahman or the jīva should be acknowledged as the instrumental-cause of world.

The first possibility is, however, out of question because Brahman being omniscient cannot be ignorant. Thus, the only alternative possibility is to concede to the opinion that jīva, which by nature is ignorant, is the author of the world. But, Vyāsa-Tīrtha argues, Śaṁkara himself, in his commentaries, disparages the idea of contemplating the jīva as the cause of the world.

The third alternative is also inconvenient to Vedānta. In the first place it may be asked : Whom does Īśvara delude by His false creation? To commonsense it may appear that it is the jīva that is the object of the magical operations of Īśvara. But, Vyāsa-Tīrtha argues, such an assumption would lead to the inevitable conclusion that the existence of jīva is a fact even prior to the creation justifying the futility of the conception that Īśvara creates the phenomenal order by deluding. Again, if jīva be also a false appearance then the cognition of jīva by Īśvara would establish that He Himself is subject to His own delusion which is absurd.

Moreover, it is apparent from the Advaitin's exposition of the doctrine of instrumental causality as the capacity to delude that the thesis that Īśvara deludes is inter-related to the doctrine of the illusory character of world. If we ask the Śaṁkarites what is actually the argument on the basis of which the doctrine of Īśvara as the author of illusion is to be propounded they would reply that because the world is illusory the instrumental causality of Īśvara is conceivable only in the sense that He is the author of world-illusion. This, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, clearly indicates the fallacy of mutual dependence inherent in the Śaṁkarite argument.

The last position is also untenable because the instrumental causality of Brahman, in the Śāṁkara school, is only *kalpita*; it cannot be understood on the analogy of the potter. Vyāsa-Tīrtha, therefore, concludes that the philosophy of Brahman as the instrumental-cause in the context of some of the basic principles of Vedānta philosophy is logically invalid.

§5. EVALUATION OF THE MĀDHVA CRITICISM

From this account of the Mādhva criticism of the Śaṁkarite doctrine of causality and the world-cause it would occur that much of the criticism is due to serious misunderstanding on the part of the Mādhva philosophers. While criticizing the Vedānta philosophy of Brahman as the material-cause they have taken their stand on the presumption that material causality means only real transformation and have built up the whole edifice of their criticism with this conception as their foundation stone. From what has been stated about the Śaṁkarite conception of material causality, in the first few pages of this chapter, it may be clear that the Mādhva philosophers have lost sight of the most fundamental difference between the Advaitic idea of material causality and their own preconceptions about it. It appears they have deliberately overlooked the philosophy of *vivartta* that has been invented for avoiding the contradictions and inconsistencies that would have otherwise followed in the wake of the ***pariṇāmi*** conception of Brahman. Many of the criticisms of Jaya-Tīrtha and Vyāsa-Tīrtha are reminiscent of Śaṁkara's denunciation of Bhāskara's view of the material causality of Brahman. Is it not a matter of pity that the great masters of the Mādhva school have, in their enthusiasm of nullifying all the achievements of the rival school, refused to take notice of the most important aspect of Vedānta philosophy ?

The Mādhva objection to the usage of the term 'material-cause' in the sense of the 'ground of illusory manifestation' is refuted by Madhusūdana in his *Advaita-siddhi*. He asserts that the meaning of '*upādānatva*' is only the causality of Ātman in the creation[42] of the effect and this may either be *pariṇāmi* or *vivartta*. The denial of the material causality of Brahman in the sense of real transformation does not mean that It is not a material-cause of world in any other sense.

It is true that in the Vedānta of Śaṁkara also 'material-cause' is used in the sense of the cause that undergoes real transformation but this is only with regard to the hierarchy of causes ending in the *Avyakta*. Till the state of *Avyakta*[43] or *Hiraṇyagarbha* one may be correct in applying the idea of *pariṇāmi-kāraṇatva* but when one tries to comprehend the relation of the world or the *Avyakta* with Brahman or the Absolute one must bear in mind the Vedānta philosophy of *vivartta*.

Again, Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism of the Vivaraṇa school is a wrong assessment of the intentions and the spirit in which the philosophers of this school have tried to explain the relation between *māyā* and Brahman. No one who reads the Post-Śaṁkarite Vedānta with a catholic outlook can fail to realize the lurking doubt in the minds of the Vivaraṇites on the question of the material causality of Brahman.

The history of the Post-Śaṁkarite literature is an exposition of the logical development of an important judgement that Brahman while dissociated with the inexplicable (*anirvacanīya*) principle of *māyā* is inconceivable in terms of 'world-cause'. For introducing 'causality' in Brahman the Śaṁkarites find it expedient to associate It, in some way or other, with the *anirvacanīya avidyā* and the three alternative suggestions are only different ways of explaining this relation. This does not mean that this explanation is to be taken up literally. As a matter of fact, intellect is incapable of comprehending the relation between *māyā* and Brahman. Though this may be taken to be a weakness of the Vedānta system yet it is a fact and we must not be shy of accepting the truth. In the words of one of the modern interpreters of Vedānta, "It is not a matter of shame to say that we are finite, that in the bosom of reality are hidden secrets unknown to man and unknowable through his intellect, that the panorama of the universe is the writing of an unseen hand which we can only half understand. We will not be required to apologise for our being finite".[44]

The Mādhva refutation of the philosophy of Brahman as the instrumental-cause may also be met with by arguing that it is Īśvara and not Brahman who is the instrumental-cause[45] of world-creation. He is thus the instrumental-cause of world on the analogy of the potter and is moved with the desire of affecting real transformation in the unmanifested state of Name and Form. Because the idea of material causality is also with regard to Īśvara the presence of both the material and the instrumental causes in Him has no logical contradiction. To be frank, the doctrine of causality, in Vedānta, is only with regard to Īśvara who alone is knowable to human intellect. The law of causality, being a logical and phenomenal category, is intelligible only with regard to Īśvara and not Brahman that transcends all categories of human intellect.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONCEPTIONS OF ISVARA AND MĀYĀ

§1. INTRODUCTORY

From what has been described in the preceding chapters it may be evident that the description of the real nature of Brahman as attributeless (*nirguṇa*) is, according to Śaṁkara and his followers, the main purport and the topic of discussion in the *śrutis*. The conception of Brahman as foundational consciousness and as the ground of phenomena is the topic of many important Vedānta texts in which the concept of Brahman as an immanent and transcendental principle has been elaborately explained. The first few *mantras* of *Kenopaniṣad*[1] describing the nature of Brahman as that which is not known through any of the 'instruments of knowledge but through which the existence and function of these instruments is rendered possible' aim at the exposition of a transcendental and immanent principle whose existence, as a ground, is the prerequisite of the manifestation of phenomena. At several places in his *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, Śaṁkara describes[2] the real nature of Brahman as eternal purity, consciousness and freedom; It is immutable and uncontaminated by any of the evils of phenomena. The main consideration with Śaṁkara, as revealed in all his commentaries, lies in establishing the supreme reality of a transcendental principle of pure-consciousness which, though unrelated to phenomena in its own nature, is the ground of their appearance. The nature of Brahman, therefore, is beyond determination and differentiation. Yājñavalkya emphatically denounces the idea of duality with regard to Brahman when he says in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, "When there is duality, as it were, then one smells something, one sees something, one hears something, one speaks something, one thinks something, one knows something. But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self then what should one smell and through what, what should one see and through what,

what should one speak and through what, what should one think and through what, what should one know and through what ? Through what should one know that owing to which all this is known —through what, O Maitreyi ! should one know the knower ?"[3] There is no second to Brahman or Self as Āruṇi had instructed his son, "In the beginning there was only this non-dual truth."[4]

This description of the *nirguṇa* aspect of Brahman, though sustainable from the ultimate (*pāramārthika*) standpoint carries scant justification as an explanatory principle of cosmic creation and phenomenal existence. Besides this, the reference to the determinate nature of Brahman in such *śrutis* as 'All desire, all smell etc.'[5] and the description of Brahman as the source of origination, sustenance and destruction of world appear rather incompatible with the concept of the *nirguṇa* character of Brahman. One may, therefore, rightly question : What is the Śaṁkarite explanation of this difficulty and the apparent contradiction in the verdict of the *śrutis* ?

A study of the works of Śaṁkara would reveal that he did not stand for a complete denunciation of the qualified nature of Brahman; instead, he asserted only the empirical or the *vyāvahārika* character of Qualified Brahman. At numerous places, in his commentaries, Śaṁkara explains[6] that the treatment of the *saguṇa* or the qualified nature of Brahman in the *Upaniṣads* is only for the purpose of *upāsanā* because the unqualified and the transcendental aspect of Brahman is unsuitable as an object of devotion. Moreover, we have the description of Brahman, both in the *śrutis*[7] and the *Vedānta-sūtra*, as the material as well as the instrumental cause of the origination, sustenance and the destruction of the world-order. How can Brahman which is unqualified, transcendental and immutable be the material-cause of such a changing, qualified and phenomenal cosmos ? As a material-cause, in the sense of *pariṇāmi-kāraṇa*, is always subject to modifications, it would be the transgression of the very nature of Brahman as an immutable principle to assign to it the material causality of Brahman. Śaṁkara, therefore, imagined of a different principle that belongs to the *vyāvahārika* order of reality and is the source of cosmic creation. This principle or the *saguṇa* Brahman is the Lord or the ruler and the creator of the whole universe and is the object of devotion of all the ignorant and deluded[10] individual souls. This *Apara-Brahman*, as it is called, is lower to the supreme, *nirguṇa* and the absolute Brahman because it belongs to the *vyāvahārika* order of reality and is caused by the inexplicable principle of *māyā*. Though Śaṁkara indiscriminately uses the word 'Īśvara' for both the *saguṇa* and the *nirguṇa* aspects of Brahman and as a synonym of the term 'Brahman' in his commentaries, the later writers of his school have shown a marked tendency of identifying the term 'Īśvara' with the qualified or the *saguṇa* aspect of Brahman. This distinction between Īśvara and Brahman is significant not only from the point of view of the development of thought but also for the clarity of conceptions lest there may be no confusion and overlapping between the descriptions of Brahman as *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*. In this chapter our discussion will be confined only to the concept of Īśvara as a qualified aspect of Brahman.

§2. THE SAṀKARITE CONCEPTION OF ĪŚVARA

The description of Brahman as full of immense and infinite qualities in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* aims at formulating a reality that is the source of origination, sustenance and absorption of the world. Such descriptions as "All action, All desire, All odour, All taste pervading all this without speech, without perturbation—such is my self within this heart, smaller than the corn, than barley etc.," "Greater than the greatest and smaller than an atom", try to postulate an omniscient and omnipotent principle which without being different from this world is at once its material-cause, the reservoir of all power, the totality of all possible attributes and the limit of all intellectual comprehension of the ultimate nature of reality. An examination of the concept of Īśvara as available in the works of Śaṁkara and his followers would reveal that Īśvara is the only aspect of Reality that is conceivable in relation to phenomenal world and is within the comprehension of human intellect. In other words, it may be contended that the Īśvara of Śāmkara-Vedānta is that causal and immanent principle which belongs to the same order of reality as His creations, the order of phenomenal existence or *vyavahāra*. When viewed from the *pāramārthika* standpoint His existence would be equally *āvidyaka* and sublatable.

The conception of Īśvara or the *saguṇa* aspect of Brahman, as described above, may appear rather incompatible with the Śaṁkarite theory of the indeterminate or the *nirguṇa* Brahman. We may rightly be led to question whether the two conceptions of Brahman, as qualified and unqualified, are capable of being reconciled into a single system of philosophy. Śaṁkara himself raised this question in his important commentaries on the principal *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahma-sūtra* and tried to explain that the doctrines of the *nirguṇa* and the *saguṇa* Brahman[11] are in no way contradictory. According to him, the omniscient and the all powerful Īśvara is only a determined form of Brahman like the jīvātman. Both Īśvara and jīva have their origin in the conditioning of Brahman through *māyā* and *avidyā*[12] on the analogy of the determinations of ether as 'pot-ether' and 'monastry-ether' by the two limitative adjuncts (*upādhi*), viz., the pot and the monastry. As the nature of ether remains uneffected by the defects and the determining conditions of pot and monastry, the real nature of Brahman as unqualified and beyond all change and difference is not vitiated by the conditioned existence of either Īśvara or jīva. The differentiation of an entity by limitative adjuncts however does not affect the nature of that entity like qualities that change the very character of the qualified entity by their qualifications. The existence of Īśvara is, therefore, purely phenomenal or *āvidyaka*, as it is called, and does not create any contradiction with the real nature of Brahman. As the jīva in its *pāramārthika* state is Brahman itself, Īśvara too, in the absolute state, is non-different from Brahman which is the only reality without the second.

Such a treatment of Īśvara that apparently drags Him from the highest altitude of spiritual divinity may arouse many pertinent doubts with regard to His status and relation with the jīva. The question of difference between Īśvara and the individual soul is important not only from the point of view of the valid explanation of reality and its constituents but is also significant, to a considerable extent, for the satisfaction of the devotional aspect of man. The difference between Īśvara and jīva that has a favourable verdict of both experience and testimony is recognized even by Śaṁkara. Īśvara, according to him, is omniscient, omnipotent and is the cause of the origination, sustenance and destruction of the world-order. He is not subject to any bondage or ignorance and is free from all *kārmic*[13] influences and enjoyment. The nature of the jīvātman is, however, different. It is a transmigratory creature with limited knowledge and immense ignorance, the agent of *karmas* and the enjoyer of its fruits. It suffers under the misery of bondage and tries for release. Unlike Īśvara it is never the cause of the creation, sustenance and destruction of world. It is, therefore, obvious that Īśvara is different from jīva. Yet it is to be remembered that this distinction is only phenomenal; from the absolute standpoint both are nothing but Brahman.

Now what makes this difference between them ? In other words, what is the principle governing the difference in their phenomenal appearances ? The Vedānta reply to this is simple. It is due to the difference in their *upādhis*. While discussing the relation between Īśvara as a ruler, and jīva, as ruled, in his commentary on the sūtra '*Api* ca *smaryate*.' Śaṁkara mentions clearly the difference between the *upādhis* of Īśvara and jīva and asserts that Īśvara who possesses unlimited excellence, as His *upādhi*, rules over the individual soul whose limitative adjunct is too vile and low. This difference between the *upādhis* of Īśvara and jīva has been developed in the Post-Śaṁkarite Vedānta where we have different opinions about the nature of these *upādhis* and their relation with the Primal Nescience. One can trace at least three tendencies in the Post-Śaṁkarite literature on the question of the *upādhis* of Īśvara and jīva that have their source in the interpretations of Vidyāraṇya, Sarvajñātamuni and the authors of the Vivaraṇa school respectively.

Vidyāraṇya, in his *Pañcadaśī*,[15] distinguishes the *Īśvaropādhi* from the *upādhi* of the jīva by referring to the creative and the veiling powers of the Primal Nescience (*avidyā*). In his view, the aspect of Nescience which is predominated by the creative power and has the preponderance of the *sattva* attribute, the *māyā*, is the *upādhi* of Īśvara, whereas, that aspect of Nescience in which the veiling capacity is more pronounced due to the preponderance of *tamas* is called *avidyā*, the limitative adjunct of the individual soul.

The author of the second view is Sarvajñātamuni who, according to Appaya Dīkṣita, contends that Īśvara is the reflection of *cit* in the Primal Avidyā, whereas, jīva is its reflection in *antaḥkaraṇa*, a product of the Primal Nescience. The reason for such an explanation of the *upādhis* of Īśvara and jīva is Sarvajñātamuni's desire to uphold, on the one hand, the omniscient character of Īśvara and, on the other, the phenomenal plurality of the jīva. Notwithstanding his interpretation of *jīvopādhi* as the internal-organ, it would appear that his view is not materially different from Vidyāraṇya's stand. One may ask : What is the difference between the internal-organ and the Primal Nescience ? The only possible explanation would be the assertion about the *antaḥkaraṇa* as the product of the Primal Nescience. The *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* view, therefore, tends to be identical with Vidyāraṇya's position. The Vivaraṇa explanation is, however, different. According to it, the jīva is the reflection of *cit* in *avidyā*,[17] whereas, Īśvara is its prototype. This conception of Īśvara as the prototype and the individual soul as the reflection guarantees to a considerable extent the independence of Īśvara which is probably not so marked in the doctrines that take their stand on reflectionism. The conception of Īśvara as the prototype[18] would require further elucidation especially on the question of its relation with *avidyā*. The freedom of Īśvara from all kinds of defects may create an impression that He is free from *avidyā* also but it would be a mistake to think in this light. In order that the prototype may obtain its attributive (*saguṇa*) character and be different from Brahman Its association with *avidyā* should not be dispensed with. It is why Madhusūdana, while explaining the Vivaraṇa view in his *Siddhāntabindu*, defines Īśvara as the prototype-consciousness as defined by *avidyā* and jīva as the reflection of *caitanya* in the *avidyā* as conditioned by the internal-organ and its latent tendencies or *saṁskāras*. This interpretation of the Vivaraṇa conception of Īśvara has its support in Appaya Dīksita also who finds the material causality of world in Brahman as conditioned by *māyā* and characterized by such attributes as omniscience, omnipotence, etc.

The Post-Śaṁkarite opinions on the question of the nature of Īśvara, as described above, are unanimous in their belief that the *upādhis* of Īśvara and jīva are different. There are at least two Post-Śaṁkarite philosophers, viz., Vācaspati and Prakāśānanda, who have declined to recognize any separate *upādhi* for Īśvara. Though Prakāśānanda denies the character of the *saguṇa* or the Qualified Brahman as *āvidyaka*, yet their views on the question of the seat (*āśraya*) of *avidyā* have considerably influenced their opinion on the problem of its relation with the *saguṇa* Brahman or Īśvara. Vācaspati, in his *Bhāmatī*,[20] contends that the cosmic order is an illusory imposition on Brahman caused by *avidyā* which is different in each[21] individual soul. According to him, the description of Brahman in the *śrutis* and the *Vedānta-sūtra* as omniscient, omnipotent, full of infinite attributes and the material-cause of the world is with regard to its aspect as the object of jīva's ignorance. The omniscient Being is only the content of ignorance which has its locus in the jīva. The attribution of the material causality of world to Brahman is, from Vācaspati's standpoint, also an expression of the fact that It is the substrate of world-superimposition having its cause in *avidyā*. *Avidyā*, as explained by Vācaspati, is only an instrumental-cause of superimposition and not a material-cause having Brahman as its object. It is thus clear that while Vācaspati admitted the *saguṇa* aspect of Brahman he found no justification in the philosophy of a separate *upādhi* for Īśvara. In Vācaspati's view *Māyā* is only a synonym[22] of *avidyā* having its seat in the individual soul. The relation between *māyā* and *māyin*, as described in the śruti, '*Māyān tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt māyinaṁ tu maheśvaraṁ*, is only one between the *viṣaya* and the *viṣayin* and not the one between the possessor and the possessed.

The uncompromising realism of Prakāśānanda also declined to comprehend any *upādhi* other than *avidyā* or *māyā* for which 'presumption' is the only evidence. Like Sarvajñātamuni, Prakāśānanda also justified the view that Brahman is the locus and the object of *avidyā* which, according to him, is a unitary principle[23] and not manifold as conceived by Vācaspati. Brahman as conditioned by this *avidyā* (i.e., jīva) and the whole universe including gods, men, etc., is as unreal as a dream-appearance. Though there is no detailed account of *saguṇa* Brahman in Prakāśānanda's *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī* yet it may be derived from his other conceptions that his doctrine of the One-Soul (*Ekjīva*) is not much different from the philosophy of Īśvara of the other Post-Śaṁkarite interpreters. But how the doctrine of the One Soul can explain the transmigratory order of world presuming the presence and the consciousness of duality ? How can he avert the veritable conclusion that the emancipation of one would liberate every creature from the bondage of birth and rebirth ? To these Prakāśānanda replies that mind, sense[24] organs, etc., do exist as products of Nescience to provide for the existence of instruments for the consciousness of duality and that the plurality of jīvas is just like the different creatures of a dream appearance. There is, in reality, only one soul which, in its nature, is eternal, conscious and free; this very soul on account of its association with Nescience appears as jīva and falsely surmises the bodies of gods, men, etc., for whose enjoyment it creates. This explanation of the order of the transmigration and bondage acquiesces in the plurality, though absolutely false, of all the worldly creatures that are the projections of the one conditioned soul defined by the inexplicable principle of *avidyā*. These different creatures, like all dream individuals, have no separate limitative adjuncts defining their existence. If by Īśvara be meant the first phenomenal creature, then Prakāśānanda's jīva has certainly a title to Īśvara-hood. Besides this, there is hardly any other likeness between his jīva and the Īśvara of the other Post-Śaṁkarite interpreters. All attributes of excellence, as omniscience, omnipotence, etc., have been carefully avoided in his description of the Jīva and the causality of Brahman to him is only figurative. There is thus no sufficient reason to believe that Prakāśānanda ever intended a serious enunciation of the concept of Īśvara as available in the other Post-Śaṁkarite systems. The *saguṇa* aspect of Brahman, according to him, is only an imaginary creation of the Jīva.

§3. THE SAṀKARITE CONCEPTION OF MĀYĀ

Though in Vedānta the terms '*māyā*' and '*avidyā*' are generally used as synonyms, they have been carefully distinguished by the Post-Śaṁkarite philosophers who have used '*māyā*' in the sense of the *upādhi* of Īśvara and *avidyā* as the limitative adjunct of the individual soul. It is in this particular sense of *māyā*, i. e., the *upādhi* of Īśvara, that we undertake to give an exposition to the development of this concept in Post-Śaṁkarite Vedānta.

As discussed above, all the followers of Śaṁkara, with the exception of Vācaspati and Prakāśānanda, agree to the recognition of a separate *upādhi* for Īśvara. This *upādhi* though not essentially different from the *upādhi* of the jīva possesses certain qualities that differentiate it from the limitative adjunct of the jīvātman. In his commentary on the sūtra, '*Tadadhīnatvāt arthavat*',[25] Śaṁkara refers to this *māyā* while formulating the view that the primal cause of the world prior to creation, as denoted by the word *Avyakta*, is really the unmanifested power of creation dependent on Īśvara. This causal power (*bījaśakti*) has the capacity to deprive the jīvas of the knowledge of their real nature and veil the true character of the Ultimate Reality. This *Avyakta* or the unmanifested causal principle is, by virtue of its power of creating false[26] phenomenal appearance, compared to the *māyā* of the magician[27] (*māyāmayī*) and to the great and deep slumber (*mahāsuptiḥ*) on account of its concealment of the real nature of Brahman; this *mahāsuptiḥ* is just like a great sheet thrown over the consciousness of man during his sleep to make him unconscious of his waking life.

From this description of Śaṁkara's exposition of *māyā* two important conclusions may be drawn; firstly, the presence of the two capacities of creation and concealment in the Primal Nescience and, secondly, the usage of '*māyā*' and '*avidyā*' for the powers of creation and concealment respectively. The usage of '*māyāmayī*' and '*mahāsuptiḥ*' in Śaṁkara's commentary may justify the contention that in Vedānta *māyā* denotes only the creative aspect of the *anirvacanīya* principle of cosmic superimposition. But this should not lead us to the confusion that *māyā* and *avidyā* are different principles; both *māyā* and *avidyā* are two aspects of the one inexplicable principle, the material-cause of the cosmic *adhyāsa*, like the powers of understanding and argumentation in one man.

Now, if *māyā* and *avidyā* be the two powers of a single principle what is the determinant of their difference ? Sarvajñātamuni, in his *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, contends that Brahman in association with *ajñāna* produces[28] the false appearance of Īśvara and jīva. This *ajñāna* by veiling the real and the self-luminous Ātman, on whom it rests[29] and operates upon as its object, creates the illusory appearances, viz., God (*Īśvara*), soul (*jīva*) and world, through its creative power. These two powers of *ajñāna* are further explained by Sarvajñātamuni in the second chapter of his work where he states that this *ajñāna* through its *jaḍa-śakti* exists[30] in the external world as objective phenomena and subjectively it exists as the denial of knowledge. Out of these, the *jaḍa-śakti* is the material-cause of the posterior evolution of ether, air, etc., and is responsible for the creation of the objective world. This *jaḍa-śakti*, which is but another name for *vikṣepa-śakti* or the creative power of the primal-cause, is a counterpart of its power of concealment or the *āvaraṇa-śakti*. As these two powers, generally indicated by the terms '*māyā*' and '*avidyā*' belong to the same causal principle, i. e., Nescience, they are not different. Sarvajñātamuni, however, suggests an inference to prove this identity. According to him, *māyā* is not different from *avidyā* because like *avidyā* it is also a cognitum and depends on consciousness. 'Being the cognitum' and 'dependence on consciousness' are the reasons on the basis of which the identity of *māyā* and *avidyā* can be established.

Yet the determinant of the distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* is not clear. Nṛsiṁghāśrama, in his *Tattvabodhinī*, contends that it is due to the predominance of the *sattva* attribute in the creative aspect of *ajñāna* or *māyā*. Īśvara is omniscient and independent because *māyā* which has the effulgence of the *sattvaguṇa* does not obstruct the eternal knowledge and consciousness of Brahman. When the[32] pure consciousness of Brahman is reflected through the pure *sattva* qualities, as dominating over other impure parts of *prakṛti*, there is the manifestation of God, whereas, when the pure-consciousness is reflected through the impure parts of *rajas* and *tamas* as predominating the *sattva* part of *prakṛti* there are the manifestations of the individual souls or *jīvas*. According to Sarvajñātamuni also, the conception of *māyā* is indispensable for explaining the material causality of Brahman. In the first chapter of his work he argues that though the Pure-Brahman is really the *upādāna-kāraṇa* of world Its material causality is possible only through the help of *māyā*. As the softness of earth is indispensable, though only auxiliary and instrumental to the creation of pot, *māyā* is also necessary for the adaptation of the *pāramārthika* reality, i. e., Brahman, as the material-cause of the cosmic superimposition. Thus *māyā* is only an auxiliary cause, instrumental in affecting Brahman as the material-cause of cosmic superimposition (*dvāra-kāraṇa*).[33]

The Vivaraṇa exposition of *māyā* differs from the *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* account especially on the question of its causality in bringing about the appearance of phenomena. Like Sarvajñātamuni, Padmapāda and his commentators, e. g., Prakāśātman, Vidyāraṇya and others, argue that *māyā* and *avidyā* are identical[34] and Brahman is both the support (*āśraya*) and the object (*viṣaya*) of this *avidyā*. Like Sarvajñātamuni, they interpret *avidyā* as an entity that obstructs the self-illuminating character of Brahman and causes the appearance of phenomena. Vidyāraṇya accepted the two powers of *avidyā* while defining *avidyā* as that which, being *anirvacanīya*, obstructs the revelation of the real[35] characters of reality and produces false and deceptive appearance. The Vivaraṇites recognize the validity of the conception upheld by the majority of the Śaṁkarites that *avidyā* is the limitative adjunct of the jīva, whereas, *māyā* or the *vikṣepa-śakti* is the *upādhi* of Īśvara. While explaining the omniscience of Īśvara in his *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha*,[36] Vidyāraṇya contends that Īśvara who is the reflection of Intelligence in the modifications of *māyā*, as the totality of all objects, is omniscient. The omniscience of Īśvara, thus, is only through the mediation of *māyā* and its transformations. It is no doubt a daring attempt on the part of Vidyāraṇya to explain the omniscience of Īśvara in detail through the *vṛtti* of *māyā* on the analogy of the process involved in the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* of the jīva. As regards the question as to what essentially makes the difference between *māyā* and *avidyā* Nṛsiṁghāśrama's view of the predominance of the *sattva* attribute, as described above, is accepted by the Vivaraṇa school particularly its later interpreters.

We have already given an exposition to the Vivaraṇa opinion on the question of the causality of world-appearance according to which both Brahman and *māyā* together form the *upādāna-kāraṇa* of world-appearance. In order to explain the function of *māyā* in the material causality of world, Prakāśātman and Vidyāraṇya have referred to the following three positions :—

(1) *Māyā* and Brahman are together the joint cause of world like the twisted threads of rope.

(2) *Māyā* is the power of Brahman and is directly the material-cause of world. As the power always depends on the powerful, *māyā* is also dependent on Brahman and, hence, the description of Brahman in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahma-sūtra* is only figurative.

(3) *Māyā* is directly the material-cause of world-phenomena. But because the existence of *māyā* without Brahman, the substratum, is impossible, Brahman is eulogized as the *upādāna-kāraṇa* of the world.

Thus, from the Vivaraṇa point of view, the material causality of world really subsists in *māyā* and all references to Brahman are only figurative. In reality, Īśvara or Brahman as associated with *māyā* is the cause of the world-order. The definition of Brahman given in the sūtra, '*Janmādyasya yataḥ*' is really the definition[37] of Īśvara and not of the Pure and Absolute Brahman. With regard to this aspect of Brahman the definition is only figurative.

The conception of the figurative usage of material causality in Brahman, however, acquires a distinct note in Prakāśānanda's explanation of *māyā* as the material-cause of world-phenomena. *Māyā* which, according to him, is the conditioning principle of the unconditioned and the transcendental Absolute is really the material cause; Brahman is said to be the *upādāna-kāraṇa* because it is the substratum of *māyā* and not otherwise.

§4. MĀDHVA CONCEPTIONS OF MĀYĀ AND ĪŚVARA

We already know that Madhva was vehemently opposed to the thesis of a different order of the reality of Brahman and Its nature as an undifferentiated unity transcending the concepts of the 'subject' and the 'object'. According to him, God or *Paramātman* is an effulgence of infinite attributes. It is He who is eulogized in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads* by the title of Brahman. Jaya-Tīrtha, in his commentary on *Tattvasaṁkhyāna*,[38] describes the reality as that which is not superimposed and is obtained or known through one of the *pramāṇas* or the means of valid knowledge. This Reality or *tattva* is classified by Madhva into two, viz., (1) Dependent and (2) Independent.[39] The concept of dependence, as explained by Jaya-Tīrtha, means the dependence[40] of a substance on another substance for its existence, knowledge and activity. All substances owe their existence to God or Brahman who is the only independent reality. He is the cause of the existence, maintenance and destruction of all that is conscious and unconscious in the world. As objectivity to knowledge or *prameyatva* is implied in the very definition of existence, it is necessary that God should also be an object of some *pramāṇa*. According to Madhva, He[41] is known through the *śāstras* that are the only means of imparting knowledge about Him and His attributes. Because of His objective character God or Īśvara is never free from attributes and specifications. He is always *saviśeṣa* and *saguṇa* and all arguments justifying His character as *nirviśeṣa* and unqualified are self-contradictory and not in accordance with the verdict of the *śruti*. According to Madhva, all the *śrutis* try to describe the nature and the innumerable and infinite qualities of God or Brahman. It is futile and irrational, according to him, to argue that the mention of Brahman in the *śrutis* as endowed with attributes refers only to an inferior Brahman, as contemplated by the Śaṁkarites, because the scriptural texts do not mention any other kind of Brahman than the Qualified One.

The Mādhva philosophers were naturally critical of the Śaṁkarite treatment of Īśvara that could procure for Him only a conditioned and phenomenal existence. Īśvara is not subject to any *upādhi* in the Śaṁkarite sense. He is the author of the creation, maintenance,[42] destruction and control of the world-order as well as of knowledge, ignorance, bondage and deliverance. His character is different from all material objects, souls and *prakṛti.* He is omniscient and has[43] a body of knowledge and bliss. This body is not made of any material stuff; on the other hand, His body is purely spiritual and full of knowledge and bliss.

The conception of *māyā* in Madhva's philosophy is the very denial of the Śaṁkarite doctrine of *māyā* as an *anirvacanīya* principle. In this system *māyā* is contemplated as a supra-rational power[44] of God which, on the one hand, dupes the individual souls by causing their illusions and mistakes and, on the other, helps Him in creating[45] the world-order. *Māyā*, in this system, is only a power that depends on God and has the same status, from the point of reality, as God Himself.

Vādirāja, in his *Yuktimallikā*, explains that '*māyā*' stands for three alternative meanings,[46] viz., (1) the desire of Īśvara, (2) the *jaḍa-prakṛti* and (3) that aspect of *māyā* which is the cause of jīva's illusion. It is in these three different shades of meaning that this word is used in the *śrutis* and other scriptures. When it is said that Īśvara is '*māyā-maya*' what is meant is that he is independent in His desire and is omnipotent. When the scriptures urge that God creates the world out of His *māyā* their intention is only to use the word in the second sense, viz., *prakṛti.* The word '*māyā*' is also used to denote *ajñāna* or that aspect of *māyā* which is responsible for the jīva's deception. The most apt illustration of such usage is the mantra, '*Anādi mayayā supto yadā jīvo prabudhyate*', etc.

§5. MĀDHVA REFUTATION OF THE ŚAṀKARITE DOCTRINE OF ĪŚVARA

From the above description of the philosophies of Śaṁkara and Madhva on the problem of the nature of Godhead, it is clear that the most fundamental question is whether the Ultimate Reality or Brahman is qualityless (*nirviśeṣa*) or is always qualified (*saviśeṣa*). It is an answer to this question that would justify or deprecate the Śaṁkarite philosophy of God or Īśvara as a phenomenal, though supreme, being whose existence from the ultimate standpoint is *māyika.* It would, therefore, be judicious to give a systematic exposition to the Mādhva refutation of the Vedānta views on these problems.

While repudiating the Vedānta conception of Brahman as *nirviśeṣa* Vyāsa-Tīrtha asks in his *Nyāyāmṛta* : What is the reason of the Advaitin's denial of attributes and characters in Brahman ? Is it for want of a satisfactory evidence justifying the presence of qualities in Brahman ? Or, is it due to some definite proof against the doctrine of the attributive character of Brahman ? The first alternative, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, is untenable because there are valid proofs for the philosophy of the attributive character of Brahman. Such scriptural texts as, 'The qualities in Him are extensive', 'His *parāśakti* is known in innumerable ways, as essential knowledge, strength and power', etc., establish the presence of positive attributes and qualities that are co-extensive with the reality of their *dharmin*, the Brahman. Inference also justifies this contention. Vyāsa-Tīrtha records the following inferential arguments to prove the presence of attributes in Brahman whose reality is no less inferior to that of Brahman :

(1) Brahman cannot exist without any positive attribute,
Because it is a substance, a positive existent or an existent different from negation,
Like a pot.

(2) Brahman has the character of being non-contradicted,
Because it is the ground of illusion,
Like a conch-shell.

(3) Brahman possesses the character of being the object of knowledge instructed in Vedānta,
Because it is the object of Vedānta enquiry,
Whatever is the object of an enquiry possesses the character of being so,
E. g., *dharma* in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā system.

(4) Brahman has always all the excellent and virtuous qualities,
Because He being desirous of acquiring them is also capable of doing so,
Whosoever is both capable and desirous of any attainment naturally obtains it,
Like a human being, e. g., Caitra.

(5) Brahman is free from all kinds of defects or bad qualities,
For He being desirous of abandoning them is also capable of doing so,
Whosoever is both desirous and capable of abandoning something naturally gives it up,
Like a human being, e. g., Caitra.

All these five inferences that are the systematic presentations of reasoning for the puropse of establishing the truth of their conclusions have been employed to exhibit the importance of the conception that differentiation and presence of characters can hardly be dissociated from any idea of Brahman without jeopardizing His very existence. The *pratijñā* (proposition to be proved) in the first inference is based on the relation of invariable concomitance between 'positive attribute' as probandum and such probans as, *padārthatva,* positiveness and the character of being different from negation (*abhāvavilakṣaṇatva*) described in the second premise.

The main points for consideration in this argument are the implicit acceptance of the universal proposition that all substances or positive entities possess 'positive attributes' and the Mādhva acclamation that God is also a substance and a positive entity like other substances in the world. An analysis of the two related terms of the above universal proposition between which the relation of *vyāpti* is emphasized would indicate the amount of dependence that this inferential argument presupposes upon the epistemological findings and conclusions of the Mādhva school. The concept of 'substance' has an invariable and necessary relation with the idea of 'objectivity'. In other words, it is contained in the very definition of *padārtha* that it should be an object of knowledge. But because knowledge in Mādhva school is always differentiated (*saviśeṣa*), it is impossible for them to think of a substance in the absence of its attributes, a conclusion that is responsible for the Mādhva enunciation that 'all substances have positive attributes'.

A consideration of the second question regarding the inclusion of God within the denotation of 'substance' would also justify the contention that the theory of knowledge is always the foundation of every system of metaphysics. Though God in Madhva's system is not a cognitum of ordinary perceptual cognitions yet His existence is decreed on the verdict of *śrutis* and reasonings based on the understanding of facts and categories of the world-order. It is argued by Jaya-Tīrtha, in his *Vivaraṇa*, a gloss on *Tattvodyota*,[47] that the behaviour of the 'conscious' (*cit*) and 'unconscious' (acit) principles in phenomena indicate the fact of a definite control over them under which they act in a sort of scheme or system. As this control is not due to the innate capacities of either the 'conscious' or the 'unconscious', it would not be illogical to conclude that they are governed by a superior principle whose existence by nature is exterior to both of them. Thus without the assumption of the supreme principle, i. e., God no satisfactory explanation of the world-scheme would ever be possible. This inference suggests that the knowledge of the existence of God is obtainable through inferential reasoning though His nature can be known only through the scriptures. God is, therefore, the object of knowledge acquired through scriptures and also inference in so far as the question of His existence is concerned. It is, therefore, legitimate, on the assumptions of Mādhva epistemology to contend that God is also a substance.

From what has been discussed with regard to the universal propositions and the concept of substance, the thesis proposed in *pratijñā* that Brahman possesses positive attributes follows as a natural consequence. The other two probans of the inference may also be supposed as invariably related to the probandum on the very grounds that have been considered for explaining the concomitance between the probandum, in question, and 'substance' which is one of the three probans.

In the second and the third inferences the chief implication of the arguments consists in attributing some sort of character to Brahman whether it be 'non-contradiction' or 'object of Vedānta enquiry'. The second inference is a rebuttal of the Advaitin's theory that Brahman is the substratum of world-illusion on the basis of the experience derived from other cases of illusion, e. g., the appearance of silver in conch-shell, the experience that the character of the substratum is never sublated by any knowledge whatsoever just as the knowledge of the character of the conch-shell is never thwarted and remains always valid.

The universal proposition of the third inference that whatever is the object of an enquiry always possesses the character of being so is also a derivation from the Mādhva fundamental that knowledge is always determinate and invariably belongs to characters. As the final result of an enquiry is always some sort of knowledge the object of the enquiry must, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, presume at least the character of its being an object. Accordingly, because Brahman is the object of enquiry, discussion and the final delivery of the knowledge generated through *śrutis*, it is a necessary pre-condition that He must possess the character of being all these without which no knowledge would ever be possible.

In the last two inferences, the Mādhva attempt is directed towards the position of virtues and beneficial qualities and the negation of the defects and evil characters in the Lord. Though the universal proposition in both the inferences, that whatsoever is desirous and also capable of either attaining or discarding a thing necessarily either obtains it or completely gives it up, may be taken as a valid phenomenon within the range of experience it is yet an object of doubt whether the reasons (*hetus*) through which the conclusions have been established do really qualify the 'subject' (Brahman in this case). The fact that God is desirous of acquiring good qualities and of dispensing with the bad ones is a point the test of whose validity transgresses the scope of our perceptual cognitions. The only alternative left for rescuing the probans from being fallacious is either to justify its validity on the strength of testimony or account it on the basis of the conclusions arrived at through some other reasoning. But as the fact of the desire of either acquisition or abandonment in Īśvara is itself an attribute and is a point of controversy we can hardly agree to its being the reason (*hetu*). It is an essential fundamental of logic that the reason of an inference must be acceptable without question to the exponent as well as the opponent. Here we can neither justify the sufficiency and validity of this reason through logical reasoning nor can we accredit it on the strength of the testimony which itself is a topic of discourse; there is, therefore, no solid reason in claiming an empirical or phenomenal probans in a transcendent subject—the Brahman.

One more point in this connection is, however, worthy of our consideration, a point which has been repeatedly emphasized by Vyāsa-Tīrtha during the course of his reasonings in favour of positing attributes and qualifications in Brahman. It is the paramount consideration and contention of the Mādhva school that the status of the reality of 'quality' is commensurate with the status of the reality of the 'qualified'. According to this school, no relation between 'quality' and 'qualified' is imaginable if the 'quality' belongs to a different order of reality from that of the 'qualified'. For example, the characters and qualifications of 'snake' in the illusion of snake in the rope do not qualify the rope which is the ground of illusion. The rope in this illustration can be qualified only by the qualities of the rope which belong to the same order of reality and not by the attributes of the snake which is illusory in character. The qualities of the snake are conceivable only in relation to the snake which too is illusory.

The determination of an entity is, therefore, possible, according to the veterans of the Mādhva school, only through the presence of attributes that enjoy an equal rank of reality with it. The importance of such a thesis would not have been so considerable had the scope of its application been limited only to the order of empirical phenomena in which case it would have hardly created an opposition with the Śaṁkarite assumptions but because the Mādhva philosophers emphatically asserted the truth of such a concept as a postulate of all attributions, even of the transcendent Being, its significance became more pronounced as it justified the presence of absolute and non-contradicted qualities in Brahman and, thereby, outraged the Śaṁkarite proposition that Brahman is beyond all determinations and qualifications.

From the Mādhva point of view, there can be no definite proof against the theory of the attributive character of Brahman when the *Upaniṣads* have, without any ambiguity, described its nature as comprised of excellences. Śaṁkara's interpretation of the ***saguṇa-śrutis*** as referring only to *Apara-Brahman* or the phenomenal Īśvara is highly misleading. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha,[48] the introduction of the concept of a lower (*apara*) Brahman is a flagrant misrepresentation of the real purport of the *Upaniṣadic* passages which, in reality, impart instructions only about the Ultimate and the Supreme Reality, the *Para-Brahman*. The philosophy of the distinction between the *Para* and the *Apara* Brahman is a monstrous product of the faculty of imagination having no counterpart in the region of Truth. As described in the mantra '*paraḥ parāṇāṁ* etc.' Brahman is the Supreme Being. The qualifications of Brahman such as omniscient, omnipotence, etc., are the descriptions of the Supreme Brahman and not of the *Apara-Brahman* as contemplated in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta.

§6. MĀDHVA CRITICISM OF THE VEDANTA DOCTRINE OF UPĀDHI

In their criticism of the Śaṁkarite philosophy of the *aupādhika* character of Īśvara the Mādhva philosophers have not only engaged themselves in the denunciation of the *aupādhika* character of the attributes of Īśvara by discovering logical fallacies and contradictions but have also attacked the very concept of *upādhi* as defined and explained in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta. The latter aspect of their criticism investigates the nature of a concept that is not only vital but is the very foundation of the Vedānta philosophy of Īśvara. A discussion on this question would, therefore, be of considerable importance in arriving at a correct assessment of the Vedānta position.

The functional utility of the concept of *upādhi* is rather interesting. The various ways in which this concept is employed in Vedānta philosophy for explaining some of the fundamental questions of philosophy would show that *upādhi*, besides being a limiting condition, has a creative and a causal function in creating a new appearance by dint of its association with the object that it conditions. Let us now explain this by analysing some of the commonplace examples from Vedānta philosophy, viz., the pot, the monastery and the mirror that are frequently used by the Śaṁkarites for illustrating the *aupādhika* character of the individual soul and other phenomenal entities. Ether which is, otherwise, ubiquitous when conditioned by either 'pot' or 'monastery' appears as the 'pot-ether' and the 'monastery-ether'. Prior to the limitation by the pot or the monastery the ether was undifferentiated. This differentiation and the novel appearance of ether as 'pot-ether' or 'monastery-ether' has its cause in no other entity but the *upādhi*, viz., the pot or the monastery. The same conclusion may be derived by analysing the reflection of a man in the mirror. This reflection though its exact replica in every sense is none the less different as it is not dissociated from the qualities of the mirror that invariably effect its form. If the mirror is clean and pure, the reflection is dazzling and bright; if it is dirty and impure, the reflection is, consequently, impure and dark. This shows, to follow the Śaṁkarite argument, that the reflection whose appearance is conditioned by the mirror is a new creation whose causality exists in the mirror or its *upādhi*. Therefore, the Śaṁkarites argue, the *upādhi* which has a causal function manifests an appearance that was previously non-existent. It may also be recalled that the Śaṁkarites explained the appearance of the phenomenon of difference (*bheda*) as due to the conditioning of Brahman by the inexplicable *avidyā*, the *upādhi*. Without this association there is no difference in Brahman. The appearance and the knowledge of difference has its reason in the causality of the limiting condition or the *upādhi*.

This concept of *upādhi* is a subject of ruthless criticism in Madhva's *Upādhikhaṇḍana*[49] and in Jaya-Tīrtha's gloss thereon. To both Madhva and Jaya-Tīrtha the Vedānta concept of *upādhi* as possessing a causal and a creative function is a wrong comprehension of its nature and function. The function of *upādhi*, according to them, is not to create a novel appearance, whether an entity or its difference, but only to manifest the already existing one through further characterization. This definition of *upādhi* is explained in Mādhva philosophy by analysing the concept of 'pot-ether'. The pot through its definition brings to prominence the distinction of the defined-space which already exists and is different from the other parts and locations of space. The function of the 'pot', the *upādhi*, therefore, consists only[50] in allocating an additional condition for the proper cognizance of the distinction between the different parts of space that are otherwise unknown to the human eye. By adding new qualifications the *upādhi* reveals the distinction that already exists.

Jaya-Tīrtha, while criticising the Śaṁkarite conception of *upādhi*, in his commentary on *Upādhikhaṇḍana* argues[51] : What is the relation between the pot and the ether or the *upādhi* and the object which it creates ? Is the pot related to the whole of space as a totality ? Or, does it limit only a part of the space ? Let us first consider the latter proposition which presupposes the existence of the parts of space and their difference. As the Śaṁkarites attribute the existence of parts and their difference to the causality of *upādhi*, it is necessary that a separate *upādhi* be conceived for the definition of the homogeneous space into infinite discrete parts. But the matter will not end here. The relation between this *upādhi* and portions of space defined by it and the difference between them would pose a problem for solution. What else can be a better solution of this problem, in conformity with the Vedānta philosophy of *upādhi*, than to conceive of a third *upādhi* ? But, this is an endless process in which the fallacy of the regressus ad infinitum is quite apparent. It may, however, be argued that the presumption of a separate *upādhi* determining the parts of space is unnecessary but then, as contended by Jaya-Tīrtha, such an assumption would mean that the determined part of space exists by its own self and is not caused by any *upādhi*. This is a clear case of the fallacy of self-dependence because there is nothing in the world that is self-caused.

The former proposition that the pot is related to the whole of space is prima facie incorrect because then all space would be nothing but 'pot-ether' without any distinction of the 'exterior' or the 'interior' space. Moreover, when all space is related to the *upādhi*, the Śaṁkarite doctrine of *upādhi* as a cause and a creative principle of difference would appear to be redundant. It is, therefore, clear that the 'pot' or the *upādhi* has absolutely no creative or causal function. It simply reveals to knowledge the pre-existent attributes and distinctions of the entity by adding new qualifications.

§ 7. DENUNCIATION OF THE SAṀKARITE DOCTRINE OF THE AUPĀDHIKA CHARACTER OF ATTRIBUTES

The implication of the Mādhva conception of *upādhi* on the problem of the nature of Īśvara's attributes is not difficult to understand. In a way, it presents a powerful argument against the Vedānta doctrine of Īśvara as a phenomenal appearance and the nature of His attributes as *aupādhika*. If by nature *upādhi* is not causal and creative, how can *māyā*, which is also a kind of *upādhi*, create the appearance of Īśvara ? If *māyā* be really a limitative adjunct, its proper function would not be to create the appearance of Īśvara but to manifest the existence and the attributes of Īśvara. According to the Mādhva school, the attributes of Īśvara or Brahman such as omniscience, omnipotence, etc., have no inferior reality than His existence; they possess a supra-rational and non-physical character and are eternally related to their substance, the Īśvara.

We know that the Śaṁkarites accord to the attributes of Īśvara a reality which is only phenomenal and not absolute. Because the existence of Īśvara itself is *aupādhika* His attributes would be nothing more than *aupādhika*. Against this Vyāsa-Tīrtha argues, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, that such a contention is illogical as it involves the fallacy of reductio ad absurdum. If all attributes be *aupādhika*,[52] then the existence of Brahman, which is also an attribute, according to the Mādhva school, would also be *aupādhika* or superimposed. As all superimpositions are false, it may be derived on the basis of the Law of Excluded Middle that the non-existence (*asattva*) of Brahman is true, a conclusion that is inadmissible to the Śaṁkarites also. The Vedānta philosophy of the *aupādhika* character of attributes, therefore, suffers from the fallacy of reductio ad absurdum.

Moreover, the Śaṁkarite thesis is against many of the *Upaniṣadic* texts exclaiming the real and the eternal character of the attributes of God. In the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* we have a description[53] of the aspects of His supreme power as knowledge, strength and action that are contained in His very nature and existence. Another *Upaniṣad*[54] emphasizes that the knowledge of *Paramātman* is eternal, His action is eternal and His strength too is unmitigated. All these *mantras* thus support the Mādhva stand that the attributes of *Paramātman* are essentially related to Him and are not superimposed or *aupādhika* as contended by the Advaitins. On the assumption of the Śaṁkarite thesis it would be difficult to explain the *Upaniṣad* passage that speaks of the desire for creating the world in Brahman. As no desire in any individual, according to Śaṁkarites, is imaginable without the association of the internal-organ, the conception of desire[55] in Īśvara prior to the creation of the world-phenomena including the *antaḥkaraṇa* would remain inexplicable[56] for ever. Thus, in order to justify the truth of what is told by the *śruti* it is necessary to maintain the presence of desire and all other attributes in Īśvara prior to the emergence of the world and the *upādhis.*

It may be recalled that the Advaitin's main reason in denouncing the absolute character of the doctrine of Qualified Brahman is the contradiction which this theory presents with the nature of the Ultimate Reality as preached in the *nirguṇa śrutis.* The logical satisfaction which the Advaitins derive from these *śrutis* that proclaim the non-differentiated and attributeless nature of the Ultimate Reality is responsible for their interpretation of the *saguṇa-śrutis* as referring only to the *vyavahāra* and as having for their object that aspect of Brahman that is conditioned by a limitative adjunct, viz., *māyā.* Against this derogation of the instruction contained in the *saguṇa-śrutis,* Vyāsa-Tīrtha argues that the Advaitin's attempt in lowering the value of the *saguṇa-śrutis* and according a primary importance to the *nirguṇa-śrutis* has absolutely no justification because as scriptural texts both the *saguṇa* and the *nirguṇa śrutis* have equal validity. The apparent contradiction in the teachings of scriptures does not imply the falsity[57] of either of them but only the invalidity of a particular teaching whose weakness in comparison to the other is supported by other instruments of knowledge. The theory of the falsity of the weaker *śāstra* is a monster that may devour almost every scriptural instruction. As an illustration, it may be cited that the Vedānta view as propounded in the chapter[58] of the *Brahma-sūtra* dealing with the desire of the Lord for the world creation is opposed to the Sāṁkhya view of *Prakṛti;* this may be a ground for the Sāṁkhya philosophers to claim that the whole of the Vedānta system is false which, however, would be inadmissible to the philosophers of the Śāṁkara school. The correct interpretation of this opposition between the Sāṁkhya and the Vedānta, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, would be the invalidity of either of these systems of philosophy and not their falsehood. In certain scriptural texts *ahiṁsā* or abstinence from killing is prescribed, whereas, the *śruti* dealing with the '*Agniṣoma yajña*' prescribes killing as a ritual to be performed in the *yajña*. The correct interpretation of the contradiction involved in these *śrutis* would be the proposition that killing should be disallowed in every walk of life except where the scriptures so prescribe, e. g., the *Agniṣoma Yajña*. Thus, we must construe from the opposition of the *śrutis*, not their denial or falsity, but only their conditioned implication. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the teaching by one *śruti* cannot be denied by the other as the two, being testimony, possess equal validity. Moreover, the arguments put forth by Advaitins for justifying the strength of the *nirguṇa-śruti* over the *saguṇa-śruti* may be met with more powerful arguments in favour of the *saguṇa-śrutis*. There is thus no justification in the Vedānta contention that the *Upaniṣad*-texts preaching the qualified character of Brahman and the reality of the world-order are, from the ultimate standpoint, untrue.

It would be a fallacious account of Śaṁkara's dexterous interpretation of the Vedic texts if one were to think that the *saguṇa-śrutis* have absolutely no place and importance in his philosophy. In his commentaries, he repeatedly asserts the conviction that though they are valid as pointers to the ultimate construction of Reality the teachings contained in them provide an object for devotion; their importance and utility is, therefore, only for the purpose of *upāsanā*. Though the Mādhva philosophers do not dispute the proposition that Brahman as described in the *saguṇa-śrutis* is an object of devotion, they firmly disparage the contention that Brahman as described in these *śrutis* is not its real nature and belongs only to the *vyāvahārika* order of reality. If devotion or meditation is at all a means to God-realization, the object of such devotion must always be real and eternal. For apparent reasons the worship of a superimposed and a temporary Deity, as the Īśvara of Śāṁkara Vedānta is, cannot emancipate us from the shackles of earthly bondage; the fruits of the *upāsanā* of a non-eternal deity must always be transient.

Moreover, the Advaitins themselves preach *nirguṇopāsanā* which shows that Brahman as explained in the *nirguṇa-śrutis* is also an object of meditation. Why do, then, the Advaitins not dismiss this *viṣayatva* of Brahman as false and imposed ? In order to be consistent with their theory that the object of devotion is always phenomenal, they should declare that the indeterminate Brahman is also *vyāvahārika* and, consequently, false from the absolute standpoint. Another instance of the Advaitin's contradictory assertion may be available in their contention that the unity (*aikya*) of Brahman is an object of thought and meditation in spite of their conviction that the Reality as *advaita* is always absolute. If the objectivity to thought and contemplation can coexist in one case without contradicting the absolute character of its existence why the possibility of such a harmony is discarded while determining the exact nature and the reality of the attributes of Isvara, viz., omniscience, omnipotence, etc. Like the *aikya* of Brahman the omniscience of *Paramātman*, though an object of thought and meditation, may be admitted as absolutely real.

Thus the Mādhva philosophers have diligently disproved the Vedānta thesis that the *saguṇa-śrutis* are inferior to the *nirguṇa śrutis*. Not only this, they have endeavoured to establish the supremacy of the *saguṇa-śrutis* in their efficacy to bring about the deliverance of man. As argued by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, only the knowledge imparted in the *saguṇa-śrutis* is instrumental in bringing about the *mokṣa*. The state of release is always caused by the true knowledge of reality that is determinate, full of infinite powers and attributes. This would mean that the knowledge of the aspect of Brahman as preached[60] in the *saguṇa-śrutis* and as decided by the *Brahma-sūtra* is only capable of liberating man from earthly bondage and not the *nirguṇa-śrutis* that are interpreted by the Śaṁkarites as professing the indeterminate and the qualityless character of the Ultimate Reality.

§8. MĀDHVA INTERPRETATION OF THE NIRGUṆA-ŚRUTIS

The Mādhva characterization of the Ultimate Reality or Brahman as determinate and possessing infinite attributes on the basis of the *saguṇa-śrutis* would require them to explain those *Upaniṣadic* texts that describe It as indeterminate, qualityless and impersonal or the *nirguṇa-śrutis* specially when the Advaitins formed them as the basis of their metaphysical construction. The apparent contradiction of these two categories of the *Upaniṣad-texts* poses a problem equally formidable to the Madhvites as to the Advaitins. The Mādhva philosophers explain the word '*nirguṇa*' as occurring in the *Upaniṣad-passage* that tells of Brahman as the witness, the knower, the[61] one and the attributeless as the denial of all attributes that have their cause in the three *guṇas* of *prakṛti*,[62] viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The Mādhva intention here is to explain the perfect freedom of God from all earthly and impure qualities[63] that have their material-cause in *prakṛti* without denying Him His transcendent and supra-logical excellences. The attributes of God are different from those of His creatures and are incapable of being known through the mortal eyes and the limited intellect of man. This is why the Mādhva philosophers repeatedly profess that God is knowable only through scriptures and not by any other instrument of knowledge. The word '*nirguṇa*', therefore, only means that Brahman does not possess the attributes that are within the range of the three *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas;* it does not imply that He has no attributes. The valid comprehension of the *nirguṇa-śrutis* is the denial of the *prākṛtik guṇas* in Īśvara and not the assertion that His ultimate character is the transcendence of all determinations.

§9. THE COUNTER-ATTACK AND ITS EVALUATION

Almost all the important objections of the Mādhva refutation as narrated above have been raised by Madhusūdana in the *pūrvapakṣa* of his *Advaita-siddhi*. The philosophy of Brahman as a Qualified Supreme Being is propounded by Vyāsa-Tīrtha by taking resort to only two instruments of knowledge, viz., inference and testimony. Neither of these, according to Madhusūdana,[64] establish the Mādhva thesis. It may be asked : What is the subject (*pakṣa*) in Vyāsa-Tīrtha's inferences seeking to prove the attributive character of Brahman ? Is it the Pure Brahman or the conditioned

Brahman (*upahita*) ? The consideration of Pure Brahman for the 'subject-hood' of the inference is illogical because it amounts to the conditioning of Brahman. A 'subject' in an inference cannot afford to be unrelated to the reason ('substance', 'positive-existence', etc., in Vyāsa-Tīrtha's inferences), a requirement that is not possible in the case of Pure Brahman. Vyāsa-Tīrtha would naturally admit that the subject of his inferences is the conditioned Brahman, a proposition that is a tacit assumption of the Vedānta philosophy of Īśvara.

It is one of the fundamentals of inferential reasoning that the probandum (*sādhya*) must contain those determinations with which it is conceived while considering its concomitance with the probans (*hetu*) and that these determinations qualify the probandum in the illustration also. Unfortunately, this fundamental condition is wanting in Vyāsa-Tīrtha's inferences where the judgement predicates characters equal in reality to the 'subject', the unconditioned Brahman. But such a predicate, with the specific character 'equal in reality to Brahman' is available neither in the various probans viz., 'positive existent', 'substance', etc., nor in the illustration, i. e., the pot, which belong only to the *vyāvahārika* order of existence. Vyāsa-Tīrtha's inferences, therefore, suffer from the fallacy of the unfounded substratum. His inferences would, however, be intelligible and free from this fallacy if the subject in these inferences be Īśvara and not Brahman. As a matter of fact, inference is incapable of proving the existence of absolute-qualities in Brahman.

The inferences predicating the absence of contradiction and the *viṣayatva* to Vedānta enquiry in Brahman do not really prove the existence of these predicables in Brahman which are purely conceptual[65] and do not interfere with the real nature of Brahman. How an object remains unaffected by purely conceptual predications may be illustrated by examining the position of conch-shell which is not contradicted by its own knowledge. The fact that the conch-shell is not contradicted by its own knowledge does not add at all to the nature of the conch-shell. Similarly, the fact that Brahman is the object of Vedānta enquiry does not justify the Mādhva contention that this predication is an attribute of Brahman. The Madhvites appear to be seriously overlooking the distinction between the conceptual determination of an entity and its objective determination. That a real 'X' with real attributes is different from an imaginary 'Y' with imaginary characters does not imply the objective denial of the characters of 'Y' in 'X'. The relation of an entity with another illusory or conceptual entity or attribute may very well be cognized without involving any objective qualification. It is, therefore, illogical to assert that the concepts have always their objective counterparts. Though Brahman is the object of Vedānta enquiry and is not contradicted, yet it would be incorrect to maintain that the Brahman possesses these as attributes.

In the last two inferences Vyāsa-Tīrtha makes an attempt to posit the excellent and virtuous qualities and deny the evil ones in God. Madhusūdana is, however, of the opinion that Vedānta too justifies the conclusion of these inferences with a little modification; the difference being the proposition that conclusions and the subjects to which they belong are not final and absolute. We have already mentioned that reasoning is incapable of transcending the field of *vyavahāra* and helping us in our comprehension of the Ultimate Reality or Brahman. Probably, the Mādhva philosophers did not realize the inherent weakness of the *pramāṇas* in their fervour to defend the attributive character of Godhead.

Let us now examine the Mādhva refutation of the Śaṁkarite interpretation of the *saguṇa-śrutis* as referring to a lower (*apara*) Brahman. Madhusūdana refers to this point in his *Advaita-siddhi* and argues that when the description of Brahman in the *saguṇa-śrutis* is opposed to the description about It in the *nirguṇa-śrutis* we may not be wrong in asserting that these two classes of scriptural texts have different subjects of discourse. But, then, what is the justification for their conviction that it is the *nirguṇa-śruti*, and not *saguṇa*, that has the Ultimate Reality as the topic of discussion ? Why should the Mādhva philosophers be wrong when they contend that it is not the *nirguṇa* but the *saguṇa śruti* that has the Absolute Reality as the subject of discussion ? Madhusūdana replies this question by pointing to the contradiction of the *saguṇa-śruti* in the *nirguṇa-śrutis*. Because the nature of Brahman as described in the *saguṇa-śrutis* is negated in the *nirguṇa-śrutis*,[67] it must be assumed that the nature of Brahman as described in them is not final and the topic of discussion in them is not the Absolute Reality. Moreover, the description of Brahman as determinate and full of immense attributes either occurs in those chapters of the *Upaniṣads* that deal with *upāsanā* or in those that have the Ultimate Reality as their topic of discourse. The purpose of such a description of Brahman in the chapters dealing with *upāsanā* (worship) is to impart instructions about the nature of the object of worship. But when this description occurs in the chapters explicitly meant for the description of the ultimate and the indeterminate Reality the purpose of the teaching is to acquaint the pupil of the nature of the *pratiyogin* (counterpositive) whose absolute reality is denied in these chapters. The description of Brahman as qualified is only to demonstrate that the attributive character of Brahman is not its real and absolute nature. It is only by explaining the *saguṇa-śrutis* as referring to *Apara-Brahman* that their opposition to the *nirguṇa-śrutis* can be satisfactorily resolved.

The criticism that the idea of the resolution of the contradiction between the *saguṇa* and the *nirguṇa-śrutis* by establishing the falsehood of either of the two would entail the invalidity of scriptural testimony is due to a serious misunderstanding of the Vedānta position. What the Advaitins propound is not the unreality of knowledge, imparted by the *saguṇa-śrutis*, but only the *ādhyāsika* character of the object of this knowledge. That the object is false is no argument for the falsehood of knowledge also. If a man is instructed that the object before him is only a rope and not a snake, it only means the unreality of the snake, the object, and not the false character of the instruction. Similarly, though the object of the knowledge produced by the *saguṇa-śrutis* is not absolutely real, the knowledge imparted by them is not false. There is, thus, no justification in Vyāsa-Tīrtha's contention that the interpretation of the *saguṇa-śrutis* as discussing only the nature of *Apara-Brahman* is invalid.

Madhusūdana does not deny Vyāsa-Tīrtha's considered opinion that the apparent contradiction in *śrutis* should be so interpreted as to mean the conditioned application of either of them as in the case of the prescription of killing in the *Agniṣoma-Yajña*. What he refutes is the application of this principle to such scriptural texts as have their objects belonging to the different orders of existence. The truth of the principle as enunciated by Vyāsa-Tīrtha is limited only to such *śrutis* as have the objects[68] of their knowledge belonging to the same order of being. Because the subject of discussion in the *nirguṇa-śrutis* pertains to a different order of reality[69].

it would not be wise to apply this principle for construing the meaning of the *Upaniṣad*-texts. There is only one patent fact that may be derived from the opposition between the *śrutis* referring to the different orders of reality, the truism that only one class of these *śrutis* imparts knowledge about the Ultimate Reality and is, consequently, stronger in comparison to other scriptural texts.

The futility of Vyāsa-Tīrtha's objection that without the absolute existence of the Deity His worship would not bring any deliverance may be demonstrated by explaining the fundamentals of *upāsanā*. The utility of devotion, according to Śaṁkara,[70] is only for the purification of the *antaḥkaraṇa* which in its impure state obstructs[71] the manifestation of the real nature of Self. This purification may not be impossible even if the absolute reality of devotion and its object, the Deity, be doubtful. Though the permanence of the Deity is an essential condition in *upāsanā*, as rightly emphasized by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the demand for the absolute character of His existence is illegitimate. The Deity may have permanent existence, though not absolute, in relation to the devotee if the two belong to the same order of existence. Both Īśvara and jīva, however, belong to the *vyāvahārika* order of reality and as such Īśvara may continue to be the object of jīva's *upāsanā*.

Madhusūdana emphatically denies, in his *Advaita-siddhi*, the contention that the Advaitins preach *nirguṇopāsanā*. The very concept of *upāsanā*,[72] according to him, demands the determinate and qualified character of its object; therefore, the idea of devotion towards an indeterminate and unqualified Deity is a contradiction in itself. Whenever there is a reference about *nirguṇopāsanā* in *śrutis* it is only for teaching that the knowledge of the pure and indeterminate Brahman is necessary for *mokṣa*.

Again, the difficulty, as suggested by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, that if the unity of Brahman, which is the object of both thought and meditation, can be His real and absolute nature without any contradiction how can the absoluteness of the attributes of Īśvara be denied has also been solved by the Advaitins. According to them, the unity of Brahman is not an object of thought like other objects of world that invariably take the form of *vṛttis* in the *antaḥkaraṇa* of the person who comes to know of them. As a matter of fact, the real nature of this unity is realized only at the fateful moment of Brahman-realization. So long as a person does not acquire the real knowledge of Brahman the idea of unity to him is only a concept like other human concepts.

The Mādhva contention that it is only the qualified nature of Brahman, as explained in the *saguṇa-śrutis*, that is capable of delivering man from his human bondage is refuted by the Advaitins. Though there are certain *Upaniṣods*, for example *Muṇḍaka*,[73] that appear to demonstrate the validity of the contention that the knowledge of *saguṇa* Brahman is instrumental in obtaining release or *mokṣa*, yet, according to the Advaitins, they do not refer to the ultimate[74] form of emancipation. The knowledge of *saguṇa* Brahman produces not real *mokṣa* but only the semblance[75] of *mokṣa*. The real liberation is possible only through the knowledge of Brahman as indeterminate and transcendental Reality.

The Mādhva interpretation of the word '*nirguṇa*' is also discarded by the Advaitins. To them, '*nirguṇa*' means the absolute denial of attributes in Brahman and not the negation of only the baser qualities produced by the three *guṇas* of *prakṛti*. The Śaṁkarite interpretation draws its strength from the *śruti* that declares Brahman as the transcendence of all phenomena. As the term '*neti neti*' has its application to all phenomena, it would be an intellectual predilection of the worst sort to imagine that '*nirguṇa*' does not imply the negation of all determinations.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD

§1. THE NATURE OF WORLD

While commenting on the sūtra '*Janmādyasya yataḥ*', in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, Śaṁkara explains the nature[1] of world (*jagat*) as the one that is manifested in Name and Form, is full of innumerable doers and enjoyers, is the place of fruition of such actions that are determined by space, time and causality and is absolutely incomprehensible to human understanding. He further described the nature of world as caused by *avidyā*. In his introduction to *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* he propounds the doctrine that all phenomena are due to the superimposition of the Self and the not-self which is caused by the principle of Nescience, the material-cause of superimposition or *adhyāsa*. The doctrine of Nescience as the material-cause of superimposition has been discussed at a considerable length in the chapter on the theory of knowledge to require any further elucidation. The phenomenal world and its order, according to Śaṁkara, has its reality as long as the true and the ultimate nature of Self is not realized; after this realization the phenomena disappear like kaleidoscopic images.

It is not difficult to mark, in Śaṁkara's commentaries on different *Upaniṣads*, passages that propagate the philosophy of the unreality of world. In his commentary on *Kaṭhopaniṣad*,[2] Śaṁkara describes the world tree as full of miseries, viz., birth, dotage, death, sorrow, etc., as evanescent and changing at every moment, as having their appearance till the duration of the perception like a mirage and as completely unsubstantial as a banana stalk. Apart from Brahman the world has no reality and depends on It for its origination, sustenance and destruction as the mirage depends on its substratum, the sand.

In his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*[3] also, Śaṁkara describes the real nature of this world as impure, momentary, resembling a flowing river and a burning lamp, flimsy and unsubstantial as a banana stalk, similar in character to foam, illusion, mirage-water and dreams and appears only to those who are possessed of the conviction that it is undecaying, eternal and substantial. The same view is propounded by him in his commentary on Chapter XV of the *Bhagavadgītā* also.

From this description of the nature of world from Śaṁkara's commentaries it is evident that he does not ascribe any reality to world-phenomenon with its objects and categories, as they are inexplicable in any of the modes of human understanding, viz., 'existent' and 'non-existent', in the context of the doctrine that the Ultimate Reality is indeterminate, pure, impartite and without a second. In order to be consistent with their philosophy of the non-dual character of the Ultimate Reality, Śaṁkara and his followers were constrained to reduce the ultimate character of world to the falsehood of illusion. In a system recognizing the reality of only Brahman and Its identity with the world, the only logical conclusion is the proposition that the world is false. A jar cannot be shown,[5] by any amount of dialectical skill, a different from earth and, hence, it may be concluded that the form of jar is imaginary and the earth alone is real. As Śaṁkara unambiguously writes in his *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*,[6] any attempt to establish the reality of world would definitely destroy the infinitude of Brahman for the infinity of world would surely be destroyed in the event of another delimiting reality. If the world is real, it must have an existence apart from Brahman implying the reality of a seond.

The Post-Śaṁkarites in their formulation of the philosophy of world have put forth certain arguments to prove the falsity of world-phenomena. The first argument demonstrates the inexplicability of certain facts while acquiescing in the philosophy of the reality of world. The most important of these are the relation between the subject and the object and the fact of their difference. As already discussed by us in the chapters '*The Theory of Knowledge*' and '*Identity and Difference*', these can be satisfactorily explained only on the assumption that their nature is superimposed. When the relation between the subject and the object is *ādhyāsika*, there is no other choice for the Śaṁkarites but to formulate the philosophy of the falsity of world.

Besides these logical inconsistencies that are inherent in any philosophy founded on the presupposition of the reality of world, the Śaṁkarites draw attention to an important doctrine in the

Upanisads that would remain inexplicable unless the conception of the falsity of world is held valid. In *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*[7] there is a reference to the removability of world-phenomenon by knowledge. In *Chāndogya*[8] we have the assertion that all becomes known through the knowledge of one. These propositions would continue to be nonsensical unless supported by the judgement that the nature of world is *anirvacanīya*. We have discussed at length in the chapter '*The Nature of Reality and Falsity*' that the sublation by knowledge is possible only when the sublated entity is of *anirvacanīya* character. Similarly, the knowledge of one can lead to the knowledge of the many only when they are resolved into a transcendental whole; knowledge can become universal only when it transcends the individuality. If the objects be absolutely real and mutually exclusive, how can their knowledge be all absorbing. By preaching the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one the *śruti* accords a tacit approval to the philosophy of the falsity of objects or the world-phenomenon as a whole.

Besides these arguments that take to the reasoning of reductio ad absurdum and demonstrate that the assumption of the reality of world would lead, by way of logical necessity, to conclusions contradictory to the foundational concepts of Advaita philosophy and thereby subject their demonstration subservient to the validity of the basic principles of their philosophy, the Advaitins have endeavoured to formulate the doctrine of the falsity of world by collecting direct evidences from their experience of world-phenomenon. Gauḍapāda happens to be the first systematic exponent of Advaita philosophy and his *kārikās* contain condensed arguments to establish the philosophy of the falsity of world that have been utilized by the Post-Śaṁkārite authors as the basis for the development of their standpoint. It would, therefore, not be redundant to discuss them here for the clear understanding of the Advaitin's argument. Gauḍapāda, in his formulation of the falsity of world and duality for purposes of the exposition of Advaita, raises the question: Is the world or the waking experience real ? If so, it must confirm to the criterion that the real is non-contradicted. Thus explaining the *Māndūkya* text, he describes that the three states of consciousness, viz., the waking, the dream and the deep-sleep are liable to sublation. It is only the fourth state, i. e., the *Turīya* that is really non-contradicted. The realization of this state which transcends ignorance and perversion[9] (*anyathāgrahaṇa*) and is the state of the cessation of all phenomena would contradict our experience of waking life. The sublatable character of the waking state, therefore, provides a valid argument for the unreal character of phenomena as they appear in waking life.

In the *Vaitathya-Prakaraṇa* of his *Kārikā*, Gauḍapāda endeavours[10] to prove his contention on the basis of analogy. His argument proceeds by tracing those conditions in the waking state that are prima facie present in the dream-state whose unreal character is beyond doubt. These conditions or reasons employed by Gauḍapāda for proving the falsity of world are (1) the objectivity to experience, (2) the presence of the subject-object-dualism and (3) the beginning and end in time. "The objection that our waking experiences fulfil practical purposes and have thus associated with them the pragmatic test of truth, which is absent in the case of dream experiences, is invalid for the pragmatic tests of waking experience may very well be contradicted by dream experiences; a man who goes to sleep after a sumptuous feast may well dream that he has been starving for days together". Both our inner world of mind and the exterior world of objects are illusory creations having their source in the *māyā* of Brahman. This *māyā* projects the whole creation like the *māyā* of a sorcerer overflooding the otherwise clear sky with beautiful green plants and their fresh blossoms and leaves. The world is, therefore, as unreal as the illusory creation of the magician.

This argument from the analogy between the waking and the dream states may be repudiated by the realist who may argue that the experience of the objective world as real and its cognitions through sense-organs provide justification for its being treated as dissimilar to dream experience. But to Gauḍapāda this contention is a flagrant error in the judgement of those who are a prey to their own predilections. The experience of the object as real and through sense-organs is not unknown to the dream-world. In dreams also one has the persisting consciousness of the unreality of subjective experience, a sense of realism in the objective panorama and its cognition through sense-organs. What logic, then, is there in refusing to accept the analogy between the waking and the dream experience ? The only distinction that may be drawn[11] between the dreams that have their cause in the *citta* and the world of the waking life is that, whereas, the former are purely subjective the latter presuppose the subject-object-relation and their mutual dependence.

As the following discussion would reveal, Gauḍapāda's formulation of the doctrine of the falsity of world contains an argument that has been developed by the Post-Śaṁkarites into an inference designed to establish the falsity of world. Gauḍapāda's analogy between the dream and the waking experience has provided them with a strong argument for defence. The inference that the world is false because it is perceptible was enunciated by Śaṁkara in his commentary on *kārikā* IV of chapter II and this was later on adopted by the Post-Śaṁkarites as one of the four proofs of the falsity of world.

§2. INFERENCE OF THE FALSITY OF WORLD WITH PERCEPTIBILITY AS REASON

Śaṁkara, in his commentary on *kārikā* IV of chapter II of the *Māndūkya-kārika*, recorded the following inference to establish the falsity of world.

> The objects in the waking experience are false,
> Because they are perceived,
> Like the objects of dream experience,
> The perceptibility of the objects in waking experience is similar to those of the dream experience whose falsity is already established,
> Therefore, the objects in waking experience are also false.

The examination of the validity of this inference would require us to investigate whether the two necessary conditions of a valid inference, viz., *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* are not overlooked. Let us now examine the first requirement, i. e., the *vyāpti* or the relation of invariable concomitance between 'falsity', the probandum, and 'perceptibility', the probans. The third and the fourth premises of Śaṁkara's syllogism asserting the similarity of the perceptibility of waking experience to the perceptibility of dream, however, provide us an answer to this question. The relation of *vyāpti* between 'falsity' and 'perceptibility' is established on the basis of their agreement in presence (*anvaya*) in such cases as the dream, the conch-shell-silver, the mirage, etc., that are universally accepted as the grounds of the coexistence of 'perceptibility' and 'falsity'. The apprehension of *vyāpti* here is not through both agreement in presence (*anvaya*) and agreement in absence (*vyatireka*) but only on the basis[12] of the agreement in presence. While giving an exposition to the Vedānta conception of *vyāpti* in our chapter, '*The Theory of Knowledge*', we have discussed the argument that 'agreement in presence' alone is sufficient to warrant the existence of *vyāpti* between the reason and the probandum. The argument that the agreement in presence should also be supported by the proposition that the reason is absent in all cases where the probandum is non-existent is also discarded by the Naiyāyikas in such cases where the probandum is universal. The universality of the probandum, however, defies all attempt at the investigation of the non-existence of the reason concomitant with the absence of the probandum. To press for the *vyatireka* method in the determination of *vyāpti* would be highly improper. The same argument may be repeated in favour of the Vedānta determination of *vyāpti* in the inference of the falsity of world. The probandum, i. e., falsity, is so universal and pervading that there is not a single instance left to verify its negation in association with the negation of 'perceptibility',. the reason. The Śaṁkarites, therefore, argue that the *vyāpti*, in this case, is to be determined only through the method of agreement in presence.

The question of *pakṣadharmatā* or the existence of the reason in the subject of the Vedānta inference of the falsity of world is quite interesting. Though it is a matter of common experience that all phenomenal objects are perceptible, yet experience alone is not a true guide to reality unless it is known to be a valid experience. In other words, the existence of the reason in the subject or *pakṣadharmatā* is to be known not through experience but through *pramāṇa* or valid cognition. But is perceptibility something that really exists in phenomena, the subject (*pakṣa*) ?

Ānandabodha did a positive service to Vedānta by raising this issue in his *Nyāyadīpāvalī*. According to him, what justifies the fallacy of the unfounded[13] substratum (*āśrayāsiddhi-doṣa*) is the absence of the reason in the subject apprehended not through *pramāṇa* but through experience. Consequently, the mere experience of the reason in the subject is sufficient to disprove the charge of the fallacy of the unfounded substratum. The inference of fragrance in a sky flower suffers from this fallacy not because the sky flower is not apprehended through *pramāṇa* but because it is not an object of experience at all. The mere perception of perceptibility in phenomena sufficiently justifies the freedom of the Śaṁkarite inference from the fallacy of the unfounded substratum and the disregard of *pakṣadharmatā*.

Mādhva Criticism

In the previous chapters of this book, we have referred to the Mādhva philosophy of the reality of world and their dislike for the doctrine of '*jagat-mithyātva,* whose refutation, they supposed, would by implication prove the reality of world. How significant is this refutation, from their point of view, is clear from the fact that Madhva wrote a complete book, *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, to demonstrate the logical contradictions and fallacies in the Śaṁkarite inference of the falsity of world. Much that is of real philosophical and logical value in the later works of Mādhva philosophy on this question has been included by Madhva in his dissertation which when read with the commentaries of Jaya-Tīrtha and Vyāsa-Tīrtha provides a dependable text on Mādhva refutation of the falsity of world.

Madhva's exploration of the fallacies inherent in the Śaṁkarite inference may be broadly classified into three heads, viz., the fallacies relating to the subject (*pakṣa*), the reason (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhya*). As regards the fallacy of the subject, it may be asserted that Madhva has referred to only one fallacy, viz., the fallacy of the unfounded substratum[14] (*āśryāsiddhidoṣa*) which is connected with the nature of the 'subject'. According to Madhva, if the world or the objects of waking experience be really false then there would be no sense in predicating the probandum. Like other realists, it is a settled conviction with Madhva that the reality of the subject is a necessary and a precedent condition of any predication in an inferential proposition. As an example, it may be cited that no sane person can realize the utility and the cognitive value of the inference, 'The sky flower is fragrant', because the flower being itself a non-entity cannot possess any qualification whatsoever. All propositions having unreal subjects are meaningless propositions. Similarly, the premise, 'The world is false', in the Śaṁkarite inference is nonsensical because the attribution of falsity to an unreal and non-existent world is not only illogical but impossible.

This criticism is often answered by the Śaṁkarites by distinguishing between absolute unreality and falsity (*mithyātva*) which they predicate to world. What the Śaṁkarites intend by the falsity of world is its *anirvacanīya* character and not absolute unreality as presupposed by Madhva in his criticism. Because the world is different from *sat* and *asat*, it is improper for Madhva to conceive of the fallacy of the unfounded substratum in the Vedānta syllogism which presupposes the unreality of the subject.

While repudiating the above stand, Madhva claims that the interpretation of the probandum and, consequently, the subject as *anirvacanīya* is the fountain-head of new difficulties. If by *anirvacanīyatā* be meant the inexplicability of nature, then, according to Madhva, the Śaṁkarite inference would suffer from the fallacy of unknown predication (*aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā*). It is a necessary condition of inference that the nature of its probandum should be well-defined and unambiguous; the violation of this important condition would lead to what is known as the fallacy of the unknown predication. Jaya-Tīrtha, in his commentary on *Mithyātvānumāna-khaṇḍana*, asks : What[15] is the meaning of inexplicability ? Does it mean that the nature of world is beyond human expression ? or, Does it imply that its nature cannot be comprehended within the two intellectual moulds, viz., 'existence' and 'non-existence'. In the former case the fallacy of unknown predication is quite apparent. The examination of the latter case would reveal that it has the logical defect of proving what is already established. When the Advaitins emphasize that *anirvacanīyatā* or inexplicability is something different from *asat* or unreal they recognize a part of the truth of the Mādhva thesis. Jaya-Tīrtha's criticism of the definition of *anirvacanīyatā* has already been discussed by us in the chapter, '*The Nature of Reality and Falsity*', and does not require any further elucidation.

The fallacies of the *hetu*, as reckoned by Madhva, are the violation of the two fundamental conditions of inferential reasoning, viz., the existence of the *hetu* with its characters and the relation of its invariable concomitance with the probandum. The examination of the first condition with regard to perceptibility (*dṛśyatva*) would reveal that it is non-existent or *asiddha* because in the Śaṁkarite philosophy nothing except Brahman is real, not even 'perceptibility'. The interpretation of 'perceptibility' as *anirvacanīya* would also serve no purpose because it is inadmissible to the Mādhva philosophers.

In order to be a valid instrument in the production of cognition, the *hetu* in the inference must be recognized by the opponent also. In the absence of such a recognition on the part of the Mādhva philosophers the *hetu* would remain non-existent (*asiddha*).

This point is discussed, in detail, by Vyāsa-Tīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta*.[16] He asks : What do the Śaṁkarites intend by *dṛśyatva* ? Several alternative meanings have been offered in the Post-Śaṁkarite literature. It has been contended that *dṛśyatva* means *phala-vyāpyatva*, i. e., being the content of a mental state. Against this interpretation Vyāsa-Tīrtha has argued that Brahman is also the content of some kind of *vṛtti*. Would it, then, not follow that Brahman is also perceptible and, consequently, false ? "If it is said that Brahman in its purity can never be the object of any mental state and it can be so only when associated with *ajñāna* to this the reply is that if Brahman in its purity cannot manifest itself in awareness it can never establish itself and such a theory directly militates against the self-revealing nature of Brahman. Again, it is argued that, though Brahman is self-revealing yet it cannot be the content of any mental state; for the very expression 'Brahman is pure and self-revealing, would make it the content of that verbal cognition. Moreover, if Brahman as associated with *ajñāna* be admitted to be the content of a mental state it would through such an association be a constituent of that mental content and, therefore, a content in itself"[17]. It is impossible for the Śaṁkarites to disprove the charge that their position suffers from the fallacy of *anaikāntikatva* while defining 'cognizability' as *vṛtti-vyāpyatva*.

Another meaning of cognizability is *phala-vyāpyatva*[18] which stands for *dṛśyatva* as a resultant manifestation due to the reflection of the subject-consciousness in the *vṛttis* and the ground consciousness. It is argued by Vyāsa-Tīrtha against this that on the basis of this interpretation of *dṛśyatva* it would be difficult to account for the cognizability of the past objects, eternal substances and substances not perceptible by senses because none of them are the objects of ocular contact as required in the Vedānta epistemology.

Cognizability may also be defined as that which is at sometime and in some way the object of consciousness[19] (*kadācidkathañcit cidviṣayatvaṁ*) the terms 'sometimes' and 'in some way' being used to justify the cognizability of past objects and of such external objects as are not directly intuited by the *sākṣin*, e. g., pleasure, pain, etc.

This definition of cognizability is also refuted by Vyāsa-Tīrtha on the ground that because Ātman is also an object of Vedānta knowledge or consciousness it would not be free from the fallacy of *anaikāntikatva*.

From the above account of Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism it is apparent that he has devoted himself primarily to the purely formal aspect of defining 'cognizability' and finding lacuna in the possibility of the existence of *hetu*. More important than this, probably, is the question of *vyāpti* between 'cognizability' and 'falsity' whose violation is elaborately discussed by Madhva in his *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*. In this work that displays Madhva's logical insight we have an analytic and critical account of the numerous fallacies of the reason in relation to the probandum. These fallacies, as reckoned by Madhva, are : (1) *viruddha*, (2) *anaikāntika*, (3) *sopādhika*, (4) *anadhyavasita* and (5) *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*.

Viruddha

In Nyāya logic the fallacy of *viruddha-hetu* or contradictory reason is defined as occurring in such cases where the reason (*hetu*) pervades or is concomitant with the absence of the probandum, e. g., 'Sound is eternal because of being created'. The same principle is adopted by Madhva when he defines that the fallacy of contradictory reason is caused by the absence[20] of *sapakṣa* or similar instances. As commented upon by Jaya-Tīrtha, the absence of any *sapakṣa* indirectly leads to the presence of *hetu* in contrary instances (*vipakṣas*) because the *hetu* being existent will exist in some ground that may come within the span of contrary instances. This rule regarding contradictory reason can be satisfactorily illustrated from the way Madhva and Jaya-Tīrtha have endeavoured to justify the presence of the fallacy of the contradictory reason in the Śaṁkarite inference of the falsity of world.

As we have already indicated in the preceeding pages of this chapter, Madhva and his followers have striven hard to demonstrate that the concept of inexplicability or *anirvacanīyatā* is illogical and, therefore, the major term of the Śaṁkarite proposition, 'The world is false', is unknown or *aprasiddha*. From this the Madhvites conclude that because *anirvacanīyatā* has no existence and is completely unknown we cannot trace any case of similar instance or *sapakṣa* where the probandum may be known as coexistent with the reason. On the other hand, as Jaya-Tīrtha argues, the whole world, because it is not *sapakṣa*, is really *vipakṣa* in relation to unreality, which is intended to be established by the Śaṁkarites, with the result that the experience of cognizability in the phenomenal objects of world only proves that the reason (*hetu*) in the Śaṁkarite argument is perceptible and existent only in contrary cases (*vipakṣas*). This is, therefore, a clear case of the fallacy of contradictory reason or *viruddha-hetu*.

Anaikāntika

Out of the three types of 'anaikāntika' fallacies described in the Nyāya system the particular type named as *sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika* has been referred to by Madhva while criticizing the Advaitin's inference. It may be recalled that, according to the Nyāya system, the fallacy[22] called *sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika* happens in such cases where the reason (*hetu*) is present both in similar and contrary instances. Such a type of *hetu* at once vitiates the certitude of knowledge regarding the relation of *vyāpti* between the reason and the probandum and creates a doubt as regards the validity of inference.

Cognizability which is considered as a reason in the Śaṁkarite inference of the falsity of world is also[23] such a *hetu* that suffers from this fallacy. Because the Madhvites favour the doctrine that Ātman is an object of perceptual knowledge as well as testimony and because this Ātman, according to Śaṁkarites, is not false, it can be seen that cognizability which is acknowledged as a middle term (*hetu*) in the Śaṁkarite inference is present in the contrary instance, viz., Ātman or Brahman.

In reply to this, the Śaṁkarites retort that their system does not recognize the cognizability of Ātman; on the other hand, they maintain the character of Ātman as self-illumined or such as is not illumined by any other principle. But Jaya-Tīrtha would reply that it is futile[24] to imagine that there can be any knowledge of Ātman which is unrelated to or is not determined by any other knowledge. The ordinary human experience that a particular object is liked or disliked may prove that the knowledge of an object as agreeable or disagreeable is inseparably associated with the knowledge of Ātman. If the whole of experience that an object is agreeable or disagreeable can claim an objective presentation then it would be illogical to argue that a part of it can be transcendent. The knowledge of self which forms a part of this unitary experience is also objective and has this self for its object.

Sopādhika

Apart from the two fallacies discussed above, Madhva points out that the function of 'cognizability' as a *hetu* is vitiated by the presence of *upādhi* and so the *hetu* is prevailed upon by what is termed as the fallacy of *sopādhikatva* recognized by the Madhvites as a form of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*. Jaya-Tīrtha, in his commentary on *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, contends that all false appearances in the world are essentially objects of perverse knowledge or *viparītapramāṇa* which may, however, be considered as an essential factor in the definition of falsity. This consideration of *viparītapramāṇatva* as a special characteristic of unreality or *mithyātva* has led Madhva[25] to the conclusion that the Śaṁkarites have overlooked the presence of *pramāṇaviruddhatva* or *viparītapramāṇatva*, as interpreted by Jaya-Tīrtha, as *upādhi* while establishing the relation of *vyāpti* between 'falsity' and 'cognizability'.

It may be pointed out, in this connection, that *upādhi* is defined in Mādhva school,[26] like Nyāya, as a specific quality which though pervading or invariably associated with the probandum does not pervade the reason. In the present case, the condition of *viparītapramāṇatva* though associated with falsity (the *sādhya*) is not concomitant with 'cognizability' (the *hetu*). All cognitions are not objects of perverse knowledge and so cognizability cannot be regarded as being pervaded by *pramāṇaviruddhatva*. Madhva, therefore, criticizes the Śaṁkarite venture in establishing the relation of invariable concomitance between 'falsity' and 'cognizability' by contending that this *vyāpti* is completely invalid because of the presence of *pramāṇaviruddhatva* as *upādhi*.

Anadhyavasāya

From the explanation of the fallacy of *anadhyavasita* as given by Mādhva logicians it would appear that it is a modification of the Vaiśesika conception of this fallacy. Praśastapāda, while describing the nature of various fallacies in his *Bhāṣya*,[27] defines '*anadhyavasita*' as associated with that type of *hetu* which being absent in characters both similar and dissimilar to the probandum is incapable of generating any knowledge. The main argument in Praśastapāda's definition against the efficacy of such a probans in producing the knowledge of the probandum is its utter futility in producing any knowledge whatsoever. The ground of this conclusion is the absence of any instance where the probans may be observed as coexistent with entities that are either similar or dissimilar with the probandum. For any predication of the probandum, whether positive or negative, through the cognition of the probans it is essential that the probans must be known as associated with cases similar or dissimilar with the probandum or else it would be impossible to decide whether the probans at all holds any relation with the probandum. In other words, any knowledge about the *sādhya* would be impossible if the *hetu* is not known as associated with either similar or contrary instances.

Jaya-Tīrtha and other eminent scholars of the Mādhva school who value the importance of *anadhyavasita* only in its essential incapacity of producing any knowledge have lost sight of this aspect of Praśastapāda's definition which is almost an argument for the fallacious character of the *anadhyavasita-hetu*. The Madhvites, probably with the fear of overlapping other fallacies, e.g., *asiddha*, *anaikāntika*, etc., were reluctant to associate the non-fulfilment of the relation of *vyāpti*, in any of its aspects, with the concept of *anadhyavasāya*. It is why *anadhyavasāya* has been [28] defined by them as a particular type of fallacy which yields absolutely no result with regard to the object of knowledge or *sādhya*.

Madhva, in his *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, charged the Śaṁkarite inference as also involving the fallacy of *anadhyavasāya*.[29] He calculated his attack by contemplating that because, according to Śaṁkarites, everything is false the inference which to them is an instrument for proving the falsity of world should also be false. This logic would at once strike at the root of the Śaṁkarite argument and prevent the knowledge of the falsity of world. Thus, the Śaṁkarite inference, besides other fallacies, suffers from the fallacy of *anadhyavasāya*.

Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa

According to the author of *Pramāṇacandrikā*, *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa-hetu* is one that seeks to prove a probandum[30], the negation of which is established by valid evidence, to be the property of the subject.

It is also called '*bādhita-hetu*', the sublated or the disproved ground. As an example, the author gives the inference, 'Fire is devoid of heat, because it is knowable'. In this inference the probandum is the 'absence of heat', whereas, the denial of the probandum, e. g. 'heat', is proved by tactual experience to be the property of fire—the subject of the inference. From this description of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*, as available in *Pramāṇacandrikā*, it may be easily gathered that the essential feature of a *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa-hetu* is the flagrant contradiction of the knowledge of the probandum on the strength of a pre-established truth with regard to its subject through other accredited instruments of knowledge. 'Cognizability' as a reason for[31] establishing the unreal character of world is also, according to Madhva, not devoid of such symptoms that may bespeak its inclusion within the ambit of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*. According to Madhva, both perception and testimony—the two accredited instruments of knowledge—dictate just the negation of what the Śaṁkarites seek to establish. Perceptual experience which to Madhva is the strongest of all cognitions asserts the reality of world. The Śaṁkarites are, therefore, engaged in the fruitless endeavour of forcing upon themselves a conclusion whose denial is already established.

Further, as a criticism of the Śaṁkarite inference it is pointed out by Madhva that the examples of illusion such as conch-shell-silver, mirage, etc., are not valid illustrations for justifying the unreality of cognized objects. These cases are invalid illustrations not only because they are devoid of the probandum but also because they do not have 'cognizability' which is considered as a probans. We have already discussed at a considerable length the Mādhva theory of illusion and it may, therefore, be easy to comprehend the reasons governing the Mādhva contention that these illustrations have no 'unreality' (the probandum). Madhva remarks that the type of 'cognizability' on the basis of which the Śaṁkarites profess the unreal character of world is completely absent in these illustrations. Illusions, in the Mādhva system, are absolute unrealities presented to us through the unreal appearance of the cognitum in a different form caused by past *saṁskāras* and defects of cognitive organs. These illusions have neither any inexplicable reality (*anirvacanīya sattā*) as imagined in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta nor are they at any point of time objects of cognition.

Śaṁkarite Rebuttal and Estimation of Mādhva Criticism

While discussing the other major philosophical problems in the preceding chapters of this book, it has been observed at several places that much of the criticism against Śaṁkarite philosophy has its source in the improper understanding of their doctrine of the degrees of reality and the persistent confusion of standpoints. Almost every refutation of a vital conception bears testimony to the philosophical predilections and doctrinal prejudices that have screened the vision of the critics to which the Mādhva philosophers were no exceptions. The confusion between the *vyāvahārika* and the *pāramārthika* points of view has misled the Mādhva critics to the discovery of certain fallacies in the Śaṁkarite inference of the falsity of world which an unbiassed and a valid comprehension of the Śaṁkarite argument would find to be too ingenious. One such example is the Mādhva discovery of the fallacy of unfounded substratum (*āśrayāsiddhi*) in the Śaṁkarite inference where a transcendental vision has been misapprehended as a case of *vyavahāra*. The realization of the falsity of world consequent upon the realization of the true nature of Brahman, in Advaita Vedānta, is a matter of the transcendental plane that can hardly be experienced by those who are unable to transcend the phenomena. It would, therefore, be a misrepresentation of the fundamental principles of Vedānta philosophy to think, as curiously done by the Mādhva philosophers, that the world and its cognizability is unreal even for those who have not been able to transcend the *vyāvahārika* order of existence. Inference is a means and a valid instrument for the generation of phenomenal knowledge and belongs to phenomenal existence. Would it then be correct to be guided with regard to the question of the unreality of the 'subject' by judgements whose correctness is justifiable only in the transcendental plane ? So far as the Vedānta inference is concerned, its subject, the world, and the reason, i. e., cognizability, are phenomenally real which is sufficient to make the inference valid. The criticism that the Śaṁkarite inference of the falsity of world suffers from the fallacy of the unfounded substratum and the absence of *hetu* is only an outcome of the terrible confusion of standpoints persisting with the Mādhva critics.

This point has also been raised by Ānandabodha in his *Nyā-*

yadīpāvalī. It is contended [32] by him that to emphasize in an inference the absolute reality of the subject is simply redundant. The phenomenal appearance of the subject as an object of experience is itself a sufficient condition warranting its propriety to subjecthood. According to him, the sky flower is unfounded as a substratum not because it is not an object of valid cognition but because it is not an object of experience. What constitutes the character of the substratum as unfounded is the absence of its appearance as an object to experience and not an object to valid cognition. Because the world is an object to experience there is no fallacy of unfounded substratum in the Śaṁkarite inference of the falsity of world. Likewise, the charge that the Śaṁkarite inference commits the fallacy of unknown predication (*aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā*) is also irrelevant. As argued by Ānandabodha, the concept of falsity has a definite meaning and import in Vedānta and in view of the various definitions of falsity as formulated by the Advaitins it would be simply preposterous to contend that the inference suffers from the fallacy of unknown predication.

The criticism that because the world is unreal there would be no real *hetu* to prove the conclusion of the inference is also due to the confusion in standpoints. From the *vyāvahārika* standpoint 'cognizability' has as much reality in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta as it is in the system of Madhva or any other realist. Though from the transcendental point of view it may be unreal yet in the field of *vyavahāra* it is an efficacious and dependable reason for inferring the falsity of world. Even if we take into account the unreal character of the *hetu*, the production of true knowledge would not be unjustified. It is, however, not essential that real knowledge should be produced only through real conditions; even false characters may produce knowledge that is real and valid. 'Cognizability' may thus be a valid means to the attainment of real knowledge about the ultimate character of world.

It may not be irrelevant to mention that the assertion of the falsity of world through its cognizability in Advaita philosophy has its ground in the relation of concomitance which it bears with 'falsity' or sublation on the analogy of such facts as the dreams and the illusions. These facts of whose falsehood we become conscious only after their sublation appear to us quite real during their appearance and their cognizability too is real. It is only at the dawn of real knowledge that this cognizability is discarded as false. Similarly, the certitude about the falsity of cognizability of world phenomena would dawn on us only after the realization of the Ultimate Truth, i. e., Brahman. Prior to this realization the contention of the falsity of cognizability would be unjustified.

The alternative meanings of cognizability (*dṛśyatva*) examined by Vyāsa-Tīrtha have been considered by Madhusūdana in his *Advaita-siddhi.*[34] Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism that the comprehension of *dṛśyatva* as *vṛtti-vyāpyatva* would ultimately conclude in the falsehood of Brahman is replied by Madhusūdana by contending that because Brahman or Ātman is of the nature of pure consciousness and is always self-revealing it is never a content of *vṛtti* as supposed by Vyāsa-Tīrtha. Ātman is a content of awareness only when it is associated with the *ajñāna* modifications. Vyāsa-Tīrtha's contention that if Brahman in its purity is manifested in awareness Its self evident character would remain a mockery is from the Advaitin's point of view an incorrect appraisal of *svaprakāśatva.* The self-effulgent light of Brahman, the foundational and a-priori consciousness, would radiate Itself not as a part of phenomena but as a transcendent light, the *aparokṣānubhūti.*

The scriptural proposition that 'Brahman is pure and self-revealing' does not,[35] in any way, establish the character of Brahman as an object of verbal cognition. Such passages intend not the affirmation of positive determinations but only the negation of certain unwanted predications. The proposition, as stated above, means only the denial of impurity and the character as other-revealed in Brahman and not the predication of 'purity' and 'self-revelation' as characters in Brahman. It may not be difficult to understand that this negative approach has the quality of avoiding all positive determinations in Brahman and thereby cutting the Gordian knot about the contradictions involved in all the predications about Brahman.

Besides, other definitions of 'cognizability' are also possible in Advaita Vedānta notwithstanding their doctrine of Brahman as the pure and transcendental consciousness. According to Madhusūdana, *dṛśyatva* may be defined as 'objectivity to consciousness' (*cidviṣayatva*) or as 'relativity[36] to consciousness which is different from itself'. Neither of these would be applicable to Brahman. The idea of 'cognizability' as 'objectivity to consciousness' means that the object of cognition is related to consciousness at 'sometime' and in 'someway'. But Brahman is not related to consciousness, it is consciousness itself. The idea of relation with regard to Brahman is itself inconceivable. The argument that because Ātman is also the object of consciousness this definition of 'cognizability' (*dṛśyatva*) would suffer from the fallacy of *anaikāntikatva* has, therefore, no solid foundation.

Similarly, the definition of 'cognizability' as 'relativity to consciousness which is different from itself' (cognizability) may also be justified on the ground that Brahman which is self-illuminating does not stand in need of any other principle for its revelation. Vyāsa-Tīrtha's argument that when we speak of Brahman as without a second we know about Its nature only through a different cognition is not applicable to the ultimate realization of Brahman. The comprehension of Brahman as without a second is a matter only for our empirical understanding which is unable to realize the true and the blissful nature of Brahman. In that supreme realization of man, known as *aparokṣānubhūti*, the Utlimate Reality manifests itself and destroys, once for all, all doubts about its nature and its relation to the phenomena.

A little recapitulation would show that the fallacies of the *hetu* as discovered by Madhva have actually no existence and have their reason more in his misunderstandings about the Śaṁkarite position. The charge that because 'inexplicability' is non-existent there can be no illustration of the *vyāpti* between 'cognizability' and 'falsity' with the result that the *hetu* would appear to involve the fallacy of the contradictory reason (*viruddha-hetu*) is not a correct appraisal of the Advaitin's point of view. The various definitions of falsity as explained in chapter III of this book may remove all doubts about the possibility of *anirvacanīya* existence. It is also inconceivable how Vyāsa-Tīrtha can arrive at the conclusion that there is not even a single illustration having the reason as concomitant with the probandum when we have 'illusion' to prove this concomitance. All phenomenal objects, to borrow the Saṁkarite argument, are the *sapakṣas* and they have no vestige of the possibility of the fallacy of the contradictory reason.

The *anaikāntika* fallacy is also a misjudged notion for when the Saṁkarites profess about the scriptural knowledge of Brahman they mean by it Its *sopadhika* aspect and not its foundational and transcendental aspect. What has led to this misunderstanding on the part of Madhva is his conviction that all knowledge is essentially determinate. He appears to have overlooked the Śaṁkarite doctrine that knowledge in its real and transcendental aspect is always indeterminate and without any object and has thus wrongly assessed the true import of the philosophy of the Śāṁkara Vedānta by forcing convictions that are completely alien to it.

Again, the fallacy of *sopādhikatva,* as attributed by Madhva to the Śaṁkarite inference, is caused by overlooking the doctrine of the gradations of reality which is one of the cardinal principles of Advaita philosophy. Jaya-Trtha's clarification that because *viparīta-pramāṇatva* which is concomitant with falsity is not always associated with cognizability it should be considered as an *upādhi* vitiating the validity of the Śaṁkarite inference has missed the point that for the Śaṁkarites all cognizability is caused by perversion of knowledge or *viparīta-pramāṇatva.* The instances of valid cognition as occurring in our empirical existence which have been cited by Jaya-Tīrtha as cases where cognizability is not pervaded by *viparīta-pramāṇatva* or whose appearance is not caused by perverse knowledge can be acceptable to the Śaṁkarites only as long as they are viewed from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint. But when their nature is examined in the context of the ultimate nature of Reality they would also dwindle as unreal appearances through the perversion of the real knowledge of Brahman by the inscrutable principle of *avidyā.* It is a point of considerable importance in Advaita philosophy that a valid cognition of the one plane of reality may be sublated by knowledge belonging to the different plane of existence. For example, the knowledge of the dream which is as real and uncontradicted during the dream as any real object of waking experience is sublated only after the dreamer's awakening. Thus, according to Advaitins, the valid cognitions of the *vyavahāra* may appear as fragments of unreality at the dawn of Brahman-realization. Cognizability is essentially connected with the perversion of knowledge and there is no justification in the Mādhva criticism that the inference of the falsity of world suffers from the fallacy known as *sopādhikatva.*

Let us now consider whether *anadhyavasāya* is actually present in the Śaṁkarite inference. From what has been described about the efficacy of even false knowledge in producing the real knowledge of a thing it may be clear that even when the inference, as a sort of phenomena, is false it is none the less a powerful instrument in affecting the realization of the false character of world-phenomena. As a matter of fact, this realization is a counterpart of the supreme knowledge about the Ultimate Reality. Inference can only suggest about the falsity of world on the ground of the invariable concomitance between the reason and the probandum.

The Śaṁkarites also refute the Mādhva criticism that the inference of the falsity of world has the fallacy known as *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*. In this connection it may be observed that the Mādhva emphasis on the supremacy of perception as a means of cognition and of assessing the reality of the cognitum over other instruments of knowledge has a claim to truth that is almost indubitable. Though no other valid instrument of knowledge, whether inference or testimony, can annul the deliverances of a valid perception, yet the cases of error are liable to be contradicted by a later knowledge which may be produced by any *pramāṇa* whatsoever. Such instances are not wanting when a perceptual appearance is ascertained as erroneous by a later knowledge produced through inference or testimony. As an illustration we may cite the illusion of a mirage which for a few moments dupes a man into uncertainty of having a river or a stream near at hand. But, if the man is a bit intelligent, he may at such a sight ponder over the situation, "If there be water over there, some birds must fly or some signs of life should be visible". On getting no signs of life the man may conclude that there is no possibility of any water and the appearance of water is simply illusory. This is a case where an erroneous perception is contradicted by an inferential knowledge. Again, for a moment we may imagine that the same man finds someone coming from the direction of the illusory stream and on enquiry he tells that there is neither any stream nor river but only a tract of sand. This communication may, however, put at rest all doubts in him regarding the possibility of water. This is a case where a perceptual error is rectified through testimony.

This illustration may prove that an erroneous knowledge produced by a *pramāṇa* can be contradicted by another *pramāṇa*. Though the absolute certainty regarding the incorrectness of a cognition produced by a specific *pramāṇa* may be arrived at when it is contradicted by the knowledge produced by the same *pramāṇa* yet the possibility of their sublation by other *pramāṇas* cannot be ruled out. In this connection it is necessary to remember that our contention about the sublation of the deliverances of one *pramāṇa* by that of the other is only in respect of error or false knowledge and not with regard to right knowledge. As a matter of fact, there is no question of the sublation of knowledge acquired by a valid *pramāṇa* because this would go against the concept of the self-validity of knowledge; the deliverances of a correct *pramāṇa* are never liable to sublation and carry with them the certitude required for their use in the practical life of man.

From the above exposition it may be comprehended that the Mādhva argument that because the world is an object of perceptual cognition it is real is not quite valid in the context of the ultimate and the transcendental character of Reality. A little investigation into the nature of perception and perceptual cognition would demonstrate that our conviction about the reality of the object of perception is a belief that can possibly not be shattered as long as we cling to our earthly existence. But when we try to understand its status as a real existent we find that it has in its wake a trail of contradictions some of which have been discussed in the chapter, '*The Theory of Knowledge*'. Reason may find satisfaction in the conclusion that the nature of 'object' is always *ādhyāsika* and that from the absolute standpoint the world is not true.

§3. INFERENCE OF THE FALSITY OF WORLD WITH JAḌATVA AS REASON

The second *hetu* of the Śaṁkarite inference of the falsity of world is *jaḍatva* or its material character. The inference of the falsity of world with 'materiality' as its probans is disparaged by Vyāsa-Tīrtha on the ground that no such satisfactory definition in consistence with the other tenets of Advaita philosophy is possible. What do the Advaitins mean by *jaḍatva* ? Does it mean 'not being the knower'[37] (*ajñātṛtva*) 'ignorance' (*ajñānatva*), 'non-self-revealing' (*asvaprakāśatva*) or being 'not-self' (*anātmatva*). The first meaning, i. e., its character as non-knower, is inadmissible because the 'ego' which, in Advaita Vedānta, is the product of *antaḥkaraṇa*, whose material character is acceptable to them also, is really the knower and not the Self in its transcendental aspect. In this case both 'materiality' and 'the character of being the knower' exist in one and the same substratum and as such to define 'materiality' as 'not being the knower' would be inconsistent. The second explanation defining 'materiality' as ignorance cannot be upheld because the interpretation of *ajñāna* as available in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta often creates contradictions if materiality is equated with ignorance (*ajñāna*). According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, '*jñāna*' whose negation is intended by the term *ajñāna* is either the *vṛtti* of *antaḥkaraṇa* or it is the reflection of consciousness in the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti*. Now if by materiality be meant *ajñāna* then either *vṛtti* should lose its claim as knowledge or we would be forced to conclude that *vṛtti* is not material which, however, would be against Vedānta epistemology. The Advaitins may, however, retort that by knowledge they do not mean the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttis* but the reflection of consciousness in these *vṛttis* which generates in them knowledge or *jñaptitva*. Against this Vyāsa-Tīrtha argues that though such a contention may be valid in cases of immediate cognition it would be illogical for the Advaitins to assert it in cases of mediate cognition because they do not propound the theory of the reflection of *cit* in *vṛttis* during mediate cognition; the denial of the nature of *vṛtti* as knowledge or *jñaptitva* would, therefore, create difficulties in the explanation of memory and such other human behaviour as is caused by the *saṁskāras*.

The third possibility that suggests the character of materiality as 'non-self-revealing' is, according to Śrīnivāsa, the same argument that seeks to establish the falsity of world through cognizability as *hetu*. Because this argument has been discussed at a considerable length, the weakness of *asvaprakāśatva* as a valid *hetu* does not require further elucidation.

The last alternative is inadmissible[19] for various reasons. First of all it is difficult to construe the meaning of non-self unless the self is comprehended as a sort of generality (*jāti*); but the Advaitins do not attribute any *jāti* to Ātman in their philosophy. Secondly, because, according to Śaṁkarites, self is the only reality it is impossible to comprehend the existence of any not-self that may serve as a sufficient and valid *hetu* for proving the falsity of world-appearance. The opponent may, however, argue that because the scriptures describe the nature of Ātman as *ānanda*, *anātmatva* may be taken as the denial of *ānanda* or bliss. But because the worldly pleasures, which are also false according to Advaitins, are also a kind of *ānanda* a part of the *hetu* would remain unestablished. Thus Vyāsa-Tīrtha concludes that because no satisfactory interpretation of *anātmatva* is possible it would not be wise and valid to consider it as a *hetu* in the inference establishing the falsity of world.

Śaṁkarite Rejoinder and Evaluation of Mādhva Criticism

Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism has been refuted, almost verbatim by Madhusūdana in his *Advaita-siddhi.* According to him,[40] *jaḍatva* may mean both 'ignorance' (*ajñānatva*) and 'being-not self' (*anātmatva*) without any contradiction. Here we may refer to Kāśmīraka Sadānanda's reply, in his *Advaita-brahma-siddhi,*[41] to an almost similar objection as the one raised by Vyāsa-Tīrtha against the possibility of defining *jaḍatva* as ignorance. Kāśmīraka Sadānanda while propounding the doctrine of the removal of the obstructing veil (*āvaraṇa*), in the course of mediate cognition, contends that this removal is possible even without the operation of *vṛttis* because the nature of the veil in such cases is different from that of immediate cognitions. He formulates that there are two kinds of obstructing veils, one of which is responsible for the idea of the non-existence of a particular entity and the other causes the absence of the immediate knowledge of an object. The first has its locus in the consciousness[42] which is defined by *antaḥkaraṇa* and the second has its seat in the consciousness defined by the object. The first of these two *āvaraṇas* is removed by any knowledge (*pramā*) whether mediate or immediate but the second one is destructible only by what is known as immediate cognition which has its operation through the *vṛttis* of *antaḥkaraṇa.* It is, therefore, clear that neither the operation of *vṛttis* nor the reflection of the *cit* in these *vṛttis* is an essential condition for cognition, whether mediate or immediate, and that Vyāsa-Tīrtha has committed an error when he criticized that the idea of materiality as ignorance would jeopardize the concept that *vṛtti* is knowledge. As a matter of fact, by knowledge is meant in Vedānta that which illumines[43] the object and this definition does not stand in way of comprehending the character of *ajñāna* so as to be a satisfactory interpretation of materiality.

As regards Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism against defining materiality as *anātmatva,* it may be pointed out that there is nothing wrong with the Śaṁkarite stand. *Anātmatva* or 'being not-self' consists in the non-manifestation of the real nature of Self as the transcendental, indeterminate knowledge, infinitude and bliss through the inexplicable Nescience. *Anātmatva* may also be rightly conceived as the negation of *ānanda* or bliss notwithstanding Vyāsa-Tīrtha's objection that because worldly pleasures are also a kind of bliss a part of the *hetu* would remain unestablished. As Madhusūdana argues, in his *Advaita-siddhi*,[44] the happiness derived from the worldly objects, in its ultimate nature, is not different from Brahman. According to *Laghucandrikā*,[45] the nature of worldly pleasures is *ānanda* as defined by *vṛttis* generated through the enjoyment of objects; it is these *vṛttis* that really create in the real *ānanda* the idea of production and destruction.

§4. INFERENCE OF THE FALSITY OF WORLD WITH FINITUDE AS REASON.

Mādhva Criticism

The third reason (*hetu*) by which the falsity of world is inferred is '*paricchinnatva*' or the character of being limited or finite. The Śaṁkarites argue that whatever is limited and finite is false and from this they conclude that all things in phenomena have no reality beyond what is merely a seeming appearance. Our discussion in the chapters '*The Criterion of Reality*' and '*Identity and Difference*' may acquaint the reader with the Śaṁkarite attitude towards the question of the nature of finitude which is essentially related to the category of difference. The Śaṁkarite conclusion that 'difference' is only a category of *vyavahāra* is true of finitude also. We may now discuss the desirability of utilizing this as an instrument for establishing the falsity of world.

We have described in the chapter, '*The Criterion of Reality*' that limitation is of three kinds, viz., through time, space and substance and any of these is sufficient to prove the falsity of the object. Against this Vyāsa-Tīrtha argues that there are certain categories that are not limited by time and space and, therefore, should not be taken as real. These categories, according to him, are[46] time, space, *ajñāna*, the illusory appearances and the absolute negation of these appearances in the substratum of their cognition.

As regards Time and Space, Vyāsa-Tīrtha[47] contends that they cannot be limited by time and space and this is so much the case that even the Supreme Reality, the Brahman, is often spoken of as existing always and everywhere; time and space are the universal characteristics and cannot be denied of others or of themselves.[48] According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, both time and space are completely independent of any other entity and are self-dependent in their existence; there would hardly be any justification in imagining their nature and existence as limited by spatio-temporal conditions.

Further, the particular form of *ajñāna* which is imagined in Vedānta epistemology as forming the veil or the covering principle of objective consciousness is also beyond what is understood by limitation in time and space. This particular aspect of *ajñāna* besides being the veiling principle of objective-consciousness is also contemplated in Advaita philosophy as the material-cause of all phenomena. It thus happens to form the material-cause of space and time as well. In both of its aspects it is difficult to imagine how it can ever be limited by time and space for such an assumption would mean that the covering sheet of objective consciousness has an end both in space and in time. Such a conclusion, on the basis of the principles of Vedānta epistemology, would force the inevitable conclusion that after some time and at some place every object is ever-revealing. Besides this preposterous conclusion, the conception of the delimitation of the principle of *ajñāna* would land us into a greater absurdity, the conclusion that an effect can limit its material-cause. It is, therefore, argued by Vyāsa-Tīrtha that it is impossible to comprehend the idea that *ajñāna* as an objective principle can also be limited in space and time.

It is also pointed out by Vyāsa-Tīrtha that the appearance of conch-shell-silver and its absolute negation, when its nature is described by the Vedāntins as the counterpositive of absolute negation with reference to the substratum in which it is cognized, have also no limitation in time and space. As by a temporal limitation is meant the presence of an entity in some mode of time and its consequent absence in all other modes of time, it is difficult to maintain the absolute non-existence of the conch-shell-silver for this would mean that the silver has at least existence at some moment which for the Mādhva philosophers is a sufficient condition for proving the reality of an object. Further, the non-existence of conch-shell-silver, as referred to above, has also to be considered as beyond temporal limitations because the idea of this non-existence as having an end in time is beset with the consequence that its counterpositive would become existent thereafter. This conclusion would be a death blow to the Advaitin's doctrine that illusions have absolutely no reality at any time whether past, present or future and as such if they desire to be consistent with their theory of illusion they would have to accept the other alternative that the non-existence of conch-shell-silver transcends all temporal limitations. Thus, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, all these cases that are beyond temporal limitation only establish the incorrectness of the Advaitin's thesis that limitation in space and time stands in the relation of invariable concomitance with 'falsity'. If the Advaitin's point of view be correct, then the reality of all these cases would be thrust upon us from which there is hardly any escape.

Evaluation of Mādhva Criticism

Anyone who has read the Śaṁkarite philosophy and its potential tendencies with a little care would not fail to visualize the persistent error in Vyāsa-Tīrtha's understanding of the Vedānta position. In Vedānta philosophy the categories of time, space and causation have neither any independent existence without any association with their related entities and counterparts nor are they real from the absolute standpoint. What the Advaitins mean by limitations in space, time and substance is their character[40] of being the counterpositive of absolute negation, negation posterior to existence and mutual negation respectively: all these negations are, however, restricted to what is known as the *vyāvahārika* order of reality. These definitions clearly indicate that the concepts of space and time in Advaita Vedānta are only conceptual and relative and there is no justification in Vyāsa-Tīrtha's contention that 'being limited' as reason for proving the falsity of world establishes the reality of Space and Time. The objection that the portion of *ajñāna* veiling the objective consciousness would not come within the extent of the limitation of time and space is also irrelevant because when a portion of it is destroyed in the event of knowledge it is certainly a counterpositive of negation posterior to existence and is, therefore, subject to limitation in time. Moreover, from our exposition of the second definition of falsity in chapter III of this book it is evident that an entity which is the counterpositive of absolute negation in the substratum of its appearance is *mithyā* and, therefore, all the examples as cited by Vyāsa-Tīrtha are false as they are the counterpositives of absolute negation from the *pāramārthika* standpoint.

§5. INFFRENCE OF THE FALSITY OF WORLD WITH AṀŚITVA AS REASON

Citsukhācārya while establishing the falsity of world, in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, mentions an inference in which the desired probandum is proved through *aṁśitva* as *hetu*. He argues, "The cloth is the counterpositive of the absolute negation subsisting in the yarn because it is a whole (*avayavī*) like another cloth. Similarly, the quality, action, jāti, etc., of the cloth are also the counterpositives of absolute negation of the yarns on account of being the quality, action, etc., like the other qualities, actions, etc."[51]

While attempting the refutation of the above argument, Vyāsa-Tīrtha asks whether the non-existence[52] referred to by Citsukha, in his inference, is valid or invalid. In case it is valid, it would be fatal to the Advaitin's monistic standpoint and if it be contended that it is invalid then this would prove the irrelevancy of Citsukha's argument because the assertion of the invalidity of the non-existence in the present case would be favourable to the Mādhva point of view. The Advaitins cannot assert that the existence of negation is not fatal to monism because negation includes position as its constituent.

Moreover, *aṁśitva* (being a whole) as a *hetu* is inadmissible as[53] it suffers from the fallacy of the contradictory reason (*viruddha*). The very idea of the cloth as a whole demonstrates the inseparable relation of dependence that subsists between it and the yarns as its parts. As a matter of fact, it is impossible to conceive of a whole without its parts which clearly indicates the fallacy known as *viruddha* between *aṁśitva* as *hetu* and the probandum which in the present inference is the character of being the counterpositive of absolute negation subsisting in the yarns. The non-existence of the whole in the parts is not only contradicted by perception but is also opposed to reason because the whole cannot 'subsist' anywhere else if it is not admitted to subsist in the parts.

For an estimation of Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism it may be right to recall that Citsukha himself foresaw[45] the possibility of the refutation that neither the validity nor invalidity of the non-existence could be logically explained in the context of the acceptable tenets of Vedānta philosophy. As a reply to this kind of criticism he argued that there is no harm in acknowledging the validity of non-existence because the empirical validity of either position or negation would not be at variance with the *advaita* which is the verdict of testimony or the direct realization of Truth.

As regards the other objection that *aṁśitva* as *hetu* suffers from the fallacy of *viruddha*, it may be argued that though the whole is the counterpositive of the absolute negation subsisting in the yarn yet its inherence in the yarn is not impossible and this would explain the perception that the cloth subsists in the yarn. The predication of the falsity of world through *aṁśitva* as *hetu* is, therefore, not illogical from the Advaitin's point of view.

§6. THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION

The Vedānta View

The treatment of the problem of creation in Śaṁkara is more of a convention of Vedānta philosophy than the description of a metaphysical fact. Like many of his discussions on topics that have only empirical (*vyāvahārika*) existence and value, e. g., the discussion on *pramāṇas*, the problem of cosmology is also such as cannot go beyond the range of phenomena. As we have discussed in our chapter on *Causality*, Śaṁkara could not assign to 'causation' any ontological existence because of the apparent contradictions involved in the idea of causation. The logic of the principle of causation, if strictly applied to the examination of the ultimate source of world-phenomena, would either lead to regressus-ad-infinitum or would end in the presupposition of an uncaused cause. "One is an endless pursuit after an explanation of things which we shall never find, the other is the very principle of causation." These difficulties and also the contradictions involved in the concept of material causality as subsuming real transformation led the Advaitins to the doctrine of *vivartta* as the ultimate explanation of the perennial flow of cosmic events which is nothing but the abandonment of the idea of causation, as understood within the realm of experience, at the last stage in the hierarchy of causal events when a relation between the supreme cause as comprehensible to the human intellect and that of the Ultimate Reality is to be established. Though till the 'unmanifested state', which is the seed of all manifestations of Name and Form, the principle of causation is applicable yet when we leap into the transcendent we leave the principle of causation as that of the other world. The relation between Brahman and this 'unmanifested state' is inexplicable. The world is not an outcome of a real causal activity but is an appearance having its reason in *māyā*, a principle without which no satisfactory explanation of the problem of creation is ever possible.

The inconsistency of the very idea of creation with regard to the ultimate, transcendental and uncaused Brahman is elaborately explained by Gauḍapāda in his *Māndūkya-kārikā* where he formulates with emphasis the doctrine that the world is not a creation,[56] the *ajātivāda*. Gauḍapāda's method of disparaging the philosophy of creation as a metaphysical fact consists, firstly in exhibiting that creation from the Absolute or the Real is logically inconceivable in any way other than being a false appearance caused by *māyā* and, secondly, in bringing to light the logical fallacies and contradictions involved in the proposition that the idea of causation has a real basis.

The first part of Gauḍapāda's criticism is a detailed exposition of the idea that the real nature of a thing is never subject to change. Even unreal objects have no tendency of discarding their essential nature or *prakṛti*[57] as it is called by Gauḍapāda. How can, then, the Absolute which is transcendental, partless and uncaused (*aja*) be subject to real change ? One may only profess that the phenomena are only unreal manifestations of the Absolute, caused by *māyā*, and 'creation' only an illusion and not a real production. The divergent theories of Nyāya and Sāṁkhya, according to Gauḍapāda, indirectly[58] point to the view that creation is not a fact at all.

The second part of Gauḍapāda's criticism is more devastating as it attacks the very fundamental of the relation between the 'cause' and 'effect' by considering them as interdependent concepts. Any attempt to repair this damage by claiming an alternative explanation on the analogy of the seed and the sprout would also be unsuccessful if its logical validity is critically examined. The example of the seed and the sprout, according to both Gauḍapāda and Śaṁkara, is not a true explanation[59] of the relation of the effect with its beginningless cause. The *hetu* (seed), in this example, has always a beginning because when the sprout produces the second seed it is the second and not the first and has, therefore, a beginning in time; similarly, the third, the fourth and so on ad-infinitum. How can such instances be the basis for comprehending the ultimate value of causation with regard to a beginningless principle, the Ultimate Reality ? The ideas of 'causality' and 'creation' are, therefore, not real but are only illusory impositions on the Absolute.

If creation be only a matter of convention and not a metaphysical fact, what is then the meaning of the scriptural texts that speak about the origination of the world from Brahman ? Saṁkara refers to this point in his commentaries on *Aitareyopaniṣad*[60] and the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*[61] and writes in a lucid and unambiguous style that the purpose of such *śrutis* is only to explain the nature of Brahman and their reference to creation is only figurative like so many stories that are told in the *Upaniṣads* to explain the real nature of Ātman to the unintelligent plebeian. The intention of such *śrutis* is never to propound that creation is a metaphysical fact.

Mādhva Theory of Creation and Refutation of the Vedānta View

The Mādhva philosophers find no justification in the Vedānta doctrine of the falsity of creation. Instead they propound an antagonistic theory of creation which is a real and a metaphysical fact. The world, according to them, is produced out of *prakṛti*, its material-cause, which is subservient to the will of[62] the Lord. It is the will of the Lord that is the primary cause in the production of the world. Though the *Paramātman*, being *āptakāma*, has no desire for any fruit, yet in His sportive[63] mood He creates the world. The desire of the Lord is explained in the Mādhva system by citing the example of a man who in his joyous mood dances[64] and sings. Just as in this example the activity of the person is not motivated by any desire, the Lord in creating the world seeks no satisfaction of His desire but only gives expression to His nature. The fact of creation, which is a metaphysical event in Madhva's philosophy, occurs at the time when the Lord is overwhelmed with the feeling of promoting the good of the jīvas.

It is thus apparent that the main point of discord between the Mādhva and the Śāṁkara interpretations of creation is the latter's refusal to ascribe to cosmology any metaphysical value. It is here that Śaṁkara gets a hard blow from his adversary who is well-founded in the merits of realism as a philosophical dogma. As the Śaṁkarite enunciation of the doctrine of creation depends on the philosophy of the falsity of world, the Mādhva criticism touches almost all the important aspects of the theory of the falsity of world which has been discussed at length in the other chapters of this book. Here we will undertake the discussion of only those aspects of the Mādhva criticism that have a direct bearing on the problem of creation.

The Mādhva argument in favour of the reality of creation is quite similar to the method followed by either Gauḍapāda or Śaṁkara for discrediting its ultimate metaphysical value. Just as both Śaṁkara and Gauḍapāda argue that because the world is a false appearance creation is not a real event, the Mādhva philosophers contend that because the reality of world is unassailable the creation is to be admitted as a real metaphysical event. It is why the Mādhva refutation of the Śaṁkarite philosophy of creation is mostly a rejoinder against the Vedānta speculation about the falsity of world.

It is, however, interesting that Vādirāja, in his *Yuktimallikā*, made a direct attack against Gauḍapāda's formulation of the doctrine of creation in his *kārikās*. Gauḍapāda had emphasized that because the world is a creation of *māyā* it would be futile to talk either of its origination or dissolution. Had the objectivity of world, as Gauḍapāda argues, been real the question of its dissolution or destruction would have been intelligible. But, because it is an unreal presentation of *māyā* it is irrelevant to think either of its production or dissolution. Against this Vādirāja contends that Gauḍapāda's argument would have been tenable had the philosophy of the imaginary character of 'difference'[65] been a logical success. But the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* which is the basis of his *kārikās* does not create any impression about its sympathy for such a doctrine. The word '*prapañca*', according to Vādirāja, is an assertion of difference or the five kinds of difference as propagated in the Mādhva school. The term '*prapañcopaśama*'[66] occurring in this *Upaniṣad* only indicates the destruction of the world in the sense that it dissolves and then originates again in a different form. It never means the sublation or the denial of the world as contemplated by the Advaitins.

As Vādirāja puts it, Gauḍapāda's argument that 'what is known is sublated later on' is pregnant with a devastating fallacy. The truth of this proposition would ultimately mean that Brahman[67] is also subject to sublation as He too is an object of knowledge. Moreover, the word '*vidyeta*'[68] in the *Upaniṣad* is used in the sense of existence.

If so, Gauḍapāda's proposition would mean that what is existent is liable to sublation. Because the Vedāntins acknowledge the existence of Brahman this conclusion would be applicable to Him as well.

Moreover, the first portion of the *Māndūkyopaniṣad*, according to Vādirāja, propounds the eternal character of '*bheda*'. How can then the latter portion of the same *Upaniṣad* preach the falsehood of *bheda* contrary to its previous assertions ? According to Vādirāja and his commentator Surottama Tīrtha, the objects that have a beginning in time are only the products of *māyā* and as such *dvaita* or difference which is considered beginningless[69] in the *Upaniṣads* should be considered as immune from the influence of *māyā*. Because difference is eternal it is never liable to sublation. Here it may be remembered that the nature of the eternality of Brahman and 'world' is not the same; the former is eternal by nature, whereas, the latter is eternal on the analogy of stream (*pravāhato*).

The Advaitin's explanation of the falsity of world by tracing its similarity with dream, *māyā*, etc., is refuted by the author of *Yuktimallikā* on the following grounds:

(1) The objects of dream are considered false only on account of the absence of sense organs, e. g., the eye. It is really the presentation of the objects without the association of their respective sense organs that is the determinant of the falsity of their nature and not their objective presentation alone.

(2) The false creations (*māyā*) of the magician are not witnessed by him, whereas, Īśvara being omniscient sees the world, His creation, at all times. There is, therefore, no similarity between the *māyā* of the magician and the world-creation of the Lord.

(3) In the conch-shell-silver or the serpent in the rope there is no *arthakriyākāritva* or causal efficiency. But the world, as we know, has causal efficiency. How can then the Advaitins treat the world as similar to them ? Thus, according to Vādirāja, the Śaṁkarite formulation of the doctrine of the falsity of world on the basis of such illustrations is absolutely illogical.

The Śaṁkarite reaction against this refutation is no less important. But because the arguments advanced by them have been mostly discussed in the preceding chapters of this book their elaboration here has been given up to avoid repetition.

CHAPTER IX

THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDIVIDUAL SOUL

A—THE NATURE OF INDIVIDUAL SOUL

§1. NATURE OF JIVATMAN IN ŚAMKARITE PHILOSOPHY

We have occasionally referred, in the preceding chapters, to the important Vedānta maxim that the individual soul is nothing but Brahman whose conditioning by the principle of *avidyā* results in the false appearance of world-phenomena including the difference between the subject and the object and between the objects themselves. The idea of the subject or the *vijñānātman*, as an agent of all activities, cognitional, affectional as well as relational, and their consequent enjoyments is superimposed on the Self or Brahman through *avidyā*, the conditioning principle or *upādhi*. Śaṁkara, in his commentary on the sūtra, '*Ikṣaternāśabdaṁ*', writes, "Verily, the transmigratory soul is not different from Īśvara yet it is accepted as such through its relation with the *upādhis* such as the jar, the bowl, the hill and the cave".[1] Though, in reality, the ether is one, ubiquitous and unconditioned yet through its associations with the different *upādhis* it is subjected to such false knowledge and usage as the pot-ether, the bowl-ether, etc. Similarly, the false knowledge of the difference between Brahman and jīva is caused by the indiscrimination created by the conditioning of Brahman through such *upādhis* as the collections of body, *manas* and the intellect. At so many places in his commentaries, Śaṁkara formulates the doctrine of the unity of jīva and Brahman emphasizing the causal character of the *upādhi* and its determination of the individual soul.

It may be gathered from the Post-Śaṁkarite treatment of the idea of jīvātman that while they all unanimously uphold Śaṁkara's position that the appearance of Brahman as jīvātman is caused by the association of *upādhi* either as *avidyā* in its causal form or as the effects of *avidyā*, yet they disagree amongst themselves on the question of the nature of *upādhi* and about the process of the conditioning of Brahman by the *upādhi.* It may not be out of place to mention that though Śaṁkara himself did not propound any complete theory of the individual soul, like his successors, yet the passages which he wrote for illustrating his doctrine of the individual soul as a conditioned appearance of Brahman gave birth to the later Post-Śaṁkarite divergence on the problem of the nature of *upādhi* and the modus-operandi of the limitation of the Ultimate Reality by the *upādhi.* Such passages as explain the nature of jīvātman on the analogy of *ākāśa* appearing as pot-ether, the bowl-ether, etc., the limitative adjuncts of pot and bowl, are the basis of Vācaspati's doctrine of *avaccheda,* whereas, his commentary on the sūtra, '*Ābhāsa eva ca*', is the Holy Writ for all those who belong to the lineage of the *pratibimbavādins.*

The Post-Śaṁkarite treatment of the philosophy of the individual soul may be broadly classified into three different approaches, viz., (1) the Definition Theory (*avacchedavāda*), (2) the Reflection Theory (*pratibimbavāda*) and (3) the Condition Theory. Notwithstanding their differences regarding the nature of the conditioning principle and the modus-operandi of its conditioning the Brahman, every author of Post-Śaṁkarite philosophy begins with the presupposition that It is Brahman that takes to the phenomenal appearance of the jīvātman through Its association with *avidyopādhi.* In order to have a clear picture of the Advaita conception of this problem it is necessary that we have a correct understanding of the Post-Śaṁkarite doctrines that have been mostly quoted as *pūrvapakṣa* in most of the advanced works on Mādhva philosophy.

(a) *The Definition Theory* (Avacchedavāda)

The earliest exposition of *avacchedavāda*, developed later on by Vācaspati into a systematic doctrine of the individual soul, may be found in the *Advaita-prakaraṇa* of Gauḍapāda's *Māndūkya-kārika* in which he has devoted[2] as many as five *kārikās* for the explanation of the individual soul. It is, however, interesting and significant that Gauḍapāda does not mention even a word that may be counted upon by the protagonists of reflectionism in their support. To tell the truth, the idea of jīva as a reflection of Brahman is something alien to the Vedānta of Gauḍapāda who was prominently a teacher of the *avaccheda* view. The absence of any reference to the reflection-theory by Gauḍapāda in his *kārikas* may justify the claim that *avacchedavāda* is older than *pratibimbavāda*.

Vācaspati while explaining such passages from Śaṁkara's commentary, in his *Bhāmatī*, as explain the nature of jīvātman on the analogy of the definition of ether by such limitative adjuncts as the pot, the bowl, etc. formulatedwhat is known as[3] *avacchedavāda* or the definition-theory. According to him, the pure and the absolute Brahman gets defined as individual soul through its association with such categories as the intellect, the *manas* and the subtle and the gross bodies, imagined by the inexplicable *avidyā*, just as the pure, infinite and all-pervasive ether gets determined as pot-ether and bowl-ether by the pot and the bowl respectively. The jīvātman which, from the *pāramārthika* point of view, is absolutely identical with Brahman appears through its *upādhis* as an agent and enjoyer.

The first important contention of the philosophy of *avacchedavāda* is the plurality of the *upādhis* that condition the pure and the partless reality, the Brahman. The assertion in *Taittirīyopaniṣad*,[4] of the limitation of Brahman by the five sheaths (*pañcakoṣas*) and Śaṁkara's interpretation of the distinction between the jīva and the *Paramātman* as having its cause in the *upādhis* beginning from the gross body to the intellect lend a strong support to the *avaccheda* point of view and its corollary about the pluralism of the limitative adjuncts. Vācaspati, however, moved a step forward and argued that *avidyā* which has its seat in the jīvātman is also plural[5] and is different with every individual soul. What contributes to the success of the definition-theory as a more rational interpretation of the Vedānta conception of the process of the conditioning of Brahman is its efficacy in acquiring freedom from the fallacy of mutual dependence often discovered by the opponents in Vācaspati's concept of the individual soul as the seat of *avidyā*. The definition theory offers a solution in its explanation that though *ajñāna* depends on the *cit* yet this *cit* in its turn is not dependent[6] on *ajñāna* just as the *ākāśa* which is limited by the jar does not depend on the jar. The relation between the determinant and the determined (*avacchedyāvacchedaka*), according to this theory, is the only possible explanation of the relation between *ajñāna* and the *jiva-caitanya* which, in reality, is Brahman.

Besides, the success of the definition-theory also consists in its explanation of the difference between the individual souls and between their pleasures and pains without affecting the pure and the partless character of Brahman. The denial of the pleasure and pain of the one soul in the other is explained on the analogy mentioned by Gauḍapāda in his *Kārikā*. Just as the dust and the vapour[7] of a jar do not belong to the ether defined by the other jars, the pleasure and pain of one soul do not belong to the other. Similarly, the attributes of the individual soul, such as being the agent and the enjoyer, may also be denied in Brahman. Just as the difference in the name and form of various pot-ethers does not affect the all pervasive *ākāśa* the attributes of the individual soul also do not affect Brahman.

It may thus be clear that notwithstanding the various shortcomings of the definition-theory, a mention of which is to be made in the following pages, this theory has a justified claim as a doctrine that satisfactorily explains the experience of the plurality of souls in the context of the Vedānta philosophy of the Ultimate Reality. Gauḍapāda is, therefore, justified in his statement that the example of the pot and the ether is the only illustration that can satisfactorily explain the origin of the individual soul.

(b) *The Reflection Theory* (Pratibimbavāda)

Notwithstanding its virtues as an explanation of some of the outstanding attributes of the individual soul, the definition-theory fails to explain the vital problems connected with the nature of the jīvātman. The *avaccheda* view in its emphasis on the plurality of the limitative adjuncts would ultimately face the question : What is the cause of the manifold *upādhis*, if they are not uncaused, that condition the Brahman ? To think of them as uncaused would not only create future complications but would also be against the Vedānta spirit of reducing all difference to identity. On this count the *pratibimbavādins* give a better account of their logical insight when they begin with the presupposition that the *upādhi* of Brahman is one and not manifold.

The *avaccheda* view also fails to explain the concept of *antaryāmin*[8] as explained in the *śrutis*. If *avacchedavāda* be a valid explanation of the manifestation of the individual soul, on the analogy of the pot-ether, it would be impossible to account for the presence of a single principle pervading them all. Just as the different pot-ethers have no unitary pervading principle, there can be no principle that may govern and rule over all the jīvas by virtue of its status as an *antaryāmin.* These are some of the important difficulties which the definition-theory has not been able to remove and has given speculation to the possibility of a better explanation on the basis of a different presupposition.

Śaṁkara's commentary on the sūtra '*Abhāsa eva ca*[9]' is probably the foundational enunciation of the reflection-theory of Vedānta philosophy. As Śaṁkara writes, "This jīva is a reflection of the Supreme Ātman like the reflection of the sun in water. It is neither the *Paramātman* directly nor a different substance. Therefore, just as the movement[10] of the sun's reflection in one water-vase does not create any tremor in the reflections of other water-vases, the actions and fruits of one jīva do not associate themselves with those of the other jīvas. In the same way, there is also no admixture between the *karmas* of the one jīva and the fruits of the other." This explanation of the production of jīva from Brahman through the concept of reflection is the fore-runner of an important tendency in the Post-Śaṁkarite Vedānta that seeks to explain the origin of jīva through the reflection of Brahman in the *upādhi* (which is unitary). Notwithstanding the uniformity in their approaches, the advocates of *pratibimbavāda* have differed on the question whether the *upādhi* is the causal *avidyā* or its product, viz., the *antaḥkaraṇa.* In every case the reflection of Brahman is effected by the *upādhi* just as the form of the reflection of sun in water depends on the qualities of the water. Though the individual soul which is the reflection of Brahman is not its full manifestation on account of the conditions created by the *upādhi* yet after the destruction of the *upādhi* the individual soul would be nothing else but Brahman just as the reflection of sun after the destruction of the water-vase is nothing else but the sun.

Another point regarding this theory that may not fail to impress us is Śaṁkara's contention that the reflection is not a different substance from the prototype (*bimba*), a point that has been dealt with at some length by Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha.* The conspectus of opinion amongst the protagonists of the reflection-theory has been unanimously in favour of admitting the illusory character of reflection (*pratibimba*) and not its reality as conceived in the Mādhva system. Vidyāraṇya asks: What is the nature[11] of reflection if it is to be comprehended in terms of reality ? Is it like a seal which is formed by the impact of the prototype on the *upādhi* ? Or, is it some kind of modification of the *upādhi* ? Let us elaborate this point by referring to the example of the mirror and the face and ask : Is the human face, as reflected in the mirror, produced by the impact of the face on the mirror ? Or, is it a modification of the mirror ? According to Vidyāraṇya, it is irrational to imagine that the face in the mirror is the impression of the real human face because it is sometimes smaller and sometimes larger than the real face. As a principle, the impression of the seal is always of the same dimension as the seal itself and as such it would be illogical to contend that the reflected face is an impression of the original face. The second alternative is also untenable because if the reflection is a modification it must persist in the mirror even when it is away from the face. But we find, in our experience, that as soon as the mirror is removed the reflection also ceases to be there. Vidyāraṇya, therefore, concludes that because reflection is neither an impression of the prototype nor the modification of the *upādhi* the only possibility of a rational explanation is to consider it as illusory. The status of reflection or *pratibimba* in Śaṁkarite philosophy is, therefore, false and not real.

The Vivaraṇa school or the *Vivaraṇa-prasthāna*, as it is called, conceives of a unitary principle as the material-cause of the world-superimposition. This principle, the *avidyā*, causes the differentiation of the individual soul from Brahman. The concepts of Īśvara and jīva in this system are explained on the basis of the reflection of Brahman in this *avidyā* which is the only *upādhi*. The reflection of Intelligence[12] in this *avidyā* is called jīva, whereas, the prototype or *bimba* is Īśvara. It is a peculiarity of the Vivaraṇa school that it denounces the attribution of *upādhi* to Īśvara and conceives Him as a prototype-consciousness whose reflection in *avidyā* results in the appearance of the jīva-consciousness. The Vivaraṇites disparage the idea of interpreting Īśvara as a reflection, as contemplated by Sarvajñātamuni, as it would entail the presence of another *upādhi*, different from *avidyā*, for explaining the reflection of Īśvara. They do not also support the doctrine that *antaḥkaraṇa* is the determining condition of Ātman because, as they argue, the *antaḥkaraṇa* being a product has a beginning in[13] time and is not suited to be the limitative adjunct of Ātman or Brahman. Moreover, this doctrine fails in explaining the power of the yogin's internal-organ in being so pervasive as to manifest itself in other bodies[14] (*kāya-vyūha*). It would, therefore, be illogical to press for the proposition that *antaḥkaraṇa* is the *upādhi* in which the Ātman manifests itself as the jīva. Yet the Vivaraṇa school does not completely denounce the utility of the *antaḥkaraṇa* which is necessary for the distinct manifestation of the Ātman as the agent, the enjoyer and the knower. The mere reflection of consciousness in *avidyā* is insufficient to produce such judgements as 'I know', 'I enjoy', 'I do'. According to Vivaraṇites, deep-sleep is the only state which is of the nature of the reflection of Ātman in *avidyā* unassociated with the *antaḥkaraṇa* as it is devoid of all distinctive knowledge. Sarvajñātamuni, the author of *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, however, held a different view. According to him, Īśvara is the reflection[16] of consciousness (*caitanya*) in *avidyā* or *māyā* which is the only principle of phenomenality responsible for the manifestation of the Ultimate Reality into the varied forms of matter[17] (*jaḍaprakṛti*), the individual souls and the Lord who being omniscient is the creator of the whole cosmos. Sarvajñātamuni's conception of *avidyā* as identical with *māyā*, which we have already discussed in our chapter, '*The Conceptions of Māyā and Īśvara*', is responsible for his enunciation that Īśvara is the reflection of consciousness in *avidyā* which has this intelligence both for its substrate (*āśraya*) and object (*viṣaya*).

If *avidyā* is the *upādhi* of Īśvara, what, then, is the determinant of the phenomenal appearance of the jīvātman ? Sarvajñātamuni replies this question by asserting that jīva is the reflection of consciousness in *antaḥkaraṇa* which is an effect of *avidyā* with the predominance of the veiling-power[18] (*āvaraṇa-śakti*). The essential difference betweeen the *upādhis* of Īśvara and jīva, however, consists not in the fact that they are separate principles but in their being separate aspects of one and the same[19] principle. The aspect of *ajñāna* predominated by the power of concealment or having the preponderance of the *tamas* element, to follow Nṛsiṁghāśrama's commentary on *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, is the *upādhi* of jīva, whereas, the aspect which possesses only the *vikṣepaśakti* and is immune from the veiling power is the *upādhi* of Īśvara. As per Nṛsiṁghāśrama's interpretation, this aspect of *avidyā* has the preponderance of the *sattva* element. The *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* view claims the support of the *śruti* that says, 'Īśvara is conditioned by the cause, whereas, the jīva is conditioned by its effect'.[20]

Sarvajñātamuni's account of the *upādhi* of Īśvara has the virtue of according a satisfactory explanation to the concept of *antaryāmin* with which the Vivaraṇites were probably in trouble. The presence of *Īśvaropādhi*, as a cause, in the *upādhis* of the *jīvas*, provides a better ground for explaining the concept of Īśvara as an *antaryāmin* than the philosophy of His being a prototype or *bimba*. The only difficulty with the *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* explanation of Īśvara and His *upādhi* is the possibility that He may become ignorant. This fear is set aside by Sarvajñātamuni's contention that what actually causes the ignorance of the jīva is not *ajñāna* or *māyā*, which has Brahman for its substrate, but its *āvaraṇa-śakti* or the veiling power. This power is manifested only in the *antahkarana* and not in *avidyā* which is its cause. Thus, for the author of *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, the objection that the concept of *ajñāna* as the *upādhi* of Īśvara would make Him ignorant is invalid.

The *Prakaṭārtha* view endorses the *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* conception with a slight modification. Īśvara, according to this view, is the reflection of Intelligence in the beginningless, indeterminate primal cause of all[22] beings, viz., *māyā* and the reflection of Intelligence in the innumerable limited parts of this *māyā*, i. e., *avidyā* with their obscuring and projecting powers produces the jīvas. The *Prakaṭārtha* view differs from the *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* position in its description of the *upādhi* of the individual soul. Whereas, in *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* the *upādhi* of the jīva is an effect of *avidyā*, the author of *Prakaṭārtha* conceives it as a portion of *māyā*, the *Īśvaropādhi*. with the predominance of the veiling and the projecting powers.

The reflectionist tendency in Post-Śaṁkarite philosophy acquires a climax in Vidyāraṇya's *Pañcadaśī* in which we have a lucid account of *pratibimbavāda* and some of the unsolved problems of *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* and *Prakaṭārtha* philosophy. According to the philosophy as enunciated in the *Tattvaviveka* chapter of this book, the appearance[23] of both Īśvara and jīva is caused by the reflection of Brahman in *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti*, according to this doctrine, is the equilibrium of the three *guṇas*, viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. On the basis of the preponderance of the *guṇas* it is classified into two, viz., *māyā* and *avidyā*. *Māyā* has the preponderance of the pure *sattva* unmixed with *rajas* and *tamas*, whereas, *avidyā* is predominated by *sattva* contaminated by the mixture of the *rajas* and *tamas*. The reflection of Brahman in *māyā* is Īśvara and its reflection in *avidyā* is jīva.

In the *Citradīpa* chapter of *Pañcadaśī*[24] we have a different explanation of the nature of jīva and Īśvara on the basis of a fourfold division of consciousness. Just as the ether can be conceived in four different ways, viz., (1) the pot-ether, (*ghaṭākāśa*, the ether defined by the pot), (2) the water-ether (*jalākāśa*, i. e., the ether that is reflected along with the clouds and stars in the water inside the pot), (3) the undefined ether (*mahākāśa*) and (4) the cloud-ether (*meghākāśa*, i. e., the ether reflected in the watery parts of the cloud), the *cit* may also be classified in the following four ways :

(i) The *cit* existing as the substrate of both the gross and the subtle bodies. This immutable Intelligence continues to be unmodified like an anvil.

(ii) The jīva, i. e., the Intelligence reflected in the *kalpita* internal-organ and associated with the world (*saṁsāra*).

(iii) Brahman, i. e., the undefined Intelligence and

(iv) Īśvara, the Intelligence reflected in the impressions of the intellects of all beings that exist in the darkness of *māyā* abiding in Brahman.

Thus, according to the *Citradīpa* exposition, the *upādhi* of the jiva is the internal-organ, whereas, the *upādhi* of Īśvara is the ignorance covered by the impression (*saṁskāras*) of the intellect.

(*c*) *The Condition Theory*

Inspite of *Pratibimbavāda's* success in satisfactorily explaining the appearance of jīva and Īśvara on the basis of the presupposition of a single limitative adjunct the possibility of the reduction of this doctrine to the philosophy of dualism could not be warded off. This was probably the apprehension that led to the enunciation of the condition theory which negated both *pratibimbavāda* and *avacchedavāda* as satisfactory explanations of the Ultimate Reality. The jīvātman, according to this theory, is neither defined nor reflected but is, like Kaunteya[25] conditioned as Rādheya, imposed on the pure Brahman through *avidyā*. Thus, the individual soul is nothing but Brahman conceived otherwise through *avidyā* which is absolutely unrelated to its *svarūpa*.

The interpretation of Īśvara in this doctrine is rather significant. According to this view, Brahman after having attained jīva-hood, posits the whole universe along with the Lord and His attributes, viz., omniscience, omnipotence, etc. Īśvara, thus, is an assumption of the Jīva, which is only one, on the analogy of the perception of the Deity in dream. This theory is essentially a counterpart of the doctrine of One soul which we propose to discuss in this chapter.

§2. VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY OF THE NUMBER OF SOULS

The difference of opinion on the question of the *jīvopādhi* has also led to the divergence in the philosophical position of the Post-Śaṁkarite thinkers on the problem of the number of jīva which has been, by tradition, classified into two, viz., *Ekajīvavāda* (the doctrine of One Soul) and *Anekajīvavāda* (the doctrine of many souls). The former view has been maintained by Prakāśānanda and the thinkers of the Vivaraṇa school, whereas, the latter had its exposition in the philosophies of Vācaspati, Sarvajñātamuni, Vidyāraṇya and many other later Post-Śaṁkarites.

The Doctrine of One Soul (Ekajīvavāda)

Let us begin with Prakāśānanda's fromulation of this doctrine. As we have stated above, Prakāśānanda contemplated of only one *avidyā* for explaining the illusory presentation of the self-luminous, absolute and blissful Ātman as world-phemomena. *Avidyā* which has Brahman both for its[26] locus and object is the only *upādhi* that conditions Brahman[27] for Its appearance as the phenomenal self. Consequently, this self is also a unity and not manifold as considered in many other systems. To the question as to how on the assumption of the unity of jīva the transmigratory order of the world and the appearance of the manifold nature of jīvas would be explicable it is replied by Prakāśānanda that this objection itself has its basis in the unphilosophic assumption confounding the body with the jīva. Even the doctrine of One Soul can explain the different existence of the animate bodies which we call jīva in practical usage on the analogy of dream appearance. Just as a man imagines so many creatures in his dream, the Jīva falsely imagines the various jīvas, gods etc. As Prakāśānanda explains in his *Muktāvalī*, "There is really but one self, in its own nature, eternal, absolute, intelligent, free, made known in the *Upaniṣads* only. This self associating itself with Nescience becomes jīva and falsely surmises the bodies of gods, men, etc., for whose enjoyments it creates. Of these bodies one is god, another is man, etc."[28]

Closely similar to Prakāśānanda's conception are the views of the author of *Iṣṭa-siddhi*[29] and *Nyāya-makaranda*[30] who acknowledge, in the same strain, the unity of *avidyā* and its location[31] in Brahman. The manifestation of the diversity of phenomena and the plurality of the individual souls is only a *kalpanā* or the objective presentation of the jīva whose existence is due to the conditioning of Brahman by this *avidyā*. As a matter of fact, the jīva is only one and the rest is its projection like the appearance of dream along with its creatures.

Appaya Dīkṣita, in his *Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha* refers to two other views of *Ekajīvavāda* which though very much similar to Prakāsānanda's opinion are in many respects different from his teachings. One of these views opines that *Hiraṇyagarbha* which is the sole reflection of Brahman is the principal Jīva, whereas, the others that are the reflections of *Hiraṇyagarbha* are apparent jīvas. The second view, however, asserts that a single Jīva animates and creates all bodies without distinction. Because the *Hiraṇyagarbhas* in each aeon (*kalpa*) are different it would be a problem to decide which of them is the Principal Jīva.

It may not be wrong to include the Vivaraṇa school within the category of *Ekajīvavāda* because of their belief that *avidyā*, the principle that conditions Brahman, is only one. The reflection of Īśvara in this *avidyā* would, therefore, be One Soul. Madhusūdana also, while discussing the *Ekajīvavāda*, in his *Siddhāntabindu*,[32] subscribes to this view and includes the Vivaraṇa conception within its scope.

The Doctrine of the Plurality of Souls (*Anekajīvavāda*)

Many of the Post-Śaṁkarite philosophers could not be fully convinced of the efficacy of the One Soul doctrine as a satisfactory explanation of the many of the vital issues connected with the nature of the jīva. It has been a persistent feeling with them that the theory of One Soul is hardly consistent with such commonplace notions as the difference between the bondaged and the released souls, the absence of the feeling of pleasure and pain of one soul in the other and the difference between the teacher and the taught and also with the doctrine of *karma* that allows reward of a man's deed only to him and to none else. If we believe in the doctrine of One Soul, we would find ourselves within the two horns of dilemma. We have either to propound that no one has ever been emancipated or to accept the proposition that every one in this universe has absolute freedom from bondage. Neither of these alternatives appear to be commendable[33] as they decry the verdict of the scripture that teaches the means of attaining liberation and also mentions the names of many, such as Vāmadeva, who have been liberated. If it be true that Vāmadeva attained salvation, then the emancipation of the whole world is an accomplished fact that provides no rational justification for the further search after truth and aspiration for *mokṣa*. The *Anekajīvavādins*, therefore, argue that the doctrine of One Soul cannot satisfactorily explain the difference between the bondaged and the released souls and that for this purpose the assumption of the plurality of souls is necessary.

If we do not believe that the individual souls are different, can we account for the difference between the teacher and the taught and the difference between the feelings of pleasure and pain in each individual ? It is a matter of ordinary experience that the pleasures and pains of one man are not experienced by the other. If we pin our faith in the philosophy of One Soul, we would be forced to embark the position that all men have the simultaneous experience of pleasure and pain of all other jīvas because the same jīva is present in them. Moreover, the doctrine of One Soul would bring about the admixture of the fruits of *karmas* of different individuals and would violate the moral law that the enjoyer of the fruits of action is only its author by indiscriminately rewarding to men such fruits the actions of which did never belong to them. It is, therefore, clear that for a valid explanation of the feeling of pleasure and pain and the doctrine of *karma* it is imperative that the distinction between the individual souls be recognized and their plurality be asserted.

In view of these shortcomings, Vācaspati and his followers, almost in the very strain of Maṇḍana Miśra, argued for the pluralism of souls in the context of Vedāntic monism by interpreting their differences as being caused by their *upādhis*. Vācaspati's conception of *avidyā* as manifold[34] and having its seat in the individual soul, however, allowed him an easy go in his task of seeking a philosophy that could explain the apparent distinction between the jīvātmans.

According to him, *avidyā* is not one but as many as there are jīvas so much so that when a particular jīva attains knowledge his *avidyā* is destroyed and for him the world ceases to be. This Nescience[35] binds every jīva because in respect of each jīva it has a different capacity to bind and when a particular jīva is released that particular capacity is lost though Nescience itself persists for the other jīvas.

From this account of Vācaspati's enunciation it is not difficult to realize that his doctrine of *avidyā* as manifold and having its location in the jīva opened for him a straight way towards the philosophy of the plurality of souls an objective that has not been so easy of access for those who contemplated both the location and the objectivity of Nescience (*avidyā*) in Brahman. Sarvajñātamuni had to explain the plurality of the jīvas through the medium of the internal-organ[36] which is the instrument of the explicit manifestation of ignorance in the judgement, 'I am ignorant'. Though *avidyā* has its location in Brahman, yet the clear idea of the power of concealment is available only in the jīvātman which is the reflection of Brahman in the[37] *antaḥkaraṇa*, a point that led Śaṁkara to expound, according to Sarvajñātamuni, the thesis that jīva is the seat of ignorance. Though Sarvajñātamuni, like all those who profess the unity of *avidyā* and its location in Brahman, may be called an *Ekajīvavādin* in the sense that he conceives the existence of a Primary Being arising out of the conditioning of the ultimate consciousness by Nescience whose various projections (*kalpanā*) are available in such forms as jīva, etc., like the appearance of the jīvas in dream, yet his explanations of Īśvara and jīva as conditioned by Nescience in its eternal causal aspect or *māyā* and *antaḥkaraṇa* respectively entitle him to the class of those who are the protagonists of the plurality of souls.

Vidyāraṇya, in his *Pañcadaśī*, however, adopts[38] a different point of view when he creates a distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* on the ground that the former has the predominance of the pure *sattva* unmixed with *rajas* and *tamas*. As the jīvātman, according to *Pañcadaśī*, is the reflection of *cit* in *avidyā*, the plurality of the jīvas and their difference, according to this view, are maintained on the basis of the gradation of the units of *avidyā* caused by the difference in their impurifications or the mixture of the quantum of *rajas* and *tamas*. Thus, according to Vidyāraṇya, the jīvas are different[39] because their *upādhis* are different.

It is manifest from this treatment of the philosophies of *Ekjīva* and *Anekajīva* that the Śaṁkarites were led to adopt either of these positions as an outcome of their speculations on the problem of the location of Nescience. Those who began with the assumption that Brahman is the seat of ignorance have generally affirmed 'the existence of one jīva alone where all other jīvas, the differences of the teacher and the taught, bound and released are all alike comparable to the dreams of the single jīva', whereas, those who favoured the opinion of assuming jīva as the seat of *avidyā* found it easier to maintain the plurality of souls.

It may not be unworthy to remark here that the Post-Śaṁkarite tendency is more sympathetic towards *Ekajīvavāda* than *Anekajīvavāda* of which probably Manḍana and the authors of the *Bhāmatī-prasthāna* were the only writers worth the name. The radical solipsism[40] of Prakāśānanda is the logical end of the stream that has its source in the philosophy that Brahman is both the locus and the object of *avidyā*. As suggested by Kāśmīraka Sadānanda in his *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*,[41] Śaṁkara himself gave credence to *Ekajīvavāda* and the condition-theory as the real purport and intention of Vedānta. The doctrines of *pratibimba* and *avacchеda* are innovated only for instructing the truth to[42] the ignorant and the unintelligent people. There seems to be much truth in Kāśmīraka Sadānanda's assertion because Śaṁkara himself has explained, in his *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, the conditioning of Brahman and the appearance of jīvahood through such illustrations as the apprehension of Kaunteya as Rādheya and the false apprehension of the prince as the fowler, At one place in this commentary Śaṁkara writes,[43] "Regarding this the teachers of Vedānta narrate the following parable : A certain prince was discarded by his parents as soon as he was born and brought up in a fowler's home. Not knowing his princely descent he thought himself to be a fowler and pursued the fowler's duties, not those of a king, as he would if he knew himself to be such. When, however, a very compassionate man knew the prince's fitness for attaining a kingdom told him who he was—that he was not a fowler but the son of such and such king and had by some chance come to live in a fowler's home; thus informed he gave up the notion and the duties of a fowler and knowing that he was a king took to the ways of his ancestors. Similarly, the individual self which is of the same category as the Supreme Self, being separated from it like the spark of fire and so on has penetrated this wilderness of the body, organs, etc., and although really transcendent takes on the attributes of the latter, which are relative, and thinks that it is this aggregate of the body and organs, that it is lean and stout, happy or miserable, for it does not know that it is the Supreme Self. But when the teacher enlightens that it is not the body, etc., but the transcendent Supreme Brahman then it gives up the pursuits of the three kinds of desire and is convinced that it is Brahman." This parable from Śaṁkara's pen amply illustrates the idea of jīvātman which he tried to preach through his Vedānta. Apart from this, we have many other illustrations in Śaṁkara's writings that are suggestive of the reflection and the definition theories which are explicable in no way other than that employed by the author of *Advaita-brahma-siddhi.* His contention that *Ekajīvavāda* and the condition-theory are the real philosophies of Vedānta appears to be quite valid.

The above contention may give rise to some doubts regarding the status and validity of *Anekajīvavāda.* The later writers of Vedānta, such as Madhusūdana, Citsukha and others, however, proposed a reconciliation by interpreting *Anekajīvavāda* as an aspect of *Ekajīvavāda.* Citsukha, in his[44] *Tattvapradīpikā,* suggests that the doctrine of One Soul should not be contemplated as inconsistent with the conception of manifold *ajñānas* and the plurality of apparent selves (*jīvābhāsas*). The one Brahman after It is conditioned by the beginningless and infinite *avidyā* conceives itself into the innumerable apparent selves which is the only valid condition of *Anekajīvavāda*; these jīvas and *avidyās* are projected by this One Soul in the same way as the individuals and their nesciences are presented by the dreamer in his dream. It is contended by Citsukhācārya that the formulation of the doctrine of many *ajñānas* is not something alien and contradictory to the theory of *Ekajīva.* The author of *Iṣṭa-siddhi*[45] demonstrates that there are as many *ajñānas* as there are *jñānas* and as such the idea that *Ekajīvavāda* is opposed to the theory of manifold *ajñānas* is itself an expression of ignorance. According to Citsukha, if the One Soul[46] can imagine the two *avidyās* of the waking and the dream states why the same One Soul cannot imagine innumerable *avidyās* of the various jīvas ? If we are to comprehend the real purport of Vedānta Idealism, we should not think of *anekajīvavāda* as antagonistic to *Ekajīvavāda.* In reality, the two doctrines are not contradictory; their contradiction, however, lies in our ignorance that understands the *Bahujīvavāda* as the last word in the Vedāntic interpretation of phenomena.

§3. THE SAṀKARITE PHILOSOPHY OF THE DIMENSION OF SOUL

In Indian philosophy we have three solutions to the problem of the dimension of Ātman, viz., (1) *aṇuparimāṇavāda* (the doctrine asserting the atomic character of Ātman), (2) *madhyamaparimāṇavāda* (the doctrine that Ātman is of the dimension of the physical organism) and (3) *vibhuparimāṇavāda* (the philosophy that Ātman is all-pervasive). The first position is generally upheld by the authors of Vaiṣṇavism such as Rāmānuja, Madhva and others. The second proposition, i. e., the philosophy of *madhyamaparimāṇavāda*, curiously enough, has only a solitary supporter in the whole history of Indian philosophy, i. e., the Jaina school, whereas, the last point of view has been claimed by the schools of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Advaita Vedānta.

The problem of the dimension of Ātman is not an innovation of the philosophers of the commentary period. It has been a burning topic of dicussion in the sūtra-period as well. The length at which this problem has been discussed by Bādarāyaṇa in Pāda III of the second chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra* is sufficient to indicate the measure of importance that had been attached to this question in his times. The standpoint of the Śāṁkara school can be brought out more successfully by giving an exposition to Śaṁkara's treatment of this problem in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Besides the simple argument that because the *Upaniṣads* preach the identity of the jīva and Brahman the[47] former should be considered all-pervasive, Śaṁkara employs a disjunctive argument[48] for asserting the all-pervasive character of Ātman by discarding all other attributive possibilities as contradictory. According to him, the justification of *vibhuparimāṇavāda*, therefore, lies in the successful refutation of the other two theories as illogical and invalid as a sort of the argument of reductio ad absurdum.

The Jaina doctrine of *madhyamaparimāṇa* is criticised by Śaṁkara on the ground that such a conception of soul would conclude in the proposition of the non-eternal character of soul striking the very ethical foundation[49] that the everlasting existence of the author of an act is necessary for the enjoyment of its fruit. If the dimension of the soul be that of its body, we would be compelled to accept the conclusion that the soul is also limited; but limitation is necessarily concomitant with destruction, as in the case of a jar, and as such the conclusion is thrust upon us, by way of necessary consequence, that the jīvātman is non-eternal.

If *madhyamaparimāṇavāda* be unsatisfactory, the dimension of Ātman may be taken to be atomic. The followers of the atomic view generally quote in their support the *śrutis* that claim the heart to be[50] the seat of the jīva and contend that 'this Ātman which is[51] atomic and in which the five vital breaths converge is to be known through knowledge'. They further argue that because the *Upaniṣads* tell of the jīva as going upwards[52] to the celestial region through the smoky[53] path and their return after the destruction[54] of their *karmas*, it is imperative that the jīva be considered as possessing limited dimensions. But because the futility of *dehaparimāṇavāda* has already been demonstrated the only logical possibility is to concede to the judgement that the soul is of atomic dimension.

One may argue against this : If the soul be atomic, how can it be the knower of the experiences all over the body ? The atomists reply this question through the analogy[55] of the mark of sandalwood. Just as the mark of sandalwood at one point in the forehead keeps the whole body fresh with its fragrance the jīvātman also, through its connection with the skin (*tvacā*), knows and responds to the various stimuli on the whole surface of the body. According to atomists, this difficulty is explicable on the analogy of the light of the lamp which though placed at one spot in the room dispels all darkness. Similarly, the soul though atomic and seated in the heart is capable of experiencing all over the body through consciousness, a quality of the[56] soul, that pervades it.

It may, however, be objected that a quality (*guṇa*) cannot exist apart from the qualified[57] (*guṇī*) as is discernable in the atomistic explanation given above. Unless consciousness has a separate existence from the soul, the followers of atomism would not be in a position to defend themselves. The atomists reply this by contending that the idea of the separate existence of a quality from the qualified is not impossible. We observe the presence of the fragrance of a flower at[58] a place where the flower is absent. Similarly, though the soul may not be located in all the spots of the body it may well be pervaded by consciousness which is its quality.

This doctrine of the atomic dimension is refuted by Śaṁkara on several grounds. Firstly, the argument from the analogy of the mark of sandalwood is indefensible as it is contrary to experience. Everybody knows that when a thorn pierces the leg the whole body[59] does not suffer from pain though the skin pervades the whole body. How can, then, it be asserted that the relationship of the soul with the body is explicable through the medium of skin ? The argument from the analogy of light is also a puerile suggestion. When the atomists explain consciousness as a quality of soul and assert its pervasion over the body on the analogy of light[60] they express themselves as oblivious of the important fundamental of logic that coexistence is a necessary presupposition in the idea of the relation between the 'quality' and the 'qualified'. The examples of light and smell are not apt illustrations as they are neither qualities nor do they illustrate that quality can exist apart from the substrate. As explained by the atomists, light is not[61] a quality but a substance. Fragrance also cannot fill a place without the support and movement of substance. As a matter of fact, the pervasion and movement of odour is possible only through the medium of air or water. Śaṁkara, therefore, contends that the idea of the existence of an attribute which is the backbone of the doctrine of the atomic dimension of soul is illogical.

Moreover, consciousness is not a quality of soul as propounded by the protagonists of the theory of the atomic dimension of Ātman but is the very essence of Ātman. The experience of the pervasion of consciousness all over the body would thus remain unexplained on the assumptions of *aṇuparimāṇavāda.* With these shortcomings and inherent contradictions, the doctrines of Ātman as having the atomic dimension and the dimension of the body present themselves as fallacious and insufficient explanations of the problem of the dimension of Ātman. Śaṁkara, therefore, concludes that *vibhuparimāṇavāda* or the doctrine of Ātman as all-pervasive is the only theory that is amenable to reason.

But how can Śaṁkara explain the *Upaniṣad* texts that explicitly refer to its atomic character ? In his commentary on the 29th sūtra of chapter II, section III of the *Brahma-sūtra* Śaṁkara replies this objection by arguing that all such references about the jīvātman really pertain to *buddhi* through whose superimposition the Ātman acquires an empirical character. As the phenomenal character of jīva is due to the superimposition of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the ideas regarding the measure and the seat of the latter are figuratively used for the jīvātman which, in reality, is all-pervasive. According to him, it is the intellect that is atomic, has its seat in the heart and ultimately on the death[63] of the man moves on to different regions and comes back to this earth. Thus, all the *śrutis* which refer to the atomic dimensions of the jīva and its seat in the heart should be understood as of a figurative character.

§4. MĀDHVA CONCEPTION OF THE NATURE OF JĪVĀTMAN

Before taking up the dissertation of the Mādhva refutation of the Vedānta philosophy of the individual soul it may be desirable to write a few words about Madhva's conception of the jīvātman. From the stray references about this question in the preceding chapters of this book it may occur that Madhva and his followers were the ardent supporters of the absolute reality and the pluralism of the jīvātman in opposition to the Vedānta conception of its transcendental unity. The jīva is not only different from Īśvara and the inanimate universe but is also different from the other jīvas. Consciousness and bliss[64] happen to form the essential nature of the jīva. The bliss, however, remains unmanifested due to *avidyā* which in its turn is caused by the *māyā* of Īśvara. It is only at the time of liberation that the Lord's Benediction reveals to the jīva his true blissful nature and self-illuminating character.

Here it is to be borne in mind that the two essential attributes of the jīvātman, viz., consciousness and bliss, follow the pattern of strict individuality inasmuch as they belong to the jīva and have absolutely no relation with Brahman. Whereas, in the Śaṁkara School of Vedānta, the consciousness and bliss of the jīva are really that of Brahman in Madhva's philosophy they are of the jīva though similar to that of Brahman. This aspect of Madhva's philosophy contributes immensely to a very important conception of Mādhva philosophy of jīva, the doctrine that it possesses a form and a body. All illuminating substances, according to this school, possess a form, e.g., the light of the lamp, and because the soul is self-illuminating (*svaprakāśa*) it must possess a form. This is necessary also for explaining the everlasting enjoyment of jīva after its emancipation and the presence of attributes that are mentioned in the *śrutis* for in the state of *mokṣa* no physical organism can serve as the medium of enjoyment. Moreover, without such a conception it may be difficult to explain the formal appearance of the external and the internal bodies of the individual souls. But, what is the nature of the jīva's body ? According to Madhva, it is not a product of consciousness but is constituted of bliss[65] and consciouness. It is why this theory of the body of jīvātman has been termed as '*dehātmavāda*' in Mādhva literature. Unlike the Śāṁkara school, the Mādhva wisdom has found it illogical and inconsistent to think that the jīva is neither a *kartā* nor a *bhoktā*. It has been a point of constant emphasis with them that the jīva is, as is empirically verifiable, both the doer (*kartā*) and the enjoyer (*bhoktā*). The failure to recognize this would not only be logically inconsistent but would explode the very foundation of a moral philosophy of life and its values.

The last but not the least important is the Mādhva conception that the jīva's dimension is atomic. The Mādhva justification and explanation of this conception is almost similar to that of the other Vaiṣṇavite systems that pronounced the atomism of jīva and its pervasion over the body through consciousness, its attribute, like the fragrance of the mark of sandalwood or the light of the lamp. According to Madhva, like all other atomists, this philosophy is necessary for the satisfactory explanation of the movement and the transmigration of jīva mentioned so often in the scriptural texts.

§5. MĀDHVA CRITICISM OF THE UNITY OF JĪVA AND BRAHMAN

Of all the criticisms launched by the Mādhva philosophers against the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta on the problem of the individual soul, the theory of its relation with Brahman has been the principal, rather, the foundational target of attack. As we will discuss later in this book, the desire on the part of Madhva and his successors for establishing the supremacy of *bhakti* and its ultimate instrumentality in attaining emancipation led them to propound the philosophy of jīva as absolutely distinct and different from Brahman. As this theory is diametrically opposed to the Śaṁkarite philosophy of the absolute non-difference between jīva and Brahman it happens to be the pivot and the main target of the Mādhva attack and has, consequently, given rise to many interesting issues whose exposition by the philosophers of these schools is a matter of historical interest.

In his two works, viz., *Māyāvādakhaṇḍana* and *Upādhikhaṇḍana* Madhva starts his criticism of the Vedānta philosophy by denouncing the possibility of a satisfactory explanation of the problems of the necessary qualifications of the pupil, the object of discussion, etc., on the foundation of the Śaṁkarite philosophy of the identity of jīva and Brahman. According to him, if the individual self be really identical with *Paramātman* what would be the position of this identity from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality ? If this unity be absolute, they would invariably be facing the inevitable conclusion that this unity is a reality separate from Brahman, a conclusion that would destroy the monistic character of Śaṁkarite philosophy. The Saṁkarites may retort that this unity is not different from Brahman because it is identical with the self or Ātman. But then, the Mādhva philosopher would argue, this unity must also be self-luminous like Brahman and would establish the futility of the teaching of Advaita philosophy. In case it be argued that the unity in question is something that is not real, it would be a proposition that is asserted by Madhva also, the proposition that the findings of Advaita philosophy are false and illogical.

From our exposition of Vedānta, it is clear that the four necessary conditions for the propagation of a particular system of philosophy, viz., the presence of an enquirer, (*adhikāri*), the object of enquiry (*viṣaya*), the purpose of enquiry (*prayojana*) and the relation between the purpose and the object of enquiry (*saṁbandha*) are possible in Vedānta only on the assumption of the principle of Nescience which is alone capable of creating the idea of distinction in Brahman. In order to explain these four prerequisites, it is imperative for the Śaṁkarites that they accept the distinction between the enquirer and the object of enquiry, i. e., Brahman, which is *kalpita* and has its cause in the beginningless *avidyā*.

Madhva, therefore, made the conception of *avidyā* a target of his attack in *Upādhikhaṇḍana* for disparaging the doctrine of the unity of jīva and Brahman. As a matter of fact, according to both Madhva and Jaya-Tīrtha, the refutation of non-dualism[66] is only a denunciation of the validity of the doctrine of *avidyā*. This denunciation has, however, two aspects; one of these relates to the question of the nature of *avidyā* and the other is concerned with the problem of its locus (*āśraya*). The first of these has been elaborately discussed in our chapter, '*The Theory of Knowledge*', and the second is the topic of another section of this chapter.

Here it may suffice to mention that Madhva thought it highly inconsistent that Brahman, who is omniscient, should be the locus of ignorance. The validity of the doctrine of *avidyā* can be substantiated either by a discussion on the nature of *avidyā* and its proofs or on the basis of a satisfactory solution of the problem of its seat. But unfortunately on neither of these counts can the Vedānta doctrine[67] of *avidyā* be proved as a rational philosophy. Because the very conception of *avidyā* is illogical the doctrine of *advaita* is irrelevant.

The next argument against the philosophy of unity has its foundation in the natural opposition between the essential charaaters[68] of jīva and Brahman. Whereas, Brahman is omniscient and omnipotent, the jīva never possesses the infinite wisdom and is not even capable of fulfilling its own desire. Is it not ludicrous that the Śaṁkarites should conceive of their identity ?

This refutation is counteracted by Madhusūdana in his *Advaitasiddhi*.[69] According to him, the unity in question is not something different from Brahman; it is Brahman itself. The idea of the unity of the individual soul with the Absolute Reality is only the conceptual apprehension caused by *vṛttis* for the destruction of the particular ignorance which veils the revelation of the real relation between the jīva and the Brahman. This concept of unity is intelligible to us in so far as our standpoint has its basis on the phenomenal plane and not from the ultimate consideration. From the absolute standpoint there being only one reality, the Brahman, any discussion regarding its unity with jīva would be nonsensical. The Mādhva argument that in case the unity between jīva and Brahman is of the nature of Brahman it would be self-luminous displays a gross misunderstanding of the Śaṁkarite position. When the Śaṁkarites reply that the unity is the same as Brahman they only assert that Brahman is the only reality and that jīva, from the ultimate standpoint, is only Brahman. The notion of the unity between jīva and Brahman, a relative concept, must be completely wanting in one who by transcending the limited form of jīva realizes himself as Brahman. The criticism about the nature of self-revelation of this unity as advanced by the Mādhva philosophers is not valid. Though it is true that unity in question is Brahman, yet the self-revelation here would be of Brahman and not of unity as contemplated by Madhva and his followers.

§6. MĀDHVA CRITICISM OF AVIDYĀ AS UPĀDHI

In an earlier chapter of this book we have undertaken a discussion on the Śaṁkara and the Mādhva conceptions of *upādhi* and the difference in their respective points of view. Here we propose to discuss only an application of these conceptions to the problem of the limiting condition or the *upādhi* of the Absolute Reality resulting in the appearance of the individual soul. In this connection Madhva would like to put a question : What is that *upādhi* which is the cornerstone of Advaita philosophy ? Is it real[70] or its appearance is only imaginary and caused by *avidyā* ? The proposition of the reality of the *upādhi* would expose the Advaita position to the danger of dualism, whereas, the conception of *upādhi* as an effect of *avidyā* would exhibit the fallacy of the regressus ad infinitum. The same question may be repeated in this case also when it be asked whether the *avidyā* which is the cause of the *upādhi* is real or is imaginary (*kalpita*). The former alternative would again introduce dualism in the Advaita philosophy, whereas, the latter would require the position of another *avidyā* as the cause of the *avidyā* which is *upādhi* from which the fallacy of the regressus ad infinitum is apparent.

According to both Madhva and Jaya-Tīrtha, the Advaitins cannot deny the basic conception of their philosophy that difference is always caused by *upādhi*. To the question as to what is the cause of *avidyā* in each individual soul the Vedāntins would reply that the category of difference amongst the jīvas is the cause of their ignorance and the loss of their inherent quality of omniscience. This shows the inherent incompatibility of the Śaṁkarite argument that, on the one hand, conceives ignorance as the cause of the *jīvopādhi* and on the other posits that the ignorance in itself is caused by the *upādhi* of the jīva. The *pratibimbavādin* may disclaim the contention that there is a difference between the *upādhi* of the jīva and its *avidyā*; to him the two are one and the same thing. But Jaya-Tīrtha would demand an answer to the old question whether the *avidyā* is real or is only imaginary (*kalpita*). The former contention would mean dualism in Vedānta, whereas, because in Vedānta an imaginary category is always caused by *avidyā* the fallacy of mutual dependence would be unavoidable. Thus, according to Madhva and his commentator Jaya-Tīrtha, the Śaṁkarite doctrine of *avidyā* is logically indefensible.

An examination of this criticism would reveal that it is not valid in respect of all the interpretations of the Advaita philosophy. It may, however, be valid against the *avaccheda* view of Vācaspati and his followers who propound the existence of the *upādhi* of jīva as separate from avidyā which, to them, has its location in the jīvātman. Though, in his *Bhāmatī*, Vācaspati[74] tries to exonerate his system from these difficulties by explaining the relation between the *upādhi* and its superimposition, caused by *avidyā*, as one that is known in philosophical literature as logical interdependence (*paramparā*)—the one between the seed and its sprout—yet its argumentative strength would appear to be weak before Jaya-Tīrtha's contention that 'logical interdependence' is only in such cases where the existence of the object or the effect is certified by some *pramāṇa*. In Vācaspati's interpretation of Vedānta the *upādhi* of the jīva is not testified by any instrument of knowledge and as such it does not come under the purview of 'logical interdependence'; his philosophy of the *upādhi* of jīva, therefore, suffers from the fallacy of the vicious infinite.

But to endorse the validity of these criticisms against the reflectionist interpretation of the Śāṁkara Vedānta would be a mistaken judgement and a prejudiced comprehension of the reflection-philosophy. One may not be wrong in asserting that *pratibimbavāda* is itself an outcome of some of the powerful objections against *avacchedavāda* that have forced the Advaitins to revise their stand. If at all any objection is possible against the *pratibimba* view maintaining the identity of *jivopādhi* and *avidyā*, it is the refutation that this stand suffers from the fallacy of self-dependence. The later Post-Śaṁkarites do not appear to be oblivious of this criticism. In Nṛsiṁghāśrama's commentary on *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* this criticism occurs as the prima-facie view and has been vehemently criticized by him.

In his refutation of the Mādhva criticism Nṛsiṁghāśrama asks :[72] What the opponent actually means by this self-dependence ? Does he mean self-dependence in origin or cognition or existence ? None of these, according to Nṛsiṁhāśrama, are capable of establishing the objection of self-dependence. If by self-dependence or *ātmāśraya* the opponent intends the origin of *avidyā* from itself it would be a misrepresentation of the Vedānta position because in Śaṁkarite philosophy *avidyā* is beginningless and is not caused by any other principle. The second possibility of self-dependence positing the cognition of *avidyā* by *avidyā* itself is also inadmissible because no one, in the whole of the Śaṁkarite literature, has ever professed that Nescience is known by Nescienee. It is a well known contention of the Advaitins that the knowledge of *avidyā* is acquired by the *sākṣin* or the eternal witness. The third possibility is also discarded because in Śaṁkarite philosophy the existence of *avidyā* depends not on itself but on Brahman. Thus, according to Nṛsiṁhāśrama, the objection of the presence of self-dependence is irrelevant.

The Mādhva criticism that *upādhi* is not creative but only manifests the existing difference through attribution does not appear to have engaged the attention of the Post-Śaṁkarite philosophers. Yet from their definition and explanation of *upādhi* it can be understood that the Mādhva criticism has its foundation more in a misunderstanding about Vedānta than a correct understanding about its philosophical position.

Both Madhusūdana and Nṛsiṁhāśrama define *upādhi* as that which is related[73] to an entity and produces the apprehension of its difference so long as it exists though it does not form part of its nature. Quality, on the other hand, while it pervades the effect also forms part of its essence. The essential difference between '*upādhi*' and 'quality' consists in the fact that, whereas, the latter, by forming part of the nature of an entity, enters into the effect the former which is only a limitative adjunct has no capacity to pass into the effect. Thus, whereas, the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) becomes the part and parcel of the essence of an entity, *upādhi* continues to be only an extraneous condition which by its limitation brings out a formal though not essential change in the thing. This point mav be further elaborated by investigating into the function of the *upādhi* and the attribute with regard to the thing which they either define or qualify. The examination would, however, reveal that during the first change or the transformation into the effect occurring either through attribution[74] or definition both the attribute and the *upādhi* persist with the effect. But when this effect tends to create another effect, the association of the attribute persists and that of the *upādhi* is forsaken. To put it in a different language, the attribute and the *upādhi* pervade the first effect when during the second the attribute alone continues to have its association.

This exposition of the concept of *upādhi* as different from that of quality would bring to light the Mādhva misunderstanding about the Śaṁkarite position which is responsible for their contention that the Śaṁkarite philosophy of *upādhi* as creative is illogical. A proper analysis of the arguments advanced by the Mādhva philosophers in their refutation would reveal that their idea of *upādhi* as a revealing concept is based on their understanding of *upādhi* as a synonym of quality.

§7. MĀDHVA CRITICISM OF EKAJĪVAVĀDA

Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, initiates the criticism of the One Soul doctrine by contending that it is inadmissible for divers weighty reasons. The idea of One Soul prima-facie contradicts many of our experiences and, consequently, proves its futility. If all of us be one soul, then, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the[75] moment a man goes to sleep the whole humanity must be plunged in an unavoidable slumber and there should be no experience of waking life in any of its members. Moreover, because the doctrine of *ekajīva* is essentially related to the doctrine of *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi* or that all esse is percipi it is difficult to explain a man's awakening without the admission of latent tendencies (*saṁskāras*) which the *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda* so conspicuously rejects.

It follows as a valid consequence from the doctrine of One Soul that all apparent selves, as they are termed in the Śaṁkarite literature, are actually soul-less, a conclusion that is against experience. Such judgements as, 'I am happy', 'I am pained', etc., point to the existence of a real agent or soul that propels the organism into action. It would, therefore, be a paradox if the Śaṁkarites assert that the individual soul is, in reality, soul-less.

The Śaṁkarites may argue that the jīvātman as given in our experience is illusory and appears on account of the superimposition of the self and the not-self. Vyāsa-Tīrtha retorts this stand by arguing that when the very foundation of the existence of soul, the fact of its verifiability in experience, is considered illusory by the Śaṁkarites it is difficult to find any satisfactory explanation for its existence. The contention that even the soul-less apparent selves may be the knowers of such cognitions when, in reality, these pertain to the One Soul pervading all the bodies of the apparent selves is, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, irrelevant because then there would be no cogency in the Śaṁkarite enunciation of the jīvas as the reflections of the Ultimate Reality, the Brahman. The very purpose of propounding the reflection-theory consists in giving a satisfactory explanation to the problem of the agency of the individual soul in action and enjoyment. The proposition of the One Soul, therefore, contradicts some of the important tenets of their own philosophy.

Another aspect of *ekajīvavāda* that has been criticized by the Mādhva philosopher is their formulation of the nature of jīva as conditioned, a doctrine that has been dealt with in the preceding pages of this chapter. Vyāsa-Tīrtha would ask : Is the individual soul really Brahman ? But because the world, which is false, is in no time unrelated to Brahman-consciousness, Brahman would always be subject to the *saṁsāra* and would contradict the *śruti* that tells of Brahman as *nitya-mukta*. Moreover, because, from the transcendental point of view, there is no difference amongst the jīvas it would be difficult to explain the simultaneous feeling of pleasure and pain in all the jīvas as in the case of the *yogins*. The doctrine of One Soul would also bring in the admixture of bondage and release because when the real self, in all the apparent selves, is one the fruits of the actions of the one would be rewarded to the other. This theory would, therefore, create a confusion in the moral field and would take away the very foundation of a moral philosophy.

Not only in moral philosophy, but in the field of epistemology also this conception would create confusion. How can the doctrine of One Soul explain the ideas of 'I' and 'You' in different jīvas ? To explain this point, Jaya-Tīrtha asks in his[76] *Nyāya-sudhā*: Is the jīva in the doctrine of *ekajīva* identical or different from the *māyāvādin* (the Śaṁkarite) ? In the former case, it may again be enquired whether the Śaṁkarite recognizes the existence of the opponent or not. If he does accept, he would be contradicting the premises of his own thesis and, on the other, if he denies he would be making all discussion impossible in the absence of the opponent. In the latter case, however, the *ajñāna* being of the other jīva the Śaṁkarite would not be in a position to talk either of his bondage or release.

Again, the doctrine of *Ekajīva* contributes an absurd and an incredible philosophy of God. In this theory God, along with His attributes, e. g., omniscience, omnipotence, etc., is only an imaginary creation of the jīva. This philosophy of God flagrantly contradicts all our common notions about God and the scriptural testimony that He is the creator and the destroyer of the world-order.

The doctrine of One Soul is also not in a position to explain satisfactorily the relation between the teacher and the taught. In this theory the teacher can be no one else but the *kalpaka jīva* and as such when the Reality is known to him there would be for him instantaneous deliverance and the simultaneous disappearance of the world-myth. Has ever anyone in the universe acquired knowledge and has been liberated or not ? In the former case, Vyāsa-Tīrtha argues, there would be no experience of the world as there would be no jīva at all. The latter assumption would, however, stand as an argument against the monistic philosophy of Saṁkara's Vedānta. The Advaitins when they accept the liberation of several jīvas, e.g., Vāmadeva, fail to accept the challenge of the criticism that the appearance of world after the liberation of so many jīvas is a proof of the futility of the *Ekajīva* philosophy.

§7. CRITICISM OF THE SAṀKARITE PHILOSOPHY OF THE DENIAL OF THE AGENCY IN ĀTMAN.

In his commentaries, Śaṁkara repeatedly asserts that Ātman is neither a doer nor an enjoyer. These concepts, according to him, are associated with it on account of the superimposition of the intellect (*buddhi*) to which they really belong. In so far as the Ātman is related to phenomena or is an empirical self, the concepts of agency in action and enjoyment have meaning. But, when we consider this problem from the transcendental standpoint, Śaṁkara would disagree to accord any justification to the attribution of such ideas with a principle which, in its nature, is pure, eternal and immutable.

According to Śaṁkara, if *kartṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva* be the real nature of Ātman, there would probably be no possibility of emancipation. As the real nature of a thing is always unchangeable, the assumption that Ātman is really the agent in action and enjoyment would destroy for ever all chances of freedom from bondage and suffering. Agency in the soul is, therefore, caused by the association and the superimposition of the intellect, its *upādhi*. Just as the carpenter while holding the saw in his hand feels unhappy and in the night, without this saw, he is happy, similarly, the Ātman in association with the idea of duality, caused by *avidyā*, considers itself as the agent and suffers from sorrow.

This denial of the agency in Ātman is fundamentally opposed to the Mādhva conception of Ātman as the doer and the enjoyer. As contended by Jaya-Tīrtha, in his *Tattvaprakāśikā*, the real[77] agency of Ātman is essential for upholding the utility and purport of scriptures without which all their injunctions would become meaningless. If a man is, in reality, not the agent of an act, it would be nonsensical for the *Vedas* to preach the performance of oblations and other rituals for achieving *apavarga*. The scriptural injnction that Ātman is to be worshipped would also become[78] meaningless if the agency of Ātman is not real. Moreover, such a conception is incompatible with the Mādhva philosophy of the enjoyment of Ātman in the state[79] of *mokṣa*. It is not only for explaining this particular aspect of their conception about the nature of liberation and the liberated souls that the Mādhva philosophers strive to establish the real character of the activity of the individual soul but also for giving a consistent exposition to the means of achieving *mokṣa*. It is a necessary presupposition of ethical philosophy imparting instructions about the means of liberation that the 'subject' is a real entity and not a false appearance as advocated in the Śaṁkara School of Vedānta.

The modus-operandi of the superimposition between the intellect and the Ātman, as propagated in the Śaṁkarite philosophy, is also criticized by Vyāsa-Tīrtha. We know that the Advaitins explain the appearance of activity, belonging to intellect, in the Ātman on the analogy of the superimposition of the red-flower (*japākusum*) in the quartz (*sphaṭika*). Just as the juxtaposition of the red-flower with the quartz creates in it the false appearance of redness, similarly, the association of the intellect with the Ātman produces in it the false notion of *kartṛtva*. This explanation of the superimposition between *buddhi* and Ātman is discredited by Vyāsa-Tīrtha as an example of bad logic as it draws its analogy from a case that is not exactly similar. Whereas, in the illustration we find that the superimposition obtains the form of the superimposed entity, i. e., the red-flower, the imposition of *kartṛtva* in *caitanya* appears as that of *caitanya* and not that of *buddhi*. This is why we have the cognition that *kartṛtva* is that of Ātman and not of *buddhi*. Moreover, the redness of the flower does not pervade the quartz completely when the functions and attributes of the *buddhi* appear to be of the Self alone. This is primarily the reason why a complete analogy between the superimposition of *kartṛtva* and that of the red-flower is not possible.

Vyāsa-Tīrtha retorts this novel interpretation of the concept of *adhyāsa* by contending that it is probably a consequence of the Advaitin's belief that the superimposition of the intellect is *sopādhika*. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, this superimposition is not a case of *sopādhika adhyāsa*; in reality, it is a case of *nirupādhika adhyāsa* whose most befitting illustration is the illusory appearance of the snake in the rope. Vyāsa-Tīrtha who discusses at a considerable length the conceptions of the *sopādhika* and *nirupādhika* superimpositions discovers their essential difference in the fact that, whereas, in the former case the superimposition is of a quality similar to that of the *upādhi* in the latter the *adhyāsa* is only of the quality of the imposed entity. To elaborate this point we may illustrate from the examples of the superimpositions of the red-flower and the quartz and that of the snake and the rope that are the oft-quoted examples of the *sopādhika* and *nirupādhika* superimpositions. It may be observed that in the case of the red-flower and the quartz the *adhyāsa* in the quartz is not that of the attribute of the red-flower but of redness which is a quality that is similar to that of the redness of the red-flower. In the case of the snake and the rope the position is, however, different because here we have only the *adhyāsa* of the snake in the rope and not of any quality similar to that of the characteristic of the snake. Thus, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the essential difference between the *sopādhika* and *nirupādhika* impositions consists in the fact that, whereas, in the former case the *adhyāsa* is always of the quality similar to that of the attribute of the *upādhi* in the latter it is only of the attributes of the superimposed entity.

The application of these conclusions to the problem in question would suggest that the *adhyāsa* of *antaḥkaraṇa* in Ātman is really a case of *nirupādhika adhyāsa* because the superimposition here is only of the *kartṛtva* of the intellect and not of any other *kartṛtva* similar to the *kartṛtva* of the internal organ. Had this been a case of *sopādhika adhyāsa* as revealed in the Advaitin's illustration of the red-flower and the crystal stone we would have accepted that the superimposition is not of agency which is a quality of the intellect but of some other agency similar to it. As the Advaitins do not propose the *adhyāsa* of any such similar *kartṛtva* it would be futile to contend that the superimposition of the intellect in the Ātman is a case of *sopādhika adhyāsa* and they probably cannot, without risking the consistency of their argument, illustrate this with the example of the red-flower and the quartz.

The *sopādhika* character of the *adhyāsa* in question has been further criticized by Vyāsa-Tīrtha from a different angle. For him, it is an essential feature of this type of *adhyāsa* that either the *upādhi* and its attribute should belong to the same level of existence as its substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) or should pertain to a plane of reality higher than that of the imposed (*adhyasyamāna*) entity. These conditions are available in the superimposition of the red-flower where both the red-flower and its redness belong to the same plane of existence as that of the substratum of the superimposition, the quartz. Not only this, the red-flower and its redness belong to a plane of existence superior to that of the imposed redness which is *prātibhāsika*.

It is thus apparent that the Śaṁkarite conception of the imposition of the intellect in Ātman is not a case of *sopādhika adhyāsa*. Had this been so the Advaitins would not be in a position to avoid two inevitable conclusions, firstly, that the reality of the intellect, the *upādhi*, belongs to the same plane of existence as the Ātman and, secondly, that the existence of the *kartṛtva* is of a lower order of existence than the intellect. Neither of these positions would be admissible to the Śaṁkarites. But the Śaṁkarites cannot treat this as a case of *nirupādhika adhyāsa* because they admit the existence of intellect as *upādhi* whose association with Ātman produces in it the false notion of agency. *Nirupādhika adhyāsa* is possible only in such cases where a single principle becomes the ground of inexplicable illusion through the principle of Nescience.

This criticism is vigorously refuted by Madhusūdana, in his *Advaita-siddhi*,[81] where he emphatically asserts that the superimposition between the intellect and the Ātman is a case of *sopāahika adhyāsa* which he tries to defend. According to Madhusūdana, the condition differentiating a *sopādhika adhyāsa* from a *nirupādhika adhyāsa* consists in the fact that, whereas, in the latter the superimposed entity along with its attributes bears its counterpart in a similar entitv which belongs to a superior plane of realitv the former has no similar existent of a higher degree of realitv in the whole cosmos. This can be well illustrated from the examples of the superimpositions of a serpent in the rope and that of the red-flower in the quartz which are the illustrations of *nirupādhika* and *sopādhika adhyāsas*. In the illusion of the serpent though the idea of the serpent is superimposed in the rope yet it has an existence in the outer world which possesses a superior reality than that of the imposed 'serpent'; the reality of the real serpent is *vyāvahārika*, whereas, that of the imposed serpent is only *prātibhāsika*. In the case of the red-flower and the crystal stone there is no other reality superior to that of the red-flower which is superimposed on the quartz. Thus, according to Madhusūdana, there is no fallacy in acknowledging the *sopādhika* character of the superimposition between the intellect and the Ātman.

It may, however, be questioned that if *kartṛtva* be considered as a case of *sopādhika adhyāsa* then Vyāsa-Tīrtha's contention that there should be the superimposition of different *kartṛtva* apart from that of the intellect shoula be accepted as correct. Madhusūdana, however, acknowledges this position but remarks that this is of no danger to the Advaitic standpoint. The objection that this *kartṛtva* should then be directly cognized by us does not carry any weight because when this *kartṛtva* along with the agency of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is superimposed in the Ātman, in the form of the Ātman, there cannot be any other experience than the *kartṛtva* of the Ātman. The objection would have been valid had the superimposition of the *kartṛtva* not been in the form of self-consciousness which assigns reasons for the absence of the experience of the *kartṛtva* of *buddhi*, *kartṛtvāntara* as it is called, in us. The partial difference between the analogy of the red-flower and the quartz and the fact of the superimposition of the intellect and Ātman, as described in the foregoing pages, has also been dittoed by Madhusūdana.

As regards the question of the order of reality of the superimposed entity and its *upādhi* in *sopādhika adhyāsa*, Madhusūdana considers the validity of only one principle as the criterion that may establish the *sopādhika* character of a particular *adhyāsa*. According to him, the superior degree of the reality of *upādhi* which agrees both in presence and absence[83] to the superimposed entity is the only valid condition for justifying the *sopādhika* character of a particular *adhyāsa*, a condition that is equally fulfilled in the problem under discussion. Vyāsa-Tīrtha's objection that because the Advaitins do not acknowledge the *prātibhāsika* nature of the agency of Ātman the principle enunciated by Madhusūdana would stand unjustified would also appear groundless because the Advaitins certainly attribute a lower reality to the apparent *kartṛtva* in the jīva than the intellect which has a *vyāvahārika* existence. This appearance of *kartṛtva*, according to the authors of the Śaṁkara school, is decidedly inferior in existence to the intellect and its *kartṛtva* which possesses only *vyāvahārika* or practical reality.

It may not be redundant to write a few words about the Advaitin's reactions against the criticisms of Madhvācārya and his commentator Jaya-Tīrtha. From the tendency of the treatment of the philosophy of Śaṁkarācārya and his followers in this book it might appear that the charges against them as formulated in Madhva's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and Jaya-Tīrtha's *Tattvaprakāśikā* do not really present a strong strategy. Such objections as the consequent invalidity of the *śāstra* and the futility of the Vedic injunction that 'Ātman should be known' can be easily replied by pointing to their *vyāvahārika* existence. According to Śaṁkarites, the utility of the Vedic-injunctions prescribing the performance of oblations and the worshipping of Ātman would be equally justifiable even while admitting their pragmatic or *vyāvahārika* reality. The other objection that the real agency of Ātman is necessary for maintaining the difference of emancipated souls is absolutely inadmissible to the Śaṁkara school as they do not believe in any difference in the absolute state of liberation.

Though Madhusūdana's masterly defence of the Advaita position, in his *Advaita-siddhi*, appears to eclipse the heat and the glamour of Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticisms yet it may be felt that the manner in which the fact of the superimposition between the intellect and Ātman has been explained would still continue to raise doubts with the students of Śāṁkara philosophy. It would continue to perplex all those who may endeavour to comprehend the real meaning of this philosophy as to how intellect which is contended to possess a form would give an imprint of its qualities, as conceived in the *sopādhika adhyāsa,* in a principle that transcends all name and form. Despite the Śaṁkarite contention that[84] the presumption of formal nature as a precedent condition of reflection is not always valid it may be felt that the Śaṁkarites can only subside this doubt by replying that the conception of this superimposition is only from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint and is only just a way of explaining the fact of the illusory attribution of the quality of the intellect to the Ātman. The modus-operandi of the *adhyāsa* between the intellect and Ātman as explained in the Śāṁkara philosophy can, at its best, be intelligible only as a way of explaining the highly subtle and supra-rational imposition of the qualities of *buddhi* on the transcendental Ātman. Because in a *sopādhika* imposition the realities of both the *upādhi* and its substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) belong to the same plane, it would be unwise to trace strict analogy between this and the *adhyāsa* of *antahḥkaraṇa* in Ātman.

§8. CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE THAT ĀTMAN IS VIBHU

We have already mentioned during our exposition of the Śaṁkarite opinion on the problem of the spatial dimension of jīvātman that Madhva happens to be one of those who favoured the doctrine of atomism as a true and a valid account of the *parimāṇa* of jīva. Like many others who shared his opinion on this point, he was also satisfied to explain the pervasion of consciousness over the body on the analogies of the[85] sandalwood and the light of the lamp to which his system presented no difficulty on account of his admission that knowledge is a quality of Ātman. The arguments advanced by his school in favour of their theory are almost the same that have occurred as the opponent's view in Śaṁkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* and have been treated by us in the preceding pages of this chapter. The main argument that has weighed considerably in the opinion of both Madhva[86] and Jaya-Tīrtha is the reference in the *śrutis* to the transmigration of soul, its going upwards to celestial regions and then coming down to the earth after the destruction of the *karmas.* As Jaya-Tīrtha contends, "The jīva is atomic and not all-pervasive because it moves upwards and downwards like the body of the bird. No substance that is all pervasive can have these qualities, e.g., the ether (*ākāśa*). Because the theory of Ātman as *madhyama-parimāṇa* is denounced as an unsatisfactory explanation, we are compelled to acknowledge the claim of the atomism of jīva as a valid theory."[87] Besides this argument, Madhva quotes several other passages[88] from scriptures to demonstrate that they are all really in favour of the atomic nature of jīva and discard the doctrine that Ātman is *vibhu*.

We have already discussed Śaṁkara's opinion on this question and have explained how he interpreted the casual reference in the *śrutis* about the *aṇutva* of jīvātman and the facts of its appearance through the superimposition and the conditioning of *buddhi* which, according to him, is both atomic and capable of moving. Because the phenomenal appearance of jīva is necessarily conditioned by the intellect, Śaṁkara finds no difficulty in the attribution of the qualities of intellect to Ātman which is, in reality, *vibhu*. But the Mādhva philosophers discard this as a misunderstanding of the intention and meaning of the scriptural texts that tell of the ubiquitous character of Ātman. These texts, according to them, always refer to the supreme[89] Ātman and not to jīvātman whose dimension is unequivocally accepted in the *śrutis* as atomic. Śaṁkara is, therefore, wrong in his interpretation that the reference to the atomic character of the jīvātman in the *srutis* is figurative.

For the Śaṁkarite assessment of this criticism, we may be justified in referring to Śaṁkara's own treatment of this question in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* where he has taken all these criticisms in the *pūrva-pakṣa*. Much of what has been said by Madhusūdana and other Post-Śaṁkarites against the Mādhva attack is only the interpretation of the the various *śrutis* from their point of view which is probably not of much philosophical interest. The principal strategy of their defence consists in pointing out inconsistencies in the Mādhva argument that seeks to prove the atomic character of jīva through such reasons as its movement, action, etc. Madhusūdana, in his *Advaita-siddhi*,[90] justifies the validity of the Śaṁkarite doctrine by denouncing the probans employed by Madhva, viz., movement, actions, etc., as unreal and, therefore, proving that the Mādhva conclusion that the jīva is atomic is illogical, It is an accredited principle in Vedānta logic that the probans in an inference must always belong to the subject and possess the same degree of reality as the subject. In the present context, however, it is impossible to establish the presence of movement, actions, etc., in the jīvātman which is transcendental and is one with the Absolute Reality. Because, according to Śaṁkara, movement, etc., really pertain to the intellect, the Mādhva argument suffers from the fallacy of the unreal probans. Besides, the Śaṁkarites also contend that the doctrine of the atomism of jīva cannot satisfactorily explain the feeling of the consciousness[91] of pleasure and pain over the whole body and as such the doctrine of the *vibhutva* of the jīva is the only valid account of its dimension.

B—THE RELATION BETWEEN JĪVĀTMAN AND AJÑĀNA

§1. MĀDHVA CONCEPTION OF THE LOCUS OF AJÑĀNA

Our exposition of the Śaṁkarite standpoint on the question of the locus of *ajñāna* in chapter IV of this book may disclose its natural antagonism with the Mādhva point of view considering the plural character of *avidyā* and its locus in the jīvātman. Just as defects, e.g., jaundice, that conceal and transform the real nature of an entity are different in[92] different individuals, the *avidyā* which has Brahman for its object is also different in different individuals. The reason which the Mādhva philosophers ascribe for propagating the theory that the individual soul and not Brahman is the locus of *ajñāna* is quite interesting. According to Vādirāja[93], as a principle, the locus of the destroyer (*nāśaka*) and the destroyed (*nāśya*) must always be the same, for example, when the light destroys the darkness both of them are necessarily coexistent. Similarly, when we acknowledge the principle that knowledge removes ignorance we must acknowledge the proposition that both *ajñāna* and *jñāna* have the same locus. But, because the jīvātman is the locus of *jñāna* it must also be the locus of *ajñāna*.

It is, thus, apparent that, according to the Mādhva philosophers, the Śaṁkarite philosophy of Brahman as the locus of *ajñāna* as propounded in *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* is illogical. We may, however, enumerate, in short, their criticisms of the Vedānta view chiefly those upheld by Sarvajñātamuni and Vācaspati.

§2. CRITICISM OF THE VIEW THAT BRAHMAN IS THE LOCUS OF AJÑĀNA

The view that Brahman-consciousness is really the locus of *ajñāna* as upheld by the Vivaraṇites and the author of *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* is criticized by Vyāsa-Tīrtha for more than one reason. He contends that because the jīva is caused by *ajñāna* it is illogical for the Śaṁkarites to argue that Brahman, and not jīva, is the locus of *ajñāna*. When the individual soul is itself the product of the conditioning of the[94] Ultimate Reality by *avidyā* it is simply preposterous to think that the *avidyā* has its *āśraya* in Brahman.

Again, the theory that Brahman is the *āśraya* of Nescience is unjustified because Brahman which is of the nature of knowledge cannot be the substrate of ignorance which, as a principle, is destroyed by its presence. Can anyone think of the coexistence of both light and darkness ? Moreover, when the ego presents itself in experience as the seat of *ajñāna* as in the judgement. 'I am ignorant', which is known through the *sākṣin*, it would be futile to think of the pure Caitanya as the seat of ignorance.

The Advaitins, however, reply this criticism by arguing that the idea of the ego as the locus of ignorance is due to the superimposition of pure *caitanya* which is, in reality, the locus of *ajñāna*. To this Vyāsa-Tīrtha replies that such a contention on the part of the Advaitins would surely lead to the fallacy of interdependence. On the one hand, the Śaṁkarites propose that the ego is not the seat of *ajñāna* when they contend that the pure-consciousness is the *āśraya* of Nescience and, on the other, they try to establish the proposition that *cit* is really the locus of *ajñāna* by establishing the false character of the knowledge that presents itself to us in experience, that ego is the seat of ignorance. This analysis clearly indicates where the Śaṁkarite fallacy consists in. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the knowledge accorded by the *sākṣin* is always valid and when the Śaṁkarites intend to disprove this they certainly lose every ground. In the absence of the validity of the judgement, 'I am ignorant', the Śaṁkarites cannot count upon any experience to uphold their doctrine that Brahman-consciousness is the *āśraya* of *ajñāna*.

Moreover, if *cit* be the locus of *ajñāna* it must also be subject to bondage. But, because the realization of the pure consciousness in Advaita philosophy is really the means to *mokṣa* it would simply be absurd to contend that it is also a principle of bondage.

§3. CRITICISM OF VĀCASPATI'S VIEWS

Though Vācaspati's theory of the individual soul as the locus of *ajñāna* and its plurality is also accepted by the Mādhva philosophers, yet the Advaitic presupposition of his philosophy made him the target of the Mādhva attack notwithstanding the apparent similarity in their points of view. While criticising Vācaspati's standpoint Vyāsa-Tīrtha asks : What[95] is the nature of the jīva which is described by him as the locus of *ajñāna* ? Is it the pure-consciousness or is it consciousness conditioned by *avidyā* ? If it be pure-consciousness, all their criticisms that are valid against *Ekajīvavāda* would be equally applicable to it as well. If it be consciousness as conditioned by *avidyā*, it would be difficult for Vācaspati to avoid the fallacy of mutual-dependence. On the one hand, he explains that the nature of jīva is conditioned by *avidyā* and, on the other, considers it as the seat of *avidyā*. Such an objection had, however, been foreseen by Vācaspati, in his *Bhāmatī*,[96] who replied this charge by referring to the causal interdependence of the seed and the sprout which is logically valid. The mutual-dependence of the jīvātman and *avidyā*, which is beginningless and would continue till eternity, therefore, does not establish its invalidity.

This explanation as available in Vācaspati's *Bhāmatī* is disparaged by Vyāsa-Tīrtha both in his *Nyāyāmṛta* and his *Mandāramanjarī*[97] on *Upādhikhaṇḍana*. According to him, Vācaspati has lost sight of an important condition that determines the logical character of an unending mutual causality between two entities, the condition that their existence and difference is to be cognized by some *pramāṇa*. The existence of the seed and the sprout along with their difference is, however, known through perception. But, in Vācaspati's philosophy, neither the jīva nor the *avidyā* nor their difference is cognized by any of the accredited instruments of cognition. How can, then, their infinite dependence be logically valid ?

§4. SAṀKARITE REJOINDER AND EVALUATION OF MĀDHVA CRITICISM

These criticisms against the Śaṁkarite philosophy of the *āśraya* of *ajñāna*, as explained by the Vivaraṇa and the Vācaspati schools, have been answered by the later Post-Śaṁkarites. Madhusūdana clarifies that the opposition between knowledge (*jñāna*) and ignorance (*ajñāna*), the point raised by Vādirāja, such as the former would simultaneously demand the removal of the other is only with regard to *pramā*[98] or *vṛtti-jñāna* as interpreted by the author of *Laghucandrikā*.[99] The nature of pure-consciousness or *caitanya* is, however, different. As a foundational principle of world-phenomena, it is self-illuminating and does not embody the removal of Nescience. Just as the sun's rays when they fall on dry hay only illumine its existence but when they are made to pass through *sūryakāntamaṇi* they are capable of destroying it also, similarly, *caitanya* which illumines the Nescience becomes capable of its destruction only when it is reflected through a *vṛtti*. It is, therefore, incorrect to think that the coexistence of Brahman or *Caitanya* and *ajñāna* is impossible. This argument can also refute Vādirāja's criticism that because the substrate of both light and darkness that is removed is the same, the locus of knowledge and ignorance must also be the same. As argued by Madhusūdana, Vādirāja's objection would have been valid had consciousness been the destroyer of Nescience which, however, is not true.

Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism that the doctrine of Brahman as the seat of *ajñāna* would subject It to bondage has been elaborately discussed by Nṛsiṁhāśrama in his *Advaitadīpikā*,[100] an independent treatise on Vedānta philosophy, and his commentary on *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*. He takes the plea that the conception of *ajñāna* as a binding principle is essentially related to the phenomenal aspect of Brahman or the jīvātman. The concept of bondage, according to him, presupposes the existence and the distinction of the jīvātman. "There is no existence of any conscious principle in this world without the precedent distinction between the jīva and Īśvara. Because the phenomenal appearance of jīvātman is a precedent condition it is absurd to think of Brahman as subject to bondage." Nṛsiṁhāśrama explains this by citing an example. Just as the impurities of the mirror produce blackness only in the reflection and not in the prototype, similarly, the bondage is also in the jīva, which is the reflection of Brahman, and not in Brahman.

It is clear from Nṛsiṁhāśrama's account that the Advaitin's intention in considering Brahman as the locus of *ajñāna* is not to emphasize that the individual soul is not associated with *ajñāna*. But, because it is an outcome of the mutual superimposition of *avidyā* and Brahman it would be illogical to consider it as the locus of *ajñāna*. This was probably the reason that weighed with Sarvajñātamuni in his assertion that Ātman is the locus (*āśraya*) and the object (*viṣaya*) of *ajñāna*.

The refutation of Vācaspati has also been criticized by the Post-Śaṁkarites who ventured to demonstrate that because the relation of Nescience and jīva-hood is beginningless there is no fallacy of interdependence in his argument. But, notwithstanding the vigorous defence on the part of his followers, it does not fail to impress that Vācaspati's exposition of this problem, in his *Bhāmatī*, is cumbrous and at times far-fetched. Prof. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī, in his introduction to *Bhāmatī*, writes, "We do not say at any time that ignorance was and the jīva was not or that the jīva was and the ignorance was not. If it be still urged that such dependence is in the last resort unintelligible we counter it with the question why expect intelligibility in the case of Nescience. It is the very essence of Nescience to be unintelligible in the last resort..."[101] This garb of unintelligibility is itself a sign of Vācaspati's weakness. Though inexplicability is the persistent characteristic of the whole of the Vedānta system, yet in the other exponents of Vedānta this inexplicability is transcendental and refers only to the inexplicable character of the nature of *avidyā* and its relation to the Ultimate Reality or Brahman. In Vācaspati's explanation, however, the inexplicability is introduced even in the phenomenal order of the jīva-hood and its *avidyā* and thus exhibits its weakness. Because the jīvātman belongs to the phenomenal order of existence it would be illogical to explain its relation with *avidyā* as unintelligible.

Besides, Vācaspati's system is a cumbersome interpretation of Vedānta in comparison to those who believe in a single principle, i.e., *avidyā*, as the material-cause of world-phenomenon. As his system concedes to the plurality of *avidyā*, it is imperative that he should admit that every individual has a different world-illusion; the identity of their experiences may be explained on the analogy of agreement in the illusions of different spectators. In the words of Prof. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī, "What does exist without happens to be interpreted by all of them in the same manner. The objectivity of the world, then, is no more that the consilience of illusions."[102] But we may ask : What is the reason of this peculiar agreement or consilience of illusions ? It would be difficult to find an answer to this question in Vācaspati's exposition of Vedānta. It is here that Vācaspati demonstrates the inherent weakness of his system as a satisfactory explanation of Śaṁkara's Vedānta.

C—RELATION BETWEEN JĪVA AND BRAHMAN

Though from the absolute standpoint there is no question of any relation between jīva and Brahman in Śaṁkara's philosophy yet from the *vyāvahārika* point of view this may be worthy of consideration. Śaṁkara has himself discussed this problem, in detail, in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* and has concluded that the only satisfactory relation that can be conceived between jīva and Brahman is one of the[103] whole (*aṁśi*) and the part (*aṁśa*) on the analogy of the spark and fire. In his discussions, Śaṁkara has expressed dissatisfaction over the religious attitude that conceives of the individual soul as dependent and subservient to *Paramātman* who is supposed to rule over it. The relation between jīva and Īśvara on the analogy of the master and the servant or of the ruler and the ruled with its innate distinction is, according to Śaṁkara, not finally valid as it would be inconsistent with his doctrine of the essential identity of jīva and Brahman. To think of such a relation between the individual soul and the Absolute would be denying their essential identity. Śaṁkara, therefore, professes that *aṁśāṁśibhāva* or the relation between the whole and the part such as subsisting between fire and spark is the only possible way of conceiving the relation between jīva and Brahman.

But, how can Śaṁkara profess that such a relation between jīva and Brahman is in conformity with his philosophy of the Ultimate Reality as indeterminate and partless? In his commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtra* and the *Bhagavadgītā*,[104] Śaṁkara consciously asserts that the enunciation of this relation is only from a *vyāvahārika* point of view and not from the absolute standpoint. What is meant by such a contention is that jīva is a part of Brahman as the spark is the part of fire. The expression of this relation is, however, only figurative and intends to accord no primary meaning. What Śaṁkara means by calling the jīva as the part of Brahman is only that much which is comprehended by asserting that the sun's reflection in water is the part (*aṁśa*) of the sun. As Madhusūdana writes in his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* the *aṁśa* of *Paramātman* who is partless is imagined through *māyā* just as the *aṁśa* of the sun or the ether is imagined in the water or the pot; what is meant by *aṁśatva* is only that which is actually not part but is similar to a part and has false difference."[105] Besides this ontological relationship between jīva and *Paramātman*, Śaṁkara thinks of a functional relation also according to which *Paramātman* governs the destiny and the actions of the jīva. In his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, Śaṁkara refers to the instrumentality[106] of God as a *sādhāraṇa-kāraṇa* in the actions of jīva whether good or bad. He could not completely denounce on ethical considerations the philosophy of God as the ruler and the master of the soul.

It is important to bear in mind that Śaṁkara's presumption of a relation between the soul and the Deity on purely ethico-religious considerations is not between jīva and Brahman but between jīva and Īśvara as is clear from his commentary on the sūtra, '*Api ca smaryate*', where he writes that Īśvara whose *upādhi* is par excellence rules over the jīvas whose *upādhis* are vile and low.'[107] Because in Śaṁkara's philosophy Īśvara is different from jīva there is no difficulty in assuming the former as the Lord and the latter as the servant.

The study of the Mādhva system may reveal that the problem of the relation between jīva and Brahman is considered by its exponents in such a way as to suit the fundamental requirements of *bhakti* which in this system is the only means of getting salvation. Like other Vaisnavites they also formulate that the relation between jīva and Brahman is strictly on the analogy of the ruler and the ruled and the master and the servant. They also think like Śaṁkara that jīva is the part of Brahman though their interpretation of aṁśatva is much different from that of Śaṁkara.

Though in Mādhva philosophy jīva is a reflection[108] of Brahman yet this reflection is not unreal as contemplated in the Śāṁkara School of Vedānta. The *aṁśatva* of jīva is quite real and eternal. Because the *upādhi* of jīva is absolutely real and eternal, the reflection of *Paramātman* is also real. Notwithstanding the presence of a[109] controversy between the Śāṁkara and the Mādhva schools on this point, it is interesting that the Mādhva philosophers have refrained from making it a point of criticism. The later Post-Śaṁkarites, e.g., Madhusūdana have, however, availed this opportunity for proving the absolute identity of jīva and Brahman.

In his *Advaita-siddhi,*[110] he enumerates, in detail, the alternative interpretations of *aṁśatva* and concludes that the *kālpanika* (imaginary) character of *aṁśatva* is the only possibility that is logically valid.

CHAPTER X

THE DOCTRINE OF MUKTI

§1. INTRODUCTORY

Mukti has been, since the inception of philosophical investigation in India, the ideal of human achievement whose realization is supposed to bring eternal bliss and the consequent destruction of all sorrows and sufferings. Almost every system of Indian philosophy, with the exception of Cārvāka materialism, conceives of it as a goal of philosophical enquiry, moral discipline and religious devotion. This state is the ideal of the human will that seeks freedom from earthly bondage and pangs of mortality. It is a state of freedom, immortality and everlasting bliss. The two systems of Indian philosophy whose exposition we have undertaken in this book, the schools of Śaṁkara and Madhva, also recognize *mukti* as the ideal of human life. Consequently, they have formulated their own doctrines of *mokṣa* in which they have not only described the means of acquiring this state but have also undertaken an analysis of the Supreme Experience. We may, therefore, discuss, in detail, their respective positions on this particular problem and their mutual criticisms and counter-criticisms where the same have been undertaken.

§2. SAṀKARITE CONCEPTION OF MUKTI

During the course of our exposition of Vedānta philosophy we have emphasized the fundamental Vedāntic proposition that Brahman is the only reality and that the individual soul is identical with It whose nature is pure-consciousness, existence and bliss. Closely following the *Upaniṣads*, Śaṁkara maintains that the Self in its ultimate nature is full of bliss whose manifestation in the jīvātman is obstructed by the principle of *avidyā*. He repeatedly asserts his[1] conviction that though the real nature of Ātman is pure, free from evil, unitary, eternal, beyond body and mind and effulgent bliss yet on account of *avidyā* it is subjected to the world-order and obtains all its impurities. The idea of emancipation, according to Śaṁkara, therefore, is not a matter of acquisition but is a question of self-realization. By nature, the Self is eternally free and is never subject to bondage but under the influence of *avidyā* and its effects it feels and understands as if it is in bondage. For our emancipation we have not to desire and labour for the achievement of any celestial region but to seek the light within us through the destruction of *avidyā* which occurs only at the rise of knowledge. Just as a man who has forgotten about the rosary in his neck obtains it when told by someone that it is in his neck, similarly, the achievement of *mokṣa* is only a realization of the true nature of Ātman through the instructions of such *mahā-vākyas* as, 'Thou art that', 'This Ātman is Brahman', etc., and other Vedāntic texts. Thus, the problem of emancipation is only a problem of the removal of *avidyā* whose destruction instantaneously reveals the true self. The removal of *avidyā* is, however, possible only through *jñāna* and not through anything else. The appearance of knowledge at the proper time when the *antaḥkaraṇa* is completely purified destroys the veil of *avidyā* and brings our deliverance. In the words of Śaṁkara, "The knowledge that the Self is Brahman beyond abandonment and acquisitions would, by destroying all pain, bring the greatest good."[2]

An important question has been repeatedly posed regarding the nature of *mokṣa* by the various thinkers of Indian philosophy, the question whether the state of *mokṣa* is positive or negative. From what has been stated about Śaṁkara's philosophy in the preceding pages of this book, it is not difficult to understand that the nature of *mokṣa* which is only a realization of Ātman is always positive. There is no question of the state of *mokṣa* having any separate existence from Brahman when Brahman is the only reality. 'The knower of Brahman', as the *Upaniṣad*[3] says, 'becomes Brahman Itself', a positive state of knowledge and bliss.

What is fundamental about the question of *mokṣa* is its eternality. The search after *mokṣa* is grounded on an important presupposition, the presupposition that this state will never come to an end. As the *Upaniṣad* says, "He will never return to this earth".[4] The Nyāya conception of *mokṣa* as the cessation of pain is hardly consistent with the presupposition of its eternality and the everlasting character of this state. *Mokṣa*, if it is to be eternal, should not be understood in terms of negation. The cessation of pain, as Gitsukha contends, is not the end[5] or the *puruṣārtha* (i. e., *mokṣa*). The cessation of pain every where represents the absence of the obstacle in the manifestation of the blissful nature of self and as such it is only subsidiary[6] in the attainment of bliss. *Mokṣa*, therefore, is positive and not negative.

Śaṁkara's criticism of Mīmāṁsā is an illuminating commentary on his assessment of the concept of the acquisition of *mokṣa*. There he emphatically asserts that liberation is not something that can be obtained[7] (*āpya*) because, the Ātman being all pervasive, there is no second that may be the object of attainment. Nor is the state of *mokṣa* subject to modification as this would destroy the very nature of Self as pure and transcendental. *Mokṣa* or Brahman transcends all categories of thought, it pulsates with the infinite bliss and is never an object of *karma*[8]; it is a result of direct intuition or the revelation of the true nature of Self (*aparokṣānubhūti*) acquired by the destruction of *avidyā* in the event of right knowledge.

As stated above, the problem of *mokṣa* is really the problem of the removal of Nescience. Fortunately, this aspect of the idea of *mokṣa* has received greater attention in the Post-Śaṁkarite literature where the causality of *avidyā* in producing *saṁskāra* together with its sorrows and sufferings has been elaborately discussed. They have emphasized the point that because *avidyā* is the source of all trouble its annihilation is really the aim of our achievement; the removal of *avidyā*, according to them, is really what is known as emancipation. Here we quote a passage from Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* to demonstrate this tendency and to explain that the removal of *avidyā* is the real problem and the crux of the Vedānta conception of *mokṣa*. Sureśvara argues, "As there exists in every living thing from Brahma down to a tuft of grass, a natural desire to be free from every description of pain, a spontaneous effort is made to get rid of it. But as pain owes its existence solely to the body, which again is the result of previously accumulated merit and demerit, it cannot be eradicated. Merit and its opposite too, being the fruit of prescribed and interdicted actions, cannot be averted. Action, too, cannot be avoided because it is the outcome of desire and aversion; nor can these, because they depend upon attractive and repulsive appearances; and this appearance cannot, because it is the effect of an ill-considered belief in the existence of duality; neither can duality be got rid of because, after the manner of nacre taken for silver, it is caused solely by the ignorance of the self-existent secondless one. Therefore, ignorance of the Self is the sole cause of every ill. And it is ignorance that conceals happiness, which, because it is the essence of Self, is unfluctuating and independent. When, therefore, ignorance is completely dispelled, the acme of all human desire is reached."[9]

This emphasis on *avidyānivṛtti* (the annihilation of ignorance) has led the Post-Śaṁkarites to discuss the nature of this state because of its apparent negative character. Instead of discussing the nature of *mokṣa*, they have discussed the nature of *avidyānivṛtti* which, in their view, is the synonym of *mukti.* As Citsukha opines, in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, "The definition of *mokṣa* is the total annihilation of *avidyā* along with its various effects."[10]

What is the nature of the state of the annihilation of *avidyā* ? Is it real or *anirvacanīya* ? According to the author of *Brahma-siddhi*,[11] because the state of the sublation of *avidyā* is identical with Brahmahood, it would be inaccurate to imagine any other form of reality in this state. The reality of *avidyānivṛtti* is the same as the ultimate *pāramārthika-sattā* of Brahman. Ānandabodhācārya, however, differs and contends in his two important works, viz., *Nyāya-makaranda* and *Pramāṇa-mālā*, that the state of the annihilation of *avidyā* has a different reality which is not explicable in any of the four forms of conceptual knowledge. According to him, this state is not real because its acceptance would introduce[12] dualism in Advaita philosophy. The *Brahma-siddhi* view is untenable because the identification of *avidyānivṛtti* with Ātman would make it eternal and we would be confronting a paradoxical conclusion that *avidyānivṛtti* is eternal. This state is also not unreal (*asat*) because, then, it would not be an achievement of knowledge for no one has ever heard of the efficacy of knowledge in revealing unreal entities. We also cannot assert that this state is both real and unreal (*satāsat*) because this would introduce an irresolvable contradiction inherent in such a conception. Why not, then, admit that this state is *anirvacanīya* ? In reply to this the author of *Nyāya-makaranda* asserts that because an *anirvacanīya* existence has always a beginning and has *avidyā* for its material-cause one would be justifying the existence of *avidyā* even in the state of *mokṣa* in his enthusiasm to establish the *anirvacanīya* character of *avidyānivṛtti.* Because *mokṣa* is the annihilation of *avidyā*, the philosophy of the *anirvacanīya* existence of this state would mean that the material-cause of inexplicability, i.e., *avidyā*, is present during the state of *mokṣa* because no existence that is *anirvacanīya* can be conceived as existing apart from its material-cause. Ānandabodha, therefore, concludes[13] that the annihilation of *avidyā* is of the fifth order of reality which is neither *sat* nor *asat* nor *satāsat* nor *anirvacanīya*.

Advaita Vidyācārya suggests a different[14] alternative. He asserts that the state of *avidyānivṛtti* occurring just after Brahma-realization is different from *mokṣa* and is only momentary. Just as when we conceive of the origination of an entity after *prāgabhāva* we imagine of a moment in which we think that the entity is being produced after which it really comes into existence, similarly, we can think of a moment about which it may be argued that in it the soul is being liberated. This, according to Advaita Vidyācārya, is the moment of *avidyānivṛtti* which is different from the state of liberation. This assertion of the difference of the moment of *avidyānivṛtti* from the state of liberation would not subject it to Ānandabodha's criticism even if its *anirvacanīya* character is acknowledged. Citsukha, in his[15] *Tattvapradīpikā*, however, formulates a view that is almost identical with that of Maṇḍana in his *Brahma-siddhi*. According to him, the sublation of *avidyā* is nothing else but Ātman just as the contradiction of the knowledge of silver in the illusion of silver in nacre is nothing else but nacre. The reality of the sublation of Nescience is, therefore, not at all different from Brahman.

Here it is necessary to remark that the interpretations of Citsukha and Maṇḍana regarding the concept of the annihilation of *avidyā* are more faithful and reflect truly the conception of the founder of Vedānta. The later discussions on this problem, a few typical examples of which have been given above in the expositions of Ānandabodhācārya and Advaita Vidyācārya, are mere dialectical wranglings that have imposed a sort of intellectual abstraction to their idea of *avidyānivṛtti*. They have first conceived *avidyānivṛtti* in abstraction from the idea of *mokṣa* and Ātman and then tried to ascertain its character. As a matter of fact, the sublation of *avidyā* is nothing but the manifestation of the true nature of Self which has been veiled by Nescience. Though the annihilation of *ajñāna* is essential for the revelation of Self, yet it would be too much to scratch our heads for determining the nature if its reality. When one realizes Brahman there is nothing else but Brahman and this is really the state of emancipation. Notwithstanding this position, from the ultimate standpoint, it may be asserted that just as we determine the nature of the world we may also discuss the nature of Nescience. To this it may be replied that then this annihilation has the same order of reality as the world.

With regard to the Śaṁkarite conception of *mokṣa* it is often asked whether this state preserves the individuality of the jīva or not. From our understanding of the Vedānta conception of the Ultimate Reality it may not be difficult for us to realize that there is absolutely no possibility of the continuance of the individuality of the soul after its liberation. Individuality, according to Śaṁkara, is only *aupādhika* and is ultimately lost in the state of *mukti*. When all is Brahman, why should the jīva retain its jīva-hood ?

Some modern interpreters of Śaṁkara's Vedānta, probably in their zeal to defend him against the criticism of the West that no ethics is possible in his system, have tried to show that Śaṁkara's philosophy admits the presence of individuality during *mokṣa* and that his concept of liberation is not the shaking off of individuality but its expansion. This view to our reflection is not a true interpretation of Śaṁkara who has been consistently opposed to the idea that the state of liberation can be an object of some action. We may no doubt agree to the concept of expansion from the point of view of the destruction of the impurities of *antaḥkaraṇa* and to the attainment of spirituality yet to introduce this concept to the Śaṁkarite idea of *mokṣa* would be wholly unwarranted. The state of *mokṣa* is the ultimate state of Brahman and possesses no individuality as contemplated in Rāmānuja's system.

§3. MĀDHVA CONCEPTION OF MUKTI

Like the Śaṁkarites, the idea of liberation in the Mādhva system is not only the cessation of pain but is also the acquisition of positive bliss. What constitutes the difference between these two systems, therefore, is not this aspect of their philosophy of *mokṣa* but the process and the means of its achievement in the context of their respective philosophies.

From Madhva who is a pioneer of the philosophy of the ultimate difference between God and souls where God being the independent and supreme reality rules over the jīvas that are dependent on Him for their existence, actions and capabilities it may be expected that he would propound such a doctrine of emancipation that would leave the individual soul completely at the mercy of the Divine Creator. As a realist, Madhva was constrained to acknowledge the reality of both bondage and release unlike the Śaṁkarites who in order to maintain the destruction of bondage through knowledge propagated its unreality and, consequently, of emancipation also. Madhva's philosophy of bondage and release as real events is the foundation on which he constructs the edifice of his doctrine of *mukti*.

While commenting on the sūtra, '*Janmādyasya yataḥ*', Madhva defines Brahman as the cause of creation[16], sustenance, destruction of the world and its control and also of knowledge, ignorance, bondage and release. He further quotes *Skanda-purāṇa* to demonstrate that both bondage and release are caused by the Omniscient Lord. It is, therefore, a settled conviction with him and his followers that Lord alone can deliver the soul from its earthly bondage; His Benediction is the ultimate instrument in its attainment. As argued by Jaya-Tīrtha, because only he who gives bondage can[17] release, emancipation is possible only through the meditation and worship of Viṣṇu which arouse His Benediction.

What is actually the nature of *mokṣa* in Madhva's philosophy ? Is it only the termination of the association of the jīva with its gross and subtle bodies, or, is it blissful also ? As we have discussed in our chapter, '*The Conception of Individual Soul*', Madhva's system also conceives of jīvātman as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* whose character as *cit* and *ānanda* remain unmanifested on account of *avidyā*. When the jīva after having acquired the requisite *bhakti* and *jñāna* is blessed with the Grace of God, the obstructing sheet of ignorance is destroyed and the inherent bliss of the jīvātman is manifested. This manifestation of the real nature of jīva is the state of *mokṣa*, a positive state overbrimmed with bliss effulgent. Though this concept of *mokṣa* as the removal of *avidyā* and the manifestation of the true nature of Ātman may appear to bear similarity with the Śaṁkarite doctrine, yet the two ideologies are different. In Śaṁkara *avidyā* is destroyed directly by knowledge but in Madhva's philosophy it can be destroyed only when the Lord so wishes or when the devotee has obtained His Blessings (*Īśvara-prasāda*). Moreover, the manifestation of bliss in the emancipated souls is never identical, though it may be at the most similar, as conceived in the

Śaṁkara School of Vedānta. The removal of *avidyā* in Madhva's system is real and not false as contemplated in the Śaṁkara philosophy. When the emancipated soul shakes off its *avidyā* by the Divine Grace it enjoys such bliss as bears similarity with the supreme bliss of *Paramātman.* The state of *mokṣa* in Mādhva philosophy, therefore, is the manifestation of such *ānanda* as is similar to the unlimited[18] *ānanda* of *Viṣṇu.*

Another interesting feature of Madhva's conception of *mokṣa* is his formulation of the doctrine of the gradation in *mukti.* As argued in *Yuktimallikā,* "Because we see difference in the *sādhanā* of gods, etc., therefore, we should acknowledge difference in their results also which would mean that the emancipated souls are lower and higher in themselves. If we do not accept gradation in *mokṣa,* we would be guilty of allowing to someone what is not due to him and to the other denying what is actually due to him".[19] Thus, because both *bhakti* and knowledge are different in different individuals the concept of the gradation of *mukti* follows by way of logical consequence.

The four types of *mukti* known to the Vaiṣṇavites by way of the tradition of the Bhāgavat and Pāñcarātra schools, viz., *sālokya, sārupya, sāmīpya* and *sāyujya,* may also be explained on the basis of the conception of the gradation of *mokṣa.* As a matter of fact, *sāyūjya* which is the state of the full manifestation of the blissful nature of Ātman on account of which it acquires a sort of oneness with God is the real *mukti,* whereas, all else are lower and wanting in perfection. In the other three kinds of *muktis* the manifestation of the real nature of Ātman is not perfect. The reason for this gradual rise to the final state of *mukti,* i. e., *sāyujya,* is the gradual increase in the knowledge of the emancipated soul. As explained by Madhva in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya,* "Here also through the increase in knowledge, by way of gradual development, the jīvas, who are proximate to the Supreme Being acquire *sālokya, sāmīpya, sārūpya* and *sāyujya.*"[20]

On the question of the presence of individuality in the state of *mokṣa* also the Mādhva philosophers are opposed to the Śaṁkarite stand. Not only do they confirm the presence of individuality in the state of *mukti* but they also enunciate the philosophy of the enjoyment of the *mukta-jīvas.* According to them, the liberated souls enjoy the same *bhogas* as are[21] enjoyed by *Paramātman.* This acceptance of enjoyment in *mokṣa*, however, does not subject the jīva to the transmigratory order of existence because the enjoyments of the liberated souls are quite unearthly and divine.

Another important contribution of Mādhva philosophy on the problem of emancipation is their acquiescence in the presence of *upāsanā* during the state of *mokṣa* which they perform at their sweet will without any desire for result. The difference between the devotions of the bound and the emancipated souls consists in the fact that, whereas, the former always worship with some ulterior motive the latter perform *upāsanā* without any desire for fruit as the emancipated souls have already transcended the very idea[22] of desire.

From this account of the Mādhva doctrine of *mokṣa* one can well realize that its formulation is quite antagonistic to the Śaṁkarite explanation of this problem. The range of the controversy between the two systems is restricted not only to what may be dealt with within such a section as '*The Conception of Mukti*' but spreads far and wide to other philosophical questions as well. Here we shall discuss only one aspect of their criticism which is of considerable philosophical value, the problem of *avidyānivṛtti*.

§4. MĀDHVA CRITICISM AND ITS EVALUATION

The problem of the annihilation of *avidyā* is discussed, at length, by Vyāsa-Tīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta*. According to him, if the annihilation of *avidyā* be identical with *mokṣa* what would be the nature of this annihilation ? Is it of the nature of Ātman or identical with it and in the latter case is it real or false ? None of these alternatives, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, can save the Śaṁkarite standpoint from a logical catastrophe. The position that the removal of *avidyā* is nothing but Ātman as conditioned (*upalakṣita*) by the character of being known, chiefly upheld by Citsukhācārya, is vehemently criticized by Vyāsa-Tīrtha on the ground that this would establish the futility of the Śaṁkarite endeavour to achieve this removal because it, being identical with Ātman, is already existent and self-evident. The Śaṁkarites may reply that *mokṣa* should not be misunderstood as pure, transcendental and blissful Ātman unrelated with Nescience. Instead, it is Ātman as conditioned by the final *vṛtti*, produced by the hearing, etc., of the Vedānta texts, that destroys the veil of *ajñāna*. This interpretation of *mokṣa* as Ātman conditioned by the final *vṛtti* is criticized by Vyāsa-Tīrtha on the ground that even this is incapable of defending the Śaṁkarite position. An entity conditioned by *vṛtti* should be existent even prior to conditioning in the same way as it exists posterior to destruction. Similarly, the Brahma-consciousness[23] conditioned by the final *vṛtti* must also have existence prior to the event of the destruction of *avidyā* that would establish the existence of *mokṣa* even during the presence of Nescience. Because the explanation of emancipation in Śāṁkara Vedānta is only Ātman as conditioned by the final *vṛtti*, the existence of Ātman and, consequently, of *mokṣa* also prior to the event of the destruction of bondage would follow by way of logical necessity. The Śaṁkarites would be facing an insurmountable difficulty in case they start with the presumption that *avidyānivṛtti* is identical with Ātman.

Again, if the Śaṁkarites propose that *avidyānivṛtti* is both different from Ātman and is real then this would introduce dualism in the Śāṁkara philosophy and would destroy its *advaita*. The last alternative which seeks to explain *avidyānivṛtti* as *anirvacanīya* is also untenable[24] because *anirvacanīyatā* always presupposes the existence of *avidyā*. Because an *anirvacanīya* existence is always a superimposed entity it must presuppose the existence of Nescience, its material-cause. Thus the explanation of *avidyānivṛtti* as *anirvacanīya* always concludes in its having a vestige of Nescience which is contradictory.

Further, when the Advaitins define inexplicability as a type of reality which is contradicted by knowledge and is the counter-positive of absolute negation it would be illogical for them to argue in favour of the inexplicable character of *avidyānivṛtti* or *mokṣa* unless they intend to establish[25] the sublatable character of *mokṣa* itself contrary to their conception of *mokṣa* as eternal. Ānandabodhācārya's solution of this difficulty by suggesting the nature and the status of *avidyānivṛtti* as of the fifth order has also been disparaged by the Mādhva philosophers. The principal argument of their criticism consists in demonstrating that because the Śaṁkarite principle of Nescience itself[26] is illogical there can be neither any fourth nor the fifth order of existence. The reasons for their disparagement of the principle of Nescience have already been discussed in the chapter, '*The Theory of Knowledge*', and as such they may not be undertaken here. According to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, the doctrine of *mokṣa* as of the fifth order of reality is a Bauddha conception. He quotes a *kārikā* from a Buddhist work to demonstrate that this[27] doctrine is only Buddhism in disguise.

Madhusūdana, in his *Advaita-siddhi*,[28] refutes the Mādhva criticism with such arguments as are reminiscent of Citsukha's treatment of this problem. According to him, the nature of emancipation or the sublation of *avidyā* has been correctly defined as Ātman conditioned by the final *vṛtti*. Though it is true that the conditioned entity exists even prior to conditioning as much as it exists afterwards, yet the form in which it exists is slightly different. The familiar example of the cook as given by Citsukhācārya, in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, aptly[29] illustrates this distinction. Just as a 'cook' is not associated with the epithet 'cook' prior to the act of cooking, similarly, the existence of Ātman prior to its being conditioned by the final *vṛtti* is only in its *svarūpa* and not as an entity conditioned by *vṛtti*. This difference would justify the contention that the existence of Ātman prior to its being conditioned is not exposed to the criticism that the Vedānta view would necessarily conclude in the assertion of *mokṣa* even when the *avidyā* is not destroyed.

We have already recorded our reaction against the doctrine of *mokṣa* as the fifth order of reality and have disagreed with the contention that this theory is a faithful interpretation of the Vedānta conception of liberation. This doctrine, however, could not claim any other exponent after Ānandabodha. As remarked by Madhusūdana, in his *Advaita-siddhi*, "The doctrines of the fifth order and others are only for the understanding of the people of low intellect."[30]

§5. THE CONCEPTION OF JĪVANMUKTI

The presence of the state of *jīvanmukti* may be understood from such passages from the *Upaniṣads* and the *Bhagavadgītā* as tell of the realized soul having transgressed all opposition (*dvandva*) that is the essence of *saṁsāra*. The *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* referring to the *jīvanmukta* says, "When for the *jñānī* all *bhutas* have become Ātman itself, then, how can there be any sorrow or infatuation for him who sees the one pure Ātman in everything."[31] The same idea is expressed in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*[32] when it is said that when the wise man realizes the Great all-pervasive Ātman which causes the appearance and the cognition of the objects of the dream and the waking states he is not subjected to any sorrow. The *Bhagavadgītā* devotes as many as seven ślokas in chapter II for[33] describing the behaviour of the *sthitiprajña* soul the sum and substance of which lies in communicating the idea that the realized soul becomes free from all evil influences of *saṁsāra* such as attachment, infatuation, sorrow, fear, anger, etc. When the ignorance of the saint is destroyed through right knowledge, his *buddhi* becomes capable of understanding what is only truth and is not driven away by the powerful evil forces of the *saṁsāra*.

These references from the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Upaniṣads* justify the Śaṁkarite proposition of the existence of the saint who after realizing the true nature of Ātman shakes off all sense of difference and is free from the characteristic qualities of the transmigratory order. As Vidyāraṇya maintains in his *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, "All the *vṛttis* of the *antaḥkaraṇa* being annihilated there is no occasion for them to rise again."[34] The *jīvanmukta* is free from the operations of the *indriyas* that have, by nature, a tendency to refer to the external objects notwithstanding the fact that he is still a soul caged in the gross and the subtle bodies. The difference between a *jīvanmukta* and a *videhamukta* consists not in the nature[35] of their emancipation but in the circumstance of the former's possessing the physical organism and the sense-organs, whereas, the latter is without them. The conception of *jīvanmukti* in the Śāṁkara school essentially involves a change in the attitude of man towards world and life. It is different from the attitude of the ordinary, ignorant and vulgar people in the sense that it understands correctly the existence of life in the context of the ultimate nature of Reality and is full of spirituality.

A question is generally raised with regard to the philosophy of *jīvanmukti* in the works of the Śāṁkara and its rival schools. If *mukti* is the annihilation of *ajñāna*, the material-cause of all phenomena, how can the *jīvanmukta* continue to possess a physical organism and a subtle body ? The Vedānta solution of this difficulty has assumed diverse aspects. Śaṁkara resolved this difficulty by contending that the *prārabdha-karma* is responsible for the delay in the destruction of the physical body after the *avidyā* has been dispelled by the light of right knowledge. Śaṁkara contends in his *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, "The *prārabdha-karma* of the wise man is decidedly stronger. Its destruction is possible only through its experience (*bhoga*). Besides, the accumulated (*sañcit*) and the future *karmas* can be destroyed by the fire of the right knowledge of Truth."[36] Śaṁkara seems to support the doctrine that though knowledge is capable of destroying the *sañcit* and the *kriyamāṇa karmas*, it is incapable of destroying the *prārabdha-karmas* that are destructible only through enjoyment as propagated later on by Padmapāda[37] and others.

But this difficulty is too powerful to be resolved so easily. If *avidyā* is destroyed completely at the rise of true knowledge, how can the *jīvanmukta* have a physical organism ? Śaṁkara simply evades this problem by contending that the doctrine of *karma* as an explanation of the *jīvanmukta's* physical presence is only for explaining truth to the unintelligent people;[38] in reality, from the absolute point of view, there is neither any accumulated, future or *prārabdha karma*.

This point has been raised by almost all the opponents of Vedānta and the virulence of their attack forced the Śaṁkarites to give serious consideration to the problem of the *jīvanmukta's* body. In Post-Śaṁkarite philosophy this question is explained by offering two different theories. One of these maintains that the *saṁskāras* of the past experiences are responsible for the continuance of the *jīvanmukta's* body, whereas, the other asserts the existence of residual *avidyā* (*avidyāleśa*) as the cause of the *jīvanmukta's* body. The protagonists of the former view elaborate their standpoint by such illustrations as the continuance of the fear of serpent for sometime after the removal of the illusion of snake in the rope. For the supporters of the latter view the problem is not so difficult as they admit the presence of *avidyāleśa* that can easily account for the life of the *jīvanmukta*. But, how is it that this residual *avidyā* is not destroyed by right knowledge ?

The Śaṁkarite explanation of the continuance of the *jīvanmukta's* body is vehemently criticized by Vyāsa-Tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*,[39] according to whom the Vedānta conception of *jīvanmukti* is absolutely incompatible with their philosophy that *avidyā* is destroyed by knowledge and that the annihilation of *avidyā* is *mokṣa*. Because *saṁskāra*, the gross and the subtle bodies of the *jīvanmukta*, and the *prārabdha-karmas* are positive effects, they must, according to Vyāsa-Tīrtha, possess some material-cause which can be nothing else but *avidyā*. This would mean that the *avidyā* persists even after its destruction which is contradictory. The Advaitins often reply this criticism by arguing that the continuance of the *jīvanmukta's* physical form should be understood on the analogy of the perception of two moons through some ocular defect despite the fact that the existence of one moon has been fully comprehended by him. But Vyāsa-Tīrtha replies that such a contention would give rise to fresh complications. The recurrence of the two moons is an instance where the illusion is not contradicted by knowledge alone and as such the explanation of *jīvanmukti* on its analogy would prove only the truth of the assumption that the world-appearance is not[40] removable by knowledge.

Moreover, the doctrine of *avidyāleśa* endeavouring to explain the existence of the *jīvanmukta* through the slight vestiges of *avidyā* like the dying embers of fire is also unjustified. Vyāsa-Tīrtha asks as to what is the intention of the word '*leśa*'. Does it mean a part of *avidyā* or a form of it ? Or, is its intention to convey the idea that *avidyāleśa* is only the burnt *avidyā* like the burnt ashes of the cloth ? The first and the last alternatives[41] may not be acceptable because *avidyā* in Vedānta is always *niravayava*. Unless the idea of part-hood is introduced in the conception of *avidyā* the Śaṁkarites may never be in a position to explain *avidyāleśa* either as a part of *avidyā* or as its burnt condition.

It may be worth our pains to elaborate here the Śaṁkarite conception of *leśa* as *ākāra* or form which has been later on interpreted by Madhusūdana as a power[42] (*śakti*). This interpretation introduces to the conception of *avidyāleśa* the special meaning that Nescience has several capacities, as contemplated in the mantra, '*Indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa iyata*', out of which one continues to be undestroyed even after its annihilation by knowledge. Citsukha while developing this idea in his *Tattvapradīpikā* writes, "There are several forms or aspects of *avidyā* out of which one is the cause of the deception about the Absolute Reality, the second projects the phenomenal objects possessing causal-efficacy and the third projects the form of the objects that are only appearances in immediate experience."[43] The first aspect of *avidyā* is the *āvaraṇa-śakti*, whereas, the other two are the forms of *vikṣepa-śakti*. Citsukha further explains that though the first two powers[44] of *ajñāna* are destroyed by *vidyā* or the knowledge of Brahman yet the third persists as long as the impediment of the *prārabdha karma* is not destroyed. Though *vidyā* has the power to destroy *avidyā* in toto, yet the presence of the powerful *prārabdha-*

karma as an obstacle restricts its operation for[45] a period, i. e., the life of the *jīvanmukta* after his realization. As soon as the fruits of the accumulated actions have been fully enjoyed by the emancipated soul he shakes off the body in the state of *samādhi* and enters into the state of *videha-mukti*. This explanation, according to Citsukha, does not contradict the Śaṁkarite proposition that *avidyā* is destroyed by knowledge because the presence of obstacle only obstructs the operation of a particular capacity and does not[46] prove its absence. Just as when the cloud veils the sun it simply obstructs the rays but does not disprove the luminous nature of the sun, the existence of the *prārabdha-karma* only hinders the power of knowledge in producing the result, i. e., the annihilation of *avidyā*, and does not establish the absence of such a capacity in knowledge.

With this digression we go back to our analysis of Vyāsa-Tīrtha's criticism where be quotes profusely from[47] Citsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā* as the prima-facie view. In his scathing attack he not only deprecates the doctrine of the three aspects of *avidyā* but also criticizes the efficacy of *prārabdha-karma* as an impediment of the natural capacity of knowledge in destroying ignorance. According to him, Citsukha's enunciation suffers badly from the fallacy of mutual dependence. The existence and continuance of *karma* in *jīvanmukti* state, according to Vedānta, has its cause in *avidyāleśa* and when Citsukha explains this *avidyāleśa* as caused by *prārabdha-karma* he is clearly oblivious of the lurking fallacy of interdependence.

Moreover, the proposition that *prārabdha-karma* is destructible by enjoyment alone would demonstrate the incorrectness of the Vedānta definition of falsity as that which is removable by knowledge. If it is to be false it must be destructible by knowledge. And the Vedantins cannot afford to assert that the *prārabdha-karma* is not false as this would mean the assertion of another reality apart from Brahman.

The Advaitins such as Madhusūdana[48] and Kāśmīraka Sadānanda have argued that the existence of *saṁskāra* is not in need of any material-cause. As Madhusūdana contends in his *Advaita-siddhi*, negation posterior to existence is not in need of any *samavāyi-kāraṇa* for its existence. Because saṁskāra is only negation posterior to existence, as interpreted in *Gauḍa-brahmānandī*,[49] its continuance does not require any material-cause. It may not be out of place to mention that the Naiyāyikas who acknowledge the destruction of the effect after the destruction of the *samovāyi-kāraṇa* also admit the continuance of the existence of the effect for one moment after the destruction of the cause. This existence of the effect for one moment is, however, without any material-cause. There is, therefore, nothing illogical in the Śaṁkarite assertion that negation posterior to existence is without a material-cause.

§6. KNOWLEDGE AS MEANS TO LIBERATION

Śaṁkara, in his commentaries on *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Brahma-sūtra*, repeatedly asserts that the deliverance of man from his bondage is possible only through knowledge and that the other requisites such as *karma*, *upāsanā*, etc., are only means for its attainment. The rise of the true knowledge of Self or the *vidyā* destroys the false notion about the Self as identical with body, the *indriyas*, the *manas* and the intellect by destroying *avidyā* which is the root cause of the false superimposition between the Self and the not-self. The direct experience of the Self as the transcendent pure-consciousness which is not subject to any change, the *aparokṣānubhūti*, destroys our false notion about the ego as the real self and, thereby, destroys all bondage which is caused only by false knowledge. *Vidyā* or self-realization, therefore, is the ultimate instrument in the attainment of *mokṣa*.

Knowledge as the ultimate instrument of emancipation should not be misunderstood in the sense of empirical knowledge as done by many of the rivals of Śaṁkara's philosophy. Śaṁkara was himself conscious of such a misgiving. In his commentaries he occasionally distinguishes between the *parā* and the *aparā-vidyā*. According to him, it is only the *parā-vidyā* that is the ultimate instrument in the achievement of *mokṣa* and not the *aparā* or the lower one which is only empirical and implies the distinction between the knower, the knowledge and the known. *Parā-vidyā*, according to Śaṁkara, is the knowledge that relates to[50] the Supreme Reality and *aparā* is the one that is related to the *vyavahāra* or the phenomenal order. *Aparā*, as Śaṁkara says, is only an aspect of *avidyā* as distinct from the *parā* which leads to self-realization or the removal of *ajñāna*.

It may be asked : What is the real nature of the *parā-vidyā* which is the ultimate instrument in the attainment of liberation ? Is it only the mediate verbal knowledge gathered from the *Upaniṣads* and other scriptures, or, is it the intuitional experience (*aparokṣānubhūti*) that in one flash destroys the principle of *ajñāna* and reveals the pure transcendental consciousness of Brahman. Though an answer to this question from the Śaṁkarite point of view is not simple yet a little deliberation may solve this difficulty. For understanding the correct import of the term *parā-vidyā*, it is expedient to enquire into the meaning of the term '*vidyā*'. Vācaspati, in his *Bhāmatī*, defines[51] it as the knowledge that transcends all doubts or is the one that has realized its object in such a way as to provide no ground for the recurrence of doubt with regard to its validity. According to him, it is an essential condition of *vidyā* that it transcends all doubt. While applying this definition to the concept of *parā-vidyā* it may be contended that only that knowledge can be taken to be *parā* which reveals the true nature of Self; in other words, it is self-realization itself. As Śaṁkara asserts, it is the *parā-vidyā* which brings the realization of the unity in all by knowing which all else is known. Had it been the intention of Śaṁkara and the Upaniṣadic seers that the mediate verbal knowledge as imparted by the *śruti* is really 'wisdom' or the '*parā-vidyā*' then one would have expected that it alone may bring self-realization and the unflinching conviction that Ātman is Brahman. But *sravana* alone without *manana* and *nididdhyāsana* is incapable of revealing the truth. *Parā*, therefore, is not the knowledge produced by the hearing of the Vedānta texts alone but is the realization of the true nature of Self arising out of the conjoined action of hearing, reasoning and concentration.

Madhva was, however, disinclined to accept this opinion. According to him, bondage which is real can be removed not through knowledge but only through the Benediction[52] of Iśvara (*Iśvara-prasāda*). Though knowledge has its own importance as a means to the achievement of this blessing, yet it does not acquire that ultimate position as it is in the Śāṁkara school. The efficacy of knowledge in the attainment of liberation with Madhva is, therefore, inferior to that of Śaṁkara. When through *bhakti* and the knowledge of Iśvara the devotee is in[53] a position to get the Supreme Mercy he through His desire becomes free from the clutches of the *vaiṣṇavi-māyā*.

It may be observed that the Grace of God in the Mādhva system is of three kinds in accordance with its dependence on the three kinds of devotees (*jñānis*). The lowest of them, acquired through *karma*, brings[54] not deliverance but *svarga* to the agent. The second or the middle one is caused by hearing, etc., of the nature of

Īśvara and brings to man what is known as the *janaloka* (the earth). The third or the Supreme Benediction which is acquired through the knowledge of the true nature of God liberates the soul from bondage. Thus, it is only the supreme Benediction of Īśvara that is actually the ultimate instrument in the attainment of *mokṣa.*

What is actually the position and the utility of knowledge in Mādhva system and why does Madhva recognize the importance of knowledge if it is not the ultimate instrument in the attainment of *mokṣa* ? Though Madhva does not recognize the ultimate importance of knowledge, yet he gives to knowledge an important place in the hierarchy of the different means that ultimately lead to *mokṣa* without which his own labour in writing so many commentaries would have been futile.

The process of the attainment of *mokṣa*, as explained by Madhva and his followers, may easily disclose the position of knowledge in the hierarchy of the means that bring in the deliverance of man. Jaya-Tīrtha, in his *Tattvaprakāśikā,* writes[55] that liberation is possible only through God's Grace which in turn is blessed only on those who possess the correct knowledge of God. Again, the right knowledge about Īśvara can be acquired only by those who have heard from the *śrutis* the true nature of Īśvara, have reasoned over it and have fully meditated over its contents. But, this hearing, etc., would be impossible without the worship of God which in turn is caused by hearing about His greatness along with the renunciation of the desires for worldly objects (*vairāgya*) as enjoined in the śruti, '*Parīkṣya lokān karmacitān brāhmaṇo nirvedamāyāt*'.

It is thus clear that the causal chain terminating in emancipation begins, in the Mādhva system, with the hearing of the greatness of Īśvara along with the detachment from worldly affairs. These two, viz., *māhātmya* and *vairāgya,* inculcate in the aspirant a feeling of devotion towards the Almighty that is called *bhakti.* On account of this devotion the aspirant hears about the nature of Īśvara, concentrates on it and the Lord being pleased with the devotee imparts to him the right knowledge about Himself or reveals to him His true nature. It is an important contention in Mādhva philosophy that Īśvara cannot be known unless[56] He reveals Himself. This knowledge produces what is known as *Īśvara-prasāda* which is the ultimate cause of *mokṣa.* It is, thus, clear that though Madhva understands the utility of knowledge, yet it is neither so independent nor ultimate in his philosophy as in the system of Saṁkarācārya.

§7. BHAKTI AS MEANS TO LIBERATION

The contribution of Śaṁkara's conception of *bhakti* as a means to knowledge is not so great on account of the inferior position that *bhakti* acquires in his philosophy as it is due to the historical event of being the cause of a great revolt in Indian philosophy, the Bhakti movement. This movement against Śaṁkara's conception of *bhakti* which began with the virulent attacks of Rāmānuja continued approximately for seven centuries and claimed a galaxy of such great masters of Indian thought as Madhva, Vallabha, Nimbārka and Caitanya who were the founders of the different schools of Vedānta. It has been an unanimous contention with almost all of them that in the system of Śaṁkara preaching the unity of jīva and Brahman there is hardly any place for *bhakti* and that without *bhakti* no liberation from the bondage of *saṁsāra* is ever possible. Madhva, being one of the pillars of the Vaiṣṇavite movement and the follower of the *Bhāgavat* and the *Pāñcarātra* culture, was also constrained to acknowledge and establish the supremacy of *bhakti* much more than what was assigned to it by Śaṁkara though his treatment too could not establish it as superior to knowledge. It is impossible to discuss all the tendencies of the Bhakti movement and its charges against the Śāṁkara conception; it requires a separate work in itself. We will, however, limit ourselves only to the exposition of the ideas of *bhakti* as found in the Śāṁkara and Mādhva schools and to the points of agreement and disagreement in their philosophies.

From our treatment of the Śaṁkarite conception of *mokṣa* and the means to its achievement in the preceding pages of this chapter it may be apparent that *bhakti* could not acquire the supreme status of being the ultimate cause of emancipation. From the works of Śaṁkara it may be clear that he recognizes the importance of *bhakti* only in so far as it leads through the purification of *antaḥkaraṇa* to the acquisition of the knowledge of Self. Śaṁkara, in the introduction to his commentary on the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, clearly explains this point when he writes, "These forms of meditation and worship bring about the purity of mind and character and, thereby, become illuminative of the real nature of things; to this extent they are helpful in bringing about the cognition of the one without the second."[57]

It is an essence of worship, like action, that it presupposes the idea of duality between the devotee and the object of devotion and is thus meant only for those persons who are imbued with the idea of distinction and have not transcended ignorance. *Bhakti*, according to Śaṁkara, is possible only in the *vyāvahārika* plane and is conceivable as a preparatory to the acquisition of knowledge and not as a final instrument in the attainment of liberation. Like *niṣkāma-karma*, *bhakti* with its flow of emotions towards the object of devotion which is full of infinite virtues and qualities gradually shakes off the sense of ego and infuses in the devotee the divine qualities of God. Whereas the desireless action removes the ego by abstaining from 'desire', *bhakti* does it by attuning the heart of the devotee to the rhythm of the Lord. Complete surrender which is recognized as the highest form of *bhakti* destroys the very idea of ego and qualifies him for the revelation of the real nature of Ātman.

In Śaṁkara's philosophy, as long as one is in *vyavahāra* he has to take recourse to *bhakti* which is the supreme means of acquiring the true knowledge about Self. In phenomena the concepts of 'Personal God' and 'worship' are prerequisites to the soul's passing into the transcendence of the Absolute. But, to acquiesce in the importance and place of *bhakti* as an ultimate instrument of emancipation would be, from Śaṁkara's point of view, an incorrect assessment of its capacity. *Bhakti* is instrumental in the attainment of *mokṣa* only indirectly and not directly and finally.

From the description of *bhakti* as available in Mādhva literature it may unmistakenly occur that *bhakti*, in this system, does not acquire that supreme status which is expected from a doyen of the Bhakti-movement. Though slightly superior and a little higher in steps to the place as accorded to it in the Śāṁkara school, *bhakti* remains inferior to knowledge which is recognized as the final means of evoking the Benediction of Lord. The occasional references to knowledge as a means to liberation in the works of Madhva and his followers create a feeling that the Mādhva philosophers were over-conscious of not degrading the position of knowledge, probably, due to the fear of indirectly establishing the futility of philosophical investigation. Both Madhva and Jaya-Tīrtha mention, several times, that knowledge is the only instrument of evoking God's Grace. The utility of *bhakti*[58] only consists in its being causative in the production of knowledge through *upāsanā*, which in Mādhva system is of three kinds, viz., hearing, reflection and concentration on the greatness and the real nature and qualities of Īśvara. According to Jaya-Tīrtha, the knowledge of the greatness of Īśvara and detachment of worldly objects (*vairāgya*) create a feeling[59] of love towards God which is called *bhakti*. Without the knowledge of the greatness of God no *bhakti* is ever possible. *Yuktimallikā*, however, assigns to knowledge an inferior[60] position to *bhakti* in its assertion that knowledge is necessary because in its absence no devotion is possible. This proposition if comprehended in the context of Jaya-Tīrtha's exposition of this problem would reveal that it is intelligible only in the sense of knowledge that is required in the comprehension of the greatness of God and not as a direct experience of the nature of Īśvara. Thus, *bhakti* is a second step in the ladder that leads to *mokṣa*, whereas the fourth one is acquired by knowledge.

It may be observed that the utility of *bhakti* in the Mādhva system is not only for the purification of heart but for pleasing the Lord so that He may bless His devotee with His knowledge. The supreme knowledge about God which causes His Benediction is attainable not through the capacity of the jīvātman but only when the Lord manifests Himself to him just as Kṛṣṇa revealed his divine form to Arjuna who was incapable of seeing it with his mortal eyes. It is here that the Mādhva explanation of *bhakti* deviates from the Śaṁkarite conception and accords it a superior position. *Bhakti* is necessary for any one who tries to emancipate himself from bondage because without it neither any *upāsanā* nor any direct experience of Īśvara that may compel Him to shower His blessings on the jiva would be possible.

Though the Śaṁkarite interpretation of *bhakti* differs to a certain extent from the Mādhva formulation of this concept, yet it has not given rise to any valuable criticism from their side. The only objections, as available in their works, are with regard to the nature of jīva, the nature of Lord and such other subjects as have been already discussed in this book.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The discussions in the various chapters of this book must leave an impression with the reader that epistemological conclusions are the basic concepts that have determined the attitude of the Śāṁkara and Mādhva schools towards all the problems of philosophical interest. Even such an important question as that of deciding about the criterion by which the Real is to be distinguished from the Unreal has an epistemological aspect inasmuch as its successful application is to be known by a human mind. The findings about the nature of knowledge and its related categories in the chapter, '*The Theory of Knowledge*', of this book are sympathetic towards an idealistic interpretation of the various foundational concepts that are, as these discussions must have revealed, inexplicable on the presuppositions of Realism. If the contention about the foundational character of consciousness and its status as the prius of all things be valid, it would be difficult to find good logic in the assertion that 'object' can exist without consciousness. As a matter of fact, as the Post-Śaṁkarites have ventured to establish, 'object' and 'subject' are only conceptual impositions on a transcendental principle, the consciousness, which is the foundation of all knowing. The failure of Realism as a dogma advocating the independent existence of the object from consciousness is apparent in Madhva's unsuccessful attempt in establishing a relation between the 'subject' and the 'object'. To what realistic presuppositions would ultimately lead is fortunately available in Madhva's philosophy which seeks to be an argument for the plurality of reals. The logical development of the doctrine that knowledge is always determinate and pertains to an object is the kingdom of reals in which each real is different from the other. The discussion on the problem of identity and difference evidently disfavours the possibility of a satisfactory logical explanation of difference as an ultimate category. The arguments of Çitsukha, Śrī Harṣa and other Post-Śaṁkarites refuting the ultimate and absolute existence of difference are too strong to be disparaged easily. It would, probably, be a great success for a pluralistic approach if it could really explain the nature of difference.

The Advaitic comprehension of the structure of the Ultimate Reality and the appraisal of phenomena in the context of this comprehension have at least the advantage of reconciling the conclusions of logic and the dictates of experience. The Advaitin accepts almost all that the realist asserts in the field of *vyavahāra* and only questions their absolute importance. The distinction between the *paramārtha* and the *vyavahāra* is an important fundamental in the Vedānta metaphysics the improper understanding of which is responsible for much of the criticism against it by its opponents. At several places we have asserted that the Mādhva refutation is grounded in the confusion between the *pāramārthika* and the *vyāvahārika* points of view and gives an unfaithful account of the Śaṁkarite position. The being of a transcendental existence is a necessary presupposition for the explanation of phenomena, a fact to which logic repeatedly refers. But, what is known in experience is also not untrue for it has a pragmatic value and is not contradicted from a particular point of view. Its contradiction would present itself only when we view its judgement from a different angle with a desire to know its reality from the absolute standpoint. Thus, both the *pāramārthika* and the *vyāvahārika* standpoints (*dṛṣṭi*) are essential for a correct understanding of Reality. In not appreciating this difference and in equating the *paramārtha* with the *vyavahāra* the Mādhva philosophers have fallen a prey to a gross misunderstanding about the Vedānta position.

Another point in Vedānta philosophy that requires elucidation is the Vedānta explanation of phenomena from the absolute point of view. As a matter of fact, this question is irrelevant for it is the same confusion in a different garb, the confusion of standpoints. For one who knows the Absolute becomes the Absolute Itself and for him there is no reason to think otherwise. But for those who are in phenomena and aspire to know about the Absolute Truth this question obtains some significance. Lest there be no misunderstanding, it is better to be clear at the outset that no perfect knowledge of the Absolute or Brahman is possible without an absolute point of view, the direct intuition of *aparokṣānubhūti*. The Śaṁkarite explanation of world through *anirvacanīya* *māyā* is an expression of the failure of human reason in finding an answer to this question. The doctrine of *māyā* whose formulation in Śaṁkara's Vedānta is essential for the explanation of world-phenomena is probably the crux of Śaṁkarite philosophy. Śaṁkara introduces this principle in order to explain the world whose appearance is a fact. If the world-phenomenon is a fact, how does the Absolute appear as the world ? Śaṁkara would say that this is due to the inexplicable *māyā* which is neither *sat* nor *asat* nor *satāsat*. But how does the Advaitic Brahman come to be associated[1] with *ajñāna* or *māyā* ? What is the relation between Brahman and this *māyā* and how at all this *māyā* is in a position to manifest the world when it has no existence apart from Brahman ? These are some of the vital questions that have determined the development of Vedānta in the Post-Śaṁkarite era. The logical development of Śaṁkara's *anirvacanīya māyā* is the tendency, as we have suggested in the relevant chapter of this book, that seeks to explain it very much like the power of Brahman. Though such a tendency has its own difficulty inasmuch as it introduces dualism in Śaṁkara's Advaita yet it would appear to be an inevitable conclusion from the premises of Vedānta philosophy and their doctrine of *māyā*. There is justification in the criticism that Śaṁkara's Monism has an inherent dualism. But, Śaṁkara was himself conscious of this and this is why he explained the principle of *māyā* as inexplicable. Śaṁkara's intention in branding the *māyā* as *anirvacanīya* is to assert that its relation with Brahman is unintelligible to our intellect in its different logical moulds. It is true that the indeterminate Brahman is the only reality and that this Brahman, through the principle of *māyā*, manifests the world-phenomenon but the real nature of this *māyā* and its relation to Brahman is something that transcends all logic. Unless we comprehend the world as the manifestation of the Undifferentiated Brahman through the medium of *māyā* whose import is beyond human understanding it would be impossible to seek a logical justification for Śaṁkara's Vedānta. As a matter of fact, Śaṁkara himself intends that the world is not different from Brahman. While commenting on the śruti, '*Sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ Brahma*',[2] Śaṁkara identifies '*idam*' meaning 'the whole of this world differentiated in name and form as realized through *pratyakṣa*, etc.' with Brahman as it originates, is absorbed in and lives in Brahman. Thus, it remains undifferentiated with Brahman and is never realized apart from Brahman. If all this be Śaṁkara's position then his *māyā* and his philosophy of Advaita would be intelligible as a logically valid system..

NOTES FOR REFERENCE

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CHAPTER II

1. *Bodhicaryāvatārapañcikā*, p. 254.
2. Naiṣātarkeṇa matirāpaneyā. (*Kaṭhopaniṣad, mantra*, 1.2.9).
3. *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 37.
4. *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, p. 24 to 27.
5. *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 24.
6. Pramāṇaviṣayatvayogyatā sattā. (Quoted from *Tattvabodhinī*, p. 285).
7. *Bodhicaryāvatārapañcikā*, p. 254.
8. Satyatvaṁ bādharāhitvaṁ (*Pañcadaśī*, śloka, 3. 29).
9. Yatsat tadabādhyaṁ. (*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 77).
10. Na tu pratiyamānasya paramārthasattā. (*Bhāmatī*, p. 7).
11. *Siddhivyākhyā*, p. 54.
12. *Ibid*, p. 54.
13. *Tattvabodhinī*, p. 8.
14. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, (mantra, 3. 9. 26).
15. Jaya-Tīrtha's commentary on *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 2.
16. *Tattvodyota*, p. 19.
17. *The Dvaita Philosophy and its Place in Vedānta*, p. 138.
18. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 336.
19. *Taranginī*, p. 61.
20. *Laghucandrikā*, p. 337 to 338.
21. *Ibid*, p. 338.
22. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 96.
23. *Ibid*, p. 96.
24. *Ibid*, p. 97.
25. *Ibid*, p. 97.
26. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 334.
27. *Ibid*, p. 334.
28. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 334
29. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 541.

30. It is interesting that so long there is the operation of the law of causal-efficiency one does not think himself under illusion. Causal operation ceases its function as soon as he comes to understand that the experience was an illusion and not reality.

31. *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 207.
32. *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 190.
33. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, śloka (1,338).
34. *Tattvabodhinī*, p. 8.
35. *Bhāmatī*, p. 37.
36. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 59.

CHAPTER III

1. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, kārikā (4, 7).
2. *Ibid*, kārikā (4, 8 to 9).
3. *Ibid*, kārikā (4, 7).
4. *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*, mantra (1, 1).
5. *Pañcadaśī*, ślokas (1, 3 to 7).
6. *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, mantra II.
7. Tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvaṁ. Tasya bhāsā sarvamidaṁ vibhāti. (*Kaṭhopaniṣad*, mantra 2, 2, 15).
8. *Kenopaniṣad*, mantra (1, 2 to 8).
9. Evaṁ sarvātmanā sarva viśeṣarahitasya cinmātrasvayaṁ jyotiṣo brahmatva pratipādakasya. (Śaṁkara's commentary on *Kenopanisad*, mantra I, IV).
10. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, mantra (2, 12).
11. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, mantra (6, 11).
12. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, mantra (2, 2, 10).
13. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, mantra (6, 2, 1).
14. Tadeva ātmasvarūpaṁ brahma niratiśayaṁ bhūmākhya vṛhatvād brahmaiti (Śaṁkara's commentary on *Kenopaniṣad*, mantra I, V).
15. *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, mantra (1, 2, 20).
16. *Ibid*, mantra, (1,3,15).
17. Athāto brahma jijñāsā. (*Brahma-sūtra*, 1, 1, 1).
18. It has to be kept in mind that by the status of reality we denote only 'existence' apart from all other attributes.
19. *Brahma-sūtra* (1, 1, 3).

20. Dvividhaṁ ca vastūnām tattvaṁ sattvaṁ asattvaṁ ca. (*Bhāmatī*, p. 9).

21. Kālatrayepi satvena pratītyanarhatvarūpālīkatva svarūpāngīkārat. (*Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 180).

22. Mithyātvaṁ ca satbhinnatve sati asadbhinnatvaṁ. (*Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 181).

23. Satyānṛte Mithunīkṛta. (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 1).

24. *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī*, p. 28.

25. Preface to Gauḍapāda's Kārika by Swami Nikhilananda, p. XXVI.

26. *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 34.

27. This distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* is a later development, probably, for the first time coming in Vidyāraṇya's *Pañcadaśī*.

28. *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 34.

29. *Pañcapādikā*, p. 8.

30. Sadasadanadhikaraṇatva rūpaṁ anirvācyatvaṁ. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 48).

31. Sadasadvilakṣaṇatve sati asadvilakṣaṇatvaṁ. (*Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 181).

32. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p.22.

33. *Ibid*, p. 22.

34. *Ibid*, p. 22.

35. *Indian Thought*, Vol. VI. p. 248.

36. Bhāvābhāvaudvidhā itarat. (*Tattvasaṁkhyāna*, p. 2).

37. *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 2.

38. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 24.

39. *Indian Thought*, Vol. IV, p. 250.

40. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 50.

41. *Ibid*, p. 50.

42. *Ibid*, p. 51.

43. *Ibid*, p. 51 to 52.

44. *Ibid*, p. 52 to 53.

45. Pratipannopādhau traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvaṁ vā mithyātvaṁ. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 94).

46. *Advaita-siddhi*, read with *Laghucandrikā*, p. 94.

47. *Nyāyāmṛta* read with Śrīnivāsa's commentary, p. 26.

48. *Tattvapradīpikā* with *Nayana-prasādinī*, p. 41.

49. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 96.
50. *Taranginī*, p. 41.
51. Niṣedhasya prapañcātyantābhāvaviśiṣṭatādātmyāpanna svarūpasya. Tathācoktaviśiṣṭarūpeṇa niṣedhasya bādhyatvāt kevalarūpeṇa brahmātyantābhedānnadvaitahāniriti bhāvaḥ. (*Laghucandrikā*, p. 97).
52. *Laghucandrikā*, p. 97.
53. *Ibid*, p. 98 to 99.
54. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 22.
55. Niṣedhasya bādhyatvaṁ pāramārthikasattvavirodhitvena tantraṁ, kiñtu niṣedhyāpekṣayā nyūnasattākatvaṁ. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 101.)
56. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 105.
57. Prakṛte ca tulyasattākatvāt kathaṁ na virodhitvaṁ. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 101).
58. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 27.
59. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 122.
60. Jñānabādhyatvaṁ vā anirvācyatvaṁ. (*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 79).
61. Jñānanivartyatvaṁ vā mithyātvaṁ. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 160).
62. Atītaghaṭādau avyāpteḥ. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 38).
63. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 38.
64. Jñānatvena jñānanivartyatvasya. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 38).
65. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p 39.
66. Śrīnivāsa's commentary on *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 39.
67. Bhramottarapramānivartyatvasya ca tattvajñānasaṁskāranivartyājñānasaṁskāre avyāpteḥ. (*Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*, p. 39)
68. Jñānaprayuktāvasthitisāmānyavirahpratiyogitvaṁ hi jñānanivartyatvaṁ· (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 160).
69. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 171.
70. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 453.
71. Ato vinaśyadajñānaṁabhāvajñānaṁ eva hi. (*Yuktimallikā*, p. 455).
72. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 453.
73. Sarveṣāmapibhāvānām āśrayatvena sammate,
Pratiyogitvamatyantābhāvaṁ prati mṛṣātmatā.
(*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 39).
74. Sadviviktatvaṁ mithyātvaṁ. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 195).

75. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 40.
76. *Advaita-siddhi* p. 197.
77. Vācaspati maintains the instrumental causality of *avidyā* in producing defects which subsist in the perceiver, whereas, the author of *Vivaraṇa* contends that it is the material-cause of defects.

CHAPTER IV

1. Sarvo hi ātmāstitvaṁ pratyeti, na nāhamasmīti. Yadi hi nātmāstitva prasiddhiḥ syāt sarvo loko nāhamasmīti pratīyāt.
(Śaṁkara's commentary on the sūtra, 1.1.1.)
2. *Nyāya-muktāvalī* with *Mayūkhī*, p. 63.
3. The classification has in view only those systems of Indian philosophy which recognize the eternal character of 'soul'.
4. *Bodhicaryāvatārapañcikā*, p. 367.
5. Tatsyādālayavijñānaṁ yad bhavedahamāspadaṁ,
Tatsyādpravṛtivijñānaṁ nilapītādike bhavet.
(Quoted from *Muktāvalī-mayūkha*, p. 62).
6. Mishra : *Conception of Matter*, p. 366.
7. Though the Kumārila-view does not accept the illuminating powers of Self yet Prabhākara clearly recognizes the self-illumination of Ātman.
(*Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and its Sources*, *p.* 31).
8. *The Nature of Consciousness*, p. 62.
9. *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and its Sources*, p. 80.
10 Tasmāccāviparyāsat sākṣitvamasya puruṣasya.
(*Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, XIX).
11. *Sāṁkhya-tattva-kaumudī* on Karikā, V.
12. Nirviṣayatve jñānaṁ eva na syāt. (Jaya-Tīrtha's commentary on *Tattvyodyota*, p. 14).
13. Jaya-Tīrtha's commentary on *Māyāvādakhanḍana*, p. 2).
14. *Ibid*, p. 117.
15. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 501.
16. Jñānānandādyātmaka kalyāṇa vigrahavāna. (*Madhva-siddhāntasāra*, p. 24).
17. *Madhvasiddhāntasāra*, p. 6.
18. Jaya-Tīrtha's commentary on *Upādhikhanḍana*, p. 4.
19. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Praśnopaniṣad*, mantra (6, 2).

20. *Pañcadaśī*, śloka (1, 4).

21. *Pañcadaśī*, śloka (1, 5).

22. Samvidekarūpā na bhidyate. (*Pañcadaśī*, śloka)

23. Mukerji : *The Nature of Self*, p. 118 & 119.

24. *Kenopaniṣadvākyabhāṣya*, p. 1.

25. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 16.

26. Jānāmi iti vyavahāra anyathā anupapattyā. (*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*, p, 73.)

27. Śaṁkara's commentary (*Vākya-bhāṣya*) on *Kenopaniṣad*, mantra, 1.31.

28. *Pañcadaśī*, śloka (3, 16).

29. Avedyatve sati aparokṣa vyavahāra yogyatāyāḥ tallakṣaṇatvāt. (*Tattvapradīpikā* p. 9).

30. Anyadeva tadviditādatho aviditādadhi. (*Kenopaniṣad*, mantra, 1, 3.)

31. *Kenopaniṣadpadabhāṣya*, p. 48.

32. The reflection theory of Sāṁkhya is not *puruṣa-kartṛka* but *buddhi-kartṛka.*

33. Tametaṁ avidyākhyaṁ ātmanātmanoritaretarādhyāsaṁ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇa prameya vyavahārāḥ. (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 2).

34. *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 33.

35. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 22-23.

36. *Pañcadaśī*, śloka (3, 13).

37. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p, 72.

38. *Ibid*, p. 70.

39. Nīrviṣayatve jñānaṁ eva na syāt. (Java-Tīrtha's commentary on *Tattvodyota*, p. 14.)

40. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 72.

41. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, śloka (1,319.)

42. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 300.

43. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 208.

44. *Ibid*, p. 210.

45. Athavā yajjñānaṁ yadīyasvabhāvaṁ sa tasya viṣayaḥ. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 210.)

46. *Nyāyāmṛta* p. 211.

47. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 454.

48. Ākāśasya satastadīyatāmātranibandhanaḥ svabhāva viśeṣo viṣayatā. (*Bauddhādhikāra*, quoted from *Laghucandrikā*, p. 456.)

49. Anavasthādayo doṣāḥ sattāṁ nighananti vastunaḥ,
Advaitināṁ te suhṛdaḥ prapañce satprasaṁjakāḥ.
(*Advaita-brahmasiddhi*, p. 141)

50. *Gauḍa-brahmānandī*, p. 457.

51. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 456.

52. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 218.

53. Though Vyāsa-Tīrtha maintains the ordinary (*sādhāraṇa*) and not extraordinary causality of *manas* in the production of knowledge even then the Advaitins disagree with his opinion. For them, the sense-manas-contact is as unusual as sense-object contact.

54. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 457.

55. Tasmātsatyatve dṛśyatvānupapatterdṛgdṛśyayorādhyāsika eva sambandhaḥ. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 458.)

56. *Nyāyāmṛta* with Śrīnivāsa's commentary, p. 189 and 190.

57. Nirviṣayatve jñānam eva na syāt. (Jaya-Tīrtha's commentary on *Tattvodyota*, p. 14.)

58. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 501.

59. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 196.

60. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 198.

61. *Ibid*, p. 198.

62. *Ibid*, p. 198.

63. *Conception of Matter*, p. 9 & 10.

64. *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 46.

65. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, mantra (2, 1, 1).

66. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Kenopaniṣad*, mantra (1, 1).

67. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, mantra, (2, 1).

68. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 72.

69. Nirviṣayatve jñānaṁ eva na syāt, ghaṭavat. (Jaya-Tīrtha's *Vivaraṇa* on *Tattvodyota*, p. 14).

70. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 72.

71. *Tattvaprakāśikā* on sūtra (2, 3, 26), p. 117.

72. Sa ca svabhāvato jñānī. syannakṛtimabodhavāna,
Kim citra likhitaṁ netraṁ kañcidarthaṁ prakāśayati.
(*Yuktimallikā*, śloka 1, 166, p. 25).

73. This is almost in the strain of Rāmānuja's argument and is reminiscent of the Mīmāṁsā views of Prabhākara and Kumārila.

74. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 310.
75. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 372.
76. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha*, p. 194.
77. *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*, p. 18.
78. *Tattvadīpana*, p. 185 to 189.
79. *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*, p. 18.
80. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 371.
81. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 376.
82. Ahaṁkāravyaktibhedāt kṛtahānākṛtābhyāgam prasaṁgācca. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 376.)
83. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 374.
84. *Ibid*, p. 374.
85. Smṛteḥ samānaviṣayakānubhava janyatvāditi bhāvah (*Nyāyāmṛta-prakāśa*, p. 374.)
86. *Māḍūkyakārika*, kārikā (1, 11).
87. *Ibid*, kārikā (1, 12).
88. Jānāmi iti vyavahārānyathā anupapattyā. (*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*, p. 73.)
89. *Bhāmatī*, p. 15.
90. Tasmadaparādhīna prakaśā saṁvid upetavyā. (*Bhāmatī*, p. 15)
91. Atmā svaprakāśaḥ, sva sattāyāṁ prakāśa vyatireka rahitatvāt. (*Vivoraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha*, p. 626.)
92. *Tattvadīpana*, p. 598.
93. Avedyatve sati aparokṣa vyavahāra yogyatāyāḥ tallakṣaṇatvāt. (*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 9).
94. Parasamaveta kṛyā phalaśālī hi karma. (*Bhāmatī*, p. 15)
95. Saṁvideva hi bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇaṁ. (*Upaskāra* on *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, 7, 2, 26)
96. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 9.
97. *Nayanaprasādinī*, p. 9.
98. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 507.
99. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 769.
100. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 770.
101. Svaviṣayaprakāśatvaṁ svaprakāśatvaṁ sva mate aṅgīkārāt. (Jaya-Tīrtha's commentary on *Māyāvāda-khaṇḍana* p. 2.)
102. *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, mantra (1, 3, 10).
103. *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, mantra 2.
104. *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 62.

105. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 277 & 278.
106. *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, mantra 3.
107. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, mantra 3.
108. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, mantra (4, 3, 9).
109. *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, mantra 4 with Śaṁkara's commentary.
110. *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 278 & 279.
111. *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 66.
112. *Māṇḍūkya-kārika*, kārikas (2, 1 to 3).
113. Na hi paramārtha vastu viṣayāṇi deśakālanimittāni abādhaśca svapne sambhāvyante. (*Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 244).
114. *Ibid*, p. 344.
115. *Brahma-sūtra* (3, 2, 2).
116. *Tattvaprakā-śikā* p. 148.
117. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 148.
118. Yatra sthitvā jivaḥ svāpnapadārthānpaśyati sa svapna tadeva sthānaṁ yasya sa svapnasthānaḥ. Kaṇṭha desastha ityarthaḥ. (*Khaṇḍārtha* on *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, p. 2).
119. *Tattvaprakāśikā* on sūtra (3, 2, 3).
120. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 149.
121. *Nyāyāsudhā*, p. 207.
122. *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 69.
123. *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, mantra 5, with Śaṁkara's commentary.
124. *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 75.
125. Yathārthaṁ pramāṇaṁ, tad dvividhaṁ, kevalaṁ anupramāṇaṁca. Tatra yathārthājñānaṁ kevalaṁ, tat sādhanaṁ anupramānaṁ. (*Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 249)
126. Kevalaṁ pratyakṣānumānāgamajabhedāstrividhameveti. (*Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 249)
127. Tatra smṛti vyāvṛttaṁ pramātvaṁ, anadhigatābādhita viṣayajñānatvaṁ. (*Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 19)
128. *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 246.
129. *Ibid*, p. 250 to 252.
130. *Ibid*, p. 251.
131. *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, mantra 7.
132. Naca punarāvartate. (*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, mantra 8. 15,1).
133. Tābhyāṁ nirvicikitse arthe cetasaḥ sthāpitasya yat
Ekatānatvaṁ etaddhi nididhyāsanamucyate.
(*Pañcadaśī*, śloka, 1, 54).
134. *Pañcadaśī*, śloka (1, 55).

135. *Ibid*, śloka (1, 59).

136. *Bhagavadgītā*, śloka (6, 19).

137. *Pañcadaśī*, ślokas (1, 60).

138. *Yoga-sūtra*, sūtra (4, 29).

139. Tatlābhāt avidyā ādayaḥ kleśāḥ samūlakāṣaṁ kaṣitā bhavanti. (*Vyāsabhāṣya* on *Yoga-sūtra*, 4, 30).

140. *Khaṇḍārtha* on *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, p. 5.

141. Pramākaraṇaṁ pramāṇaṁ. (*Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 9.)

142. Yathārthaṁ pramāṇaṁ. Yathāvasthita jñeya viṣayīkāritvaṁ. (*Pramāṇacandrikā*, p. 131).

143. Arthaṁ viṣayaṁ nātivartate na vyabhicarati yat tat pramāṇaṁ. (*Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 246).

144. Satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya, ahamidaṁ mamedamiti naisargiko ayaṁ lokavyavahārah. (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 2).

145. Tametaṁ avidyākhyaṁ ātmanātmanoritaretarādhyāsaṁ puraskṛtya sarve parmāṇa prameya vyavahārāḥ. (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 2)

146 *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 33.

147. Avācyatvādikaṁ tu aprasidhatvāt tadīdṛgiti jñeyaṁ na vācyaṁ na ca tarkyate. Paśyanto api na paśyanti mero rūpaṁ vipaścit iti vat. Aprasiddheravācyaṁ tadvācyaṁ sarvāmamoktitaḥ. (Madhva's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, p. 8)

148. Vedaika prāptasārvajña sarva pūrṇa guṇāh hareḥ,
Amānatvārhavedānyamānaprāpto na kaścana.
(*Yuktimallikā*, śloka, 1, 902)

149. *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, IV.

150. *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā* and *its Sources*, p. 157 and 163.

151. Pratyakṣapramā cātra caitanyameva.
(*Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 15)

152. Jñānavacchedakatvacca vṛttau jñānatvopacāraḥ. (*Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 16)

153. *Vedāntaparibhāṣa*, p. 17.

154. *Ibid*, p. 21.

155. Cittaṁ hi prakhyā pravṛttisthitiśīlatvāt triguṇaṁ, prakhyārūpaṁ hi cittasattvaṁ. (*Vyāsa-bhāṣya*, p. 13)

156. Cittasattvamiti cittasya sattvaprādhānya pratipādanāya punaruktaṁ. (*Yoga-vārttika*, p. 13)

157. *Pañcadaśī*, śloka, (2, 12 to 13).

158. Ghaṭāderjñānasya pratyakṣatvaṁ tu pramātrabhinnatvaṁ (*Vedāntaparibhāṣa*, p. 33)

159. *Ibid*, p. 35.

160. Pramāṇacaitanyasya viṣayāvacchinnacaitanyābheda iti brūmaḥ. (*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 22)

161. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 216.

162. Vyāvahārikatvasya cabhrāntidairghyamātreṇopapatteśca. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 217)

163. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 217 to 219.

164. *Ibid*, p. 221 to 222.

165. Dasgupta : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV, p. 234.

166. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 220.

167. *Ibid*, p. 220.

168. *Ibid*, p. 221.

169. *Ibid*. p. 223.

170. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 223.

171. *Ibid*, p. 223.

172. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 480.

173. Parokṣasthale api parokṣa vṛtti upariktacaitanyasya eva prakāśakatvāt. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 480)

174. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 480.

175. *Ibid*, p. 487 to 488.

176. *Ibid*, p. 483.

177. Dasgupta : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV, p. 242.

178. Samīcīna jñānakaraṇasyāpi tasya doṣakaluṣitasya vibhrama hetutvopapatteḥ. (*Nyāyā-sudhā*, p 47).

179. *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, VII.

180. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 47

181. Tadārāgādidoṣeṇakaluṣaṁ cancalaṁ manaḥ. (*Yuktimallikā*, ślokas 1, 317)

182. Anumiti karaṇaṁ anumānaṁ. Anumitiśca vyāptijñānatvena vyāptijñānajanyā. (*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*,p. 76 to 77)

183. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 79.

184. Tasmādanumitikāraṇatvāt vyāptijñānamevānumānaśabdābhidheyaṁ. (*Arthadīpikā*, p. 78)

185. Na tu tṛtīyalingaparāmarśo anumitaukāraṇaṁ.(*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 78)

186. Vyāptiśca aśeṣasādhanāśrayāśritasādhyasamānādhikaraṇyarūpā. (*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 82)

187. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 83.

188. *Nyāyā-sudhā*, p. 76.

189. *Pramāṇa-candrikā*, p. 143.

190. Avinābhāvo vyāptiḥ. (*Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 259)

191. Yaddeśakālasaṁbaddhasya yasya yaddeśakālasaṁbaddhena yena vinānupapattistasya tena sā vyāptiḥ. . . Anupapattiśca aghaṭanaṁ pramāṇavirodha iti yāvat. (*Tarka-tāṇḍava* with *Nyāyadīpa*, p. 5 to 8).

192. Kāryakāraṇabhāvarūpasya avyabhicaritasaṁbandhasya vyadhikaraṇānumane satvāt. (*Pramāṇa-candrikā*, p. 144)

193. *Pramāṇa-candrikā*, p. 147 to 148.

194. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 84.

195. *Pramāṇa-candrikā*, p. 148.

196. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 33.

197. *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 39.

198. *Vedānta-paribhāṣa*, p. 99.

199. *Sāṁkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, p. 14.

200. *Sāṁkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, p. 14.

201. Āgamodvividhaḥ. Apauruṣeyaḥ pauruṣeyaśca. Tatrapauruṣeyaḥ ṛgādisadāgamaḥ. Pauruṣeyo bhāratādisadāgamaḥ (*Pramāṇacandrikā*, p. 161.) See also Āgama-prakaraṇa of *Madhvasiddhāntasāra*.

202. *Yoga-bhāṣya* p. 31 to 32.

203. *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 4.

204. Yatra viṣaye nirdoṣaḥ tatrāptaḥ. Vivakṣitārtha tattvajñānaṁavipralipsā karaṇapāṭavaṁ cetīyamāptiḥ. (*Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 5)

205. Bhramapramādavipralipsākaraṇapāṭavādidoṣarahitena. (*Yoga-vārttika*, p. 31)

206. Sarvajñapraṇītā vedā vedatvāt yatpunar na sarvajña praṇitau nāsau vedo yathetaravākyaṁ. . . Vedavākyāni pauruṣeyāṇi, vākyatvāt, asmadādi vākyavat. (*Nyāya-kusumāñjalī*, stavak V, p. 104 to 107)

207. *The Conception of Matter*, p. 389.

208. *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and its Sources*, p. 143 and p. 150 to 153.

209. *Tattapradīpikā*, p. 161.

210. Tatsaṁskāraranjit māyopavṛṁghita parameśvarasya mūlakāraṇasya vā vidyamānatvāt. (*Nayana-prasādinī*, p. 161)

211. *Nayana-prasādinī*, p. 161.

212. Kintu sajātīocchāraṇānapekṣocchāraṇaviṣayatvaṁ. (*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 135)

213. Puruṣasvātantryamātraṁ capauruṣeyatvaṁ rocayante jaiminīyāḥ api taccāsmākamapi samānamanyatrābhiniveśāt. (*Bhāmatī*. p. 52)

214. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 159.

215. Śrutīnāmīśvarājjanma kevalaṁ śrutiṣu śrutaṁ. (*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 159)

216. *Bhāmatī*, p. 52.

217. Yatnataḥ pratiṣedhyā naḥ puruṣāṇāṁ svatantratā. (*Bhāmatī*, p. 52)

218. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 7.

219. *Ibid*, p. 8.

220. Sa vaktā anādi nityasiddhabuddhikramāt kramaṁ. (*Yuktimallikā*, p. 9)

221. Vipratipattau ca smṛtīnāmavaśyakartavye anyatar parigrahe anyatara parityāge ca śrutyānusāriṇyah smṛtayaḥ pramāṇam-anapekṣyāḥ itarāḥ. (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 181)

222. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 79.

223. Puruṣavacasāṁ tu mūlāntarāpekṣaṁ vaktṛsmṛtivyavahitaṁ ceti viprakarṣaḥ. (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 181).

224. Śruti virodhenasmṛtīnāṁ eva aprāmāṇyākhya doṣa prasaṁgāt. (*Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 79)

225. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 136.

226. *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and its Sources*, p. 136.

227. *Pramāṇa-candrikā*, p. 163.

228. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 139.

229. Dasgupta : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 393.

230. Kathaṁ. . .vyatirekavyāptijñānāt anumitiḥ ? Arthāpatti pramāṇāt. (*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 85)

231. *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and its Sources*, p. 163 to 164.

232. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 141.

233. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* with *Arthadīpikā*, p. 142 to 143.

234. *Pramāṇa-candrikā*, p. 163 to 164.

235. *Ibid*, p. 163.

236. *Ibid*, p. 163.

237. *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and its Sources*, p. 163 to 164.

238. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 144 to 145.

239. *Ibid*, p. 145.

240. Na hi dṛṣṭerbalavat kiñcit pramāṇaṁ. Na hi yukti parājitopikṣudhito nānnamatti. (*Tattvodyota*, p. 31)

241. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 99.

242. *Ibid*, p. 104.

243. Dasgupta : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV, p. 229.

244. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 355.

245. Na tāvat itara pramāṇāpekṣayā prābalyam bhavati. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 355)

246. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 373 to 374.

247. *Ibid*, p. 369.

248. 'Paurvāparye pūrvadaurbalyaṁ prakṛtivat' (*Pārmarṣa-sūtra*, 6, 4, 54)

249. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 364.

250. Na hi upajīvyamātreṇa prābalyaṁ kiñtu parīkṣitatayā. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 264)

251. Na hi āgamajñānaṁ sāmvyāvahārikaṁ pratyakṣasya prāmāṇyaṁ upahanti yena kāraṇābhāvānnabhaved apitu tāttvikaṁ. (*Bhāmatī*, p. 4)

252. *Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 193.

253. *The Nature of Self*, p. 359.

254. *The Vedanta and Modern Thought*, p. 78.

255. Tarkāpratiṣṭhānat iti kevalasya tarkasya vipralambhakatvaṁ darśayiṣyati. (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 189)

256. Śrutyaiva sahāyatvena tarkasyābhyupetatvāt. (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 8)

257. Vākyārtha vichāraṇādhyavasānanirvṛttāhibrahmāvagatir nānumānādi pramāṇāntara nirvṛttā. (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 7).

258. *Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 194.

259. *The Nature of Self*, p. 393.

260. *Ibid*, p. 366.

261. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 90.

262. Na hi śabdaika samadhigamya vastuni yuktivirodhaḥ. (*Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 90)

263. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 85.

264. *Ibid*, p. 87.

265. *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 160 to 173.

266. Dasgupta : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 373.

267. *Ibid*, p. 374.

268. Āhurvijñānasāmagrījanyatvesatyajanyatā,
Tadanyataḥ pramāyāstatsvatastvamiti tadvidaḥ.
(*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 122).

269. Apramayā vijñānasāmagrījanyatve sati atiriktahetujanyatvāt. (*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 122)

270. Tatrotpattau svatastvaṁ nāma jñānakāraṇamātrajanyatvaṁ. Yenajñānaṁ jāyate tenaiva tadgataṁ prāmāṇyaṁ jāyata. (*Pramāṇa-candrikā*, p. 165)

271. Pramājñānahetvatirikta hetvadhīnā kāryatve sati tadviśeṣatvāt apramāvat. (*Nyāya kusumāñjalī*, p. 207 to 209)

272. Āgantukabhāva kāraṇāpekṣāyāṁ eve paratastvāt. (*Vedānta paribhāṣā*, p. 155)

273. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* with *Arthadīpikā*, p, 155 to 156

274. Yathārtharūpasya tattajjñānaprāmāṇyasya grāhyaprāmāṇya virodhyupasthāpaka sāmagrī asamavahita prāmāṇyāśraya tattajjñānaviṣayaka sākṣijñānaviṣayatvaṁ naiyatvaṁ svatastvaṁ. (*Tarka-tāṇḍava*, Vol. I, p. 4)

275. *Yuktimallikā*, (1, 311 to 315)

276. *Ibid*, śloka (1, 341)

277. *Ibid*, śloka (1, 325)

278. *Bhāva-vilāsinī*, p. 49.

279. *Yuktimallikā*, śloka (1, 311)

280. *Bhāva-vilāsinī*, on śloka (1, 316)

281. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 55

282. Paratastve anavasthoktiḥ. (*Tarka-tāṇḍava*, 1, 7)

283. *Tarka-saṁgraha*, p. 157.

284. *Dīpikā* on *Tarka-saṁgraha*, p. 159.

285. *Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 66.

286. Citsukha's gloss on *Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 66.

287. *Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 65.

288. *Ibid*, p. 67.

289. *Nyāya-makaranda* with Citsukha's commentary, p. 67 to 68.

290. *Nyāyamakaranda*, p. 85.

291. *Tattvabodhinī*, p. 36.

292. *Bhāmatī*, p. 9.

293. Idamrajatam iti aparokṣapratītyanupapatteḥ. (*Tattvabodhinī*, p. 37)

294. Smṛti rūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ. (*Brahmasūtra-śāṁkara-bhāsya*, p. 1)

295. Smṛte rūpam iva rūpamasyeti smṛtirūpaḥ. (*Bhāmatī*, p. 8)

296. Tatrārthasya tāvat smaryamāṇasadṛśo anyātmanā avabhāsyamāno anyoartho adhyāsaḥ. (*Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha*, p. 26)

297. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 82.

298. *Nyāyamakaranda*, p. 116.

299. *Ibid*, p. 116.

300. *Yoga-sūtra*, sūtra (1, 9.)

301. *Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 120.

302. *Tattvabodhinī*, p. 38.

303. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, p. 5.

304. Asataḥ pratītim vinā sadvailakṣaṇyānupapatteḥ. (*Tattvodyota*, p. 10)

305. *Pramāṇa-candrikā*, p. 133.

306. *Yuktimallikā*, Chapter I, ślokas 493 to 503.

307. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 423.

308. Jaya-Tīrtha's commentary on *Tattvodyota*, p. 10.

309. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 418.

310. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 417.

311. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 630.

312. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 420.

313. *Yoga-sūtra* (1, 9) with *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*.

314. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 632.

315. *Ibid*, p. 632.

316. *Ibid*, p. 632.

317. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 635.

318. *Tattva-pradīpikā* with *Nayana-prasādinī*, p. 81.

319. Citsukha's gloss on *Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 117.

320. *Pramāṇa-mālā*, p. 11.

321. Na ca nimittakāraṇa mātrāt kāryasiddhi ata upādāna ca mṛgyaṁ. (*Iṣṭa-siddhi*, p. 48)

322. Anādibhāva rūpaṁ yat vijñānena vilīyate,
Tadajñānamiti prājña lakṣaṇam sampracakṣte.
(*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 57)

323. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 544.

324. *Tattvabodhinī* on śloka (1, 20)

325. *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, p. 49.

326. *Bhagavadgītā*, *śloka* (2, 16)

327. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, p. 1.
328. *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, p. 48.
329. *Pramāṇa-mālā*, p. 11.
330. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha*, p. 17.
331. *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī* with Dr. Venice's translation.
332. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, mantra (8, 3.2)
333. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, mantra (4, 10)
334. *Ṛg-Veda*, mantra (10, 129, 3)
335. *Vajur-Veda*, mantra (17, 31)
336. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, mantra (1, 10)
337. *Ibid*, mantra (4, 5)
338. *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, mantra (2, 5)
339. Na vayaṁ bhāva rūpājñānasya paripanthinaḥ. (*Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 63)
340. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 299.
341. *Ibid*, p. 299 with *Nyāyāmṛta-prakāśa*.
342. Bhāvatvaṁ cātra abhāvavilakṣaṇatva mātram vivakṣitaṁ. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 544).
343. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 302.
344. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 308.
345. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 308.
346. Ajñānāvidyānīhāraśabdā api prakṛtiparāh. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 308)
347. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 330.
348. Bhāvatvaṁ cātra abhāva vilakṣaṇatva mātraṁ vivakṣitaṁ. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 544.)
349. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 544.)
350. *Laghucandrikā*, p. 544.
351. Na hi kvacidavilambenajanakasya pratibandhena vilambe janaktā apaiti. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 544)
352. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 545.
353. *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī*, śloka XXXVIII.
354. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 545.
355. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 552.
356. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha*, p. 16.
357. Nimittaṁ tāvat anādi santativāhinī saviṣayasya vibhramasyaiva vāsanā syāt. (*Pramāṇa-mālā*, p. 11)
358. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, mantra (8, 3, 2)
359. *Ibid*, mantra (8, 1, 5) with Śaṁkara's commentary.

360. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 570.
361. *Laghucandrikā*, p. 570.
362. *Bhagavadgītā*, śloka (5, 15)
363. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, mantra (1, 10)
364. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 60.
365. *Ṛg Veda*, mantra (10, 54, 2). For the interpretation of *māyā* as illusion (*mṛṣā*) Sāyaṇa's commentary should be carefully read.

CHAPTER V

1. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 2.
2. *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 130.
3. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 166.
4. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, *śloka* (2, 104)
5. *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 133.
6. *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*, p. 112.
7. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 168.
8. *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*, p. 114.
9. *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*, p. 115
10. *Tattvabodhinī*, p. 624.
11. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, śloka (2, 105)
12. *Tattvapradīpikā* with *Nayanaprasādinī*, p. 169.
13. *Tattvabodhinī*, p. 626.
14. *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 130.
15. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 170 to 171.
16. Yugapadagrahaṇāyogāt anavasthā prasaṁgataḥ,
Parasparāśrayatvāt ca dharmabhedena ākṣadhīḥ.
(*Tattvapradīpikā*, śloka II, 2)
17. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, śloka (2, 106)
18. *Tattvapradīpikā* with *Nayanaprasādinī*, p. 173.
19. Vaidharmye vaidharmyāntarābhyupagame anavasthā. (*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 174)
20. *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 137.
21. Satyaṁ bhedastu vastūnāṁ svarūpaṁ nātra saṁśayaḥ ityāgamāt ca bhedasya svarūpasiddhiḥ. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 558 to 559)
22. Vastutastu asman mate bhedo vastunā saviśeṣābhinnaḥ. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 562)

23. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 551.

24. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, śloka (2, 107). *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* may also be referred at p. 128.

25. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 551.

26. Parasparaviruddhayorbhedābhedayorekatrāvasthānag haṭanāyāmapi viśeṣasyāṅgikaraṇāt. (*Nyāyasudhā*, p. 106)

27. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 553 to 554.

28. Vastutastu bhedo na vidārakaḥ kiñtu vidāraṇaṁ. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 554)

29. Na svarūpamātram bhedaḥ kiñtu anyonyābhāvaḥ sa ca vastunā saviśeṣābhinnaḥ. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 552)

30. *Nyāyasudhā*, p. 106.

31. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 590.

32. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 787.

33. Pratyakṣasya pāramārthikasattvaviṣayatvenavirodhitvasya prāgevoktatvāt. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 788)

34. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 795.

35. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 796.

36. *Ibid*, p. 796.

37. *Ibid*, p. 795.

38. Dasgupta : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV, p. 179.

39. Ekamevādvitīyaṁ. (*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, mantra, 6.1.1)

CHAPTER VI

1. Utpatteḥ pūrvaṁ svayamasataḥ svotpattau aprabhutvena svasmāt iti pakṣānupapatteḥ. (*Nyāyakusumāñjalī*, p. 43)

2. *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, kārikā VIII.

3. *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 196.

4. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, mantra (6, 1, 4)

5. Dasgupta : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 467.

6. Ananyatve api kāryakāraṇayoḥ kāryasya kāraṇātmatvaṁ na tu kāraṇasya kāryātmatvaṁ. (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 190)

7. *Tattvabodhinī* on śloka (2, 57)

8. *Tattvabodhinī*, p. 576.

9. Vastunastatsamasattāko anyathābhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ. (*Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, p. 54)

10. *Tattvabodhinī*, p. 576. See also *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, mantra, (6, 1, 4)

11. *Bhāmatī*, p. 262.

12. Vivarttavādaṁ svarūpaparityāgena anirvacanīyarūpantara prāpti lakṣaṇa vivartta siddhāntaḥ. (*Tattvabodhinī*, p. 576)

13. *Bhāmatī*, p. 225.

14. *Tattvabodhinī* on śloka (2, 55)

15. *Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 202.

16. Śaṁkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, p. 44.

17. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, śloka (2, 61)

18. *Ibid*, ślokas (2, 81 to 83)

19. Bagchi : *Inductive Reasoning*, p. 285.

20. Prakṛtiścopādāna kāraṇaṁ ca brahmābhyupagantavyaṁ nimitta kāraṇaṁ ca. (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 176)

21. Śaṁkara's commentary on the sūtra '*Abhidhyopadeśācca*'.

22. Śaṁkara's commentary on the sūtra '*Yoniśca hi gīyate*.'

23. Na lokavadiḥ bhavitavyaṁ. Na hi ayaṁ anumānāgamyo arthaḥ. Śabdagamyatvāt tu asyārthasya yathāśabdamihabhavitavyaṁ. (Śaṁkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* p. 177)

24. *Śaṁkṣepaśārīraka* śloka. (1, 333)

25. *Ibid*, śloka (1, 332)

26. Ekā hi avidyā anādirbhāvarūpā....anyāpūrvapūrva vibhrama saṁskāra tadavidyādvitayaṁ sattvāsattvabhyāmanirvācyaṁ sacivaṁ *sahakāri* yasya tattathā. (*Vedānta-kalpataru*, p. 3.)

27. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha*, p. 684.

28. Brahmājñānājjagajjanma brahmaṇo akāraṇatvataḥ,
Adhiṣṭhānatva mātreṇa kāraṇaṁ brahma gīyate.
(*Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī*, p. 116).

29. *Mādhva Logic*, p. 138.

30. *Ibid*, p. 138.

31. *Nyāyasudhā*, p. 193.

32. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 500.

33. Pariṇāmikāraṇaṁ hi upādānaṁ ucyate. (*Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 194)

34. *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 194.

35. *Nyāyāsudhā*, p. 194.

36. *Ibid*, p. 196.

37. *Ibid*, p. 197.

38. *Ibid*, p. 198.

39. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 500.

40. Viśiṣṭasya mṛdādivat dharmisamasattākarūpāntarāpattirūpa pariṇāmāt vivarttamatahāniśca. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 501)

41. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 502.

42. Naca upādānalakṣaṇābhāvaḥ, ātmanikāryajanihetutvasya upādānalakṣaṇatvāt, tasya ca pariṇāmyapariṇāmyubhayasādhāraṇatvāt. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 757)

43. Tadhedaṁ tarhi avyākṛtaṁ āsīt. (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, mantra, 1, 4, 7)

44. Raju : *Thought and Reality*, p. 154.

45. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 759.

CHAPTER VII

1. *Kenopaniṣad*, mantras (1, 2 to 7).

2. Nityaśudhabuddhamuktasvabhāve kūṭastha nitye ekasmin asaṅge.... (*Brahma-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 115)

3. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, mantra (2, 4, 14)

4. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, mantra (6, 2. 1.)

5. *Ibid*, mantra (3.14.4)

6. Svamahimapratiṣṭhasyāpyādhāraviśeṣopadeśa upāsanārtho bhaviṣyati, sarvagatatvāt brahmaṇo vyomavatsarvāntaratopapatteḥ. (*Brahman-sūtra-śāṁkara-bhāṣya*, p. 45)

7. *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, mantra (3, 1)

8. Janmādyasya yataḥ. (*Brahma-sūtra* 1.1.2).

9. Śaṁkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* (1.1.2).

10. Tatrāvidyāvasthāyāṁ brahmaṇaḥ upāsyopāsakādi lakṣaṇaḥ sarvo vyavahāraḥ. (*Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 35)

11. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, p. 201.

12. Niratiśayopādhisampannaśceśvaro′ nihīnopādhisampannān jīvānpraśāstīti. (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, p. 297)

13. *Bhagavadgītā*, śloka (4, 14) and *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, mantra, (4, 6)

14. *Brahma-sūtra* (2, 3, 45) and Saṁkara's commentary on the *sūtra* (2.3.45)

15. Māyāvidyevihāyaiva upādhīparajīvayoḥ. (*Pañcadaśī*, śloka 1.48)

16. Kāryopādhirbhavet jīvaḥ kāraṇopādhirīśvaraḥ,
Pratibimbo atra saṁkṣepaśārīrakakṛtāṁ naye.
(*Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, śloka 1, 38)

17. *Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, śloka (1.40)

18. *Tattvadīpana*, p. 240 to 241.

19. *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 28.

20. Na ca tātvikamaiśvaryaṁ sarvajñatvaṁ ca brahmaṇaḥ kiñtu avidyopādhikamiti. (*Bhāmatī*, p. 230)

21. *Bhāmatī* on sūtra '*Tadadhīnatvāt arthavat*'. Also—Avidyāśaktiryoniḥ sa ca pratijīvaṁ nānā (*Bhāmatī*, p. 192)

22. Brahmaṇaḥ tu iyaṁ avidyāśaktırmāyādiśabdavācā. (*Bhāmatī*, p. 187)

23. *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, p. 14 and 15.

24. *Ibid*. p. 19

25. *Brahma-sūtra* (1.4.3)

26. Parameśvarādhīnā tu iyamasmābhiḥ prāgavasthā jagato abhyupagamyate na svatantrā. Sa ca avaśyābhyupagantavyā. Arthavatī hi sā. Na hi tayā vinā parameśvarasya sraṣṭṛtvaṁ siddhyate. (*Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*. p. 148)

27. *Ibid*, p. 149.

28. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, śloka (1.2)

29. *Ibid*, śloka (1, 20)

30. *Ibid*, śloka (2, 165)

31. *Ibid*, śloka (2, 166)

32. *Tattvabodhinī*, p. 689 and *Advaitadīpikā*, chapter II, p. 206.

33. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, ślokas (1. 52 and 323)

34. *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha*, p. 37.

35. *Ibid*, p. 37.

36. *Ibid*, p. 670.

37. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, śloka (1.538)

38. Tattvamanāropitaṁ. (*Tattvasaṁkhyāna* with *Vivaraṇa*, p. 1)

39. Svatantraṁ paratantraṁ ca prameyaṁ dvividhaṁ mataṁ. (*Tattvaviveka*, p. 1)

40. Svarūpapramitipravṛttilakṣaṇa sattātraividhye parānapekṣe svataṁtraṁ. Parapekṣaṁ asvatantraṁ. (*Vivaraṇa* on *Tattvasaṁkhyāna*, p. 1)

41. Na hi sabdaika samadhigamya vastuni yuktivirodhaḥ. (*Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 6)

42. Sṛṣṭisthitisaṁghāraniyamanajñānājñānabandhamokṣāḥ. (*Brahmasūtramādhvabhāṣya*, p. 6)

43. *Yuktimallikā*, śloka (3. 2. 38)

44. Anenasarvagatatvamāyāmayasabdādibhyaḥ. (*Brahmasūtra* 3. 2. 38)

45. Sarvagatatvaṁ ca brahmaṇaḥ sarvasṛṣṭyādyarthaṁ eva (*Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 160)

46. *Yuktimallikā*, ślokas (3, 321 to 331)

47. *Tattvodyota* with *Vivaraṇa*, p. 1.

48. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 488 to 489.

49. Vidyamānasya bhedasya jñāpako naiva kārakaḥ. Upādhirdṛṣṭa pūrvo hi (*Upādhikhaṇḍana*, p. 3)

50. *Upādhikhaṇḍana*, p. 2 to 3.

51. *Upādhikhaṇḍana* with Jaya-Tīrtha's commentary, p. 3.

52. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 489.

53. *Svetāśvataropaniṣad*, mantra (6.8)

54. Jñānaṁ nityaṁ, kriyā nityaṁ, balaṁ nityaṁ paramātmanaḥ. Eṣaḥ nityo mahimābrāhmaṇasya. (Quoted from *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 489)

55. Madhva's commentary on the sūtra '*Ikṣaternāśabdaṁ*' with *Tattvaprakāśikā*.

56. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 489.

57. Ko hi mīmāṁsakobrūyāt virodhe śāstrayormithaḥ,
Ekaṁ pramāṇaṁ itarat tu apramāṇaṁ bhavetiti.
(*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 490)

58. *Brahma-sūtra*, Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa.

59. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 490.

60. Saguṇajñānasya eva mocakatvokteḥ. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 495)

61. Sakṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaśca (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, mantra, 6.11)

62. *Yuktimallikā*, śloka (1.532). Also—Idaṁapi traiguṇyarāhityādyabhiprāyaṁ. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 492)

63. *Nyāyāmṛta*, 492 to 494.

64. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 719.

65. *Ibid*, p. 718.

66. *Ibid*, p. 719.

67. *Ibid*, p. 720.

68. Tatra śastrayoḥ prāmāṇye samānakakṣatayā ekatarasyā tyā ntikabādhāyogāt. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 724)

69. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 724.

70. Tasminadvaitavidyāprakarṇe abhyudayasādhanāni upāsanāniucyānte. (Śaṁkara's commentary on *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, p. 113)

71. Paramamuktiheturnirguṇasākṣātkāropayogi sattvaśudhi upāya saguṇopāsanā vidhyarthavādatayā sākṣatmuktihetutvāpratipādakatvāt. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 731)

72. *Ibid*, p. 728 to 729.

73. Saguṇajñanajanyamukteravāntaramuktittvācca. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 732) and *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, mantra (3.1.3)

74. Saguṇasyamithyātvena tatpratirūpamuktervināśitvāt (*Laghucandrikā*, p. 732)

76. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 736.

CHAPTER VIII

1. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, p. 7.

2. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, mantra (2, 3, 1).

3. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, p. 83.

4. Na rūpamasyeha yathā varṇitaṁ tathā naiopalabhyate svapnamarīchyudakamāyāgandharvanagarsamatvātdṛṣṭanaṣṭasvarūpo hi sa ityata eva nānto na paryanto niṣṭhā samāptirvā vidyate. (*Bhagavadgītāśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 614)

5. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, śloka 231.

6. *Ibid*, śloka 234.

7. Bhūyascāntevisvamāyānivṛttiḥ. (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, mantra 1, 10)

8. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, mantra (1, 1, 5). Here reference may also be made to Śaṁkara's line 'Na cānyathā ekavijñānena sarvavijñānaṁ sampadyate' in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, p. 197).

9. *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*, kārikā (1, 15)

10. *Ibid*, kārikā (2, 46)

11. *Ibid*, kārikā (2, 14)

12. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 83.

13. Na ca pramāṇāgocaro dharmītyāśrayāsiddhiriti sāmpratam. Pratītigocaramātrasyāśrayopapattau pramāṇaviśeṣaṇasyāsamarthatvāt. (*Nyāyadīpāvalī*, p. 1)

14. Ityukte jagatobhāvādāśrayāsiddhaḥ pakṣaḥ. (*Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 1)

15. *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 2.

16. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 49-50.

17. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV, p. 215.

18. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 58.

19. *Ibid*, p. 60.

20. Anirvacanīyasiddhereva sapakṣābhāvādviruddhaḥ. (*Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 4)

21. Jaya-Tīrtha's commentary on *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 4.

22. Yaḥ sapakṣe Vipakṣe ca bhavetsādhāraṇastu saḥ. (*Nyāyamuktāvalī*, kārikā, 73)

23. Ātmanopi dṛśyatvādanaikāntikaḥ. (*Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 4)

24. Jaya-Tīrtha's commentary on *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 8.

25. Pramāṇaviruddhatvaṁupādhiḥ. (*Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 8)

26. Sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyapaka upādhiriti upādhilakṣaṇaṁ. (*Pramāṇacandrikā*, p. 153)

27. Yaścānumeye vidyamānastatsamānāsamānajātīyayor asanneva soanyatarāsiddho anadhyavasāyahetutvāt anadhyavasitaḥ. (*Praśastapādabhāṣya* with *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara, p. 239)

28. Na vidyate adhyavasitaṁ adhyavasāyaḥ sādhyasiddhiryasmāt sa tathokta iti. (Jaya-Tīrtha's commentary on *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 5).

29. Jagato abhāve anumānasyāpi abhāvaḥ iti tarka bādhitatvena anadhyavasitaḥ. (*Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 5)

30. Yasyasādhyabhāvaḥ pramāṇena niścitaḥ sa kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ. (*Pramāṇacandrikā*, p. 155)

31. *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*, p. 6.

32. *Nyāyadīpāvalī*, p. 1.

33. *Ibid*, p. 1.

34. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 239-240.

35. *Ibid*, p. 242.

36. *Ibid*, p. 273.

37. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 68.

38. *Nyāyāmṛta* with *Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*, p. 73.

39. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 73.
40. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 296.
41. *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 225.
42. *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 39.
43. Arthopalakṣitaprakāśasyaiva jñānatvena. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 299).
44. Vaiṣayikānandasyāpi brahmarūpatvāt tadupādhimātrasaivotpatti vināśapratiyogitvāt. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 312)
45. Viṣayasevājanyavṛttyavchinnacidrūpānandatopalakṣita-sya ityarthaḥ. (*Laghucandrikā*, p. 312)
46. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 75.
47. *Ibid*, p. 76.
48. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV, p. 221.
49. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 315.
50. Aṁśinaḥ svāṁśagātyantābhāvasyapratiyoginaḥ,
Aṁśitvāditarāṁśiva digeṣaiva guṇādiṣu.
(*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 40)
51. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 40-41.
52. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 83.
53. *Ibid*, p. 85.
54. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 41.
55. Tiwary, *Ethics of Śaṁkarācārya*, p. 92. (from original thesis not yet published in English)
56. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* (4, 4)
57. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, (4, 9)
58. *Ibid*, kārikās, (4, 4-5)
59. *Ibid*, kārikā, (4, 20) with Śaṁkara's commentary.
60. Atrātmāvabodhamātrasya vivakṣitatvāt sarvo ayaṁ arthavādaḥ...... (Śaṁkara's commentary on *Aitareyopaniṣad*, p. 25)
61. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, kārikā (3, 15) with Śaṁkara's commentary.
62. *Yuktimallikā*, śloka, (4, 70)
63. *Tattvaprakāśikā* on sūtra '*Lokavattulīlākaivalyaṁ*'.
64. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 442.
65. *Ibid*, p. 435.
66. *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, mantra 7.
67. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 437.
68. Prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṁśayaḥ,
Māyāmātraṁ idaṁ dvaitaṁ advaitaṁ paramārthataḥ.

(*Mānḍūkya-kārikā*, 1, 17). Here it is interesting and important to observe that, whereas, the Advaitic tradition takes this *kārikā* to be an explanation of the *Mānḍūkyopaniṣad* the author of *Yuktimallikā* subscribes to the view that this kārikā is *Upaniṣad* itself. The Mādhva tradition, thus, is in agreement with the view upheld in certain quarters that the whole of the *Āgamaprakaraṇa* is *Mānḍūkyopaniṣad.*

69. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 437.
70. *Ibid*, p. 444.

CHAPTER IX

1. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, p. 28.
2. *Mānḍūkya-kārikā*, kārikās (3, 3-7).
3. *Bhāmatī*, p. 17.
4. *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, mantras. (2, 1 to 5)
5. Na vayaṁ pradhānavadavidyāṁ sarvajiveṣu ekāmācakṣamahe yena evaṁ upalabhemahi, kiñtu iyaṁ pratijīvaṁ bhidyate. (*Bhāmatī*, p. 187).
6. *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 205.
7. *Mānḍūkya-kārikā*, kārikā (3, 5).
8. *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha*, p. 233.
9. *Brahma-sūtra*, sūtra (2, 3, 50).
10. *Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 302.
11. *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha*, p. 220.
12. *Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, śloka (1, 40), p. 102.
13. Antaḥkaraṇasyāpi avidyākāryasya avidyādvāraiva ātmāvacchedakatvaṁ na sākṣāt. (*Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha*, p. 47).
14. Antaḥkaraṇopādhiparicchinnasyaiva caitanyasya jīvatve yoginaḥ kāyavyūhādhiṣṭhānatvānupapatteḥ (*Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, p. 105).
15. Kṛṣṇānanda's commentary on *Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, p. 105.
16. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, chapter II, śloka 127.
17. *Ibid*, chapter II, ślokas 165 to 169.
18. *Ibid*, chapter II, śloka 164.
19. *Ibid*, chapter II, ślokas 176 and 207.

20. Kāryopādhiravaṁ jīvah kāranopādhirīśvarah. (*Tripādavibhūtimahānārāyaṇopaniṣad*, mantra 4, 8).

21. *Saṁksepaśārīraka*, chapter II, śloka 207.

22. *Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, ślokas (1, 28 to 29).

23. *Pañcadaśī*, chapter I, ślokas 15 to 17.

24. *Ibid*, ślokas (6, 18 to 23).

25. Kaunteya iva rādheyo jīvaḥ svāvidyayā paraḥ,
Nābhāso nāpvavacchinno ityāhurapare budhāḥ.
(*Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, śloka 1 ,42).

26. *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvali*, kārikā (1, 3).

27. *Ibid*, p. 15.

28. *Ibid*, p. 19.

29. *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, śloka (6, 27).

30. Brahmaiva svāvidyayā saṁsarati svāvidyayā ca vimucyata. (*Nyāyamakaranda*, p. 324).

31. Vayaṁ hi brahmatattvaṁ eva ekaṁ avidyādhikaraṇaṁ abhyupagacchāmaḥ. (*Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 323).

32. *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 28.

33. *Vedāntatattvaviveka*, p. 32 to 33.

34. *Bhāmatī* on the sutra (1, 4, 3).

35. Introduction to the translation of *Bhāmatī* by Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstri and C. Kunhan Raja, p. XXXI.

36. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, śloka (2, 207).

37. *Ibid*, śloka (2, 176).

38. *Pañcadaśī*, śloka (1, 16).

39. *Ibid*, śloka (1, 17).

40. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstri, : *Introduction to Bhāmatī*, p. XXXII.

41. *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 212.

42. Vastutastu pratibimbāvacchedānāṁ vyutpādane nātyantāgraha teṣāṁ bālabodhanārthatvāt. (*Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, p. 211).

43. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, mantra (2, 1, 20), p. 121.

44. *Tattvapradīpikā*; p. 384.

45. *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, p. 64 and *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 384.

46. Avidyā kalpyate anekā jāgratsvapnavibhedinī,
Yathā tathaiva kalpyantāṁ anantāḥ sati kalpake.
(*Tattvapradīpikā*, śloka 4, 6, p. 385).

47. Parameva cedbrahma jīvastasmāt yāvat paraṁ brahma

tāvāneva jīvo bhavitumarhati. Parasya ca brahmaṇo vibhutvamāmnātaṁ. Tasmāt vibhurjīvaḥ. (*Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 286).

48. Pariśeṣādvibhurjīvaḥ. (*Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 286).

49. *Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 254.

50. Hṛdi hyeṣa ātma (*Praśnopaniṣad*, mantra 3, 6).

51. Eṣo aṇurātma cetasā veditavyo. (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, mantra 3, 1, 9).

52. Utkrāntigatyāgatīnāṁ. (*Brahma-sūtra*, sūtra 2, 3, 19).

53. Ye vai ke cāsmāllokātprayanti candramasaṁ eva te sarve gacchanti. (*Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*, mantra 3, 3).

54. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, mantra (4, 4, 6).

55. Avirodhaścandanavat. *Brahma-sūtra*, (4, 4, 6)

56. Guṇādvā lokavat. (*Brahma-sūtra*, 2, 3, 25).

57. *Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 284.

58. Vyatireko gandhavat. (*Brahma-sutra*, 2, 3, 26)

59. *Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 285.

60. *Ibid*, p. 286.

61. *Ibid*, p. 286.

62. *Ibid*, p. 286.

63. *Ibid*, p. 287.

64. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 119.

65. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 27.

66. *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 61.

67. *Upādhikhaṇḍana*, p. 1.

68. *Ibid*, p. 6.

69. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 829.

70. *Upādhikhaṇḍana*, p. 2.

71. *Bhāmatī*, p. 187.

72. *Tattvabodhinī*, p. 70.

73. Upādhirnāma viśeṣyananupraveśitve sati svasambandhinī svasamayamātravyāvṛttibuddhijanakaḥ. (*Tattvabodhinī*, Vol I, p. 130).

74. *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa*, p. 43.

75. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 293.

76. *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 220.

77. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 120.

78. *Ibid*, p. 120.

79. *Tattvaprakāśikā* on the sūtra '*Virahopadeśāt*'.

80. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 386.

81. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 608.

82. *Ibid*, p. 608 to 609.

83. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 608.

84. *Ibid*, p. 579.

85. Madhva's commentary on the sūtras (2, 3, 23 to 25).

86. *Ibid* on sūtra '*Utkrāntigatyāgatīnāṁ*'.

87. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 115.

88. Aṇurhyeṣa ātmāyaṁ vā ete sinīta puṇyaṁ cāpuṇyaṁ ceti gaupavana śrutau aṇutvaṁityatovirodha iti. (*Brahmasūtramādhvabhāṣya*, p. 84).

89. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 116.

90. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 851.

91. *Laghucandrikā*, p. 851.

92. Pungataṁ eva hi tamaḥ. (*Tattvodyota*, p. 16).

93. *Yuktimallikā*, chapter II, ślokas 170 to 173.

94. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 336.

95. *Ibid*, p. 350.

96. *Bhāmatī*, Vol I, p. 187.

97. Tatra bījānkura paramparā prāmāṇikī Atra tu ajñānādi paramparā tu aprāmāṇiki ityanavasthādusaṇaṁ. (*Mandāramañjarī*, p. 2).

98. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 577.

99. Ajñānavirodhitvaṁ pramāyāmeva na cinmātra iti ca. (*Laghucandrikā*, p. 577).

100. *Advaitadīpikā*, chapter II, p. 424.

101. *Introduction to Bhāmatī*, p. XXXIV.

102. *Ibid*, p. XXXIV.

103. Ato bravītyaṁśa iti jīva īśvarasyāṁśo bhavitumarhati, yathāgnervisphulingaḥ aṁśa ivāṁsaḥ. Na hi nirvayavasya mukhyo aṁśaḥ sambhavati. (*Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 298).

104. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Bhagavadgītā*, chapter XV, śloka 7.

105. Madhusūdana's commentary on *Bhagavadgītā*, chapter XV, śloka 7.

106. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Brahma-sūtra* (2, 3, 42).

107. *Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 298.

108. *Brahmasūtramādhvabhāṣya*, p. 90.

109. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 119.

110. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 846.

CHAPTER X

1. Śaṁkara's introduction to his commentary on *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*.
2. *Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 11.
3. Brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati. (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, mantra 3, 2, 9).
4. Na ca punarāvartate. (*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, mantra 8. 15, 1).
5. Na ca dukhābhāvaḥ svatantratayā puruṣārthaḥ sukhābhivyaktiśeṣatvāt. (*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 365).
6. *Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, p. 507.
7. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*, p. 1.
8. *Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, p. 17.
9. *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, p. 1 to 4. Also see G. A. Jacob's Preface to *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, p. VIII.
10. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 345.
11. Atmaiveti brahmasiddhikārāḥ. (*Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, p. 498).
12. *Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 253.
13. *Ibid*, p. 355.
14. *Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, p. 500.
15. Nivṛttirātma mohasya jñātatvenopalakṣitaḥ,
Upalakṣaṇanāśepi syānmuktipācakādivat.
(*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 390).
16. *Brahmasūtramādhvabhāṣya*, p. 6.
17. *Tattvaprakāśikā* on sūtra (2, 3, 13)
18. Jagatkartṛtvalakṣmīśrīvatsavarjaṁ viṣṇorniravadhikānandādi sadṛśānando mokṣa iti mādhvāḥ. (*Muktivāda*, p. 82)
19. *Yuktimallikā*, chapter V, ślokas 251 to 253.
20. Atrāpi kramayogena jñānādhikyāt samīpagāḥ sālokyaṁ ca sarūpatvaṁ sāmīpyaṁ yoga eva ca (*Brahmasūtramādhvabhāṣya* on sūtra 4, 4, 19)
21. Ye bhogāḥ paramātmanā bhujyante ta eva mukterbhuyante. (*Brahmasūtramādhvabhāṣya* on sūtra 4, 4, 4)
22. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 171.
23. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 631.
24. *Ibid*, p. 632.

25. *Ibid*, p. 633.
26. *Māyāvādakhaṇḍana*, p. 4.
27. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 633.
28. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 884 to 885.
29. *Tattvaprakāśikā*, p. 390 to 391.
30. Ye tu pañcaprakārādi pakṣāḥ te tu mandabudhivyutpādanārthā iti na tatsamarthanaṁ arthayāmaḥ. (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 885)
31. *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*, mantra 7.
32. *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, mantra (2, 1, 4)
33. *Bhagavadgītā*, ślokas (2, 55 to 61)
34. *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, p. 43.
35. *Ibid*, p. 43.
36. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇī*, śloka 474.
37. *Vijñānadīpikā*, ślokas 53 to 55.
38. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇī*, ślokas 463.
39. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 638.
40. *Ibid*, p. 638.
41. *Ibid*, p. 638.
42. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 890.
43. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 393.
44. *Tattvapradīpikā* p. 393.
45. *Ibid*, p. 394.
46. Avidyāleśaśabdena mohākārāntaroktitaḥ,
Jñānasya pratibandhācca prabalārabdhakarmabhiḥ.
(*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 393)
47. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 638.
48. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 890.
49. *Ibid*, p. 890.
50. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, mantra (1, 1 to 5)
51. Nirvicikitsitaṁ jñānaṁ vidyāmāhuḥ. (*Bhāmatī*, p. 18)
52. *Tattvaprakāśikā* on *Upādhikhaṇḍana*, p. 1.
53. Yato nārāyaṇaprasādamṛte na mokṣaḥ na ca jñānaṁ vinā atyārthaprasādaḥ. (*Brahmasūtramādhvabhāṣya*, p. 4)
54. *Brahmasūtramādhvabhāṣya*, p. 4.
55. *Tattvaprakāśikā* on sūtra (3, 1, 1)
56. *Brahmasūtramādhvabhāṣya* p. 3.
57. Śaṁkara's *Introduction* to *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, p. 114.

58. *Tattvaprakāśikā* on sūtra '*Sarvavedāntapratyayaṁcodanādyaviśeṣāt*'.

59. Māhātmyajñānapūrvako sneho hi bhaktiḥ. (*Tattvaprakāśikā* on sūtra 3, 2, 1)

60. *Yuktimallikā*, p. 460 to 461.

CHAPTER XI

1. Mishra : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 26n.

2. Śaṁkara's commentary on *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, chapter III, section XIV, mantra 1

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